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On 19 August 1942 a mixed Anglo-Canadian amphibious force 
raided the German occupied port of Dieppe in Normandy, France, resulting 
in probably the worst disaster in Canadian military history. The operation, 
code-named Jubilee, lasted just nine hours and resulted in more casualties, 
proportionate to the forces involved, than in any other Western Allied 
operation of the war. As with any military failure, immediate myths and 
misconceptions arose that have simmered to boiling point many times 
during the last fifty years.
The dissertation aims to clarify the historical debate, and if possible 
expunge, or at least challenge, these myths. It is divided into chapters 
dealing with the operation's historiography, strategic and decision-making 
context, operational planning, intelligence aspects, execution phases, and 
aftermath. The conventional wisdoms concerning Jubilee are analysed and 
explored. These include the decision-making behind Jubilee's conception, 
planning, mounting, cancellation and remounting; the role and significance 
of radar, deception and Ultra (signal intelligence); the background, 
composition and role of special operational units, such as the Commandos 
and Special Operations Executive; the claims concerning German 
foreknowledge of Jubilee and the potential consequences of such 
knowledge; and the supposed lessons learned from Jubilee and their 
influence on future operations, such as the 1944 Nomiandy invasion.
The dissertation explores a broad collection of historical sources, 
primary and secondary, including written, oral and audio-visual accounts, 
from Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Many of 
the post-war interviews, and some primary documents, have never been 
examined in any account of the operation, while some primary records from 
the Cabinet Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, were only 
recently released or are still officially closed. These sources shed new light 
on the controversial issues, such as decision-making, intelligence, and 
supposed lessons learned, within the historical debate surrounding the 
Dieppe raid.
IN DEDICATION TO ALL THE SURVIVORS OF 
OPERATION JUBILEE AND LATER CAPTIVITY
O Canada, of your sons be proud 
Who bravely fought and never bowed. 
Against great odds, fought Freedom's cause. 
For a living God and Freedom’s laws. 
Who strove that we may live in peace, 
Took arms that wars may some day cease. 
Remember them when war is done. 
Remember them when peace has come. 
See that they did not die in vain.
Work out the purpose of the slain.
See that their hopes are fulfilled 
Lest uselessly their blood was spilled. 
Remember that they paid a price 
Of Freedom by their sacrifice.
Arthur S. Bourinot
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PREFACE
My interest in the Dieppe raid started while pursuing a Masters 
degree in military history and strategic studies at the University of Victoria, 
under the excellent guidance of my mentor, Dr Reg Roy, Emeritus Professor. 
This dissertation examined the history of The Calgary Tank Regiment during 
the Second World War and one chapter dealt with its actions at Dieppe. My 
research led me to interview many veterans, the highlight of my work, 
including most of the survivors of Dieppe and later captivity.
On coming up to Cambridge, my Supervisor was changed at the last 
minute and, consequently, I had the fortune to be given the honour of 
reading under Sir Harry Hinsley, Emeritus Professor. During the first five 
minutes of our first meeting he immediately ruled out my proposed 
dissertation topic. Instead, he suggested that since I had some background 
knowledge of the Dieppe raid and the fiftieth anniversary of the operation 
was approaching, I examine it.
Many myths and controversies resulted from this failed operation 
which have gone marching on through the decades. Thus, my aim is to 
resolve or at least reach a new interpretation concerning the planning, 
decision-making, intelligence, radar, deception and German foreknowledge 
aspects. The role of the special operational units are also explored.
During my first nine months I carried out preliminary research, mostly 
at the Public Record Office, London, and successfully completed the 
Diploma in Historical Studies. My interest in the subject grew when I took the 
opportunity to accompany Calgary Tank veterans and their families to the 
Fiftieth Anniversary Commemoration at Dieppe in August 1992. Here I met 
many veterans but, more importantly, made contact with the presidents of 
several of the veterans' organisations, including Ron Beal, Dieppe Veterans' 
and Prisoner of War Association, and Jimmy Dunning, the Commando 
Association. These men, and many other veterans who are too numerous to 
name here, were vital to the preparation of this dissertation.
What follows is the result of my own work and includes nothing which 
is the outcome of work done in collaboration. The published work of 
Professors Brian Villa, John Campbell, and Dr Peter Henshaw, concerning 
the decision-making, planning and intelligence aspects of this operation, 
were the most important leads in studying these topics. At various times 
during my research I was able to have fruitful discussions with them which 
deepened my knowledge of the subject.
Documentary sources researched Include a broad collection of 
primary and secondary, including written, oral and audio-visual accounts, 
from Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Many of 
the post-war interviews and some of the primary documents, have never
VI
been examined in any account of the operation, while some of the latter 
were only recently released, are still officially closed or have been 'lost'.
Acknowledgements go first and foremost to my parents and family, 
whose constant support and encouragement was indispensable to 
completion of this dissertation. The unnamed archivists at the many 
repositories visited are specially thanked for their kind assistance. Also 
deserving are Brian Begbie, Louis Brown, Alain Buriot, Don Deshamais, 
Derek Howse, Emyr Jones F.A. Kingsley, Mary Mackie, Terence Macartney- 
Filgate, Vice-Admiral Sir Ian McGeoch, John Mellor, Jack Nissen, Andy 
Nyman, Jack Ryan, Ian Seymour, Tim Stewart, Bob Sharp and Mathias 
Völker.
Thanks goes to my international group of friends, Abdulla Baabood, 
Fernando Neves, Dr Ian Thomas, Dr Rashid Zaman, and Eddie Zengeni, 
who ensured that my time in Cambridge was enjoyable. A final thanks is 
given to the St John's College Bollinger Society and its guests who were a 
welcome distraction from the occasional monotony of research life.
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INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
On 19 August 1942 a mixed Anglo-Canadian amphibious force raided 
the German occupied port of Dieppe in Normandy, France, resulting in 
probably the worst disaster in Canadian military history. Here in just nine 
hours the Canadians sustained more casualties than in the whole north-west 
European campaign of 1944-5. Immediately after the extent of the failure 
became obvious, the major players involved all attempted to shift 
responsibility and blame away from themselves and on to other individuals 
and organizations. Questions arose as to not only why the operation had 
failed so completely but why it had been attempted in the first place. Over fifty 
years of historical debate has not resulted in any clear consensus on these 
and other aspects of the operation's decision-making, detailed planning, 
training, execution, intelligence, supposed iessons learned, and ultimate 
responsibility. On the contrary, more common has been myth-making and 
heated controversy.
This is reflected in the muddled historiography of the operation, code- 
named Jubilee, which can be traced through more than three dozen 
monographs, several Second World War official histories, the applicable 
regimental histories and numerous memoirs, schoiarly journals, popular 
magazines, newspapers, novels and poems. Evidence of confusion is not 
only in the written word but aiso in several dozen Canadian, British, French 
and American produced television documentaries, docu-dramas and even 
stage plays. The aim of this dissertation, using this myriad of material, is first 
to outline the operation's historiography and later examine it within the
context of the current state of debate surrounding the various controversies, 
myths and misconceptions. An attempt will be made to resolve or at least 
reach a consensus on the outstanding issues, taking into account all the 
relevant secondary records, primary sources and aforementioned material.
In 1942 the newly formed Combined Operations Headquarters 
(COHQ) was responsible for mounting raiding operations and therefore 
directly responsible for the planning and execution of the Dieppe raid (code- 
named Operation Jubilee) . The Chief of Combined Operations (CCO), Vice- 
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, merely a captain of destroyers less than 
two years previously, owed his meteoric promotion to his ambition and 
connections in high places. Not only was he a close friend and like a son to 
Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill, but also cousin to King George V. Thus 
on receiving the first reports of Jubilee's failure, Mountbatten was anxious to 
portray the operation in the best light possible. If the true extent of failure had 
become obvious at the time, his organization and his position as CCO 
probably would have received so much criticism from the other three 
Services that COHQ and the position of CCO would very likely have been 
abolished.
Therefore Mountbatten instigated immediate damage control in the 
form of propaganda to protect his organization from criticism from the other 
Services and public opinion. The press and radio were inundated with 
headlines and stories claiming a great victory. These carried the themes of 
heroic deeds, success against ovenwhelming odds and, most important, that 
the huge casualties sustained were not in vain but justified by the 'lessons 
learned'. These 'lessons', the argument went, would be vitally important in 
planning future amphibious operations leading up to the eventual Allied
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invasion of Adolf Hitler's Festung Europa. The triumphant invasion of 
Normandy in 1944 reinforced what soon became regarded as fact, namely 
that the valuable lessons learned on the Dieppe raid did not just contribute, 
but were indeed essential, to the success of D-Day. Mountbatten continued 
to consistently claim this long after the end of the war, to the point that many 
historians and veterans came to regard it as fact. This is reflected 
throughout the historiography.'
This positive official line was reinforced by politicians for their own 
reasons. During 1942 the Allies experienced one military reversal after 
another so that the British and Canadian governments, worried about 
sinking home-front morale, needed some kind of victory, or at least to show 
that they were doing something against the evils of Fascism. Therefore, to 
maintain adequate morale, vital to the greater goal of a continued war effort, 
both governments hid from public opinion the true extent of the operation's 
failure and fully supported Mountbatten's portrayal of the raid as a success. 
On 8 September 1942 Churchill, in a House of Commons speech, referred to 
the operation as a 'most gallant affair' and 'indispensable preliminary to full- 
scale operations'.^
'  See Lord Louis Mountbatten's: 'The Dieppe raid'. Transcript of filmed inten/iew, 12 July 
1962,1 -5, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation programme Close Up, broadcast 9 September 
1962, Imperial War Museum (IWM), Haydon Papers II; 'The Dieppe raid'. The Naval Review 
51/1 (January 1963), 35-40; 'Commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Dieppe raid on 
19 August 1942; speech by Admiral of the Fleet The Earl Mountbatten of Burma: at that time 
Chief of Combined Operations', 19 August 1967, 1-11; 'Dieppe; the Inside story'. Legion 
Magazine (November 1973), 10-45; and 'Operation Jubilee: the place of the Dieppe raid In 
history'. Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 119/1 (March 1974), 25-30.
2 Winston S. Churchill, 'Supply: Committee -  War Situation, 8 September 1942', in House o f 
Common Debates (UK), Vol.383 (London: King's Printer, 1942), p.84; see also Winston S. 
Churchill, 'Oral answers; Dieppe operations, 30 September 1942', in House of Commons 
Debates (UK), Vol.383 (London: King's Printer, 1942), pp.768-69.
The Canadian government was quick to realize the need for some
kind of public explanation of the operation, particularly in relation to the high
casualty figures. Therefore, on 27 August 1942, the Commander-in-Chief,
First Canadian Army Overseas, Lieutenant-General Andrew G.L.
McNaughton, received the following cable;
There is a feeling that the public ought to have some sort of authoritative statement in 
the form of a white paper or similar document prepared by Canadian Army or CMHQ 
[Canadian Military Headquarters, London] In which the participation of the Canadians 
at Dieppe is dealt with in a factual way as a military operation from the time they left 
England until they returned with some indication of the preparation necessary
The Historical Officer at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ),
London, Maj. Charles P. Stacey, who after the war become the official
historian of the Canadian Army, was assigned to the task of drafting the
paper. After approval of the initial draft by the relevant Canadian authorities it
was passed on to COHO, which requested certain sections be cut.
Mountbatten's insistence on revision of this white paper is a prime example
of the effect and influence he had, during the war and after, on the recording
of events and later historical writing. Therefore it is instructive to recount this
case in detail.
During the operation the Germans had captured the military operation 
order, over which, in Stacey's words, Mountbatten had 'shown some 
disgust... and had ruled that nothing was to be published that would in any 
way tend to admit the loss'. At the same time, Mountbatten reportedly 
remarked something to the effect, 'even Boy Scouts knew better than that'. 
(This ignores the fact that the order itself, approved by CCO, authorized each 
brigade headquarters to carry two copies ashore.)<
3 Charles P. Stacey, ‘Aftermath of a dress rehearsal'. In A date with history: memoirs of a 
Canadian historian (Ottawa: Denau, 1983).
* Stacey, Date with history, pp.91 -2.
The task of revising the draft at COHQ was given to an American, 
Major Jock Lawrence, who a few months earlier had worked for Metro- 
Goldwyn-Mayer in Hollywood, California. His draft was unacceptable for 
issuance by the Canadian Government and Stacey was again ordered to re­
draft it, to which Mountbatten, Stacey says. To end a long story briefly... 
finally gave his blessing'.^
The cuts insisted on by Mountbatten resulted in an extremely watered 
down version of events and it is worth noting that the following information 
was excised: the operation's local objectives; details about the decision to 
withdraw; a reference that many of the planned objectives were not attained; 
comments on pre-raid training; and the names of all British commanders 
(although the Canadian unit commanders names were permitted to remain). 
Stacey concludes this section with a comments on the command 
arrangement, which deserve quoting in full, as it later became a point of 
historical controversy:
I had written, The whole operation was under the general supervision, and the plans 
were subject to the approval, of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten GCVO, DSO, 
Chief of Combined Operations, Canadian plans were concerted with the latter by 
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, DSO, General Officer Commanding a Canadian 
Corps'. As published, this became, 'Canadian plans were concerted with the Chief of 
Combined Operations (Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten GCVO, DSO), by 
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, DSO, General Officer Commanding a Canadian 
Corps'. The Canadian reader was thus denied any real understanding of the important 
part played by Lord Louis and his headquarters in the affair.^
® Commenting on Major Lawrence, Stacey writes: 'In retrospect, it seems perhaps not 
altogether unsuitable that a man who had done publicity for Sam Goldwyn should now be 
doing publicity (or Dickie Mountbatten'. Stacey continued that, 'Putting an American on the 
job was, to say the least, extraordinahly tactless. At the time I suspected it of being a calculated 
insult. Now, I am inclined to think It was just an exceptional piece of stupidity'.Stacey's notes at 
the time state that, 'He had cut out many facts and substituted adjectives; his draft.., was in 
terms which could not be Issued by the Cdn Govt', Stacey, Date with history, p.92, the 
previous passages are taken verbatim from Stacey's Diary, 'Notebook No.17, 3 August-13 
September 1942', 5 September 1942, p.70, University of Toronto Archives (UTA), Charles 
Stacey Papers (CSP) Box/015.
 ^Stacey, Date with history, p.93.
Stacey concludes that the white paper was prepared 'prematurely 
and hurriedly, to meet an immediate official need,' and that it was seriously 
lacking as a piece of history . Besides the dampening effect of the COHQ 
cuts and censorship office, it contained a glaring factual error that a radar 
facility had been captured, which was not the case.^ The paper was sent by 
bomber to Ottawa and was the basis for a public statement made on 18 
September.
On13 May 1943 to the Canadian House of Commons, the Canadian 
Minister of National Defence, the Honourable James L. Ralston, spoke at 
length about the 'splendid assistance' given by the Royal Navy, the 
'magnificent' air cover provided by the combined allied air forces, and 
praised the determination of the ground units who 'evinced the keenest 
desire' to attain their objectives 'at whatever cost'. He concluded that the 
heavy casualties suffered by the units engaged were to be expected in 
amphibious operations of this kind and that 'the lessons learned and 
advantages gained... will be of great value to them in future operations'.^ 
The media obligingly followed suit, or at least this is the popular belief. 
British, Canadian and American war correspondents were permitted to 
accompany commando raids and about a twenty-five went on Jubilee. One 
of them noted, 'it was the best publicised military event of modem times... of 
all times'.^ After the operation they were 'briefed' by the COHQ press section
 ^Stacey, Date with history, pp.93-4; Stacey, with the aid of Capt Cotterell, of the Army Bureau 
of Current Affairs (ABCA), War Office, also wrote an article for internal distribution to armed 
forces personnel only. Although more detailed than the White Paper, it still had many of Its 
restrictions. Army Bureau of Current Affairs, War Office, 'Dieppe summary'. War 28 (3 October 
1942), 1-12.
® Hon. James L. Ralston, 'War Appropriation Bill -  Army, 13 May 1943' In House of Commons 
Debates (Ottawa; King's Printer, 1943), 2669-2672.
® Brian L. Villa. Unauthorized action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe raid (2 revised edn., 
Toronto; Oxford University Press. 1989. 1990. 1994), p.23.
so that their newspaper reports and photographs toed the official line. Given
the extremely tight restrictions and limited access to information imposed by
COHQ and the respective government ministries of propaganda and
information, British and Canadian journalists reported as accurately as
possible under these conditions. As they were allowed no knowledge of the
planning and high-level decision-making, they took the only option of
reporting on the individual fighting man as opposed to a whole regiment or
unit. Their eyewitness accounts were objective, realistic and personal
descriptions. Ross Munro, Canadian war correspondent for The Canadian
Press and Windsor Daily Star, reported the day after the raid:
When the Canadian battalions stormed through the flashing inferno of nazi defences, 
belching guns of our huge tanks rolling into the fight, I spent the grimmest 20 minutes 
of my life with one unit when a rain of German machine-gun fire wounded half the men 
in our boat and only a miracle saved us from annihilation.
Carrying the same theme, the Canadian London correspondent for
the Montreal Standard, Wallace Reybum, wrote the following graphic
account, entitled 'Street fighting in Dieppe,' which was not only published in
his newspaper, but also in Life Magazine:
The bayonet on the rifle of one Canadian was covered with blood. This private named 
Silver Stuart, a Moose Jaw lumberman, had happened to notice two German soldiers 
in the doorway of a house. Each held a stick grenade in [each] hand, their rifles 
propped against the doorway ready for use. In a flash, Stuart detached himself from 
his group and made a headlong dash at the Germans. With his bayonet he slashed 
both Jerries to ribbons. Leaving the bodies, he rejoined his group without saying a 
word and marched to battalion headquarters as if nothing had happened at all.^'
When the journalists strayed into moralizing onthe larger questions of
the operation, their reports inevitably became less accurate and more
Ross Munro, 'Scottish at Dieppe', The Windsor Daily Star, 20 August 1942; Ross was the 
first man to arrive back in Canada who had been on the raid and his stories were carried In all 
the national papers, for example see his full page, 'Calgary Tanks at Dieppe Carry Brunt of 
Attack', The Calgary Herald, 20 August 1942, p.10; and 'They never flinched a minute at 
Dieppe -  tribute to Calgary Regiment (Tank)', The Tank-Canada 2/10 (October 1942), 7-8, 
excerpted from The Calgary Herald.
Wallace Reyburn, Street fighting In Dieppe', Life Magazine, 23 August 1942.
8'official', due to dependence on the official sources for information. To 
prepare pubiic opinion for the huge casuaity figures to be released later, 
official sources grossly exaggerated the German losses and claimed a 
victory. Two days after the raid, the most prestigious Canadian newspaper. 
The Toronto Globe and Mail, carried the front-page banner, '500 Fighters 
Sweep French Coast, Units of Four Ontario Regiments Ashore with 
Commandos'. Sub-headiines on the same front page prociaimed that, 'Allied 
Fliers Bagged 280 Nazi Pianes in Dieppe Victory'.
The American papers were even more sensationalistic, this being the 
first time American troops had fought against the Germans. Despite the 
combined efforts of the authorities in London, including the American Military 
Headquarters, to down-piay US participation, the American media made the 
most of this unique opportunity. Individual Rangers were interviewed by 
Charies Coliingwood, Edward Murrow and Quentin Reynolds on the 
National Braodcasting Corporation (NBC) Radio's Army Hour. Proud that 
American Rangers had fought alongside the famous British Commandos, the 
US papers carried such wild headlines as; 'France Invaded', 'Nazi Dieppe 
Loss Put at 4000 Men', 'US and Britain Invade France', 'US Troops Land 
with Commandos in the Biggest Raidl', and 'Tanks and US Troops Smash at 
the French Coast'.'3
Some of these journaiists quickly followed up with books on the 
operation whose titie and content directiy refiected the propaganda line that
The Toronto Globe and Mall, 21 August 1942.
13 David W. Hogan. Jr, 'American commandos', in Raiders or elite Infantry: the changing role of 
the US Army Rangers from Dieppe to Granada (Westport. Connecticut: Greenwood, 1992), 
pp.20-21; 'France Invaded', The Los Angeles Times, 20 August 1942; and various articles in 
The New York Times 19, 20, 21, 25 August 1942; see also 'US Fight 6-Hr Battle', The 
Honolulu Star Bulletin 20 August 1942; and 'Truscott's Rangers', Newsweek 31 August 
1942, 21-2.
the official organsiations, such as COHQ and HQ First Canadian Army 
Overeseas, and their senior personnel, such as Mountbatten, McNaughton 
and Crerar, wanted to portray—that the sacrifice was worth it for future 
victory. Alexander B. Austin, the celebrated British correspondent for the 
London Daily Herald, declared in We landed at dawn: the story of the 
Dieppe raid (1943), 'it was a testing and rehearsing of all our combined 
military, naval and Air Force staff work, a detailed working out of plans on 
which once completed, weeks could be saved another time'; Wallace 
Reybum, in Rehearsal for invasion: an eyewitness story of the Dieppe raid 
(1943), published in the United Kingdom as Glorious chapter: the Canadians 
at Dieppe-, commented after the successful North African landings in 
November 1942, 'As well as providing the much-needed experience of 
landing troops and heavy fighting vehicles on hostile shores, Dieppe's place 
in the broad pattern of our offensive strategy in western Europe can now be 
clearly seen'. Quentin Reynolds, correspondent for the American Collier's 
Magazine, and well-known in Mountbatten's Hollywood circle, came out 
with. Dress rehearsal: the story of Dieppe (1943), in which he announced, 
'the Dieppe attack can only be classed as a definite and useful operation 
which accomplished almost everything that the military leaders hoped it 
would accomplish'. He later claimed that it 'taught the British, Canadian and 
American chiefs of staff many lessons'; and concluded that it, 'was never 
intended to be anything but a dress rehearsal'.
Alexander B. Austin, We landed at dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid (New York; Harcourt, 
Brace, 1943), p.51 ; Wallace Reybum, Rehearsal for Invasion: an eyewitness story of the 
Dieppe ra/d (London: George Q. Harrap & Co. Ltd), 1943, p.12; Quentin Reynolds, Dress 
rehearsal: the story of Dieppe (Garden City, New York; Blue Ribbon Books, 1943), pp.264-7, 
277.
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Reynolds also claimed that it was McNaughton who had pushed for 
Canadian participation in Dieppe and implied that the Canadians were 
responsible for changing Mountbatten's original plan of a flanking attack to a 
frontal one. This was not the case. Stacey discusses this at length in his 
memoirs. Concerning the charge against McNaughton, Stacey points out 
that it was Crerar who had been pushing for Canadian participation in raids 
and that, 'Perhaps Reynolds' statement is a garbled version of this'. The 
story that the Canadians were responsible for the frontal assault has, he 
explains, 'gone marching on through the decades. Lord Mountbatten 
himself, who in his later years tended to talk about Dieppe "without book," 
helped to keep it going'. In his 1973 Toronto speech, later published in the 
Journal of the Royal United Institute (RUSf), Mountbatten discussed the 
frontal attack saying, 'this was what the army and air force authorities — the 
Canadians in particular — insisted on'. Stacey and Mountbatten had an 
exchange of letters, concerning this and other points in the article, published 
in RUSI, in which the latter reluctantly agreed to retract the words 'the 
Canadians in particular'. These journalistic accounts were based on official 
briefings from COHQ and other organizations and thus would directly echo 
the themes put out for domestic propaganda reasons — normal in wartime 
and practised by all official organizations and individuals responsible to 
them. Although Mountbatten was not responsible personally for many of 
these stories, natural at the time, later he perpetuated them deliberately.^^
Reynolds, Dress rehearsal, pp.261-3; Stacey, 'Aftermath of a dress rehearsal', A date with 
history, pp.94-7; Lord Louis Mountbatten, 'Operation Jubilee', the place of the Dieppe raid In 
history'. Journal o f the Royal United Services Institute 119/1 (March 1974), 25-30; and 
Charles P. Stacey and Lord Louis Mountbatten, Correspondence; Dieppe', Journal o f the 
Royal United Services Institute 119/4 (December 1974), 97,
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The confusion that reigned during the actual battle itself is reflected in 
the reports that were sent back by the Military Force Commander, Maj.-Gen. 
J.H. 'Ham' Roberts, to COHQ. Many of these contained inaccurate or 
completely false information. COHQ, in its effort to build up its public support 
base, quickly issued press releases based on these early reports, without 
first waiting or seeking verification. That some information in these reports 
was soon after officially denied by the authorities, including COHQ and 
Mountbatten, did not matter as, unfortunately, the damage had already taken 
effect. Many of these claims are still being propounded over fifty years later. 
The most persistent being that the Germans had been forewarned and were 
at the highest state of readiness at the time of attack.
One of these initial reports from the Military Force Commander, sent 
by a pigeon at 1340 hours, soon after the surrender of the remaining troops 
ashore, stated;
Very heavy casualties In men and ships. Did everything possible to get men off but In 
order to get any home had to come to sad decision to abandon remainder. This was 
joint decision by Force Commanders. Obviously operation completely lacked surprise 
[author's emphasis].
In 1963 claims of German forewarning and that the Dieppe garrison was at full alert' were 
given renewed validity In a series of articles In the Evening Standard, written by the well 
known British historian David InrIng. Although the official British naval historian, Stephen 
Roskill, soundly refuted all his claims, the myth still lingers today; see Stephen W, Rosklll, 'The 
Dieppe raid and the question of German foreknowledge: a study In historical responsibility'. 
Royal United Services Institute Journal 109/633 (February 1964), 27-31. The complete 
documentation of the Irving-Roskill controversy is held In Cambridge. Churchill College 
Archives Centre (CAC), Stephen Roskill Papers (SRP), ROSK 5/51 'The Dieppe Raid' and 
ROSK 6/14 'The Dieppe Raid'. For recent claims that support the Irving thesis see; Charles 
Reid, 'Mountbatten not to blame for Dieppe disaster'. The TImes-ColonIst, Tuesday 18 
January 1994; and Mervyn F. Thurgood, 'Sacrifice at Dieppe', Military Collectors Club o1 
Canada (Spring 1994): 14-17. For a discussion and detailed summary of the debate see John 
P. Campbell's, 'Dieppe and German foreknowledge'. Extension Bulletin [a periodical of the 
Canadian Forces College Extension School] 36 (summer 1974), 35-41; and Dieppe revisited: 
a documentary investigation (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp.13-20.
Maj.-Gen. John H. Roberts. 'Military Force Commander to 1 Canadian Corps', pigeon 
sen/lce, 1340 hours, 19 August 1942, in Douglas Stuebing, Dieppe 1942, Vol.CS, The 
Canadian Series of Jackdaws, ed. Douglas Stuebing (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1967).
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Obviously when Roberts wrote this report he was under tremendous 
pressure, given the high casualties, failure to attain the operations military 
objectives, and the fact that the operation was still in progress. Thus his 
general frame of mind at the time can probably be easily deduced. Not 
surprisingly, when the surviving soldiers and sailors reached England they 
claimed the same thing also. This situation led to a wildfire of rumours 
eventually resulting in the long-standing myth that surprise was not achieved 
and that the Germans were forewarned. Despite protestations by the senior 
people involved at the time, including Mountbatten, and clear documentary 
evidence, German and Allied, to the contrary, outlined repeatedly by official 
historians, many veterans and historians still cling to this belief today.^B
The other commonly held belief is that a radar station was captured by 
British commandos and highly-secret, specialized components from it were 
seized. This tale was again inadvertently begun by COHQ itself through 
early, unverified communiqués. Although later officially retracted, the 
national press had already printed the story, which was even repeated in 
scholarly journals.Curiously, the 'radar expert', Flight-Lieutenant Jack 
Nissenthal, assigned during the operation to examine the radar equipment.
Examples denying foreknowledge are; Sir William M. James, 'Letter of August 26, 1942', in 
The Portsmouth letters (London: Macmillan, 1946); Lord Louis Mountbatten, The Dieppe 
raid'. The Naval Review St/ t  (January 1963), 35-40; and Ross Munro, 'Dieppe -  key to 
Invasion', in Gauntlet to Overlord: the story of the Canadian Army (Toronto: Macmillan, 1945). 
The relevant official histories are: Christopher Buckley, The raid on Dieppe', in Norway, the 
Commandos, Dieppe, 3 (London; HMSO, 1951); F. H. HInsley, eta!., 'Air war in the West: May 
1941 to end of 1942/lntelligence before and during the Dieppe raid', in Bhtlsh IntelllgerKe In 
the Second World War: Its Influence on strategy and operations, 2 (6 vols.. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Charles P. Stacey, 'At the war's turning poInt/The raid on 
Dieppe 19 August 1942', in The Canadian Army 1939-1945: an official historical summary 
(Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948); and his. Six years of war: the Canadian Army In Canada, Britain 
and the Pacific, 1, Official history of the Canadian Army In the Second World War, ed. Charles 
P. Stacey (4 vols., Ottawa; Queen's Printer, 1955).
Editor, 'Diary of the war'. Royal United Senrices Institute Journal 57/548 (November 1942), 
123; and Charles P. Stacey, Dieppe, 19 August, 1942', Canadian Geographic Journal 27/2 
(August 1943), 47-63.
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Examples denying foreknowledge are: Sir William M. James, 'Letter of August 26, 1942', in 
The Portsmouth letters (London: Macmillan, 1946); Lord Louis Mountbatten, The Dieppe 
raid'. The Naval Review 51/1 (January 1963), 35-40; and Ross Munro, 'Dieppe -  key to 
invasion', in Gauntlet to Overlord: the story of the Canadian Army (Toronto; Macmillan, 1945). 
The relevant official histories are: Christopher Buckley, The raid on Dieppe', in Norway, the 
Commandos. Dieppe, 3 (London; HMSO, 1951); F. H. Hinsley, eta!., 'Air war in the West: May 
1941 to end of 1942/lntelllgence before and during the Dieppe raid', in British intelligence In 
the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, 2 (6 vols., New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Charles P. Stacey, 'At the wars turning poInt/The raid on 
Dieppe 19 August 1942', in The Canadian Army 1939-1945: an official historical summary 
(Ottawa; King's Printer, 1948); and his. Six years of war: the Canadian Army In Canada, Britain 
ar)d the Pacific, 1, Official history of the Canadian Army In the Second World War, ed. Charles 
P. Stacey (4 vols., Ottawa; Queen's Printer, 1955).
Editor, 'Diary of the w ar. Royal United Services Institute Journal B7ISA8 (November 1942), 
123; and Charles P, Stacey, 'Dieppe, 19 August, 1942', Canadian Geographic Journal 2712 
(August 1943), 47-63.
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is one of the main proponents of the myth which he has even taken one step 
further. He now asserts that the information gained by him led to advances in 
radar development which were instrumental in the success of the 1944 
Normandy landings.20
Mountbatten's efforts to mold the recording of Dieppe went througn a 
transition stage from mere influence, during the immediate aftermath, to one 
of control, beginning when he commissioned, in September 1942, the 
preparation of a special confidential report for internal circulation. For the 
task Mountbatten assigned Hilary St George Saunders as the Combined 
Operations Recorder. In compiling this document, which became known as 
the 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid', Saunders interviewed all the 
senior people involved and the finished draft was proofed by Mountbatten 
personally in October 1942. This document, containing all the operation's 
orders and detailed description of events, ran to over two hundred pages. 
The most important part of it was the section on 'Lessons Learned', which 
was thirteen pages long. The Combined Report was later used as the basis 
for the preparation of a Naval Confidential Book in 1946 and revised in 
1959, which Mountbatten vetted also, as described below.^'
^  After the war Nissenthal shortened his name to Nissen. His tale Is told in; James Lessor, 
Green beach: the true story of one man's courageous mission that changed the course of 
World War II {Hew York: William Morrow & Company Inc., 1975); Jack Nissen and A.W. 
Cockerill, Winning the radar war: a memo/r (Toronto: Macmillan, 1987); Bill McNiel, 'Jack 
Nissen', In Voices of war remembered: an oral history of Canadians in World War II (Toronto: 
Doubleday, 1991). His story was recently repeated by David Brown, 'Dieppe raid let Allies 
learn Nazi radar secrets for the D-Day Invasion, vet says'. The Ottawa Citizen, 4 May 1992; and 
C.E. Hooker, 'Signal intelligence', Canadian Defence Quarterly ^9/2 (October 1989), 52.
COHO, 'Lessons Learned', in 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid', CB 04244, 
(amended to BR 1887), 15 October 1942, pp.37-50, Ottawa, Directorate of History, National 
Defence Headquarters (DHist), 594.013 (D1); Admiralty, 'Raid on Dieppe (naval movements) 
19 August 1942', CB 3081 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle Summary 
No.33, February 1946, London: Admiralty Historical Section, Tactical and Staff Duties 
Division, pp.1-79, PRO, ADM 234/354; Admiralty, 'Raid on Dieppe (naval operations) 19 
August 1942', BR 1736 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle Summary No.33, 
revised 31 December 1959, London: Admiralty Historical Section, pp.1-92, PRO, ADM
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All official and semi-official publications concerning Dieppe written 
during the war and in the post-war period also used the Combined Report as 
their basis.2z One of these was a 1943 Ministry of Information booklet, 
entitled Combined Operations: the official story of the Commandos, which 
was not shown to any Canadian until the Ministry of Information sent it in 
proof form to Canada House. It was passed to Stacey who noted that, 
besides minor errors, it failed to mention Canadian casualties. Stacey 
immediately contacted the author, Saunders who, Stacey explains, gave a 
lame excuse. On the insistence of the Canadians, the casualty figures were 
put in the final draft.23
This effort to cover-up or down play the casualties was continued by 
Mountbatten during and after the war. In 1951, while Mountbatten was 
Fourth Sea Lord, he was sent a revised draft of the 1946 Naval Confidential 
Book covering the Dieppe operation. Even though Mountbatten was not 
directly blamed in it for anything, he immediately asked that it be withdrawn. 
The then Head of the Naval Historical Branch, Lieutenant-Commander Peter 
Kemp, recalled that;
234/355 [released in 1990].
^  The Impodant wanime publications are: Admiralty, 'Weekly naval notes-current 
events/Newhaven-Dleppe' in Weekly intelligence report, 129 (London: Naval Intelligence 
Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, 1942); Admiralty, The Royal Marines at Dieppe', in The Royal 
Marines: the Admiralty account of their achievement f 9 3 9 -f 943 (London: HMSO, 1944); 
Combined Operations Headquarters, Combined operations: the official story of the 
Commandos (New York: Macmillan, 1943); Charles P. Stacey, Historical Section, CMHQ, 'The 
Canadians in Britain 1939-1944', in The Canadian Army at War, 1/B (3 vols., Ottawa: King's 
Printer, 1945); and Lord Roger Keyes, 'Raids in home waters in 1942', in Amphibious warfare 
and combined operations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943). Other non-official 
wartime works are David Masters, 'The tanks at Dieppe', in With pennants flying: the immortal 
deeds of the Royal Armoured Corps (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1943); Charles P. 
Stacey's, The Canadian Army In Britain, 1942-1943', Canadian Geographic Journal 27 
(October 1943), 256-83; and his, Dieppe, 19 August, 1942', Canadian Geographic Journal 
27/2 (August 1943), 47-63.
^  Stacey, A date with history, p.99.
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When Mountbatten realized that this was hardly possible, he asked, Well can you 
rewrite this bit saying it was an operational failure?' And I replied, 'Frankly, sir, no. We 
are merely repeating what the official records say'.
He walked up and down his office. He seemed more hurt than cross. Then 
said, 'Now, about these figures of casualties. I'm sure they're exaggerated'. 'No, sir, 
we have seen ali the returns, the prisoner-of-war lists, and so on. They are as written'.
In the end he persuaded us to do a little tinkering, dividing the casualties into 
those wounded, taken prisoner and dead, which was fair enough. But it is quite 
interesting because it shows how badly he felt about Dieppe.^^
Mountbatten also attempted to influence the writing of the Dieppe
sections of the Combined Operations official history and Roskill's official
British naval history of the Second World War, the former in 1949, and the
latter in 1955 and 1959, evidence of which is in his own papers.^ It was not
necessary for him to comment critically on the Stacey's official history of the
Canadian army, published first in a suumarized form in 1948, for it toed the
official line completely, especially concerning the 'lessons leamed'/D-Day
scenario. Perhaps this was to be expected of any official historian,
particularly from one who was so close to the events. On the other hand,
Stacey leaves many questions only partially answered or not addressed at
all. For example, on the decision-making aspects he is most vague;
concerning Canadian responsibility in the chain of command he is more
clear but obviously reluctant to assign blame to any commander (his later
statements about the responsibility of Crerar should be noted here); and
finally, being a military man he should have been more critical of the Outline
Plan and raised objections to the overly ambitious military objectives.^e
2^  Richard Hough, 'Combined Operations', In Mountbatten (New York: Random House, 1981), 
pp. 155-6 [Peter Kemp quote].
^ o u n tb a tte n  correspondence with Rosklll, University of Southampton Library (SUL), 
Mountbatten Papers (MBP), MB1/116; Mountbatten to Q.E. Wlldman-Lushington, 9 
December 1949, and Alan Campbell-Johnson to Brockman, 23 November 1950, in MB1/B58, 
quoted In Villa, Unauthorized action, pp.274-5, note 48.
^  Charles P. Stacey, The raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', in The Canadian Army 1939- 
1945: an official historical summary (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948); for Villa's discussion of 
Stacey see, Unauthorized action, pp.26-8.
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One of the most startling coups Mountbatten pulled off in this area was 
the manipulation of the relevant chapter in the memoirs of Prime Minister Sir 
Winston Churchill. Professor Brian L. Villa, Unauthorized action: 
Mountbatten and the Dieppe ra/'d (1989) details this in fifteen pages and 
remarks that, 'Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of all this was that 
Churchill was willing to — and did — publish in his memoirs an account by 
someone else, the details of which he had no recollection'. Villa explains 
that Churchill's (actually Mountbatten's) account became the 'bedrock' of 
almost every history of the raid that followed.^ Villa reveals how some 
authors have used quotations from Churchill's memoirs to corroborate 
Mountbatten's apparently independent account of certain aspects of the 
operation. One example of this situation was. Villa states, 'used to dispel 
doubts and uncertainty about why the raid was ever attempted'.^
Historians did not have much of an opportunity to contradict the 
assertions of such revered people as Churchill and Mountbatten and the 
historiography from the end of the war through the 1950's, 1960's, and even 
after the opening of the records in 1972, reflects this. The standard works
^  Villa, Unauthorized action, p.39. Villa explains further that the passages most quoted by 
historians are, 'those In which Churchill shouldered responsibility for the decision to relaunch, 
together with the claim that the raid had been necessary and the results of great value'.
^  The famous passage which Villa says historians never tire of quoting from Is;
Dieppe occupies a place of its own In the skxy of ttie war. and the grim casualty sgures must not class It as a 
failure. It was a coaly tx jt not unfnitful rsconnalssance-Irvtorcs. Tactically It was a mine of experience. It shed 
revealing NgM on many shortcomings in our outlook. It taught us to tx jld  In good «me various types of craft arxi 
appNancsslor our use. We learned again the value of powerM support of hwsvy naval guns In an opposed lancing 
and our bombardment technktus. b o il marina and aerial, was thereallar Im p rc ^ . Above all N was shown that 
Individual skM and gallantry without thorough organization and combined training would not prevail, arxt tia t team 
wcxtc was the secret of success. This could rxily be provided by trained and organised amphibloua formatkxis. All 
these lessons were taken to heart... Hcxtour to the brave who leu. Thak sacrtflca was rxX In vain.
Winston S. Churchill, 'Africa Redeemed: Return to Cairo', in The Second World War: the 
Hinge o f Fate, 4 (6 vols., London; Cassell, 1951), p.459. Some histories quoting from this 
passage are: Richard Garrett, The rehearsal'. In The Haiders: the world's elite strike forces 
(London: David & Charles, 1980), p.167; Terence Robertson, The shame and the glory: 
Dieppe (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1962), p.xi; and Reginald W. Thompson, Dieppe a t 
dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid (London: Hutchinson. 1956), p.10.
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and memoirs for the period continue the lessons learned line and do not 
question what seems to have become regarded as fact.^s
This began to change after 1972. John P. Campbell was one of the 
first serious historians to delve into both the Allied and German primary 
sources and reveal new information, especially regarding the air and 
intelligence aspects. Ronald Atkin, in Dieppe 7942(1980), wrote what is a 
basically a narrative style with some minor analysis. He also utilised primary 
records, both allied and German, included interviews, and focused on the 
battle itself, although avoiding any in^epth discussion of the planning and 
decision-making aspects. Atkin's book can be regarded as the best to come 
out of this genre of what could be called critical popular history.^o
^  The monographs and memoirs for the post-war period dealing with Dieppe not already 
mentioned, up until the opening of the documents in 1972 are John Durnford-Slater,
'Dieppe', in Commando: memoirs of a fighting commando in World War Two (London:
Geenhill, 1953,1991); John Hughes-Hallett, 'The mounting of raids', Royai United Services 
institute Joumai 95/580 (November 1950), 580-8; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, 'Dieppe; prelude to 
D-Day', in Captains without eyes: inteiiigence failures of World War II (London: Macmillan, 
1969); James Leaser and Sir Leslie Hollis, War at the top (London: Micheál Joseph, 1959); 
Adolphe Lepotier, Raiders from the sea (London; William Kimber, 1954); Eric Maguire, 
Dieppe: August 19 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1963); C. Churchill Mann, 'Dieppe was 
necessary and worth while'. The Legionary Magazine (February 1959), 12, 26 ,27; Bernard L. 
Montgomery, 'The army in England after Dunkirk', in The memoirs of Fieid-Marshai the 
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG (London; Collins, 1958); Reader's Digest, ed. 'Dieppe: 
The day that will not die', in The Canadians at War 1939/45,1 (2  vols., Toronto: Reader's 
Digest Association, Canada, 1969); Goronwy Rees, 'A day at the seaside', in A bundle of 
sensations: sketches in autobiography {London: Chatto & Windus, 1960); Terence 
Robertson, The shame and the giory: Dieppe (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1962); Hilary 
St. George Saunders, 'Twenty men and a battery/A classic operation of war*, in The green 
beret: the story of the commandos 1940-1945 (London: Landsborough, 1959); Charles W  
Schreiner, The Dieppe raid: its orgins, aims and results'. Naval War College Review 25/5 (May- 
June 1973), 83-9; Peter Scott, 'SGB-9/Let battle commence'. In The eye of the wind {2 
revised, Brockhampton; Brockhampton Press, 1961,1966); Peter M. Scott, 'To implement 
the threat'. In The battie of the narrow seas: a history of the tight coastal forces in the Channel 
and Noth Sea, 1939-1945 (London: Country Life, 1945); Reginald W. Thompson, Dieppe at 
dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid (London: Hutchinson, 1956); Lucien K. Truscott, Jr, 
'Operation Jubiiee -  the Dieppe raid', in Command missions: a personal story (New york; 
Dutton, 1954); and Peter Young, Dieppe', in Storm from the sea (2 revised edn, London; 
Lionel Leventhal Ltd, 1958, 1989).
^  Ronald Atkin, Dieppe, 1942: the Jubilee disaster {London: MacMillan, 1980); John P. 
Campbell's articles are, 'Dieppe and German foreknowledge'. Extension Bulletin (a periodical 
of the Canadian Forces College Extension School] 36 (summer 1974), 35-41; 'Air operations 
and the Dieppe raid'. Aerospace Historian 23/1 (spring 1976), 10-20; The "LUtra* revelations: 
the Dieppe raid in a new light of now inevitable revisions in Second World War historiography'.
A
18
John Mellor, in Canada's forgotten heroes (1975) wrote a balanced 
account which contained a vivid description of the prisoner-of-war 
experiences. Although he pointed at an important change, he did not follow it 
up. This was that in between the cancellation of Rutter, and the remounting 
of it as Jubilee, the command structure was changed. This thread was not 
picked up on until fifteen years later and will be discussed later. Norman L.R. 
Franks, in The greatest air battle: Dieppe, 19 August 1942(1979), expanded 
on Campbell's work and made the first serious examination of the air 
aspects of the battle. Jacques Mordal's Dieppe: dawn of decision (1981) 
utilises many German sources, written and oral, but unfortunately does not 
offer many references. He makes the important point that the German 
Luftwaffe radar operators had detected Jubilee several hours in advance, 
but had not been believed by the Dieppe naval authorities.^'
Even though the documentary sources were available after 1972, 
many historians did not bother to examine them, and instead repeated the 
myths and stories of previously published works that had become regarded 
as standard works on the subject. Some of the more obvious of these that 
followed Mountbatten's lessons learned theme are: Robert P. Amoldt, 'The 
Dieppe raid; a failure that led to success,' in Armor (1981); Harold Calin, in 
Dieppe (1978), cites no references and repeats old myths; William A.B. 
Douglas, 'The army overseas 1940-1943,' in Out of the shadows: Canada in 
the Second World War (1977), follows the official line; R.J. Fanshawe,
The Canadian Defence Quarterly &1 (summer 1976), 36-41; and 'Dieppe, deception and D- 
Day', Canadian Defence Quarterly 9/3 (Winter I960), 40-44.
31 John Meiior, Dieppe: Canada's forgotten heroes (Scaiborough, Ontario: Macmiiian-NAL 
Pubiishing Ltd., 1975,1979), p.30; Norman L.R. Franks, The greatest air battle: Dieppe, 19 
August 1942(2 edn., London: Wiiiiam Kimber, 1979,1992); Jacques Mordai, Dieppe: the 
dawn of decision (2 edn., Transiated by Mervyn Saviii, London: New English Library, 1981), 
pp. 157-60.
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'Dieppe: unforgettable lessons,' Marine Corps Gazette (1977); T. Murray 
Hunter, formerly in the CMHQ Historical Section under Stacey, does not 
stray from his mentor's line in, Canada at Dieppe (1982); Edward L. Smith, in 
'Dieppe,' Army (1977) continues with the lessons learned thread; as does 
William Whitehead, Dieppe 1942: echoes of disaster {1979).^
Thus nothing that could shed new light on some of the mysteries of 
Dieppe came out until publication by Villa in 1989. The depth of research 
was most remarkable and revealed many sources which, although 
previously open, historians had neglected to examine. Villa's basic thesis is 
that the newly promoted Mountbatten, vain, ambitious and using his 
connection to royalty, pushed the Dieppe operation through to protect his 
own position, as CCO, and that of his fledgling organization, COHQ, against 
the judgement of the Chiefs of Staff Committee who knew better, but 
acquiesced for their own reasons. Villa's circumstantial case rests on the 
argument that no written authorisation for the remounting of Rutter as Jubilee 
has ever been found, and in his view does not exist. Thus the operation was 
mounted without the proper authorisation.
Contrary to this view is the work of the Whitaker team, Dieppe: tragedy 
to triumph (1992), which harks back to an older view that Churchill was the 
real protagonist behind the operation, insisting on it for political reasons. 
Another scenario which no author has examined until recently, is proposed 
by Peter Henshaw. He makes a persuasive case, in four recent articles, that
^  Robert P. Arnoldt, 'The Dieppe raid: a failure that led to success', Armor 90 (July/August 
1981), 12-19; Harold Calin, Dieppe (New York; Belmont Tower Books, 1978); William A.B. 
Douglas and Bereton Greenhous',The army overseas 1940-1943', In Out of the shadows: 
Canada In the Second World War (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977); R.J. Fanshawe, 
Dieppe: unforgettable lessons'. Marine Corps Gazette 77/2 (February 1977), 57-9; T, Murray 
Hunter, Canada at Dieppe, Vol.17, Canadian War Museum Historical Publication ( Ottawa; 
Canadian War Museum, 1982); Edward L. Smith, 'Dieppe', Arm y  27/8 (August 1977), 25-28; 
William Whitehead, Dieppe 1942: echoes of disaster (Toronto: Personal Library, 1979).
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the real pressure was from the senior Canadian commanders in England. 
The present author beleives that the answer is not so black and white but 
lies in that grey area, which Mellor hinted at in 1975, that is, to do
with the change in command arrangements. This is still under debate and 
was first enunciated in the foiiowing article published by the present author, 
'A reappraisal of the Dieppe raid; planning and intelligence,' Pro-PhUe 
(Spring 1993).“
J.R. Robinson's 1991 article in the Canadian Defence Quarterly a\so 
clears up some of the mysteries and myths surrounding radar aspects of 
Jubilee. This author's, Dieppe through the lens of the German war 
photographer 993), is a typical drum and bugle history that details the 
training and actions of each of the tanks, belonging to The Calgary 
Regiment, that landed at Dieppe. German photos of every one of the 
armoured vehicles landed are shown in A4 size format. The text is based on 
primary, secondary and oral interview sources.^^
Brereton Greenhous, while an historian at the Directorate of History 
(DHist), National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, produced an elegant
“  Denis & Shelagh Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson,
1992) . The following articles by Peter J. Henshaw consider the changes In command and 
responsiblitles for launching raids by: 'The British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the 
preparation of the Dieppe raid, March-August 1942: did Mountbatten really evade the 
Committee's authority?'. War in History 1/2 (1994), 197-214; 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery's 
role reassessed', in Perspectives on warfighting. Seiected papers from the 1992 (59th 
annual) meeting of the Society for Military History, ed. Donald F. Bittner, 3 (Quantico, VA: 
Marine Corps University Command & Staff College Foundation, 1994), pp.187-202; 'The 
Dieppe raid: the quest for action for all the wrong reasons'. Queen's Quarterly 101/1 (Spring 
1994), 103-115; The Dieppe raid; a product of misplaced Canadian nationalism'. The 
Canadian Historical Review 77/2 (June 1996), 250-66; Hugh Q. Henry, 'A reappraisal of the 
Dieppe raid: planning and intelligence', Pro-Phlle (Friends of the Public Record Office) 4/1 
(Spring 1993), 4-6.
^  J.R. Robinson, 'Radar Intelligence and the Dieppe raid'. The Canadian Defence Quarterly 
20/5  (April 1991), 37-43; Hugh Q. Henry, Dieppe through the lens of the German war 
photographer, ed. Winston G. Ramsey (London: Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd,
1 9 9 3 ) .
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coffee-table style edition entitled, Dieppe, Dieppe (1993), which is of the 
critical popular history type, generally follows the Villa line, and doubts that 
so many useful lessons were learned as previously claimed.^ Finally, John 
Campbell's, Dieppe revisited {^994), which although very confusing, 
complicated to follow and containing some errors, does contribute to the 
scholarship by clarifying the question of German foreknowledge. Using 
German sources, he shows that the movement away from the operational 
area, of important air and naval units, definitely proves that the German 
garrison was not forewarned. He also examines the supposed linkage 
between lessons learned from Dieppe and their relevance to the 1944 
Normandy landings.*
Although some historians, since Mountbatten's assassination in 1979, 
have begun to question some of his assertions, and those of the earlier 
historians, there is still an engrained body of thought based on this earlier 
scholarship that has proven resistant to change. This was revealed by the 
resurgence of interest in the operation at the time of the 50th anniversary 
(four books were published on the raid from 1992-1994), when many of the 
old myths that should have been laid to rest for ever, resurfaced.^^ |t is the
*  Brereton Greenhous, Dieppe, Dieppe (Montréal: Éditions Art Global Inc. in cooperation with 
the Department of National Defence, 1993). A copy of this was presented by the Canadian 
Minister of Veterans Affairs to the French Minister for Veterans Affairs in 1993.
*  John P. Campbell, Dieppe revisited: a documentary investigation (London: Frank Cass, 
1993). Barry Hunt and Donald Schurman also doubt the validty of the claim that Dieppe's 
lessons were vital to the success of Overlord, stating that 'the linkage between cause and 
result must be suspected of having been forged by the natural desires or wish to explain the 
disaster', see 'Prelude to Dieppe: thoughts on combined operations policy In the 'raiding 
period', 1940-1942', in Naval warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900-1945: essays in honour 
of Arthur Marder, ed. Gerald Jordan (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p.207.
^  Micheál R.D. Foot, 'Dieppe: triumph out of disaster. History Today 4215 (August 1992), 10- 
11, makes several Incorrect claims, some of these are: the poor fighting capabilities of the 
Canadian soldier at Dieppe; the supposed Canadian responsiblity for the frontal attack; that 
the convoy encounter resulted In loss of surprise for the whole of Jubilee-, and to do with 
lessons learned. These errors are corrected In the following replies, one by the Director of 
DHIst, William A.B. Douglas. 'Canada's role'. History Today 4514 (April 1993), 60; and by Mary
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intention here to resolve once and for all this confused historiography, using 
not only all material used by previous authors but untapped sources as well.
Mackle, Unfair dismissal?', History Today A2/^^ (November 1992), 59.
STRATEGIC PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING
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STRATEGIC BACKGROUND
The immediate consequence of any military defeat, especially one
that causes casualties as high as the Dieppe raid, is the search for
clarification of responsibility for the decisions behind the operation's
inception and military plans. To explain effectively the decision-making and
planning process it is necessary first to understand the general strategic
in
context that the Allies found themselves inflate 1941 and early 1942. At this 
time the responsibility and chain of command for planning, authorizing, 
mounting and launching cross-channel operations was constantly changing. 
The raid's consequent failure has caused much confusion over which 
individual or organization was ultimately responsible for various key 
decisions.
By the spring of 1942 the Allied coalition fortunes reached their nadir. 
The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere expanded as a wave unchecked 
across Southern Asia, the Pacific and threatened Australia. In the 
Mediterranean Sea the strategic island of Malta was under air and U-boat 
blockade and in the Battle of the Atlantic the Allied tonnage losses reached 
their war-time peak in March. In North Africa the Afrika Korps, under the 
famous General Erwin Rommel, had pushed the British forces back into 
Egypt and threatened Cairo and the vital Suez Canal. On the eastern front 
German armies, already deep inside the Russian heartland, prepared for a 
summer offensive designed to knock Russia out of the war. The United 
States, still in the process of replacing ships lost in the surprise attack at
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Pearl Harbour and occupied in the Pacific, could only offer moral support and 
the promise of men and material to Britain in the future.
In this period the main strategic priority of the Western Allies was to 
prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union or any possible compromise, 
reminiscent of 1917, between it and Nazi Germany. In support of this aim the 
Western Allies had engineered the lend-lease agreement with the Soviets 
which was implemented through regular supply convoys to Murmansk, 
though by July 1942 heavy losses forced their suspension. The Western 
Allies, determined to relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union, had various 
major plans for cross-channel invasion of North-West Europe on the books 
for 1942 and 1943. The two most important were Sledgehammer and 
Round-Up. Sledgehammer was to be implemented only if the Soviets 
appeared to be on the brink of collapse or 'in the case of serious German 
demoralisation'. The United States pushed for Sledgehammer lo  be 
implemented in the latter part of 1942, as did the Soviet Union. Round-Up, 
which envisaged a permanent return to the continent, was planned for May 
1943 and depended for its success on the rate that the bridgehead could be 
built up on the continent 'versus the rate of possible German concentration 
for a counter-offensive'. Domestically, In Canada, the United States and 
Britain, the Second Front Now movement was also very vocal, and was 
supported by influential writers and politicians such as Basil H. Liddell Hart 
and the press baron Lord Beaverbrook. Liddell Hart published many 
newspaper articles advocating the Second Front and discussing pre­
invasion strategy. He frequently criticized the policy of large-scale raids. In 
June 1942 he stated that large-scale raids 'will not of themselves cause the
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withdrawal of substantial forces from the enemy's Russian front... only our 
invasion can achieve a heavy transfer'.’
They were not alone in ignoring the factual evidence against 
premature invasion. American and Soviet planners equally underestimated 
the difficulties in mounting amphibious operations. The Soviets and Stalin 
especially, who held a paranoid mistrust of British intentions, disparaged 
legitimate British reasoning as weakness and a lack of will. This view still 
appears to be the prevailing orthodoxy on the Soviet side. As recently as 
1992, at a conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Dieppe raid. Dr. 
Aanatoliy Khor'kov, stated that the resources used for Operation Torch, the 
November 1942 Anglo-American invasion of North Africa, could instead 
have been utilised in opening the Second Front in Europe.^ This scenario 
ignores the fact that by August 1942 American troops had not yet begun to 
arrive in Britain in large numbers and the shortage of specialized landing 
craft prevented any permanent return to the European continent occurring at 
that time. In early April 1942 General Marshall estimated that by the 15 
September 1942 the American forces in the UK would be only two and a half 
infantry divisions, one armoured division and nine hundred aircraft.^
’ 'Aide Memoir-State of Planning', 10 June 1942, pp.1-8, PRO , WO 193/809; Basil H. Liddell 
Hart, 'Thoughts on our pre-invasion strategy', 15 June 1942, p.1. King's College London 
(KCL), Liddell Hart Papers (BLHP), BHLH 10/1942/14a; for Beaverbrook's efforts at 
promoting a second front see Anne Chisholm and Michael Davie, 'Champion of Russia', in 
Beaverbrook: a life (London: Hutchinson, 1992), pp.431-8, 440-3.
2 The paranoid and conspiratorial mind of Stalin Is revealed by the fact that In October 1942 he 
actually suspected that Churchill was attempting a separate peace with Germany. This was first 
outlined by Jonathan Q. Haslam In 'Stalin's fears of a separate peace, 1942', Intelligence and 
National Security B/A (October 1993), 97-9; Anatoliy Khor'kov, 'Dieppe and Soviet policy of 
second front', p.14, at the conference 'The Dieppe raid 19 August 1942' in Quebec City, 
Meeting of the Canadian Committee for the Second World War, 13 November 1992.
3 Gordon A. Harrison, The roots of strategy' In Cross-channel attack. United States Army In 
World War II. The European Theatre of Operations, 2, (Washington; Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), p.18-17.
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After some study American planners realized the impossibility of an 
invasion in 1942 and instead hoped to have Round-Up in 1943, using 1942 
for general preparation, build up and especially to gain battle experience for 
American troops.^ An American delegation, sent over to prepare the way for 
the arrival of American forces {Bolero) and to work out an agreement on a 
timetable for the eventual return to the continent, was led by the Army Chief 
of Staff, General George C. Marshall.^
In April 1942 a fundamental shift in Allied strategic thinking occurred. 
The basis for Sledgehammer's implementation had been dependent on 
either Soviet collapse or German demoralisation. Marshall rejected the 
emergency option and based it on German failure only. This thinking was 
embodied in what became known as the Marshall Memorandum. Two 
months later Churchill supported this view stating that 'Sledgehammer 
should be dependent not on Russian failure but on Russian success'.^ In the 
meantime the general Allied offensive strategy in the north-western theatre 
of raiding would keep German troops pinned down, possibly provoke the 
German Air Force (GAF) fighter squadrons to battle and help train forces for 
the eventual invasion.^
^Harrison, Cross-channel attack, p.17.
 ^One active step In the direction of Anglo-American cooperation was the assignment by Major 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Assistant Chief of Staff, of Colonel Luden K. Truscott, Jr to
the staff of COHO. His missions were outlined as:
To study the planntng. organization, preparation, and oonduct ol corxluct of combinad oparattons. (aapadally of the 
commando t ^ )  and to Reap the ODWD [Opaiatlons Division. War Dapaitmantl Infomtad as to the 
dsvsiopmsnts In training, tacnrrlqua, and aquipmant pertaining to these and relatad oparatlona:
To Initlata plans for the partktlpatkin by Amaitcan troops In thass oparatkxis to tha fullest practicabis sxtsnt with a 
view to affording actual baMs sxpaitarvta to maxlrrxim patsonnal. arvt to plan arxt coordlnats ths training of 
detachments designated for sucn partktipatlon
Major General Dwight D. Elsenhower, 'Letter of Instructions to Colonel L.K. Truscott, Jr, 
Cavalry', 5 May 1942, Washington: Operations Division, War Department, Lexington, Virginia, 
George C. Marshall Library (GCML), Luden K. Truscott Papers (LTP), 9/1.
B Prime Minister, Minute for General Ismay for COS Committee, 10 June 1942, Annex to COS 
(42) 175th, quoted In Harrison, Cross-channel attack, p.18, fn.47.
 ^Important references to the raiding policy are: COS (41) 248 (O), 7 November 1941, 'Action 
In Spring 1942: DIredIve to the Commander-In-Chief Home Forces', pp.90-2, PRO, CAB
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The proposed raid on Dieppe, Operation Rutter, set for early July, was 
part of this raiding policy. Doubt about its wider strategic purpose, which was 
not referred to in any of the operational plans, was possibly why Churchill 
held a small private meeting on 30 June 1942 at No. 10 Downing street. His 
concerns were mollified though by his senior advisors. Mainly due to poor 
weather Rutter was cancelled on 8 July. The same day Churchill decided to 
abandon Sledgehammer, cabling Roosevelt that 'No responsible British 
general, admiral, or air marshal Is prepared to recommend Sledgehammer 
as a practicable operation in 1942'. A week later he suggested that the 
invasion of North Africa, Gymnast, in the autumn of 1942, be pursued as an 
alternative. In response Roosevelt sent a delegation, headed by Marshall, to 
London to discuss the issue. On 24 July, after much debate, Roosevelt 
agreed to drop Sledgehammer and proceed with the North African venture, 
now renamed Torch. Leaving the needs of the Russian situation aside, this 
decision nullified any politico-strategic reasons for going ahead with a 
revived raid on Dieppe (Operation Jubilee) or any other cross-Channel 
operation in 1942.8
80/60; COS (42) 26 (O), 25 January 1942, Annex and Enclosure, 'Conclusions Reached in 
the Study of a Major Raid on the Continent', pp.140-5, PRO, CAB 80/61; COS (42) 40 (O). 13 
February 1942, Annex, 'Operations on the Continent; Directive to the Commander-in-Chief 
Home Forces', pp. 197-8, PRO, CAB 80/61; COS (42) 103 (O) (Final), 18 April 1942, 
Memorandum, 'Operations on the Continent', pp.22-24, Cambridge, Churchill College 
Archives (CCA), Ellis Papers, ELLS 2/5; COS (42) 157 (O) (Final). 6 June 1942, Report. 
Operations on the Continent In 1942', pp.29-30, PRO, CAB 80/63.
8 Barry Hunt and Donald Schurman, 'Prelude to Dieppe: thoughts on combined operations 
policy in the "raiding period", 1940-1942', in Naval warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900- 
1945: essays In hormur of Arihur Marder, ed. Gerald Jordan (London; Croom Helm, 1977), 
p.204 [Churchill's doubts); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: the Hinge of Fate, 4 
(London: Cassell, 1951), p.391 ['No responsible'], pp.395, 404 [Roosevelt agrees); J.R.M. 
Butler and J.M.A. Qwyer, 'Anglo-American strategy reconsidered: the decision for Torch', In 
Grand strategy, June 1941-Auguat 1942, 3(11) (London; HMSO, 1964), p.630 [Churchill 
abandons Sledgehammer], p.634 [Roosevelt abandons Sledgehammer],
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The fact that that Churchill and the COS did not cancel Jubilee 
immediately reveals that another reason remained for its continued 
existence. This was first deduced by two authors, Barry Hunt and Donald 
Schurman, in 1977, who explained that the formation of the bureaucracy of 
Combined Operations Headquarters (COHO), the organization responsible 
for the doctrinal development, planning, training and mounting of raids, 
'developed a rationale and momentum of its own which very quickly began 
to raise expectations well beyond the level of raids by a few hundred men. 
Which is to say, the very existence of COHO itself was one good reason for 
the Dieppe Raid'. How this situation came to be needs examination.^
MOUNTBATTEN AND COHQ 
RAIDING PROCEDURE AND RESPONSIBILITY
COHQ had its origins in the pre-war Inter-Services Training and 
Development Centre (ISTDC). In June 1940 Churchill formed COHQ as a 
separate body. The following month its status was raised further by the 
appointment as Director of Combined Operations (DCO) of Admiral of the 
Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, hero of the Great War's Zeebrugge raid. His major 
contribution to the organization was the provision of the basis and resources 
for building an actual combined operations capability, and the development 
of the army commando units. These units became known as the Special 
Service Brigade and were effectively a private army under the sole control of 
COHQ.'o
B Hunt and Schurman, 'Prelude to Dieppe', p.203.
Mountbatten described the role of COHQ in a 1962 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC) television Interview;
At Combinad Oparatlons Haadquartart our |ob was to craata tha machina which w otid avantually maka tha 
Invaalon of ttia contnant poaalbla: and to davlta Via naw tachniquat lor tha aiaault. aa wal aa lor tha maintananca 
by aaa o l tha graat lorcat onca thay had baan landad. Naw landing thipa. craft and appNancaa wara to ba davlaad.
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In October 1941, due to disagreement between Keyes and the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee (COS), he was relieved and replaced by the young and 
ambitious Lord Louis Mountbatten.^^ Mountbatten brought with him a political 
sense that Keyes had lacked as well as the necessary drive to ensure that 
COHO received the resources it needed. He not only gathered around him 
the brightest of officers from all three services but also recruited scientists to 
work on the various problems in developing amphibious warfare technique 
and equipment. Most important though was his talent for getting the various 
services to work together in supporting COHQ.’2
The newly promoted Commodore was to be known as 'Advisor on 
Combined Operations' (ACO) when advising the COS or Force 
Commanders and 'Commodore Combined Operations' for administrative 
command and command of raids. The former title specifically reinforced the
designed, tested and produced: arvi hurxireds c4 ttxxisands o( soldiers and airmen were to be trained together to 
act as a single entity In the assault.
Lord Louis Mountbatten, 'The Dieppe raid [transcript of 1962 CBC interview]'. The Naval 
Review5^/^ (January 1963), 35-6. Important sources dealing with the early history and growth 
of COHQ are: 'History of Combined Operations Organization', London: Amphibious Warfare 
Headquarters, 1956, Chs. 3 & 4, pp.18-57, PRO, DEFE 2/1773; Glen St. J. Barclay, '“Butcher 
and bolt“: Admiral Sir Roger Keyes and British combined operations, 1940-1941', Naval War 
College Review 35/2/sequence 290 (March/April 1982), 18-29; Kenneth J. Clifford, 
'Organization and training for combined operations 1940-1944', In Amphibious warfare 
development in Britain and America from 1920-1940 (Laurens, N.Y.: Edgewood, 1983); 
Bernard Fergusson, The watery maze: the story of Combined Operations, (London; Collins, 
1961); H. E. Horan, 'Combined operations, 1939-1945', Royai United Services Institute 
Journal 96/569 (February 1953), 55-65; John Hughes-Hallett, 'The mounting of raids'. Royal 
United senrices Institute Journal 95/560 (November 1950), 580-8; and Lord Roger Keyes, 
Amphibious warfare and combined operations (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
1943).
Concerning Keyes' dismissal one author suggests that: apart from the 'very serious 
questions of [his] mental or emotional stability', combined operations necessitated the 
'harmonious and mutually supportive cooperation of the other services', yet Keyes 
'deliberately went out of his way to offend or intrigue against the very people upon whose 
goodwill his own success totally depended. Still more serious was his failure to recognize the 
essential difference in tactical doctrine between raids and invasion'. See Barclay, 'Butcher and 
bolt', p.27.
A former COHQ officer states that on Mountbatten's appointment, Churchill permitted him 
to choose six 'brilliant staff officers, two from each Service, to join his staff, no matter where 
they were serving; and this he had done most carefully and on the best advice'. Fergusson, 
The watery maze, p.120.
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fact that the position was subordinate to the COS. The official COS directive 
specified that he was the 'technical adviser* in all phases of the planning, 
training of personnel, research and development of equipment and 
technique, relating to combined operations. During his first six months at his 
new post he greatly expanded the COHO staff and opened specialized 
training centres in Australia and India, and totally reorganised COHO. The 
attachment of American Officers in May 1942 created a historical precedent 
as the first 'integrated, Inter-Allied, Inter-Service staff'. 3^ Although the 
administrative, training and preparation side of a combined operations 
capability was progressing well, the same could not be said for the practical 
side -  the execution of raids in preparation for a cross channel invasion.
Mountbatten's responsibility and the procedure for mounting and 
launching small and large-scale raids were constantly changing during the 
period from October 1941 up to execution of Jubilee in August 1942. To fully 
understand the decisions behind the planning, mounting and launching of 
Rutter and Jubilee, this process needs to be carefully elucidated. The COS 
directive of October 1941 concerning the procedure for mounting a raiding 
operation was issued in revised form, on 9 December 1941, as follows:
(a) A requirement arises.
(b) COS Issue necessary Instructions for project to be examined by Joint Planning 
Staff with Adviser on Combined Operations.
(c) Outline Plan.
(d) COS consider Outline Plan with ACO.
(e) Outline Plan as approved as guide only to Force Commanders.
(f) Force Commanders.
13 CO S (41) 732, 9 December 1941, Annex 1, 'Directive to the Adviser on Combined 
Operations', PRO, CAB 80/32. COHO was reorganized into Administrative and Operations 
groups. The former was primarily a Naval Staff that dealt with personnel, material, assault ships 
and craft and the latter had the Intelligence, Planning, Training and Communications Sections. 
All the Operations groups were inter-service. See COS (41) 7 3 6 ,10  December 1941, 
'Establishment of Combined Operations Headquarters Staff, PRO, CAB 80/32; 'History of 
Combined Operations Organization' (London; Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 1956), 
pp.20-1, PRO, DEFE 2/1773; and Clifford, 'Organization and training', pp.134-40.
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capability was progressing well, the same could not be said for the practical 
side -  the execution of raids in preparation for a cross channel invasion.
Mountbatten's responsibility and the procedure for mounting and 
launching small and large-scale raids were constantly changing during the 
period from October 1941 up to execution of Jubilee in August 1942. To fully 
understand the decisions behind the planning, mounting and launching of 
Rutter and Jubilee, this process needs to be carefully elucidated. The COS 
directive of October 1941 concerning the procedure for mounting a raiding 
operation was issued in revised form, on 9 December 1941, as follows;
(a) A requirement arises.
(b) COS Issue necessary instructions for project to be examined by Joint Planning 
Staff with Adviser on Combined Operations.
(c) Outline Plan.
(d) COS consider Outline Plan with ACO.
(e) Outline Plan as approved as guide only to Force Commanders.
(f) Force Commanders.
13 COS (41) 732, 9 December 1941, Annex 1, 'Directive to the Adviser on Combined 
Operations', PRO, CAB 80/32. COHO was reorganized Into Administrative and Operations 
groups. The former was primarily a Naval Staff that dealt with personnel, material, assault ships 
and craft and the latter had the Intelligence, Planning, Training and Communications Sections. 
All the Operations groups were inter-service. See COS (41) 736 ,10  December 1941, 
'Establishment of Combined Operations Headquarters Staff, PRO, CAB 80/32; 'History of 
Combined Operations Organization' (London: Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 1956), 
pp.20-1, PRO, DEFE 2/1773; and Clifford, 'Organization and training', pp.134-40.
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(g) Force Commanders produce Final Plan in conjunction with Joint Planning Staff and 
the ACO.
(h) Final Plan considered by COS with the ACO.
(i) Implementation of approved Plan by Force Commanders assisted by the ACO, the 
Joint Planning Staff and Service Ministries.''*
Under the above procedure at least three minor raids were 
successfully earned out; on 27 December 1941 against the Norwegian Port 
of Vaagso, the main object being the destruction of enemy shipping; on 
27/28 February 1942 against Bruneval on the French coast, the aim being 
the gathering of information on German radar capability; and on 28 March a 
daring attack against the French port of St. Nazaire, resulting in the 
destruction of the only dry dock on the Altlantic coast large enough to 
acconjpdate the German battleship Tirpitz. Rear-Admiral H.E. Horan states 
that these three raids proved that COHQ 'could produce results', that the 
technique and training developed there was on the right course and that 
most importantly, 'confidence in the command was being built up and the 
morale of the combined operations personnel raised to a high level'. As Hunt 
and Schurman observed, 'these raids did predispose the planners to the 
idea of success', which could be dangerous, since question of whether these 
small pin-prick raids had any relation to large-scale, and therefore more 
hazardous operations was not considered.
1* COS (41) 732, 9 December 1941, Annex 1, 'Directive to the Adviser on Combined 
Operations', PRO, CAB 80/32. Curiousiy, a post-war unpubiished confidentiai print produced 
by the successor organization to COHQ, quotes this directive siightiy differentiy, tending to 
downpiay Mountbatten's infiuerree. In the above directive the 'History of Combined 
Operations Organization' (1956) has the inserted the words advice o/before 'ACO', in stages
(b) and (g), and as adv/ser after 'ACO', in stages (d) and (h), and finally. In the significant 
implementation stage, has deleted completely 'ACO' after the words 'assisted by the'. There 
seems to be no satisfactory explanation for this. As it Is, Mountbatten's powers were later 
expanded anyway. Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 'History of Combined Operations 
Organization', Appendix 6, p.209.
Admiral Horan continues to explain that perhaps all this was due to the fact that Mountbatten 
'dinned into his staff that their job was to think about nothing but the offensive'. He concludes 
that It was about this time the COHQ staff became known as The Crazy Gang', Horan, 
'Combined operations, 1939-1945', 59; Hughes-Halletl writes that in eight months the 
'Mountbatten System' of planning and mounting raids resulted in the execution of four
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In late 1941 and early 1942 COHQ changed from planning operations 
in Norway to Northern France. The main reason for this switch was the 
shorter distance across the English Channel, offering less chance of 
navigational error and longer and more effective fighter cover. Captain John 
Hughes-Hallett, the Naval Adviser to COHQ and one of the principal 
planners, states on 21 January he and other COHQ planners prepared a 
rough monthly raiding schedule for the Spring and Summer. 'We were not 
so much concerned at this stage with the intrinsic value of objectives on a 
particular raid, but rather with the feasibility of reaching the place 
undetected'. They suggested a raid on St. Nazaire for late March and one a 
few days later on Bayonne. For May they planned an attack on the Channel 
island of Alderney and for June they picked Dieppe (Rutter), by which time 
they expected to have enough landing craft to transport an entire division.
For July they planned a second raid on Dieppe, hoping it 'would achieve 
surprise and lead to the slaughter of specialized German engineers likely to 
be at work repairing and strengthening the fortifications'. For August they 
envisioned a reckless scheme of landing a large armoured force to make a
medium and one large operatior^ An equivalent number of op>eration8 of the same scale were 
fully mounted but were only cancelled due to unsuitable weather 'or some other cause 
outside our control. No other system, either before or afterwards, yielded comparable results'. 
The mounting of raids', 584. Concerning Jubilee's relation to previous successful raids, Hunt 
and Schurman, state;
In Ih lt sans* , axpatranc* was a poor taachar. Harmony In pravloua tma« rakto lad man to urxtarrata toa 
Importarwa o l tha Irictlon of war* tha poaalbWtlaa tor wNch Vtoraaaad dramatically In largar undartaklnga. DIappa 
would axpoaa tha Insanity at planning procadurat that parmittad altaratlons and arrangamanta at many dHlarant 
lavals. In this aansa. D la ^  was svorytxxV* l>st>y Although thara was Intoimatlon w id practical sxparlsncs to 
draw from, thara was simply no way to transtar tha Know.how arto oooparatlvs spirit that charactaitaa a small 
oparatlon dlracSy to a larga-scala antarprlss sapadally whan Via oommandars wara man who could spaaK as 
squats to tha Chlaf o l ComUnad Oparatlons and who wars at Vis asms Vms rsaponsibis to thsir own knmsdlats 
supsrlors.
'Prelude to Dieppe', pp. 199-200 (predispose the planners], 203 [above quote].
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dash towards Paris with the objective of shooting up the German 
Headquarters thereJ®
Mountbatten submitted a note dated 19 February concerning this 'new 
form of regular raiding on a small scale' and it was approved by the COS on 
14 March 1942. He then ordered Hughes-Hallett to prepare outline plans for 
each of the proposed operations. Meanwhile, on 4 March, at Churchill's 
insistence, Mountbatten's title was changed to 'Chief of Combined 
Operations' (CCO), and he was promoted to the honorary ranks of Vice- 
Admiral, Lt-Gen. and Air Marshal, to emphasize the 'combined' approach his 
position and COHO represented. Mountbatten's appointments seems to 
have taken some time to go through as he was still referred to as the ACO in 
a COS meeting on 14 March, although his new title was used at another 
COS meeting three days later. The following day, 18 March, Churchill's 
unprecedented step to make him a full member of the COS was officially 
confirmed, much to the chagrin of the other Chiefs of Staff who felt that he 
had been promoted beyond his ability and over the heads of more qualified, 
senior people. Indeed on 6 March Admiral Sir Dudley Pound offered his 
resignation in protest but Churchill, who had been having
differences of opinion with him, accepted it and two days later replaced him 
with Gen. Sir Alan Brooke. Villa has shown that Churchill's motivations for 
promoting Mountbatten were political and were mainly an attempt to de-fuse 
domestic critics, such as Lord Beaverbrook, and to show the Americans that
The only source giving details of the raiding program seems to be Hughes-Hallett himself. 
Vice-Admiral John Hughes-Hallett, Unpublished Memoirs, 'Before I forget', pp.117-18, NAC, 
JHHP; see Brian Villa's comments In Unauthorized action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe raid, 2 
revised edn., Toronto; Oxford University Press, 1989, 1994, pp.187-8.
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something was being done. Mountbatten was very popular in American 
high-society and particularly with the President.’^
During the latter half of March 1942 Mountbatten attempted to 
increase gradually his authority over raiding operations. The terms of the 
COS directive of 9 December 1941 restricted him to coordinating air and 
naval support for small-scale raids and using his Special Service Brigade. 
But the requirements of the larger raids his staff were presently planning 
meant that regular army troops from other commands would be needed. The 
current procedure for a raiding operation was somewhat complicated and 
difficulties could easily arise since the Force Commanders had to have their 
operation orders approved by their respective C-in-Cs. If any of these 
commanders disagreed with any part of the plan COHQ and the Force 
Commanders had three choices; change the plan to the C-in-C's 
satisfaction; change it by removing his units from the operation; or cancel the
operation.18
17 QOS (4 2 ) 84th, 11 ,14  March 1942; the date of 4 March for Mountbatten's promotions is 
given by his official biographer Phillip Ziegler, Mountbatten: the official biography (London; 
Collins, 1985), p.168; Brooke's diary confirms this date. After the war Brooke recollected that 
Mountbatten's promotion to membership of the COS was a 'snag' and that 'there was no 
justification for this move'. He continued that his appointment as CCO was 'no reason for his 
inclusion in the COS, where he frequently wasted both his own time and ours... [and] at times 
was apt to concern himself with matters outside his sphere'. KCL, Brooke Papers. vol.V '1941- 
2'/3/AA/ 'Notes on my life', 4-6 March 1942, p.367. Villa, Unauthorized action, pp.108, 
[Pound's resignation], 169-72 [Churchill's motivations]. The reaction in COHQ to 
Mountbatten's promotion is described by his chief naval adviser, John Hughes-Hallett, who 
later wrote 'My own reaction was one of exhilaration, almost exultation. At one stride our 
organization had penetrated the very centre and citadel of Power. We were now to work for a 
man with access to all the secrets, and for one who could, and would be an advocate at the top 
level for any plan', Hughes-Hallett, 'Before I forget', p.134, NAC, JHHP, MG 30 E463/Memolrs 
1971. On Mountbatten's appointments see COS (42) 84th, 11 ,14 March 1942, PRO, CAB 
79/19; COS (42) 87th, 8, 17 March 1942, PRO, CAB 79/19; COS (42) 174, 18 March 1942, 
Committee arrangements-Memorandum by General Ismay', PRO, DEFE 2/710; I.C.B. Dear 
and M.R.D. Foot, eds. 'The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, in (Oxford: OUP, 
1995), p.911 [Pound's resignation].
18 COS (42) 87th, 8. 17 March 1942, PRO, CAB 79/19; CO S (42) 91st, 9, 21 March 1942, 
PRO, CAB 79/19; Hughes-Hallett, 'The mounting of raids', 582-3; and Peter J. Henshaw, The  
British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the preparation of the Dieppe raid, March-August 1942; 
did Mountbatten really evade the Committee's authority?', War in History M2 (1994), 199-201.
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To try to alleviate this problem and increase further his control of 
continental raiding operations, Mountbatten compiled a memorandum, in 
consultation with the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, General Sir 
Bernard Paget, which was circulated for the COS consideration at their 
meeting of 21 March. Entitled 'Agreed Procedure for raiding Operations', the 
COS approved it by 30 March and, under its first instruction, Mountbatten 
became the 'sole coordinating authority for all raids on the Western sea­
board of Europe'. In the words of Hughes-Hallett he became the 'mounting 
authority'.^®
The changes to the 9 December 1941 directive gave a significant 
increase to Mountbatten's influence and control over raids. The relevant 
points of the 30 March memorandum are listed as follows:
(a) Whereas before he was only to advise, the CCO was now responsible for preparing 
the Outline Plan In conjunction with Home Forces planners, who replaced the 
COS'S Joint Planning Staff.
(b) C-in-C Home Forces in conjunction with CCO would prepare all military operation 
orders.
(c) The Outiine Plan was to be approved by the C-ln-C Homes Forces, or his nominee.
(d) COS approval remained at the completion of the Outline Plan, as did their 
nomination of Force Commanders.
(e) The CCO was now to be responsible tor the detailed planning with the Force 
Commanders, staff from Home Forces, as well as consulting 'the operational staff's 
at the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry, and the principal Naval, Army and RAF 
Commands likely to be directly concerned',
(f) The Naval C-ln-C of the area of the point of origin of the expedition would 'usually' 
be named the ‘supreme commander', and as such, maintained the 'executive 
decision to sail, or to postpone sailing, the Force'. He was. however, only
responsible for the Force while It was at sea and not during the land operations.®®
[Tbit authors tm phatls)
’ 9 COS (42) 91th, 9, 21 March 1942, CAB 79/19; COS (42) 99th, 17, 30 March 1942, PRO, 
CAB 79/19; copy in PRO, WO 106/4117, fol.9A; approved COS (42) 195, 30 March 1942, 
Annex-'Agreed procedure for raiding operations', 21 March 1942, CAB 80/35, copies In PRO, 
W O  106/4117 and DEFE 2/2; Lt-Qen. J. Q. Swayne, CQS Home Forces, 'QHQ Directive on 
small-scale raiding', HF/00/66/Q(Plans), 31 March 1942, pp.1-3, PRO, W O 106/4117.
®® Hughes-Hallett, 'The mounting of raids', 581; COS (42) 195, 30 March 1942, Annex- 
'Agreed procedure for raiding operations', 21 March 1942, PRO, CAB 80/35; copy In COHO  
W ar Diary, PRO, DEFE 2/2; Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of Staff', 201; 'History of Combined 
Operations Organization', p.21.
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No mention is made in the document of direct COS approval of the final
detailed plans although this seemed to happen indirectly since 'at each
phase of planning' the CCO was required to consult the three Services main
operational staffs and the respective commands from each service likely to
be involved. Thus the Force Commanders most likely submitted their
detailed operation orders to their respective C-in-Cs for final approval. This 
a
could be^problem for Mountbatten, though, as the C-in-Cs might be even 
more reluctant to grant approval to use their forces since the Joint Planners 
had been removed from the planning process.21
Through April, May and June Mountbatten continued to consolidate 
his authority over the planning, mounting and launching of all raiding 
operations. The Chiefs of Staff Minutes clearly show this trend.^ One 
important case serves to illustrate the difficulties COHQ would face in 
coordinating and gaining support from the three Services. This was during 
the planning of Operation Blazing, a large raid on the island of Alderney 
planned for August. The interservice problems were such that on 2 May 
Mountbatten and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 
requested further revision of the planning procedure.^
Henshaw says the COS were still required to give the detailed plans final approval though 
his references do not indicate a source, Henshaw, The British Chiefs of Staff, 200.
^Further references to Mountbatten's extending power are: JP (42) 63rd, 1, 3 April 1942, 
PRO, CAB 84/4; COS (42) 109th, 6, 8[?] April 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20; COS (42) 204, 
Memorandum by Chief of Combined Operations-'Home Forces, Joint Planning Staff and 
Combined Operations Headquarters-Division of responsibility for planning', 5 April 1942, CAB 
80/36, copy in PRO, WO 106/4117; COS (42) 140th, 5 May, PRO, CAB 79/20; 'Note on 
Memorandum for the Chief of Combined Operatlons-"Minor Raids", 10 May 1942', Enclosure 
13c, PRO, WO 106/4117; COS (42) 130(0), Memorandum for the Chief of Combined 
Operatlons-'Minor Raids', 9 May 1942, PRO, CAB 80/62; approved by COS (42) 146th, 8 ,11  
May 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20.
“ COS (42) 137th, 4, 2 May 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20.
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The COS accepted the revision that even if a particular C-in-C 
disapproved of a final detailed plan, presented by a Force Commander, 
Mountbatten could still submit the plan to the COS, who had the option of 
overruling the objections and approving the plan. Henshaw has suggested 
that, in this way, Mountbatten perhaps thought he could get around the RAF 
Bomber Command's refusal for a preliminary bombardment in support of 
Blazing. The RAF's main concern was having its bombers exposed to 
German daylight fighters. This concerned Churchill also, who is on record at 
a COS meeting on 11 May explaining that they could not, 'in present 
circumstances, afford the risk of heavy casualties to our bomber force which 
this operation would probably entail'. He considered this the decisive factor 
and, as a result, not only did the other Chiefs support the RAF decision but 
they and Churchill cancelled the operation in its present form, agreeing to 
consider it later in the year.2< From 5 May the procedure for planning and 
authorizing operations up to and including Rutter, although not Jubilee, was:
(a) Outline plan is prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations.
(b) Agreement or comments on the outline plan is obtained by CCO from all 
Commanders-ln-Chief* concerned.
(c) Outline plan with any comments by Commanders-in-Chief' is submitted by CCO for 
approval of Chiefs of Staff.
(d) If outline plan is approved. Force Commanders are appointed to produce their 
orders.
(e) When the Force Commanders' orders are complete CCO should obtain the 
agreement or any comments of all Commanders-in-Chlef’ concerned.
(f) CCO should then submit the final plan with comments by the Commanders-in- 
Chief’ to the Chiefs of Staffs for final approval.
Note: Since several RAF [Royal Air Force] Commanders-in-Chlef are involved in any
plan, the Air Force Commander during stage (d) must obtain, either directly or through
the CCO's Staff the approval of the Air Force Commander-In-Chief* for the
employment of their forces which he proposes.
* Or officers nominated by them. [This author's emphaslsj^s
COS (42) 244th (Revised) Memorandum. 5 May 1942, PRO, CAB 80/36; COS (42) 146th. 
7,11 May 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20; Henshaw, 'British Chiefs of Staff', 201; Villa, Unauthorized 
action, pp. 150-1.
^  COS (42) 244th (Revised) Memorandum -  Procedure lor planning of combined operations 
lor which the Chief of Combined Operations Is responsible', and Annex-'Procedure', S May
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In an effort to further his influence even more he submitted a 
memorandum to the COS on the 11 May concerning gaining COS approval 
to mount, launch and execute 'minor raids' of not more than 200 men. He 
explained his plans to have one large raid a month, interspersed with many 
smaller ones before the end of this year's raiding season. He went on that 
the need for speed in mounting small raids required a more flexible planning 
and approving procedure. He proposed that he select objectives and that his 
commando units be used who would be assisted solely by his Planning Staff 
at COHQ. Further he proposed dealing directly with the Rear Admiral 
Combined Operations and the local naval C-in-C concerned to arrange the 
naval forces. Fighter cover was to be arranged through the Naval C-in-C as 
well. He stated that he had arranged with the C-in-C, Home Forces that if he 
wished to employ any units under his command in this type of operation, he 
would make the 'necessary arrangements direct with him'. Finally, 
Mountbatten proposed and sought approval, 'To inform the Chiefs of Staff 
verbally of minor raids, shortly before they are due to take place' [emphasis 
added]. A War Office brief presented the day before the COS were to discuss 
the memorandum, advised them to give approval to the memorandum, 
stating that 'if these raids are made to confirm topographical intelligence they 
will be justified'. It also noted that the changed procedure Mountbatten was 
requesting did not just deal with minor raids but with 'raiding operations in 
general'. One could speculate that Jubilee might have gone through this 
COS verbal authorization procedure but there is no concrete evidence for 
this. The COS and Churchill approved the memorandum, Churchill
1942, PRO, CAB 80/36, hand-wrinen copies are Enclosures 12a and 12b, PRO, WO  
106/4117; approved by COS (42) 140th, 6. 5 May 1942.
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qualifying his agreement by saying he would, 'provided that these pinpricks 
were in addition to and not in substitute of, larger scale operations'. 
Churchill's fears were quickly subdued as the same day, 11 May, 
Mountbatten submitted to the COS the Outline Plan for Rutter and explained 
it in detail. Two days later the COS approved it as a basis for detailed 
planning by the force Commanders. The COS noted that the executive 
decision to execute the operation remained with the Naval C-in-C of the 
home port as specified in the COS memorandum approved on 30 March 
1942.26
THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS 
RAIDING PROCEDURE AND RESPONSIBILITY
Closely involved in these changes in procedure, but largely 
overlooked until recently, were the senior commanders of the Canadian 
Army. Since 1939 Canadian armed forces, including naval, air and army 
units, had been steadily building up in Britain, yet had participated in no 
large scale actions. This was particularly relevant to the army, which 
although being sent to France in 1940 after the withdrawal at Dunkirk, and 
training for or participating in small abortive raids, had basically filled a 
garrison role as the backbone of defence against possible German invasion 
of southern England. After the German attack against Russia in the summer 
of 1941, this threat of a German invasion gradually receded, and by the
26 COS(42)146th, 8. 11 May 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20, approved COS(42)130(0), 9  May 1942, 
Minor raids. Memorandum by the Chief of Combined Operations', PRO, CAB 80/62; War 
Office, 'Chiefs of Staff Committee. Meeting to be held on the 11 M ay 1942. Note on 
COS(42) 130(0). Minor raids. Memorandum by the Chief of Combined Operations', 10 May 
1942, PRO, WO 106/4117, foi.13C; CCO to COS, Memorandum 'Operation Ruffer Outiine 
Pian, Ref. P126/15', 11 May 1942, approved at COS(42)149th, 5  'Operation Rutter, 13 May 
1942, both documents In PRO, CAB 121/364, SIC File D/France/1, Operation Ruffsr Folder, 
fo ls.1,1 A, IB , 1C, the latter record Is also In PRO, CAB 79/20.
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spring of 1942 it appeared most unlikely. Amid the growing clamour for a 
Second Front were the sharp calls for active participation of Canadian 
ground troops, who were suffering from low morale due to constant
inaction.27
The strategic decision to put off Round-Up -  the full-scale invasion of 
North-West Europe -  until 1943, meant that the Canadian Army would not 
see major action for at least three and a half years. British requests for units 
to be detached for service in distant theatres of war were strenuously 
rejected by the senior Canadian commanders, Lt-Gen. A.G.L. 'Andy' 
McNaughton and Lt-Gen. H.D.G. 'Harry' Crerar. For them, especially the 
former, maintenance of unity of the Canadian Army Overseas, as it became 
known on 5 April 1942, was the determining factor in all negotiations on its 
use. Raids from Britain were the perfect answer to the calls for action while 
still fulfilling the ultimate objective of maintaining the unity and 
independence of the Canadian Army. McNaughton, and Crerar especially, 
actively lobbied for the participation of Canadian units in raids. This is 
contrary to the previous long-standing myth that during the Second World 
War the Canadian Army was treated as 'Empire troops', as they had been 
during the Great War, and that at Dieppe Canadian troops were led like 
lambs to the slaughter by their British masters. Unfortunately, this myth was 
recently given credence by Denis and Shelagh Whitaker in Dieppe: tragedy
^  Denis Whitaker, a platoon commander In the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, claims that low 
Canadian Army morale in 1942 is a myth that has persisted for over fifty years: 'I don't believe 
the morale In the Rileys was suffering, nor was It In any other units I saw or heard about In 
England. Many veterans will corroborate this'. He says that the propaganda line Invented by 
the media and Canadian government that 'we were the ones who wanted action, that we were 
bored and demoralised -  Is pure nonsense. They were the ones who were trying to justify 
action-action for action's sake. Action tor votes. Canadian troops were not spoiling for a fight'. 
See Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson, 1992), pp.7S-6. Whitaker bases his claim on his personal experiences and not on 
the overwhelming documentary evidence to the contrary.
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to triumph, who claim that the raid was undertaken for the primarily political 
reasons of both Churchill and Canadian Prime Minister William L.
Mackenzie King.^s
Although the Whitakers concede that Crerar played an active role in 
promoting Canadian participation they do not agree that McNaughton did 
also. On the contrary, they claim that McNaughton was 'outfoxed by his own 
corps commander' and then could never admit this for the obvious reason 
that it would have undermined his authority. To analyse this claim it is 
necessary to examine the role of McNaughton and Crerar and their 
relationship to the British military and political establishment since the arrival 
of Canadian troops in Britain.^
^  The idea that the British Army was responsible for Canadian involvement was first claimed in 
a British official history that was probably vetted before publication by Mountbatten and 
Hughes-Hallett: Christopher Buckley states that Montgomery had acted as 'chief 
representative of the [British] Army at some of the preliminary discussions' and that it was 'his 
influence which made the raid on Dieppe so largely a Canadian affair“, see The raid on 
Dieppe', in Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, 3 (London; HMSO, 1951), p.230; Nigel 
Hamilton, Montgomery's official biographer, supports this argument by quoting Buckley, see 
'Dieppe', in Monty: the making of a general 1887-1942 (London; Hamish Hamilton, 1981), 
p.551; Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph, Canadian reviews of the book reflect how readily 
accepted is the view that the British were responsible for the debacle; Douglas Fisher, 
'Between ourselves -  Dieppe: tragedy to triumph. Legion Magazine 67/5 (November 1992), 
4-5; Tony Foster claims Dieppe was 'badly organized by the British General Staff and 
Combined Operations from start to finish', in “War Is hell, though you might hear otherwise; 
officer's timeless story strips the myth from Dieppe [review of Dieppe: tragedy to triumph]', 
Globe A Mall, 1992; Ron RIter asks why the 'upper-crust' COS and the 'wily' Churchill let such 
an operation be 'planned, chopped, changed', and then proceed. In 'Dieppe; a bloody 
campaign Is vindicated', Vancouver Sun, Saturday 15 August 1992; Peter Worthington claims 
Churchill and Mountbatten knew before the operation that 'secrecy had been breached' and 
blames the politicians who wanted to placate' the Americans and Soviets, In 'Dying at Dieppe; 
the last word', Toronto Sun, Tuesday 18 August 1992.
^  Whitakers, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph, p.75. The two sources the Whitakers' use 
concerning Crerars circumventing McNaughton's authority are open to Interpretation. The 
Minutes of Crerars meeting, on 6 March 1942, with Lt-Qen. Archibald E. Nye, Deputy Chief, 
Imperial General Staff (DCIGS), Mountbatten and Brigadier Guy G. Simonds, contain the 
statement, 'the enterprise should be known only to the Corps Com[ander] and BGS and a 
limited number of his own (I.e. Mountbatten's) staff. General Crerar readily agreed to these 
conditions', see Brigadier G.G. Simonds, BGS, Canadian Corps, 'Notes on conferences held 
on 6 March 1942', 8 March 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ GOC 1-0-4, 
Operations -  Raids, Part 1(a), Correspondence re Training, fol.3. The other, somewhat 
dubious source. Is Simonds's post-war recollection of the same meeting, which he mistakes 
for happening on 24 March, see Simonds to Mountbatten 22 January 1969, NAC, JHHP, MG  
30 E463.
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As early as March 1941 when the possibility opened that the 
Canadian Corps might assume the defensive area of the coast of Sussex, 
McNaughton told Brooke, then C-in-C Home Forces, that he hoped 'that in 
assuming the role of a static Corps, the claims of the Canadian Forces to 
form the spearhead of any offensive would not be forgotten'. The move 
actually began in the fall and was completed by December. This brought it 
under the operational control of GOC-in-C South-Eastern Command, Lt-Gen. 
B.L.M. Montgomery.**
With the increase in British raiding activities in 1941 McNaughton saw 
an opportunity for Canadian participation. He raised this matter with C.G. 
'Chubby' Power, the Canadian Air Minister, during his visit in June, and 
again the next month with another Canadian minister. He spoke to the latter 
of the possibility of 'operations of limited scope which depend for their 
success on the strictest secrecy'. McNaughton noted that the present 
procedure of special requests to Canada for authority for each operation was 
cumbersome and asked that this be changed. Before this could happen the 
Nonwegian Spitsbergen operation came up in late August.^*
In late July the 'special question' that McNaughton had discussed with 
the Canadian ministers became a future operation. After some deliberation 
the Canadian Cabinet War Committee informed McNaughton, through Lt- 
Gen. Kenneth Stuart, Chief of General Staff (CGS), that once the operation
** Stacey, Six years of war, pp.297-8.
The Spitsbergen operation was successfuiiy executed from 19 August to 3 September 
using about 650 Canadian soidiers and some small Norwegian and British units. The purpose 
was to ensure that the Germans could not use the Spitsbergen Islands to their advantage in 
the future. The objectives to remove the Russian miners and Norwegian citizens, destroy 
wireless and weather stations, coal dumps, mining and harbour facilities, were all attained 
without a single casualty. The Germans did not know of the operation until after it was over. 
Stacey, Six years of war, pp.301-6 [Spitsbergen], p.307 ['operations of limited scope').
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had the approval of the British War Cabinet the decision would be up to him.
Concerning this decision the CGS cabled McNaughton to keep in mind
whether or not 'prospects of success are sufficient to warrant risks involved
which include not only personnel but possible encouragement to enemy if 
are
results^negative or worse'. With this authority McNaughton authorized a 
Canadian role in the Spitsbergen expedition. In early September C-in-C 
Home Forces, Lt-Gen. Sir Bernard Paget, discussed with McNaughton the 
use of Canadians in raids on the French coast, resulting in a small 
detachment being given combined operations training.^^
The Canadian Minister of National Defence, Colonel James L. 
Ralston, and the CGS visited England in October and met with McNaughton 
and Crerar. Crerar's war diary recounts that McNaughton made 'strong 
representations concerning his authority to undertake minor raids and 
operations', like Spitsbergen, 'without the necessity of obtaining Cabinet 
approval in each case' and that these raids should be looked on as regular 
'patrol activities'. The Minister subsequently recommended that McNaughton 
receive 'general authority to act in such cases subject to his own judgement'. 
On 29 October the War Cabinet Committee gave him approval to use 
Canadian troops in 'minor' operations. Less then six months later 
McNaughton would sanction the use of Canadians at Dieppe, although the 
official historian of the Canadian Army, Charles P. Stacey, categorically 
states that McNaughton 'had nothing to do with originating... Canadian 
participation' in it.33
^  Stacey, Six years of war, pp.307-8.
33 Crerar War Diary, 20/25 October 1941, NAC, Crerar Papers (CP), MQ 30 
E157/15/958C.009 (D269); Stacey, Six years of war, p.308; see also Villa, Unauthorized 
action, p.224; and Charles P. Stacey, 'Organization and control of Canadian fighting forces'. In 
Arms, men and government. The war policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's
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Crerar took over command of the Corps at the end of 1941 and in the 
words of Stacey was Very anxious' to get his troops onto raids and had 
'used the opportunity of being in command during McNaughton's absence in 
early 1942 'to press this point of view' on Montgomery, Brooke and 
Mountbatten. Stacey concludes that 'this may at least be part of the 
explanation for the Canadians going to Dieppe'. In fact, recent works by 
Canadian historians all point the finger at Crerar and some at McNaughton 
also.3*
The senior Canadian military personnel in the first quarter of 1942, in 
the words of Villa, 'threw heart and soul' into gaining the right to undertake 
raids. The Whitakers partially support this, stating that an 'avalanche' of 
letters and memoranda from Crerar and Brigadier Guy G. Simonds, his 
Brigadier General Staff (BGS), 1 Canadian Corps, 'engulfed' senior British 
officers, such as, Brooke, Paget and Montgomery.^^
Printer, 1970), pp.208-9; Charles P. Stacey, Letter to the Editor, 'Canadians at Dieppe', Royal 
United Services institute Journal \26 lt (March 1981), 83-4; Major-General Cyril Lloyd, who 
was at the Canadian Field Headquarters, Leatherhead, 'vividly remembers' McNaughton 
saying 'it was high time that the Canadians were “blooded” and it was he who pressed hard for 
the Canadians to have sole responsibility for the raid'. Letter to the Editor, 'Comments on 
Stacey letter. Royal United Services Institute Journal ^26/^ (March 1981), 84.
^  Stacey, Six years of war, p.308; Stacey, Letter to the Editor, 'Canadians at Dieppe', 83-4. 
Recent works supporting Crera^s responsibility for Dieppe are Jack L. Granatstein, The 
generals: the Canadian Army's senior commanders in the Second World IVar (Toronto: 
Stoddart, 1993), pp.102-3; and Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph, pp.73-5; those 
implicating both Crerar and McNaughton are Villa, Unauthorized action, pp.224-7; David J. 
Bercuson, 'The agony of Dieppe', In Maple leaf against the Axis: Canada's Second World War 
(Toronto: Stoddart, 1995), pp.66-7, 75; Terry Copp, 'Dieppe', in A Canadian's guide to the 
battlefields of Northwest Europe (Waterloo; The Canadian Battle of Normandy 
Foundatlon/Wilfrid Laurier University, 1995), p.35; Peter J. Henshaw's three articles, 'The 
Dieppe raid: Montgomery's role reassessed', In Perspectives on warfighting. Selected papers 
from the 1992 (S9th annual) meeting of the Society for Military History, ed. Donald F. Bittner, 3 
(Ouantico, VA; Marine Corps University Command and & Staff College Foundation, 1994), 
193-4; The Dieppe raid: the quest for action for all the wrong reasons'. Queen's Quarterly 
101/1 (Spring 1994), 108; and The Dieppe raid: a product of misplaced Canadian 
nationalism'. The Canadian Historical Review 77/2 (June 1996), 250-66.
^  Villa, Unauthorized action, p.224; Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph, p.74.
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On 5 February Crerar wrote to Montgomery that the Canadian Corps' 
'static' role in the last year was 'not of its choosing', and that during the up­
coming raiding season, 'it would be In the general interest if a very high 
proportion of these prospective raids, if not the total, should be undertaken' 
by Canadian units. He went on that the Corps would receive a 'great 
stimulus if, in the near future, it succeeded in making a name for itself for its 
raiding activities'. Two days later Montgomery replied that he hoped to 
receive some assault craft the following month, some of which he would allot 
to Newhaven so that Crerar could run his 'own raiding activities from there'. 
He added that 'Your men should be quite first class at raiding'. Villa states 
that Crerar, 'either suspecting that he was getting the polite run-around, or 
determined to clinch matters', decided to approach a higher authority.^^
On 1 March he met with Brooke who agreed to the 'importance' of 
Canadian troops being used in 'future raids' and that Crerar should meet 
with Mountbatten, to discuss 'ways and means'. A week later Crerar was 
invited by Mountbatten for lunch at the Naval and Military Club. Also present 
were the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (OCIGS), Lt-Gen. 
Archibald E. Nye and Brigadier Simonds, who took notes of the meeting.^^ 
Crerar opened by saying he had received permission from the GOC- 
in-C, South-Eastern Command, Montgomery, and the CIGS, to discuss with
^  Crerar to Montgomery, 5 February 1942, 'Possibility ol Canadian troops taking part in raids', 
NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ QOC 1 -0-4, Operations -  Raids, Part 1(a), 
Correspondence re Training, (ol.l; Stacey, Six years of war, p.308; Villa states that this letter 
was a 'blistering reaction' by Crerar caused by 'British resistance to giving Canadians the lead 
in raiding operations'. Unauthorized action, pp.224-5; Montgomery to Crerar, 8 February 
1942, NAC, RQ 24/107SO/220C1.009 (02)/ QOC 1-0-4, Operations -  Raids, Pad 1(a), 
Correspondence re Training, fol.2.
^  Meeting ol 1 March is noted in Brigadier Q.Q. Simonds, 'Notes on conferences held on 6 
March 1942', NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (02)/ QOC 1-0-4, Operations -  Raids, Pad 1(a), 
Correspondence re Training, fol.3.
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Mountbatten, arrangements for raids using Canadians. He explained that the 
COHQ plan to have a series of raids through the year had not come about so 
far due to the scarcity of landing craft. He went on that Canadian troops in 
the UK had been inactive for over two and a half years and that if the 
present situation continued that it would have serious effects on morale in 
the Canadian Corps. He warned of possible long-term repercussions on 
recruiting in Canada and the probable effects on the US attitude to sending 
troops to Europe. General Nye concurred with Crerar although Mountbatten 
initially disagreed. Villa states that it was 'undoubtedly the memory of this 
meeting' that caused Simonds to claim after the war that, 'I know for facts 
[s/c] that as soon as Crerar heard of the Dieppe project, he bought every 
pressure he could bring to bear on the British Chiefs of Staff, and even 
Churchill himself: (a) To nominate Canadian troops for the operation [and]
(b) To have the operation carried out'. Simonds continued that in making the 
decision to use Canadian troops to execute the operation, and to revive it 
after it had been cancelled, 'Crerar was a prime mover, and his influence 
was probably paramount'.^e
Mountbatten commented that Crerar's proposal to use only Canadian 
troops 'ran counter to the policy' which he had agreed with C-in-C Home 
Forces, which was that raids were to be carried out by his Commandos and 
that any 'Army representation would take the form of "dilution” of the raiding
^  Brigadier G.G. Simonds, 'Notes on conferences heid on 6 March 1942', NAC, RQ  
24/10750/220C1.009 (02)/ GOC 1-0-4, Operations -  Raids. Part 1(a), Correspondence re 
Training, fol.3. Curiousiy both Villa and the Whitakers have stated that Crerar's meeting on 6 
March was with the CIGS when It was actually with the DCIQS: the Whitakers write 'on March 6 
Crerar made Brooke the key convert in his campaign', Dieppe: tragedy to triumph, p.74; Villa 
states 'On March 6 he was making his case strongly... In the office of the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke', Unauthorized action, p.225. On SImonds'a post-war 
recollections see Villa, Unauthorized action, p.301, fn.25; Simonds to Stacey, 10 February 
1969, UTA, CSP/054, copy In NAC, JHHP, MG 30 E463.
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Commandos'. Villa states this was as close as he could come without being 
offensive, to implying that the Canadians were inexperienced. In the end, 
Mountbatten had no choice but to agree, since Nye supported Crerar. 
Simonds's notes of the meeting record that Mountbatten 'appreciated the 
special position of Canadian troops' and would agree to a 'purely Canadian 
enterprise, provided the C-in-C Home Forces would also agree'.
Mountbatten added that he would also detail the recently arrived Canadian 
landing craft flotilla, if their training could be speeded up, to train with the 
Canadian troops.^^
Within a few days correspondence was being exchanged between 
the BGS, 1 Canadian Corps and COHQ, concerning the amphibious training 
of about one hundred and ninety men from 2 Canadian Infantry Division 
(CID) in Scotland. Training instructions and an outline training plan were 
also issued. On 14 March Paget visited Crerar and they discussed the 
arrangements that had been made with Mountbatten concerning Canadian 
preparation for a raid. Simonds account of the meeting noted that Paget 'had 
no objection to the arrangements'.^
Just before McNaughton's return from Canada to the UK Crerar met 
with Mountbatten again. 'Dieppe was specifically mentioned and Crerar 
urged that it should be undertaken by Canadian troops'. Simonds noted that 
for reasons of military protocol, all three agreed to not talk of the plans for the
^  Brigadier Q.Q. Simonds, 'Notes on conferences held on 6 March 1942', NAC, RQ 
24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ GOC 1-0-4, Operations -  Raids, Part 1(a), Correspondence re 
Training, fol.3; Villa, Unauthorized action, p.301, fn.26; see also Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to 
triumph, p.74.
*0 See correspondence concerning training from 9-23 March 1942, fols.4-7, 9,-10 and 
Brigadier Q.Q. Simonds, 'Memo -  Qen. Paget approves arrangements for Canadian 
participation In raids', 15 March 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/Q O C 1-0-4, 
Operations -  Raids, Part 1(a), Correspondence re Training, fol.8.
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Canadians 'until a request for Canadian troops had been formally made to 
General McNaughton’/ ’
On McNaughton's return in early April 1942, now as GOC-in-C of the 
newly constituted First Canadian Army Overseas, he had several meeting 
with Mountbatten concerning Canadians taking part in ra>ds in an attempt 'to 
clinch the accord'. His and Crerar's many months of pressure finally paid off 
when on 30 April Montgomery officially informed McNaughton of the 
nomination of Canadian troops for Rutter.*^
At this meeting Montgomery explained that he had been told by Paget 
about the Dieppe project and that the single division required was to come 
from South-Eastern Command. Although he had been 'pressed to agree to a 
composite British and Canadian Force', he told Paget that it was essential to 
maintain unity of command and that in his opinion the Canadian troops 
'were those best suited', and Paget accepted this. Montgomery then 
informed McNaughton that Crerar had already been approached and had 
nominated 2 CID. McNaughton confirmed the selection 'subject to details of 
plans being satisfactory and receiving his approval'. They agreed that 
Montgomery should go ahead with the preparation of the plans and that he 
should advise the GOC 2 CID, Maj.-Gen. J.H. 'Ham' Roberts, that he could 
begin work on plans in conjunction with the CCO, Mountbatten. The same 
day HQ, 1 Canadian Corps issued 'Training Instruction No. 9', a combined 
operations training program beginning with 2 CID and continuing with 1 and 
3 CIDs. This was done as security cover to squash any speculation or
Simonds to Mountbatten, 22 January 1969 and Mountbatten to SImonds, 4 February 1969, 
NAC, JMHP, MG 30 E463, quoted in Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph, p.7S.
^  McNaughton's visits to COHO In April and the meeting of 30 April are recorded In his War 
Diary, NAC, MQ 30 E 133/248, quoted In Villa, Unauthorized action, p.226 ['clinch the 
accord'].
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discussion about the special training 2 CID was to undertake on the Isle of 
Wight.“«
That same evening McNaughton sent a 'Most Secret' personal cable 
to the CGS in Ottawa, concerning the authority he had been given in October 
1941 to use Canadian troops in 'minor' operations without receiving special 
permission. It stated that 'Plans are now being made which involve 
operations... on a scale which cannot properly be classed as 'minor'. He 
requested that his powers over raiding be increased by deleting the word 
'minor' from the phrase 'minor projects of a temporary nature'. The War 
Committee approved this on 1 May 1942, noting that this was subject to the 
same conditions as required for the Spitsbergen operation, which were that 
the operation had the approval of the British government and that the 
prospects of success justified the risks. The next day McNaughton received a 
cable to this effect from the Vice-Chief of the General Staff (VCGS), Maj.- 
Gen. J.C. Murchie.**
King, the Canadian Prime Minister, was inclined to refuse 
McNaughton's request, writing in his diary that 'It was essential that no such 
operations be undertaken without adequate preparations and a full 
appreciation of all the factors involved, including the extent of the Forces 
available and the opposition that might be anticipated'. Ralston assured the
«  Lt-Col G.P. Henderson, ‘Notes of a meeting between Lt-Qen. A.G.L. McNaughton and Lt- 
Gen. B.L. Montgomery at HQ First Cdn Army 1000 hrs 30 April 42 (given to Lieutenant- 
Colonel G.P. Henderson by Lt-Gen. McNaughton at 1600 hrs 30 April 42)', NAC, RG 24 
C l7/13611/GS, First Canadian Army HQ W ar Diary, July 1942/T6672; Simonds to Haydon, 13 
April 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2); Stacey, Six years of war, p.329.
** Stacey, Six years of war, pp.332-3; Charles P. Stacey, The operation at Dieppe, 19 August 
1942: communications to and from Canada concerning the operation', CMHQ Historical 
Officer Special Report. 11 February 1943, pp.1-2, DHIst 594.013; Defensor [Murchle] to 
Canmilltary (McNaughton], telegram CGS 18 0 ,2  May 1942, NAC, Hon. J.L. Ralston Papers 
(RP), MG 27 III BII/51/ McNaughton's General Correspondence 1939-1945.
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COS that the operation would only be on the same scale as the Spitsbergen 
operation, after which the Committee gave approval for 'a brigade or 
possibly larger', and also requested additional information.^
Villa describes Ralston subsequently 'downplayed' his request 
that McNaughton elaborate on the operation and McNaughton, for his part, 
continued to be 'guarded', replying that 'the largest project in 
contemplation... at present [Ruttei] might involve up to three brigades which 
might all be Canadian'. If the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had had any doubts 
about the operation, they could have questioned Mountbatten during his 
meeting with them on 11 June but the minutes make no reference to a 
division size raid, let alone to Rutter, scheduled to take place ten days later. It 
is significant to note that at this time the War Committee still did not know the 
date or location of Rutter. Stacey explains that in the 'interests of security, no 
information as to the time or place of the raid was requested by or sent to 
Canada'.^
After the British COS approved the outline plan for Rutter or\ 13 May, 
McNaughton informed the CGS of this and that he was content with the 
'Higher organization for the planning of combined operations'. Concerning 
the present operation, he further explained that he was satisfied that: '(a) 
objective is worthwhile (b) land forces detailed are sufficient (c) sea and air 
forces adequate (d) arrangements for operation satisfactory'. He concluded
^  Cabinet War Committee minutes of 1 May, Privy Councii records, copy in Department of 
Extemai Affairs fiies, NAC. il/4/6; and King Diary, 1 May 1942, NAC, MG 26 J13 1942, both 
quoted in Viiia, Unauthorized action, p.227.
^  Canmilitary to Defensor, telegram GS 1541,6 May 1942, NAC, RP, MG 27 III BII/51/ 
McNaughton's General Correspondence 1939-1945; Villa slates McNaughton was 
somewhat 'disingenuous' as three brigades were In effect a division, and he may have been 
hoping that the civilian Committee would underestimate the size of a brigade. Minutes, 
Canadian Chiefs of Staff with Mountbatten, 11 June 1942, DHIst, quoted In Villa, 
Unauthorized action, p.227; Stacey, Six years ot war, p.333.
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that he had approved the outline plan, had ordered detailed planning to 
begin and finally stressed the need for absolute secrecy. The same evening 
Murchie cabled McNaughton that he had 'confidence' in McNaughton's 
judgement and that the War Committee 'confirmed authority' for the 
operation. The cable finished by saying that secrecy would be 'meticulously 
observed' and that the War Committee would 'appreciate any information 
which may be from time to time communicable'.^^
RUTTER AND JUBILEE OUTLINE PLANS
Before continuing with the procedural changes for implementing raids 
in general, and Rutter in particular, it is necessary to examine why Dieppe 
was chosen in the first place, and who was responsible for the adoption of a 
frontal assault contained in the outline plan that was submitted to the COS. 
As was explained previously, a series of raids was planned for the spring 
and summer of 1942. Although many of them failed to develop, Rutter stayed 
on the books. Home Forces had previously submitted a report on the 
problem of a full-scale invasion of the continent. It outlined seizing about six 
French ports and exploiting only those where there was initial success. 
Hughes-Hallett, in a 1946 interview with Stacey, explained that with this 
background in mind, the projected raid on Dieppe 'assumed special 
importance from the experimental point of view', especially since it was not 
one of those ports named in the plan. An ex-COHQ officer, Bernard 
Fergusson, confirms this conclusion: 'A final reason for choosing Dieppe 
was the fact that the planners had already ruled it out as a desirable place to
Canmilitary to Defensor, telegram QS 1658,15 May 1942; Defensor to Canmilltary, telegram 
CGS 197,15 May 1942, NAC, RP, MG 27 III BII/51/ McNaughton's General Correspondence 
19 39 -194 5 .
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capture in the early stages of a real invasion, and we should therefore be
giving nothing away by raiding it now'.^
The prevailing conception in the higher command circles was that any
invasion would depend on seizing ports in working condition at the very
start. Rutter offered a much needed opportunity to carry out a test of a
divisional size raid on a port. Since the disastrous 1915 Gallipoli landings no 
assault
large-scale amphibious^operations had occurred. Brigadier Antony H. Head,
a
Military Adviser Combined Opedions (MACO), stated, 'a practical test of
equipment and technique under battle conditions was considered essential'.
Similarly, in a 1967 television interview Hughes-Hallett explained:
Dieppe was chosen for no particular reason originally except that it was a small sea port 
and we thought it would be interesting to do -  to capture -  a small sea port for a short 
time and then withdraw... It was not thought to be of any particular military 
importance... and it appeared... that it would be about the scale of objective that 
would be suitable for a divisional attack... but I must impress that we were raiding for 
the sake of raiding... There was no particular significance attachable to the places that 
were chosen.^
Other Key factors in the choice of Dieppe were that it was the only deep 
water port within effective range of shore based fighter aircraft and had the 
only suitable gorges in the steep coastal cliffs and beaches where flank 
landings could be put in.^
^'Memorandum of Interview with Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, 29 and 30 September 1946', 1 
October 1946, Appendix A, pp.1-2, CMHQ Historical Report No. 159, DHIst; Fergusson, The 
Watery Maze, p.169.
Commenting on the operation as a test, Hughes-Hallett writes, 'the Raid had the further 
tactical object of testing a method of divisional attack on a small port, which was currently 
popular with Army thought at Whitehall', Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, Letter 27 June 1962, 
IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/10; 'Memorandum of Conversation with Brigadier A.H. Head, 15 March 
1946', 22 March 1946, Apjjendix B, pp.1-2, CMHO Historical Report No.153, DHIst; Hughes- 
Hallett, 1967 Interview with John Seconder!, transcript. University of Southampton Library 
Archives (USLA), Mountbatten Papers (MBP), MB1 67. An undated COHO war-time 
document referring to the selection states, 'Dieppe was chosen since it was on the extreme 
edge of the “advantageous area’ . It was, therefore thought to be not so heavily defended as, 
for example, Calais or Boulogne', Quoted In 'Operation Jubilee. Lecture to Staff Colleges. 
Notes lor CCO', p.t, PRO, DEFE 2/324.
“  Hunt and Schurman, 'Prelude to Dieppe', p.204.
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The earliest references to Dieppe/Ruffer in a primary source are in the 
Combined Operations War Diary but this was compiled after X\r\e raid or 
possibly the war. The references do not necessarily refer to a particular 
operation until they mention Dieppe from 3 April 1942. These reports 
concern intelligence about German defences received by COHO as early as 
26 November 1941 and in March and April 1942. They are probably not so 
significant since during this period COHQ also received similar intelligence 
information about many other French ports.®’
Stacey claims that the 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid', 
produced in October 1942 under Mountbatten's direction, says that the 'first 
meeting to consider a definite plan took place on 3 April' 1942. Curiously, 
this author has been unable to find this reference in the Combined Report, 
however it does state, which Stacey correctly quotes, that the idea of a raid 
on Dieppe was first contemplated in 'early April 1942'. The same wording is 
used in the unpublished confidential print by COHQ's successor 
organisation. Amphibious Warfare HQ, entitled, 'The history of Combined 
Operations organization' (1956), and a unpublished Confidential Book, 
compiled by the Admiralty Historical Section, 'Raid on Dieppe (Naval 
Operations) 19 August 1942', BR 1736 (26) Naval Staff History, Second 
World War, Battle Summary No. 33 (revised 1959). This last report claims
COHO War Diary entries about Dieppe are:
26 Novm b w  1941 Operation RuUar- A raport was racaivad from NID (Naval Intalllganca DMilon| giving 
Information ra. enamy dafancat:3 March 1B42 Oparanon b u ffa r- Information was racaivad from QHQ (I) ra. poiltlon of anamy guns; 
ta ivw ch 18*2 Operation R utfr-Inform ation was racaivad from NID ra. blocking of tha hartxxjr antranca:
3 Antll 1942 Operation Ruffar> A raport from Intalllganca at Homa Forcas gava datata of Via landing baachas: 
tha MEW (Ministry of Economic Warfars( gave economic Information concerning Dieppe;
4 April 1942 Operation nirffar-lnlorm atlan racaivad ra. HO In tha DIappa area:
6 April 1942 Operation fluP ar- Further Intalllganca Information on the DIappa area was racalvsd;
5 /te d tlM Z  Operation f7 i4 far- Tha ONI (Oractor of Naval IntaNgancai sent Information about Hofsl Madama.
COHQ, War Diary, PRO, DEFE 2/2-3. Viiia states that Waiter Skrine's Papers iater formed the 
heart of the officiai COHO Rutter tiies' and that the COHQ War Diaries are based on these, 
personai information from Brian Viiia, also see Unauthorized action, p.198.
54
that 'It is probable that verbal discussions of which there is no written record' 
took place at COHQ in March. An alternative draft of the same section, states 
that the 'possibilities of an attack were first investigated in March 1942 and 
before the end of the month the Planning Staff of Combined Operations -  
under the general direction of Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, RN -  began to 
prepare an outline plan'. Stacey warns that the COHQ records concerning 
the planning are 'exiguous and incomplete', and although these and other 
details may be 'authentic', they were 'presumably added from memory' after 
the operation.“
Since no definite date can be set concerning when Dieppe was 
suggested as an objective, due to the fragmentary record, one is left with the 
COHQ claim that the Target Committee of COHQ first serious/y examined the 
project in early April. At this time GHQ Home Forces was concerned that it 
was gradually losing control over its forces, which were to be used in 
combined operations, to the increasingly independent Canadian Army and 
ever expanding COHQ. Anxious to maintain some degree of control, or face 
the possibility of having no, or a limited, part in the final invasion of the 
continent. Home Forces insisted that it must approve and have input into any 
project using forces under its command. Therefore from 14 April staff officers 
from GHQ, Home Forces, officially joined the planning syndicate of COHQ in 
accordance with the procedure approved by the COS on 30 March 1942.
“  Stacey, Six years of war, pp.327; Combined Operations Headquarters, 'Combined Report 
on the Dieppe raid', BR 1887 (formerly CB 04244), October 1942, London, Whitehall: COHQ, 
p.2, DHIst, 594.013 (D1): Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 'History of Combined 
Operations Organization', London: Ministry of Defence, 1956, p.37; and Admiralty, 'Raid on 
Dieppe (Naval Operatlons)19 August 1942', BR 1736 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World 
War, Battle Summary No.33, revised 31 December 1959 [released 1990], London: Admiralty 
Historical Section, p.3, PRO ADM 234/355; Mountbatten to Charles Haydon, Letter 16 July 
1958 and enclosure 'Second alternative draft for paragraph 3 -  Origin of the plan', by Hughes- 
Hallett, IWM, Haydon Papers, IV,
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Also on 14 April 1942 was a meeting at COHQ to discuss Rutter, which was 
attended by a representative of GHQ, Home Forces, Brigadier C.V. McNabb. 
Stacey states this meeting's minutes is the 'earliest paper that appears to 
have been preserved' discussing the Rutter planning. The minutes make no 
mention of a frontal assault and only state that Hughes-Hallett, in his position 
as Naval Adviser to COHQ, gave a 'brief outline of the plan for the operation'; 
that it was agreed that the operation was 'attractive' and 'worthwhile'; and 
that the project should receive 'further examination' by COHQ Advisers and 
a Home Forces representative.“
Some kind of examination must have been carried out by the COHQ 
Military Planning Syndicate, which probably included a Home Forces 
representative, as three days later an unsigned document was produced 
entitled 'Appreciation from point of view of the raid planning staff (military) on 
the proposed Operation Rutter'. Although it contains the proviso that it was 
produced without 'any exact information' regarding German defences and 
order of battle, a frontal attack is clearly indicated, with flank attacks and a 
'heavy air bombardment' of the 'houses and sea front', immediately before 
the arrival of the first assault troops. Tanks were also to support the frontal 
assault. Although use of tanks during street fighting, it warned, seemed 
'inadvisable', the presence of tanks to assist in 'mopping up the town' and to 
'hold off' enemy armoured units was considered 'essential'.^
“ Henshaw, The Dieppe raid; Montgomery's role reassessed', 189; COHO, 'Combined 
Report', p.2; 'Minutes of meeting held at Combined Operations Headquarters at 1100 hours 
14.4.42 to discuss Operation Rutter", 18 April 1942, quoted In Charles P. Stacey, 'Operation 
Jubilee-, the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942. New light on early planning', 22 March 1946, 
Appendix A, CMHO Historical Section Report No.153, DHist.
^  This early appreciation made the interesting suggestion of Puys as a 'possible landing' point 
for motor transport and perhaps a lew light cruiser tanks', 'Appreciation from point of view of 
the raid planning staff (military) on the proposed Operation Rutter, 17 April 1942, Appendix A, 
CMHQ Historical Section Report No. 153, DHIst.
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A further document, 'Operation Rutter and Jubilee: Notes on principal 
changes in the military plan', dated 14 September 1942, also seems to shed 
some light on the decision to adopt the frontal assault. Stacey points out its 
date is almost a month after the operation and five months after the events 
described, and therefore must be regarded with caution. It describes that 
'about' the 18 April 1942 two alternative outline plans were prepared by the 
Planning Syndicate. The first was similar to the final Jubilee plan of a frontal 
assault with flank attacks. The other had no frontal assault at all and instead 
envisaged landing two battalions each at Puys and Pourville, one battalion 
and the tank battalion at Quiberville, while holding the last battalion in 
floating reserve. A 'verbal discussion (of which there is no written record)' 
was held at COHQ 'about the 18 April' to discuss the two plans. Besides 
Major-General J.C. Haydon, who was the Vice Chief Combined Operations 
(VCCO), and GOC Airborne Division, two Home Forces representatives also 
took part, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, GHQ Home Forces (DCGS), 
Major-General P.G.S. Gregson-Ellis, and Brigadier McNabb. They 
unanimously agreed that 'on balance there were advantages In taking the 
town by a frontal assault', which was the plan finally adopted. The document 
warns that the Naval Adviser, Hughes-Hallett, who did not attend this 
meeting, regarded the frontal assault as 'unduly hazardous'. The reasons 
given for selecting the frontal assault were that the loss of time caused by the 
flank landings would 'make a surprise attack on the town more difficult to 
achieve', and that the tanks that landed at Quiberville 'would have to cross 
three [actually two] rivers - all anti-tank obstacles'. Stacey adds that this
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entailed capturing the bridges in advance and that it was not certain whether 
they could support a Churchill tank.®
The conclusions of a meeting held on 21 April, attended by one Home 
Forces representative, Major R. Fanshawe, state that the previously 
mentioned outline plans that were 'suggested' to the GOC Airborne Division 
and the DCGS, Home Forces by the VCCO the previous day, had to be 
altered for naval reasons. The minutes show that by the 20 April, a direct 
frontal assault on the town, supported by tanks, had been agreed upon, as 
well as using parachute and glider troops. Tanks would not now be landed 
at Pourville as the beach there seemed 'to be more difficult than was 
supposed at first'. A heavy air bombardment of the sea-front and town 
generally was also Included in the plan.®
The Combined Report, 'The history of Combined Operations 
Organization', and the Admiralty Battle Summary all claim that the question 
of a frontal assault was discussed at the first formal meeting to discuss the 
newly named operation Rutter on 25 April. The meeting was chaired by 
Mountbatten and Home Forces was represented by Maj.-Gen. Gregson-Ellis 
and Major W. Goronwy Rees, who was Montgomery's personal liaison officer 
at COHO, and charged with keeping him personally Informed of events. The 
histories, ail produced under the auspices of COHO and hence Mountbatten, 
make the case that the Army's pian of a frontai assault was chosen over the 
COHO plan for flank attacks. The minutes of the meeting do not indicate that 
the question was discussed at all and only say that Hughes-Hallett
®  Stacey, Six years o f war, p.328; ‘Operation Rutter arvi Jubilee-. Notes on principal changes 
In the military plan', G .2 P.1. to VCCO [Vice-Chief of Combined Operations], 14 September 
1942, in Stacey, Appendix A, CMHO Historical Section Report No.153, DHist.
®  Operation Rutter, conclusions of meeting held at COHO on Tuesday, 21 April', In Stacey, 
Appendix A, CMHO Report No.153, DHIst.
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'explained the draft of the outline plan which, with minor amendments, was 
approved'. Stacey notes that the source for the claims is the unreliable 
document of 14 September. Thus the contemporary documentary evidence 
demonstrates that both Home Forces planners and COHQ planners were 
responsible for the adoption of a frontal assault, supported by heavy air 
bombardment, in the initial outline plan, which was approved by 
Mountbatten before being submitted to the COS.^^
GHQ HOME FORCES AND MONTGOMERY 
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY
In 1958, while Montgomery was in the process of getting his memoirs 
published, it came to Mountbatten's attention that they contained serious 
criticisms of COHQ and its part in the planning for Dieppe. He thus used his 
position as naval Chief of Staff to instigate a revision of the Admiralty Battle 
Summary 'Raid on Dieppe' (1946), to bring it in line with the other official 
COHQ publications, 'The history of Combined Operations organization' and 
the Combined Report, concerning Home Forces and Montgomery's 
responsibility for the formation of the outline plan, particularly concerning the 
adoption of the frontal assault. In referring to the 14 April meeting the 
Combined Report states, 'shortly aftenwards', the C-in-C, Home Forces, 
delegated his authority for this raid to Montgomery, as he was GOC-in-C, 
South-Eastern Command, to which 2 CID was subordinate. The Combined
COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.2; Amphibious Warfare HQ, 'The history of Combined 
Operations', p.38; Admiralty, Battle Summary (1959), p.4; J.M. Gray, Plan/Sec., 'Minutes of 
meeting held at 1100 hours Saturday 25th April at COHQ to discuss Operation Rutter', 28 
April 1942; and 'Operation Rutter and Jubilee-. Notes on principal changes In the military plan', 
Q.2 P.1, to VCCO, 14 September 1942, both In Stacey, CMHQ Report No.153, Appendix A, 
DHIst. In paragraph 4 ot the Report Stacey notes that the latter document mistakenly states 
that the meeting of 25 April was on the 24.
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Report continues 'From that moment he became closely associated with the 
military side of the planning and attended the principal meetings of the 
planners'. 'The history of Combined Operations organization' uses the exact 
same wording. (The source for these allegations is the previously 
mentioned, somewhat dubious document of 14 September, 'Notes on 
principal changes in the military plan'.) However, the 1946 version of the 
Admiralty Battle Summary does not mention 'Army representatives' 
attending any meetings until 25 April, by which time an outline plan had 
previously been formulated and a frontal assault already decided on. 
Montgomery is not shown to be involved until he chaired a meeting on 5 
June, and rightly so, as he was commander of a subordinate command to 
Home Forces and thus not part of its GHQ staff.^
Mountbatten persuaded Hughes-Hallett to compose an alternative 
version of the planning section of the 1946 Battle Summary which was 
similar to the Combined Report. Home Forces and Montgomery, it implied, 
were responsible for adopting the frontal assault while COHQ was absolved 
from any responsibility. This version was passed around to veterans of the 
COHQ planning staff, including Haydon, Major Walter H. Skrine, and Major 
Robert Henriques for their comments. In a letter to Haydon concerning the 
draft, Mountbatten explained that 'it was on the insistence of the Army 
Authorities that the original COHQ plan of two big flank landings was
COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.2; Amphibious Warfare HQ, 'The history of Combined 
Operations', p.3S; Admiralty, 'Raid on Dieppe (naval movements) 19 August 1942', CB 3081 
(26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle Summary No. 33, February 1946, London; 
Admiralty Historical Section, Tactical and Staff Duties Division, p.2, PRO, ADM 234/354; the 
source for these histories claiming Home Forces and Montgomery's responsibility Is 
Operation Rutter and Jubilee-. Notes on principal changes in the military plan', G.2 P.1, to 
VCCO, 14 September 1942, DHist, CMHO Report No.153, Appendix A. For a very 
Illuminating description of the attempts of Mountbatten, COHQ and historians to distort 
Montgomery's role see Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid; Montgomery's role reassessed', 167-201.
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changed so that the whole Army effort was put into a frontal assault'. He 
requested that Haydon reword this section 'to put the responsibility for 
suggesting these changes fairly and squarely where it belongs'.^
From the correspondence it is difficult to tell what Haydon's opinion 
was but from one of his last letters to Mountbatten concerning the matter, he 
seems to not want to cause any waves. Concerning the original COHQ plan, 
which was forwarded in 'amended form' to the COS, he writes that 'all 
parties, at that stage, were agreed on landings in darkness preceded by 
heavy air bombardment'. 'All parties' would seem to be both COHQ and 
Home Force planners, and could include Montgomery as well, but he is 
never mentioned.®®
Skrine could not agree that Montgomery had any influence on the 
outline plan before 5 June. Skrine recalls in a letter to Haydon that 'I can not 
however agree that the idea of the frontal attack was suggested by Monty in 
the first instance. I can only remember him attending one conference at 
COHQ [5 June], when the outline plan was firm and I think had received the 
blessing of the Chiefs of Staff'. Later in the same letter he again states he 
could not agree but does say 'It is conceivable that Monty had a hand in 
discussing the project in March but I never heard of this, at any time, before 
reading Admiral Hughes-Hallett's draft' on the origin of the plan. A second 
letter to Haydon concerns the Hughes-Hallett draft and confirms his previous 
recollections;
My personal view about Monty's part remains unchanged. I believe he did not come 
Into the picture until after the Chiefs of Staff had approved the plan, as originally
Mountbatten to Haydon, 16 July 1958, IWM, Haydon Papers IV,
®® Haydon to Mountbatten, 25 September 1958, IWM, Haydon Papers IV; SKrIne to 
Mountbatten, 29 June 1962, University of Reading Archives (URA), Henriques Papers (RHP), 
HEN 92; for more of the same see Skrine to Henriques, 6 July 1963,URA, RHP, HEN 115.
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conceived, and I do not see how he could be blamed for the subsequent alterations 
in what was a joint plan... Monty lay low throughout.^''
Finally, in a nine page letter to Mountbatten dealing with the planning,
Skrine makes the point crystal clear. This letter, and others, from the
personal papers of Maj. Robert Henriques have not been examined
previously in analysing this debate. Skrine adamantly declared:
the responsibility for suggesting the frontal assault cannot be placed solely on the 
shoulders of HQ Home Forces... [and] at no time did I have an Impression that Home 
Forces planners were the only ones who doubted the feasibility of taking Dieppe by 
assaults from the flanks.
Home Forces were quite ready to take the lead from us in any plan that could 
be found workable. I think therefore that the military (planners) in COHO were quite as 
much responsible for the idea of a frontal assault on Dieppe as the Home Forces 
planners. I hate having to admit this but I am certain it is right... I think that the 
[Combined] Report was not very precise on this subject.
Skrine sums up by commenting again that Home Forces were 'not
entirely to blame' for the frontal assault and that he did not think Montgomery
was either.“
Henriques, in a letter to Haydon, seems to also confirm that 
Montgomery became involved only after he attended his first meeting on 5 
June after which planning responsibility 'passed from COHQ to Montgomery 
and the Force Commanders'. Henriques goes on that it was at this point that 
the decision was made to make the frontal attack, 'which we had always said 
was out of the question'.“
Skrine to Haydon, 14 October 1958, IWM, Haydon Papers IV.
“  Skrine to Mountbatten, 29 June 1962, URA, RHP, HEN 92.
“  Henriques to Haydon, 12 August 1958, IWM, Haydon Pajsers IV. In a letler to Mountbatten 
in 1965 he emphasised that 'when the plan left COHQ, It specified assaults under cover of 
darkness with heavy bomber supjjort and naval support, and of course with no frontal assault 
on the esplanade', Henriques to Mountbatten, 30 July 1965, URA, RHP, HEN 115. 
Henriques contradicts himself, since In 1952 he wrote to Haydon, concerning 'The history of 
Combined Operations organization', saying that it la;
ralhar oH Ih* rails a t ragardt lha changtt In f i t  DIappa planning. Tht Ittua was last ana of frontal attack' 
vartut flank attacks, than of daykgM and dark. W t wara praparad to agraa to a frontal attack (as far aa I 
ramtmbar) provkftd It took placa bafort dawn and was practdad by a naavy Naval and Air bombaidmant. 
Henriques to Haydon, 4 February 1952, URA, RHP, HEN 94.
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’s
In the end, Skrine^and Henriques objections were ignored and 
Hughes-Hallett produced a final draft that specifically fingered Montgomery 
and Home Forces and exonerated COHQ. The relevant sections state 
Montgomery 'at once criticized the military plan' and proposed 'a dawn 
frontal assault'. Concerning Home Forces influence, it states that at the 18 
April meeting, when the two alternative plans were discussed, 'the weight of 
Army opinion' favoured the frontal assault option, and at the 25 April 
meeting, it recounts that the 'Army representatives explained the reasons 
which led them to favour this form of attack'.®«
Mountbatten continued throughout his life to blame Montgomery and 
Home Forces although it has to be recognized that he held this view at an 
early stage, even if it was not correct. Less then a month after the raid,
Vincent Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner, invited Mountbatten for 
dinner. His diary entry of the evening records that Mountbatten 'told me, very 
privately of course, that there had been a change of plan as a result of the 
views of the soldiers'. The original plan of landing 'strong forces on either 
flank and to strike at Dieppe from the rear' had been changed 'for the plan of 
a frontal attack on the town from the beaches'.®®
In the 1962 CBC documentary on Dieppe both Mountbatten and 
Hughes-Hallett were interviewed. Mountbatten's final draft notes for the 
occasion state that the 'Army planners decided for technical reasons such as 
the terrain and the time factor... that a frontal assault preceded by a short
Admiralty, Battle Summary (1959), p.4.
®® Vincent Massey Diary, 14 September 1942, University of Toronto Archives (UTA), Vincent 
Massey Papers (VMP), B1; A33.01.07.
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intense air bombardment offered the best chance of success'. Hughes- 
Hallett repeated these claims in his own interview and in his later memoirs.^
In 1967 in a letter to The Sunday Telegraph, Wallace Reybum, a 
reporter who was on one of the HQ ships on the raid, criticized the planning 
and blamed COHQ, and Mountbatten indirectly. An exchange of 
correspondence between Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett resulted in the 
latter sending two replies to the Editor-in-chief, shifting the blame to 
Montgomery and Home Forces. In 1973 Mountbatten, in an address to the 
Dieppe Veterans and Prisoners of War Association in Toronto, and in a 
statement on Radio-Québec, repeated these claims of Montgomery's 
responsibility.®^
These claims were given new life with the publication of the official 
biography of Mountbatten by the reputable historian Phillip Ziegler, who, as 
Peter Henshaw notes, has 'accepted Hughes-Hallett's memoirs as gospel', 
and also by the Whitakers, who, Henshaw says, did the same. The Whitakers 
claim 'There is indisputable archival evidence' indicating that he 'either
®® 'Draft notes for Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma's CBC TV intenriew on 
Dieppe', 1962, UAR, RHP, HEN 92; final draft is Louis Mountbatten, 'Dieppe; Mountbatten's 
view (transcript of 1962 CBC intenriew]'. The Legionary {October 1962), 12; for Hughes- 
Hallett's claims see Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery's role reassessed', 192; and Ray 
Hickly to McNaughton, 24 January 1962, enclosing James Senter, Globe and Mail, Hughes- 
Hallett comments on Dieppe, pp.3-4.
®^  Wallace Reybum to the Editor, Sunday Telegraph, 27 August and 17 September 1967, 
Hughes-Hallett to the Editor, 7 ,1 0  and 26 September 1967, NAC, JHHP, MG 30 E/163/6; 
Mountbatten to Hughes-Hallett, 18 September 1967, and suggested reply to Editor to 
Reyburn 27 August letter, UTA, CSP/062; in correspondence to his researcher, David 
McIntosh, Stacey states, 'Strange things went on in Mountbatten's mind about the Outline 
Plan', Stacey to McIntosh, 10 May 1985; McIntosh replies that he is Including the letter of 
Mountbatten 'orchestrating' Hughes-Hallett's replies to 'upstart Wally Reybum', 23 May 1985, 
both In UTA, CSP/062; Lord Louis Mountbatten, transcript of speech to Dieppe Veterans and 
Prisoners of War Association 30 September, 'Dieppe: the inside story', Legion Magazine 48/8 
(November 1973), 10-45; 'Mountbatten implies Montgomery okayed Dieppe attack plan', 1 
October 1973, Toronto Star, and Glenn Platt, 'Mountbatten blanrtes Monty for Dieppe 
catastrophe', 30 September 1973, The Sunday Sun, Toronto, both In UTA, CSP/044; Lord 
Mountbatten of Burma's declaration' on Radio^u4bec, c. 1973, p.80, Toronto, Terence 
Macartney-Fllgate Dieppe Collection (TMFDC), Mountbatten File.
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suggested or actively promoted the changes to Ruttei'. They continue that he 
'insisted on the changes to the original Dieppe plan' and 'proposed the 
switch from a flank attack' to a frontal attack. They conclude by claiming that 
from the very first meetings at COHQ until its final execution, 'it remained 
'Monty's plan'.“
As has been shown Montgomery had very little influence, if any, on
the original outline plan before 5 June. As Henriques recalls, Montgomery
preferred to let Roberts and his staff handle the detailed military planning,
and therefore 'stepped in and more or less kicked out the COHQ [military]
Planners'. Skrine remembers that he felt 'too many cooks spoiled this broth'.
Skrine also states that he considered 'Monty was doing his best not to
interfere' and could see that Roberts was being 'harassed' by visits from
people such as McNaughton and Crerar. Henriques makes the provocative
statement that initially Montgomery:
came Into the picture, not as 'a senior officer nominated by the Commander-in-Chief 
Home Forces' -  although this may have been the reason formally recorded in the 
Chiefs of Staff minutes -  but because it was decided for political reasons to employ 
the Canadians who were in South-Eastern Command.“
Thus Montgomery's involvement seems to have been due to
Canadian pressure and not vice versa. Paget was under pressure from
McNaughton and especially Crerar, who, as has been seen, was
aggressively campaigning in high places for Canadian participation in raids.
Thus by default Montgomery was delegated responsibility, as he was the
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C), South-Eastern
Command, to which 1 Canadian Corps was operationally subordinate. This
“  Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph, pp. 159-65.
*  Henriques to Haydon, 4 February 1952, URA, RHP, HEN 94; Skrine to Henriquea, 29 June 
1962, URA, RHP, HEN 92; Henriques to Haydon, 12 August 1958, URA, RHP, HEN 113, 
[copy In IWM, Haydon Papers IV].
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letter, which has not been examined previously by historians concerned with 
Dieppe, directly contradicts the Whitaker thesis claiming Montgomery's 
culpability in the affair. Paget's main concern in this period was maintaining 
some degree of control for Home Forces in amphibious operations and at 
the same time putting a break on the rapidly increasing influence of the 
maverick COHQ and on the Canadian Army. Henshaw explains that the 
Canadian Army, 'from the British perspective', must have looked something 
like a 'private army' promoting inexperienced officers to high rank in a 
separate hierarchy, playing one superior authority off against another, fully 
under the control of neither Home Forces nor Ottawa, something of a law 
unto itself.™
THE ROYAL AIR FORCE 
MODIFICATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY
One significant factor in the calculations for the frontal attack was the 
knowledge that a heavy preliminary air bombardment would take place 
before it. Why then did the Force Commanders at the meeting of 5 June 
1942 drop the proposed high-altitude preliminary air bombardment of 
Dieppe? Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett and most Dieppe accounts blame the 
abandonment of this bombardment on Montgomery since he was in the 
chair.^^ Discussion about the issue of bombing occurred again on the 4 and 
16 July, the latter date being after the cancellation of Rutter and revival of the
™ Henshaw, The Dieppe raid: Montgomery', 195.
Address by Vice-Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe Raid', 20 January 1962, transcript, 
p.4, PRO, CAB 106/6; Hughes-Hallett, 'Before I forget', p.155, NAG; Villa, Unauthorized 
action, p.151-2, fn.60; John Mellor, Dieppe: Canada's forgotten heroes (Macmillan; 
Scarborough, Ontario, 1975), p.23; Mountbatten's official biographer, Philip Zelgler, claims 
Montgomery's decision to continue without air attack had become Irrevocable, Mountbatten: 
the official biography {Lor\don‘. Collins, 1985), p.189.
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operation as Jubilee, long after the elimination of Montgomery from the 
planning process.^ During the several discussions on the issue, Crerar and 
Roberts never opposed the decision to cancel, for they agreed accurate 
bombing could not be guaranteed, and accepted the possibility that the 
resulting fires and rubble strewn streets might impede the advance of the 
tanks. Thus they must take a share of the blame for the decision. The main 
person behind the push for cancellation, though the evidence is only 
circumstantial, was the head of Bomber Command, Air Marshal Sir Arthur 
'Bomber' Harris.^
Harris advocated the policy of strategic bombing to defeat Germany 
and thus was very sceptical about loaning precious aircraft to support what 
he considered 'useless side-shows'. In a letter to Portal he complained,
'CCO sends us one wild idea after another for dispersing the bomb lift. About 
once a fortnight'. Harris was scraping together every bomber available for 
his 1000-Bomber, or Millennium, raids on Germany. Aware of this Leigh- 
Mallory proabably realized that he could not get the necessary bomber 
support from Harris. Therefore at the 5 June meeting Leigh-Mallory 
suggested dispensing with the bombing of the port itself because it 'would 
not be the most profitable way of using the bombers, as a raid which was not 
overpowering, might only result in putting everyone on the alert'. Instead he
^  COHQ staff Meeting No.13,4 July 1942, Minute 1, NMM, Baillie-Grohman Papers (BQP), 
GRO 23, Baillie-Grohman also notes he received orders to the effect that instead of the 
preliminary air bombardment he would have to depend on tactical surprise. See his 
Unpublished Memoirs, 'Flashlight on the Past', p.158, NMM, BGP; Baillie-Grohman to Roskill, 
letter 23 February 1962, p.2, Cambridge, Churchill College Archives, CCA, Stephen Roskill 
Papers (SRP), ROSK 5/52. 'Operation Jubilee Force Commanders' Meeting, 16 July 1942, 
Minute 4, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1, the bombing decision was again examined by the CCO and 
the Force Commanders on 17 August but remain unchanged, Stacey, Six yean of war, p.344.
^  Terence Robertson, The shame and the glory: Dieppe (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 
1962), pp.93-5; Villa, Unauthorized action, pp.152, 162.
67
outlined an alternative plan to attack aerodromes in the Dieppe sector and 
Boulogne as a diversion.^'*
In examination of his reasoning many inconsistencies show up.
During May and June 1942 seven bombing missions attacked Dieppe and 
no raids followed so why would the Germans be 'alerted' or expect anything 
different on the night of the 18/19 August?^ Roberts stated on record, 
several months after the operation, that he thought a few more such raids 
were to follow to mislead the Germans as to the significance of the actual 
attack. Major Walter Skrine, COHQ General Staff Officer II (Plans), and 
therefore deeply involved in the military planning aspect, recalls the 
preliminary bombardment was a 'fundamental factor' in the original army 
plan.76
Leigh-Mallory also indicated the resulting fires in the town and rubble 
on the streets would prevent the passage of the tanks on which the whole 
plan depended. Roberts recalled discussing the question of bombing 
accuracy with Leigh-Mallory, after which Roberts decided that 'I wouln't take 
a chance, because if they could only hit Dieppe and not the headlands and 
places where I wanted them to... all we would do is block the streets and my
Harris to Portal, 21 October 1942, p.4. Oxford, Christ Church College, Portal Papers, 9 
CorresponderKe with C-in-C Bomber Command', fol.66; Villa incorrectly states that this letter 
was to Churchill, Villa, Unauthorized action, p.290, note 88; 'Combined Force Commanders 
and Council and Advisers to CCO Meeting', 5 June 1942, Minute 5, In Appendix 3, p.272, 
'Rutter. Planning, Intelligence, Training, Security', Vol.lA, PRO, DEFE 2/542.
^  Dieppe was bombed on 8 May and night of 29/30 May, 2 June and nights of 2/3, 3 /4 ,4 /5  
and 8/9 June. Martin MIddlebrook and Chris Everett, The Bomber Command war diaries: an 
operational reference book. 193B-194S (New York: Viking, 1985), pp.264-5, 268, 274-7. 
Villa quotes Incorrect dates from this source, Unauthorized action, p.289, note 62.
^  Stacey, Six years of war, p.344 [Roberts]; Walter Skrine, Interview, CBC Close-Up: Dieppe, 
9 September 1962, transcript, p.11, DHist 594.009 (D13). Villa writes Skrine Indicated in this 
interview the following comment that the present author does not find: 'Those on Combined 
Operations Staff closest to the ground plan were convinced that an air bombardment could 
easily have been fitted In without seriously compromising the element of surprise'. See also 
Villa's discussion. Unauthorized action, p.153.
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tanks would never get through'. Surprisingly none of the army planners ever 
raised this objection during the previous two months of planning. The most 
important question for the planners concerning the issue of bombing was in 
the context of whether it was more essential to create the conditions whereby 
the infantry and engineers could cross the wide beach and esplanade 
(requiring heavy bombing) or to allow the tanks to pass through the town to 
the airport. Villa concludes:
The folly of sacrificing a thousand lives for the sake of easy passage for 30 tanks 
seems not to have been discussed -  perhaps because Harris had made clear he 
would never provide the bombers in the quantity the infantry needed to make its 
frontal attack. Getting the tanks into the town -  and, it was hoped, beyond -  therefore 
became the single paramount objective.^
Although Harris did not supply the operation with the bomber support 
essential to its success, Air Marshal Sholto Douglas, AOC Fighter 
Command, did supply a disproportionate amount of fighter support.^ He did 
so not out of a keen desire to support the other Services but because he 
wanted to provoke the German Air Force (GAF) to battle to inflict wastage on 
it. This was the most important objective of the RAF in 1942 and the aim of 
the Circus operations -  offensive sweeps using escorted bombers as bait. 
Depleting GAF fighter strength would mean fewer RAF bomber losses in its 
strategic bombing of Germany and, at the same time, had the added bonus
^Maj.-Gen. J.H. Roberts, Transcript of interview, p.5, CBC Oos»-Up. Dieppe, 9 September 
t962, NAC, MG 30 E507/2; Villa, Unauthorized action, p.153. Two official historians, Stacey 
and Rosklll, both cite the standard reasons for eliminating the air bombardment -  loss of 
surprise and obstruction of the tanks. Although they do not agree with the decision, they 
make no attempt at critical analysis. Stacey, Six years of war, p.336; Stephen W. Roskill, The 
war at sea, 1939-1945: the period of balance 2(2 vols., London; HMSO, 1956), p.241.
^  Villa states of the approximately seventy squadrons engaged, only two were bombers 
(Boston), Unauthorized action, p.286, fn.2. Of the 2,614 sorties flown, 2,111 were by 
fighters, 288 by cannon and bomber Hurricanes, 72 by tactical reconnaissance Mustangs of 
Army Co-operation Command, and 86 by day bombers -  24 by the American B-17 Flying 
Fortresses, 60 smoke-carrying aircraft and 7 Coastal Command reconnaissance aircraft. See 
'Combined Report', p.33, para.302 and John P. Campbell, 'Air operations and the Dieppe 
raid', Aerospace Historian 23/1 (Spring/March, 1976), 13.
69
of relieving pressure on Russia. The record shows as early as 21 March 
1942 Portal thought of the idea of using large-scale raids to lure the GAP into 
battle. In the Chiefs of Staff Minutes for that day he suggested 'we might be 
able to bring on a series of air battles in advantageous conditions by 
dropping detachments of paratroops behind the coast defences in the Calais 
area and then launching a series of small sea-borne raids with the object of 
bringing off our paratroops'. This strain of thinking characterised the Chief of 
the Air Staff throughout the spring of 1942.™
Many sources claim one of the main objectives of Dieppe was to 
provoke the GAP into an air battle of attrition.“  This seems to have been the 
underlying aim of the RAP but definitely not of the other Services. As noted 
previously, COHQ's primary concern was the feasibility of capturing a port in 
working condition with a division. No mention of an air battle as an objective 
is in the RAP operational orders for Rutter and Jubilee or any of the other 
pre-raid documents. The object officially stated by the Air Ministry documents 
was to protect the naval and military forces against air attack and to interdict 
any enemy reinforcements.®’
fighter
What resulted was the largest single-day^air battle in history. Leigh- 
Mallory, Mountbatten and Churchill quickly claimed this to be a great
™ Fergusson, The watery maze, p.169; Qoronwy M. Rees, A bundle of sensations: sketches 
In autobiography (London; Chatto & Windus, 1960), p.146 and Villa, Unauthorized action, 
pp.157-162; COS (42) 12th, (O), 21 March 1942, quoted in Villa, Unauthorized action, 
pp.157-8.
“  Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, 2 (3 vols., 
London; HMSO, 1953), p.143; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Captains without eyes: Intelligence 
failures of World War Two (London; Macmillan, 1969), p.165; Butler and Qwyer, Grand 
strategy, p.639; Brigadier John F. Durnford-Slater, Commando: memoirs of a fighting 
Commando fighting In World War Two (London; Qreenhill, 1991,1953), p.92; Charles 
Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946 {London: KImber, 1985), p.144.
8’ COHO, 'Rutter, Notes lor CAS' (Chief ol Air Staff), 2 July 1942, p.4, PRO. AIR 8/895.
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victory.“  A cursory examination of the documents shows that the statistical 
basis of this claim is grossly incorrect and the battle was a defeat for the RAF. 
In conclusion it seems that although the induced air battle was never an 
official objective, the RAF leadership all yearned for it as a way of indirectly 
furthering their aim of winning the war through their strategic bombing policy. 
Goronwy Rees recalls the RAF's 'principal objective was to force the 
Luftwaffe into the air and to give battle... We were assured that a landing in 
France on the scale of Rutter would compel the Luftwaffe to react violently'. 
The RAF looked on the COHQ military and naval objectives as ancillary and 
minor. Rees rather harshly, but it seems accurately, sums up the RAF view, 
'The military forces employed in the operation were not only guinea pigs. 
They were also bait. What did it matter if the bait was devoured whole, so 
long as the fish, or rather the Luftwaffe, was properly hooked?'.“
THE ADMIRALTY
MODIFICATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY
The decision to cancel the bombing did not lead to any corresponding 
increase in naval supporting fire as one would perhaps have thought.^^ The 
reason, on which the majority of Dieppe chronicles agree, is that Admiral Sir 
Dudley Pound, Chief of Naval Staff, flatly refused the heavy naval support. 
COHQ first envisaged having this support before the submission to the COS
“  Lelgh-Mallory, Cover Letter to Air Force Commander's Dieppe Report, S September 1942, 
p.3, NAC, RQ 24/10870/23202 (D5); COHQ Communiqué No. 4, 19 August 1942, p.2, PRO, 
DEFE 2/330; Churchill speech In the House of Commons quoted in Robertson, The shame 
and the glory, p.389; War Office. 'Assessment of the Dieppe Raid, August 1942' [Initials 
illegible, no date], PRO, W O 106/419SA.
“  Rees, A Bundle of sensations, p. 146-7.
B^Rosklll, Thewaratsea,p.^A^.
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of the original outline plan on May 9. The reason was Pound did not want to 
risk losing any of his larger ships, such as cruisers or battleships, to the 
threat of mines and U-boats known to be in the narrow Channel. The Royal 
Navy, and thus Pound, having suffered many recent humiliations could not, 
and would not, chance any more.ss
At the beginning of June Rear-Admiral H. T. Baillie-Grohman, Naval 
Force Commander, arrived at COHO and reviewed the plan. Afterwards he 
immediately requested a battleship. This, he recalls, 'was turned down in the 
“highest quarters” (Prime Minister, I presumed)’. Apparently the reason was if 
it was sunk 'we could never claim a victory and a victory in the face of the 
disasters we had lately suffered was required for the morale of the nation'. 
The Admiralty Battle Summary confirms this view saying, 'whatever 
happened, the operation could not have been represented as a success had 
a battleship been lost by a mine or otherwise in the confined waters off
Dieppe'.86
Major Rees, commenting on the final plan's inadequate sea and air 
preliminary bombardment and support, states the attitude at COHQ was that 
these kinds of 'unexpected obstacles' were exactly what COHQ existed to 
solve, 'by some commandos-raid of the imagination which would gaily 
overleap them'. He concludes that the over-confident atmosphere, inspired 
by Mountbatten, was so impossible to resist that the operation would have
^  The Navy's defeats Included the loss of aircraft carriers, battleships arxl seven cruisers in 
the previous six months. The Ark Royal and Barham ^ ere  sunk in November 1941, the Valiant 
and Quean Elizabeth severely damaged In December, and the Prince of Wales and the 
Repulse sunk in the same month. Admiralty, Battle Summary, (1959), p.1, fn.1, PRO, ADM 
234/355.
^  Baillie-Grohman, Unpublished Memoirs, p.156, NMM, BQP; Balllle-Grohman to Rosklll, 23 
February 1962, p.1; Admiralty, Battle Summary, (1959), p.6, PRO, ADM 234/355.
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gone ahead, 'even if the troops had been asked to land with no better 
weapons than their bare hands and fists'.^^
THE FORCE COMMANDERS 
MODIFICATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY
The other most significant change introduced to the original outline 
plan by the Force Commanders, and probably approved by Montgomery, 
was that the timing of the main frontal assault was changed from thirty to sixty 
minutes after the flank attacks went in. This meant that the units would be 
landing ninety minutes after nautical twilight. The reason for this was that half 
an hour was not considered enough time for the flanking battalions to secure 
the headlands. The significant point here, first elucidated by Henshaw, was 
that this delay in the Rutter plan would have left the units carrying out the 
frontal assault with less cover of darkness than they would have in Jubilee, 
(as it was renamed after its revival). Since in the Rutter p\ar\ the landings 
began closer to the beginning of nautical twilight, and twilight at that time 
continued for a longer period, the units would have had the same amount of 
time to reach their objectives before sunrise as in Jubilee's.^
The other important difference between the Rutter and Jubilee plans 
was that the Force Commanders approved Jubilee even though four out of 
the six days in August that it was planned to take place would leave the units 
ashore much longer than Montgomery had considered safe for Rutter. Each 
day the withdrawal schedule was different due to the changing tides, and 
each day of the six day period when the operation was possible left the units
•^Rees, A bundle of sensations, p.146. 
Henshaw, T h e  Dieppe raid: Montgomery', 196.
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ashore progressively longer. The fear related to 10 Panzer Division (PzD); 
intelligence had recently established that it was located at Amiens, and 
estimated that it could intervene within four to eight hours. Therefore after its 
second postponement on 5 July, the plan was switched to a one-tide 
operation for 7/8 July, named Rutter II, moving up the withdrawal time by six 
hours. Weather forced its final cancellation.^^
Henshaw has revealed that the significance of tidal conditions and 
their dependent schedules has never been fully explained in any of the 
COHQ histories or in any published works since. Perhaps, he explains, the 
COHO planners responsible were 'sensitive' about the fact that they had 
pressed for the main assault to go in before the flanking headlands had 
been secured. He says that Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett 'succeeded in 
twisting' the revised 1959 Battle Summary to claim that Montgomery, as 
soon as he entered the command chain, disagreed with the COHQ plan, and 
'proposed that a dawn frontal assault should be made instead, synchronised 
with two smaller landings either side to seize the cliffs which over looked 
Dieppe'. Later in the same section, the Summary also asserted, 'it was 
immaterial whether the main attack preceded or followed the flank attacks'. 
This replaced the earlier 1946 version that the frontal assault 'was not to be 
launched until the two flank attacks, to be carried out in darkness against the 
batteries east and west of Dieppe, had been successfully delivered'. 
Henshaw continues that only while Montgomery was in the command chain
^  This author is indebted to Peter Henshaw for pointing out the significance of the tidal 
conditions on the landing schedules. Not only Rutter and Jubilee suffered postponements 
because of bad weather but other operations also, such as Lancing. These were attributed to 
bad luck. Is this really so? The Military Adviser to COHQ noted, 'I am inclined to doubt whether 
It is, In effect, really bad luck, or whether the conditions required for such operaflons occur 
much less frequently than we think'. Brigadier Antony H. Head, 'Notes on the Preparation and 
Mounting of Operation Rutter, 0 July 1942', p.4, PRO, DEFE 2/549.
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did the plan allow enough time needed, 'even in theory', to capture the 
headlands before the main assault on the town. Perhaps, he concludes, the 
changes Montgomery made in the schedule of the landings in Rutter made it 
an equal or better plan than either the original outline or final Jubilee plans.^
REVIVAL OF RUTTER AS JUBILEE 
CHANGES IN CHAIN OF COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY
The day before the cancellation of Rutter on 7 July Mountbatten had 
persuaded the COS to agree to 'consideration' being given to remounting 
the operation at a later date. The process of how the operation came to be 
remounted as Jubilee is unclear in all primary and secondary accounts of 
the operation. What is certain is that Montgomery was completely against its 
revival for security reasons and recommended that it should be cancelled for 
'all time'. He says in his memoirs that he wrote to Paget in this regard, 
suggesting that if a raid had to take place to pick another target besides 
Dieppe, but his advice was disregarded. Hughes-Hallett's claim, that the 
'real reason why Monty recommended that the operation be dropped was 
that he had been removed from the chain of command and was bitterly 
offended', can be discounted as no evidence exists for it. Villa and Henshaw 
give a convincing argument that Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett and 
McNaughton arranged for his exclusion from the Jubilee chain of command 
as he probably would not have supported remounting the operation for 
security reasons.^i
Admiralty, Battle Summary (1946), p.2; Admiralty, Battle Summary (1959), pp.3-4; 
Henshaw, The Dieppe raid: Montgomery', 196-7.
9’ COS (42) 64 (O), 2 'Operation Rutter, 6  July 1942, PRO. CAB 121/364/SIC 
D/France/l/'Operatlon Rutter, agreed to at COS (42) 198th, 6, 6 July 1942, PRO, CAB 
79/21; Bernard L. Montgomery, 'The army In England after Dunkirk', In The memoirs of Field-
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Three schools of thought presently exist on the reasons for and timing 
of the revival of the operation as Jubilee. The first is Villa's. His argument is 
that Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett, knowing that the raiding season was 
coming to a close, and not having executed any large-scale raids, were both 
worried that the very existence of the fledgling COHQ, and their own careers, 
were under threat. They therefore pushed the operation through, scheming 
to remove any one who opposed the operation, such as Montgomery and 
Baillie-Grohman, and actually executed the operation without the required 
COS authorization. His evidence for this is largely circumstantial and he 
points to four vital questions that he says can only be answered once it is 
accepted that the operation went ahead without COS authorization. The first 
is why have none of the official historians who have dealt with the subject, 
and would have had access to all the relevant records, <■ been able to 
come to a clear consensus on the way the operation was revived? Second, 
why is there no document stating the COS decision to revive it? Third, why 
did Churchill inquire on 15 August about the status of the operation using the 
old code-name, Rutter, if the COS had already authorized the raid before he 
left for Moscow? If the COS gave the authorization after he left why was the 
DCIGS, Nye, once the raid was in progress, so angry about not knowing 
about it?
Marshal the Viscount Montgomery ofAlameIn, KQ (London: Collins, 1958), p.76; the Battle 
Summary claims Montgomery only 'alluded to his objection to the remounting'. Admiralty, 
Battle Summary (1959), p.9, fn.2; Hughes-Halletl to Mountbatten, 27 June 1962, IWM, JHHP, 
quoted In Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery', 198; Villa, Unauthorized action, pp.159- 
60. Hughes-Hallett replaced the Naval Force Commander for Rutter, Rear-Admiral H.T. Balllle- 
Grohman, who was promoted out of the way as he was also seen as a potential obstacle to 
Rutter's revival; on Canadian responsibility lor the revival, see Peter J. Henshaw, 'The Dieppe 
raid: the quest for action for all the wrong reasons'. Queen's Quarterly 101/1 (Spring 1994), 
109-12.
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The second school of thought is the Whitakers'. They go to the other 
extreme, arguing almost the exact opposite, declaring not only that the COS 
and Churchill certainly knew of the operation, but actively pressed for its 
execution. The COS apparently did this, knowing that it would probably fail, 
for the more important political reasons of mollifying the demands of their 
Soviet and American allies for a Second Front. The Canadian commanders 
(except for Crerar) are portrayed as mere pawns who were led like lambs to 
the slaughter in a political-strategic game being played out by their 
Canadian political and British masters, such as Mackenzie King and 
Montgomery.
The third is Henshaw's. He argues that the Villa and Whitaker views 
on the revival are not consistent with what is certain about the actions of the 
Canadian Army and COHQ, or about Mountbatten's with the COS. He 
explains that the question is not as simplistic as Villa and the Whitakers have 
portrayed it and that a more careful examination of the relevant records 
prove that McNaughton and Crerar were more to blame than any other 
authors have been willing to admit. Henshaw states that McNaughton 
and Crerar 'pushed ahead with Jubilee, confident in their own assessments 
of its viability, no doubt reassuring themselves that a plan, which in its earlier 
stages had been scrutinised in almost every quarter, could not go far wrong'. 
He goes as far to say that the Dieppe raid would not have taken place if it 
had not been for Canadian pressure for it.^
These three schools of thought concerning the decsion-making 
process can be thought of as three comers of a triangle, each represented
^  Henshaw, The Dieppe raid; the quest (or action', 112 [quote]; Henshaw, The Dieppe raid: 
a product of mispiaced Canadian nationaiism', 250-66.
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by one of the three authors supporting one of the three organizations, which 
they consider the main protaganist. The present author's view is that these 
three viewpoints are extreme and that the answer lies in the middle of the 
triangle. Therefore the answer to which organization and/or personality was 
responsible for the revival must be a compromise. To be more specific, the 
operation would not have happened, without Churchill, the COS, 
Mountbatten, COHQ, MacNaughton, Crerar and the RAF, pressuring for 
some offensive action in their own ways, and for their own reasons.
The actual date of the decision to revive the operation seems to have 
been just after a Force Commanders meeting of 11 July to discuss aspects of 
cancelled Rutter. The evidence is the recollections of Hughes-Hallett. It was 
definitely on again by the 14 July as it is referred to in McNaughton's 
personal war diary and two days later a Jubilee Force Commanders meeting 
took place, attended by Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett, Roberts and Leigh- 
Mallory, to discuss the plan. The same evening Roberts and Mountbatten 
met with McNaughton who explained that concerning the chain of command, 
he 'would ask General Paget to agree to General Crerar being named as the 
responsible military officer to coordinate' and if this was done he would grant 
him the 'appropriate authority' regarding the use of Canadian troops. He told 
Mountbatten that after preparation of the detailed plans, they would be 
subject his approval 'in the same way as C-in-C Home Forces and Chiefs of 
Staff Committee had approval for operations of British troops'. Mountbatten 
said that he thought he should be 'appointed Supreme Commander in lieu 
of Admiral James', C-in-C Portsmouth, McNaughton replied he had no 
objections but that this was a matter for C-in-C Home Forces and the COS to
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decide. Finally, he instructed Roberts to proceed with the preparation of the 
detailed plans in conjunction with COHQ and to report directly to Crerar.“
The evening of 17 July McNaughton met with Paget to discuss Jubilee 
and the latter agreed to a new chain of command that would run C-in-C 
Home Forces -  GOC 1 Canadian Corps -  GOC 2 CID. McNaughton stated 
that Crerar, GOC 1 Canadian Corps, would be named as the responsible 
military officer under the terms of Paget's letter of 5 May 1942. Paget agreed 
to write to South-Eastern Command concerning the new arrangement. He 
did so on 24 July, naming McNaughton the 'military officer responsible for 
the conduct of raiding operations to be carried out by troops under his 
command'. Three days later, McNaughton in turn named Crerar the 
'responsible military officer for operation Jubilee', and officially approved the 
participation of 2 CID and the 14 Canadian Army Tank Regiment in the 
operation. He concluded that his HQ should 'be kept fully Informed of the 
progress of plans'.^
How Churchill and the COS viewed Jubilee In the wider grand 
strategy context needs clarification. The reason for Jubilee's continued 
existence in July 1942 was the momentum for action already established by 
COHQ. This was the last operation based on the old raiding policy of 1941-2, 
and even if it had succeeded, no more raids could have taken place, 
because prior to it, Mountbatten had committed COHQ's complete resources 
to the North African invasion and any future large-scale operations. On 8
“ Villa, Unauthorized action, pp. 195-6; Stacey, Six years ol war, pp.342-3; McNaughton, 
‘Memorandum -  Operation Jubilee, 16 July 1942', 25  July 1942,8-3-5/OPS, NAC, MQ 30 
E l 33/248/1-31 July 1942.
^  McNaughton, 'Memorandum -  Operation Jubilee, 17 July 1942', 20 July 1942, fol.56; Lt- 
Qen. J, G. Swayne, CQS Honre Forces, to HO South-Eastern Command and copy to HQ First 
Canadian Army, 24 July 1942, fol.58; McNaughton to Crerar, 8-3-5/OPS, 27 July 1942, fol.59; 
all three In NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D3).
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July Churchill and the COS had abandoned Sledgehammer and decided to 
proceed with Gymnast/Torch, to which the Americans eventually concurred 
on 24 July. This left no politico-strategic justification, excluding the Russian 
dimension, for executing Jubilee. On these grounds Churchill and the COS 
should have cancelled it. That it was not cancelled reflects the pressure from 
the other organizations and individuals.
In rebuttal of the Whitaker thesis, the COS and Churchill, did not, 
through the instruments of Paget and Montgomery, push to revive the 
operation. On the contrary, Paget and Montgomery were very reluctant about 
the remounting for security reasons. They could do little else than express 
their concerns to McNaughton which he subsequently brushed aside. He 
was, after all, the senior commander of the majority of the troops to be 
involved and was officially responsible for their welfare. In fact, the 
negotiations concerning chain of command in July proves it was the two 
senior Canadian commanders, McNaughton and Crerar, who were 
responsible for the revival, along with the CCO, his Naval Adviser, and GOC 
Fighter Command.
When the active role of the Canadian Army, in conjunction with 
Churchill, the COS, COHO and RAF, is taken into account. Villa's argument 
that Mountbatten went ahead without COS authorization unravels. It appears 
that the COS In fact waived their right under the procedure of 5 May to give 
their approval to the final plan. On 17 July Mountbatten, in an attempt to 
increase his powers over raiding operations, specifically requested that the 
COS grant him the 'executive responsibility for the mounting and ordering' of 
Jubilee, and approve Hughes-Hallett's appointment as Naval Force 
Commander for It. This proposed paper was probably discussed at a COS
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meeting three days later, since at that time the COS confirmed Hughes- 
Hallett's appointment but only said it would consider the question of 
extending the CCO's authority the next day. Mountbatten, probably in an 
impatient mood, threatened to appeal to higher authority (who else was 
higher except Churchill) concerning his powers as CCO and specifically lack 
of operational control. On 27 July the COS accepted these procedural
changes.®®
The new procedure for raids was almost identical to that agreed on 5
May. There were two exceptions, stages (d) and (f). These are were:
(d) If the outline plan is approved the Force Commanders are appointed who are held 
responsible under the CCO for the detailed joint planning, the operation orders, 
preparation and combined training of the forces, and launching of the operation.
(f) CCO will be responsible for the launching of the operation in consultation with the 
necessary authorities and subject to the Naval Commander-in-Chief's approval.®® 
[This author's emphasis]
This indicates that at their meetings of 17 and 27 July the COS might have 
tacitly approved the outline plan for Jubilee by appointing Hughes-Hallett as 
Naval Force Commander and agreeing to the above procedural changes. 
On the other hand, the new procedure indicates the need for COS approval 
for the detailed plans has been abandoned and that the CCO has the 
authority to execute any future operation, including Jubilee, in consultation 
with the necessary authorities. The key question is who are the 'necessary 
authorities'? The answer lies in the changes to military command structure 
after the cancellation of Rutter, previously explained.
®® Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 'Operation Jubilee-, proposed entry In Chiefs of Staff 
minutes', 17 July 1942, IWM, JHHP; Copy of minute from Mountbatten to Secretary, COS, 23 
July 1942, PRO, WO 106/4117; COS (42) 218th, 11, 27 July 1942, PRO, CAB 79/22.
®®COS (42) 218th, 27 July 1942, Minute 11, CAB 79/22, Annex located separately in 
'Reconnaissance and Raiding Procedures', Enclosure 17A, PRO, WO 106/4117. The need 
for the Naval Commander-In-Chief's, Portsmouth, approval was In case of emergency last 
minute weather postponements as happened In Rutter.
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Rutter Military Command Structure
• Home Forces — Paget
• South-Eastern Comd — Montgomery
• 1 Canadian Corps — Crerar
• 2 Canadian Division — Roberts
Jubilee Military Command Structure
• Home Forces — Paget (delegated to McNaughton)
• First Canadian Army — McNaughton (delegated to Crerar)
• 1 Canadian Corps — Crerar
• 2 Canadian Division — Roberts
Therefore the 'necessary authorities' for launching Jubilee were not 
only the Force Commanders, RAF operational commanders, and C-in-C 
Portsmouth, but the two senior Canadian commanders overseas. In a 1943 
interview McNaughton explained that the actual control over the planning 
exercised by either Crerar or himself had been very slight.s^ This statement is 
not altogether convincing in the light of his record of participation. On 30 
April he approved the rough outline plan, on 15 May approved the outline 
previously submitted to the Chiefs of Staff, on 3 July reviewed and approved 
the final Ruffer plan and on 14 August examined the Jubilee plan and 
sanctioned the use of Canadian units.”  The 30 July entry in McNaughton's 
war diary notes that Mountbatten verbally told him the operation had the 
approval of the British War Cabinet. It seems apparent that Mountbatten 
purposely deceived McNaughton, since McNaughton never received
^  These changes In chain of command lor raids directly rebutts Villa's thesis that Jubilee did 
not have authorization. This was first explained In the present author's preliminary research, 'A 
reappraisal of the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942: planning and Intelligence', (unpublished 
Diploma in Historical Studies dissertation, St. Edmund's College, University of Cambridge, 
1992); the conclusions were published 'A reappraisal of the Dieppe raid: planning and 
intelligence', Pro-Phlle 4/^ (Spring 1993), 4-6 [pamphlet of The Friends of the Public Record 
Office).
Operation Jubilee/, Part I, Draft, CMHO Historical Report No.lOO, paragraph 133, DHIst, 
594.013.
”  Stacey, Six years of war, pp.329, 333, 335,344. On McNaughton's role, responsibility and 
effects on the plans at these meetings Stacey does not comment.
82
anything on paper to confirm this, and no other evidence for this has come to 
light. McNaughton could only sanction the use of Canadian troops in a plan 
that had approval, at least in outline form, by the COS. The fact that he never 
requested this in written form indicates his approval of the plan as a whole 
and his desire to get Canadian troops into action, no matter the cost.®®
Thus it seems under these procedures that the COS did not require 
their approval of the final detailed plans, although they might have expected 
Mountbatten to keep them at least in the picture. Perhaps also some 
ambiguity or misinterpretation existed among COS members regarding the 
actual meaning of key words such as 'mount' and 'launch'. Henshaw 
suggests that he even might have purposely 'misled' the COS. This seems 
unlikely, a more probable explanation is confusion arising from the fact that 
the procedures and terminology were new and constantly changing. At the 
first post-mortem COS meeting dealing with the operation, the minute 
entitled 'Raid on Dieppe' gives as its previous reference 'COS (42)234th, 5, 
12 August 1942'. This Minute 5 is entitled 'Raiding Operations' and states 
that 'The committee took note with approval of the outline plan for a future 
raiding operation'. Strangely, this did not appear in any other confidential or 
official history until the publication of Sir Harry Hinsley's second volume on 
British intelligence in the Second World War. He notes that the approval 
occurred 'only a week before it was carried out', which historians agree was 
extremely late for an outline plan to be submitted. Henshaw wonders why 
the submission would have been necessary at all.'°°
®® Villa, Unauthorized action, p.231 lor wrong date of McNaughton's approval, p.228 and 
In.30 for his discussion of the Mountbatten and McNaughton meeting.
'00 Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of Staff, 206-7; COS(42)242nd, 4, 20 August 1942, PRO, 
CAB 79/22; COS(42)234th, 5, 12 August 1942, PRO, CAB 79/22; F.H. HInsley, E.E. 
Thomas, et at., Intelligence before and during the Dieppe raid', in British intelligence In the
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Villa explains there are five reasons why 12 August approval was not 
referring to Jubilee. Villa raises pertinent questions which need clarification. 
First, why did not any of the other official or confidential histories make note 
of this before? The comprehensive, thirty-four page Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) report, completed a few months after the raid with much 
COHO help, dealt with all aspects of the operation, including the decision­
making and planning aspects. It only makes the ambiguous statement that, 
'The outline Plan drawn up by the 3 Force Commanders was approved by 
CCO and passed to the Chiefs of Staff'. A mistake or sloppy research seems 
very unlikely since, as Villa points out, these were 'some of the best official 
historians in the western world'. By examining the 1953 correspondence 
between the official Canadian army historian, C.P. Stacey, and the Cabinet 
Historical Section, Villa was able to conclude that the latter 'admitted in 
private correspondence that there was no record, nor even solid evidence of 
approval'.’®’
Second, during Rutter, the Inter-Service Security Bureau (ISSB) was 
completely involved in all necessary intelligence aspects of the operation, 
including a rigorous security check after its cancellation. Yet the ISSB never 
knew of with the revival of Jubilee or the impending operation until after it 
had begun. Villa makes a strong case that if the COS had approved it on 12 
August, or any time previously, they naturally would have expected, and 
insisted, that the ISSB check to ensure that no security leaks to the Germans
Second World War: Its influence on strategy and operations, 2 (6 vols.. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p.897.
’®’ B. Villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.1-2 (five reasons]; Allen, H.I., 
JIC(42)468(0), 'Operation Jubilee-Security', 5 December 1942, p.16, PRO, CAB 121/363, 
fol.20; Villa, Unauthorized action, p.45 ['best historians'); C.P. Stacey 1953 correspondence 
with United Kingdom Cabinet Office Historical Section, DHist 981.011 (D40), quoted in Villa, 
Mountbattan, the British Chiefs of Staff', p.208.
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had occurred. Mountbatten's excuse was that Jubilee was only on a 'need to 
know' basis and that many orders were put through verbally. Concerning 
intelligence, Mountbatten figured his own COHQ intelligence Section could 
handle the necessary tasks and thus the intelligence services were not 
informed. In the aftermath of Jubilee the COS reprimanded Mountbatten for 
not having informed them and took steps to make sure this never happened 
again.
Third, in 1950, while searching through official records for 
Mountbatten, the former chief of staff at COHQ, Major-General G.E. Wildman- 
Lushington, came across a note saying that for reasons of secrecy, a 
complete record of the operation's decisions were not being kept in the 
normal COS papers holdings but instead detailed discussions had been 
recorded in the COS Secretariat's secret files of General Sir Leslie Hollis, 
Senior Assistant Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet. Writing to 
Mountbatten, Wildman-Lushington concluded, 'I do not understand, 
therefore, why the search through the Cabinet files has failed to reveal the 
record of the decision to remount'. The folder on Dieppe has extracts from 
COS meetings of all important decisions concerning the operation but the 12 
August minute is not contained and does not seem to have been removed.^*”
Fourth, Villa asks, why could the 12 August minute not have been 
referring to 'the town of Dieppe in some future or ancillary operation'? This 
seems unlikely as the minute of 20 August was specifically about the raid so
’02 B. Villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.1; Hlnsley, British intelligence, 
p.697 [ISSB not Informed].
’03 Maj.-Qen. Sir Leslie Hollis, Cabinet Secret Information Centre Files (CSIC), D/France/1, 
Operation Ruttai“-, Ma|.-Qen. Q .E. Wildman-Lushington to Mountbatten, 17 August 1950, 
Kings College London (KCL), Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), General Lord 
Hastings Ismay Papers (HIP), Ismay 11/3/260/3; also see Villa, 'Mountbatten, the British Chiefs 
of Staff, 208.
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why would it not refer back to the last time the raid was discussed? Unless 
this was an error on the part of the person recording the minutesJ<^
Fifth, Churchill's queries from Moscow and Cairo about the status of 
the operation do not fit. On 15 August 1942 Churchill cabled Ismay inquiring 
about the operation's status, using the old code-name Rutter and Ismay 
replied included the date of launch as 17 August and the correct name 
Jubilee. Then on 17 August Churchill cabled Ismay again saying 'Please 
report when and if Jubilee takes place'. Why did Churchill not know the new 
code-name? Villa views this as evidence that no COS approval had been 
received. Could Churchill have just forgotten that the code-name had been 
changed, after all, it only had been known as Jubilee for about a month and 
as Rutter tor at least three months. He was not the only one to be confused. 
Colonel Antony Head also used the Rutter code-name when writing to 
Crerar on Mountbatten's behalf. If Churchill was just confused then the 
cables could be seen as confirmation that Churchill knew the operation had 
approval, whether it was given on 12 August or some other time. The 
problem was with Nye, who was present and chaired the 12 August COS 
meeting as VCIGS in Brooke's absence, and was furious after Jubilee, 
claiming not to have been informed until the battle communiqués started to 
come in. It is possible that Nye could have been lying after the fact but seems 
unlikely. Henshaw concludes that there is 'no clear evidence to determine 
whether he [or any of the other Chiefs] had seen an outline plan on 12 
August, but had expected to be told about the specific launch date before the 
event, or whether he knew nothing at all about the operation's revival'.
B. Villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.1.
105 Discussion of Churchill's cables arid Nye's ignorance; Villa, Unauthorized action, p.30 
I'Please reperì'], pp.31- 3, 44-5; Villa, 'Mountbatten, the British Chiefs of Staff, 208, 218; B.
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had occurred. Mountbatten's excuse was that Jubilee was only on a 'need to 
know' basis and that many orders were put through verbally. Concerning 
intelligence, Mountbatten figured his own COHQ intelligence Section could 
handle the necessary tasks and thus the intelligence services were not 
informed. In the aftermath of Jubilee the COS reprimanded Mountbatten for 
not having informed them and took steps to make sure this never happened
again.’“
Third, in 1950, while searching through official records for 
Mountbatten, the former chief of staff at COHQ, Major-General G.E. Wildman- 
Lushington, came across a note saying that for reasons of secrecy, a 
complete record of the operation's decisions were not being kept in the 
normal COS papers holdings but instead detailed discussions had been 
recorded in the COS Secretariat's secret files of General Sir Leslie Hollis, 
Senior Assistant Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet. Writing to 
Mountbatten, Wildman-Lushington concluded, 'I do not understand, 
therefore, why the search through the Cabinet files has failed to reveal the 
record of the decision to remount'. The folder on Dieppe has extracts from 
COS meetings of all important decisions concerning the operation but the 12 
August minute is not contained and does not seem to have been removed.’“
Fourth, Villa asks, why could the 12 August minute not have been 
referring to 'the town of Dieppe in some future or ancillary operation'? This 
seems unlikely as the minute of 20 August was specifically about the raid so
’“ B. Villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.1; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 
p.697 [ISSB not informed],
’“  Maj.-Gen. Sir Leslie Hollis, Cabinet Secret Information Centre Files (CSIC), D/France/1, 
Operation Ruffe/'; Maj.-Qen. G.E. Wildman-Lushington to Mountbatten, 17 August 1950, 
Kings College London (KCL), Liddell Hart Centre tor Military Archives (LHCMA), General Lord 
Hastings Ismay Papers (HIP), Ismay 11/3/260/3; also see Villa, 'Mountbatten, the British Chiefs 
of Staff, 208.
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why would it not refer back to the last time the raid was discussed? Unless 
this was an error on the part of the person recording the minutes.
Fifth, Churchill's queries from Moscow and Cairo about the status of 
the operation do not fit. On 15 August 1942 Churchill cabled Ismay inquiring 
about the operation's status, using the old code-name Rutter and Ismay 
replied included the date of launch as 17 August and the correct name 
Jubilee. Then on 17 August Churchill cabled Ismay again saying 'Please 
report when and if Jubilee takes place'. Why did Churchill not know the new 
code-name? Villa views this as evidence that no COS approval had been 
received. Could Churchill have just forgotten that the code-name had been 
changed, after all, it only had been known as Jubilee for about a month and 
as Rutter tor at least three months. He was not the only one to be confused. 
Colonel Antony Head also used the Rutter code-name when writing to 
Crerar on Mountbatten's behalf. If Churchill was just confused then the 
cables could be seen as confirmation that Churchill knew the operation had 
approval, whether it was given on 12 August or some other time. The 
problem was with Nye, who was present and chaired the 12 August COS 
meeting as VCIGS in Brooke's absence, and was furious after Jubilee, 
claiming not to have been informed until the battle communiqués started to 
come in. It is possible that Nye could have been lying after the fact but seems 
unlikely. Henshaw concludes that there is 'no clear evidence to determine 
whether he [or any of the other Chiefs] had seen an outline plan on 12 
August, but had expected to be told about the specific launch date before the 
event, or whether he knew nothing at all about the operation's revival'.
B. villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.1.
105 Discussion of Churchill's cables and Nye's Ignorance: Villa, Unauthorized action, p.30 
('Please report'], pp.31- 3, 44-5; Villa, 'Mountbatten, the British Chiefs of Staff', 208, 218; B.
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If the operation was approved on 12 August, Henshaw states this 
demonstrated not that Mountbatten was 'adhering to the correct procedures, 
but rather that, in the confusion of the time, he did not know what steps he 
was required to take' concerning remounting the operation or that, 'having 
lost his nerve at the thought of using his new powers to the full, he wished to 
spread responsibility for the raid more widely'. The Whitakers' claim that the 
COS 'approved a remounted raid again in July and August', which they give 
no reference for, is vague and seemingly without foundation, and therefore 
can be discounted.
Henshaw sums up that 'for these men and the organizations they 
controlled, the drive to revive the raid had become entwined with the need to 
justify their favoured strategy and tactics for winning the war, their claim to 
power and resources, their autonomy, or even their corporate existence'.^°^ 
McNaughton, Crerar, Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett and Leigh-Mallory, of the 
Canadian Army, COHQ, and RAF respectively, were the main protagonists in 
the decision-making and responsibiiity concerning Dieppe's original outline 
plan, modified Rutter and Jubilee detailed plans, and in the key decisions, 
such as adopting the frontal assault, excising the preliminary air 
bombardment, and remounting the operation. In this last regard, 
undoubteldy the desire for action expressed by Churchill and the COS also 
influenced these organizations and their representatives in pushing the 
operation forward.
villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.2; Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of 
Staff, 209-10 [Head, quote).
Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of Staff, 212; Whitaker, Dieppe: triumph to tragedy, p.200. 
Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: the quest for action', 112.
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OPERATIONAL PLANNING
On 9 May 1942 the Rutter outline plan was sent to the COS for 
examination and four days later they approved it as a basis for detailed 
planning. They authorized the use of 2 Canadian Infantry Division (CID) and 
agreed to Roberts and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory as the 
Military and Air Force Commanders. The Navai Force Commander, Rear- 
Admiral H.T. Tom' Baillie-Grohman, was not appointed until 1 June, as he 
was then serving in the Middle East and was slated to be responsible for 
training activities on the Isie of Wight. His place was temporarily held by his 
Chief of Staff, Commodore T.H. Back. Before close examination of the 
detailed operational planning and intelligence aspects of Rutter/Jubilee, the 
reasons for the selection of 2 CID and a summary of pertinent information 
given in the outline plan, on which the COS based their approval, is 
necessary.'
The reasons for nomination of 2 CID are not entirely clear but they 
apparently stem from Montgomery’s positive evaluations of it. In the Spring 
of 1942 Montgomery toured the majority of Canadian units under South- 
Eastern Command, making detailed personal evaluations of the officers 
down to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and general evaluations of the Non- 
Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and Other Ranks (ORs). Copies of all the 
reports were fonwarded to Crerar at HQ 1 Canadian Corps. One might 
wonder why the more senior 1 CID was not chosen for the task? Possibly
'  COS(42) 42nd, 3 ,13  May 1942, PRO , DEFE 2/546, fluffar -  Appendix III', p.9; Hilary A. St. 
Qeorge Saunders, 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid', BR 1887 (formerly CB 04244), 
London: COHO, IS October 1942, p.3, para.20, DHIst 594.013 (D1).
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because Montgomery considered that during Exercise Beaver III, in April 
1942, it was 'badly handled' and had concluded that its commander, Maj.- 
Gen. George R. Pearkes, was a 'gallant soldier... without brains' who 
seemed 'unable to appreciate the essentials of a military problem and... 
formulate a sound plan'. He similarly castigated, Maj.-Gen. Basil Price, the 
senior officer of 3 CID after Exercise Beaver IV, 10-13 May, stating that his 
leadership was 'lamentable' and 'completely ineffective', that he was a 
'complete amateur, one totally unable to train his Division', and that he was 
thus, 'unfit to command a Division in a field army'. Montgomery concluded, 
therefore, that the 3 CID was not as prepared for combat as the other two 
divisions. Finally, he stated that he did not think it 'possible to produce good 
divisions unless you... [had] good Divisional Commanders'.^
Montgomery judged that Roberts was 'the best divisional commander' 
in the Canadian Army, 'very sound, but... not in any way brilliant', and that 
his chief staff officer, or GSO 1, Mann, was 'first class'. In a 1996 Canadian 
television production, and subsequent book. Professor Terry Copp states 
that 'Montgomery was asked [not saying by whom] to select a division' from 
his Command and that 'despite pressure to employ a composite British- 
Canadian force, he selected 2 Canadian Division as the troops best suited to 
carry out the raid'. Thus Crerar probably nominated 2 CID based on 
Montgomery’s recommendations.^
2 John A. English, 'The Montgomery measurement'. In The Canadian Army and the Normandy 
campaign: a study ot failure In high command (London: Praeger, 1991), pp.135-6.
3 English, The Canadian Army, p.136; Copp also states Montgomery positive judgements 
meant that 2nd Division was selected lor Dieppe', see Terry Copp and Richard Nielsen, The  
Dieppe raid -  planning'. In No price too high: Canadians and the Second World tVar (Vl/hitby, 
Ontario: McQraw-HIII Ryerson Ltd., 1996), pp.92-3.
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Apparently, Canadians had not always been included in the Rutter 
plan, at least this is the view of the Whitakers, who take at face value, and 
without supporting documentary evidence, the post-war claims of Colonel 
Brian McCool. In the Spring of 1942 he was a major in the Royal Regiment of 
Canada and also had, in the words of the Whitakers, a 'unique second life' 
as 'corps raiding officer'. On 14 March 1942 he was ordered to report to HQ 
2 CID for 'special duties'. In fact, he was detached and sent to Scotland for 
special training. In a 1981 interview he recalled that, 'Originally, Dieppe was 
geared to entail the [1 Independent] Guards, Brigade [Group] reinforced by 
the 8th Argyles... They did a fine job in their rehearsals on the Isle of Butte, 
and then they moved down for a rehearsal on the Isle of Wight. There they 
fell apart -  not entirely their fault, but partly so'. McCool continues to explain 
that, at that point, the operation was passed on to his 'old commander', Lt- 
Col Micheál Rogers, of 1 Commando. McCool states that they 'profited' from 
the mistakes made by the Guards, but gives no details. The Whitakers 
explain his plan was for a small, compact raid based on speed, mobility and 
surprise, in the true commando style, using approximately 500, and not 5000 
men. McCool claims that their planning and training were excellent on the 
Isle of Wight: 'We could have done a good job, a better job than the whole 
division... but that was wiped out, and the job was given to the 2 Canadian 
Division'. Whether these claims are true or not is difficult to substantiate. 
Interestingly, McCool makes no mention of the fact that Mountbatten had 
originally envisaged using commandos and the Royal Marine Division. This 
latter claim of Mountbatten's is based on post-war testimony; no 
contemporary documents substantiating this have come to light.^
' Interview transcript of Col. Brian McCool by Joan Caswell. 1981, Oakville, Ontario, Whitaker
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The object of the 9 May buffer plan was to capture and hold the town, 
while tasks including demolitions of port facilities, power stations, the 
aerodrome at St. Aubin, dock and rail facilities, capturing a RDF (radio 
direction finding or radar) station and German divisional HQ at Arques-la- 
Baille, removal of invasion barges back to the England, and taking prisoners, 
were to be carried out (see Map 2). The units were to begin withdrawal eight 
hours after landing. Intelligence at the time indicated the garrison consisted 
of 'a single low-category battalion', with a total of not over 1,400 troops that 
could not receive more than 2,500 reinforcements within five hours. The 
basics of the plan were that during the night before the attack a heavy air 
bombardment, of at least 150 sorties, against the town would be carried out. 
Thirty minutes after nautical twilight two flanking attacks by three infantry 
battalions, two and half miles to the eastward, at Puys, and the same 
distance to the westward of Dieppe, at Pourville, with the objective of 
capturing the anti-aircraft, coastal defence and mobile batteries and any 
other German defences on the headlands overlooking the town. One of the 
two battalions landed at Pourville was detailed to capture, with tank support, 
the aerodrome at St. Aubin, three and a half miles south of the town. At the 
same time as the flank attacks a battalion of paratroopers were to be used to 
capture the divisional HQ four miles south-east of Dieppe, while another
Papers; Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph (Toronto: McQraw- 
Hill Ryerson, 1992), p.89; confirmation of 1 Independent Quards, Brigade Group in combined 
operations training, using tank landing craft, at Thomess Bay, Use of Wight, Is from official 
photographs taken by U  Lockeyear, IWM, Department of Photographs, H/20177-20217. In 
1967 Mountbatten first went on record claiming that he had originally wanted to employ Army 
and Royal Marine Commandos and repeated this many times therafter, ‘Commemoration of 
the 2Sth Anniversary of the Dieppe raid on 19 August 1942; speech by Admiral of the Fleet 
The Earl Mountbatten of Burma; at that time Chief of Combined Operations', Transcript of 
speech, 19 August 1967, p.3. Author's Dieppe Collection; Transcript of Interview, August 
1972, p.3, BBC Dieppe 1942, DHist 79/567/2; 'Operation Jubilee-, the place of the Dieppe 
raid in history. Journal of the Royal United Services Institute M9H  (March 1974), 26.
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group of paratroopers, amounting to approximately half a battalion, would be 
dropped at Varengeville to neutralize coastal and anti-aircraft batteries in the 
area. The parachute drop was to take fifteen minutes. About six miles to the 
east of Dieppe, at Berneval, about two companies of airborne glider troops 
would attack similar anti-aircraft and coastal defence batteries. The plan 
noted that, 'If this time is not acceptable, the commencing time can be made 
10 minutes earlier (20 minutes after the beginning of nautical twilight) but 
only by a sacrifice of important ground tactical advantage'.^
The frontal attack on the town would begin forty-five minutes after the 
flank landings, 'at a time when there is sufficient light for the tanks to be 
disembarked'. Up to two infantry battalions, supported by up to thirty, 'or their 
equivalent load' of, infantry tanks, would be landed. The remaining twenty- 
eight tanks and single infantry battalion would remain in reserve and could 
be landed at either the main beach or to the west of Dieppe; the plan did not 
specify where but most likely at Poun/ille. This frontal assault would be 
supported by a low level fighter-bomber attack on the town's beach defences 
and not more than three other selected targets in the vicinity, commencing 
fifteen minutes before and continuing for thirty minutes. Immediately 
following the fighter-bombers would be regular fighters, which would strafe 
for one hour the anti-aircraft and coast defence guns in the vicinity of the 
town and its beach defences. One squadron was to be held on call to 
support the assault on the aerodrome while a second squadron was to held 
on call for tactical support throughout the day. Full fighter cover to neutralize
s The 3 Infantry battalions would be carried in 25 Assault Landing Craft (ALCs), 2 Motor 
Landing Craft (MLCs) and 25 Landing Craft Personnel (Long), LCP(L), or R-Craft (unarmoured 
wooden boats), COO to COS, 'Operation Ruffer- Outline Plan', 9 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 
2/542, Rutter -  Appendix I', pp.77-9.
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German Air Force (GAP) intervention would be in place to cover both the 
initial assault and final withdrawal phases, as well as being availabie 'during 
the other dayiight hours to meet the air situation which deveiops'A
Navai support would be given by six Hunt Class destroyers, mounting 
4in guns, eight Motor Gun Boats, two Beach Protection vesseis and the Gun 
Boat HMS Locust, the latter which was to be in cióse communication with a 
Forward Observation Officer (FOO). Once the harbour defences had been 
neutralized it was proposed to have the Locust enter the harbour to give the 
infantry close-support if required. Arrangements were aiso made for the ship 
to be abie to disembark a 'small force of infantry' at the discretion of the force 
commanders. Finaiiy, the naval forces would provide a protection screen 
against possible German naval surface attack.
Concerning the withdrawal, the tanks needed to be embarked on a 
rising tide, while the troops could simultaneously be withdrawn either from 
the Dieppe beaches or from inside the harbour. The latest time this could 
start on 1 June was 1430 hours ( eight hours after the assauit) and three 
hours was permitted for its completion which would have been about one 
hour later each succeeding day. The plan warned the final withdrawal of the 
rear-guard units couid be made under cover of darkness.^
A COHQ staff meeting was held on 11 May to discuss Rutter and 
some adjustments were made in the outline pian. The date for the operation 
was now set for 20/21 June 1942, or any of the six days following. Although
B The 2 infantry battalions and 30 tanks were to be be landed from 25 ALCs, 2 MLCs and 10 
Tank Landing Craft (TLC). The resenre of 28 tanks were In 2 flights of 4 TLCs each, and the 
single Infantry battalion In 25 LCP(L)s, COO to COS, 'Operation Rutter -  Outline Plan', 9 May 
1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, 'Puffer -  Appendix I', pp.79-80.
 ^COO to COS, 'Operation floffer -  Outline Plan', 9 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, 'Rutter-  
Appendix I', pp.80-1.
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the 9 May Outline Plan did not mention this date, but only 'late June', 
previous planning documents had given the specific date. The Admiralty 
was given the option of increasing the naval support forces 'in the light of 
German prevailing dispositions'. The air authorities made the firm decision 
that low flying bombers could not be used 'later than 30 minutes before civil 
twilight', which left only five minutes for the low bombing, and that the tactical 
fighter support could not go beyond fifteen minutes after the frontal assault 
had begun. This left a gap of twenty minutes in the air attacks which was 
unacceptable, as it was necessary to have sustained air attacks before and 
after the assault troops landed. Therefore it was proposed to have the one 
squadron (twelve aircraft) of Hurricane close-support bombers begin their 
short attack five minutes earlier, and to advance the landing of the infantry 
frontal assault by fifteen minutes. Mann, who was representing 2 CID, 
agreed to confirm this with the Military Force Commander, Roberts.^
The air authorities also reported only enough lift for one battalion of 
paratroopers; none for the glider troops would be available. Therefore it was 
decided that the batteries at Berneval, originally the task of the glider troops, 
would be taken over by two companies of paratroopers, while the remaining 
one company would be used for an attack of an 'harassing nature' on the 
German divisional HQ. It was finally agreed that if 'tugs' (glider pulling 
aircraft), could be obtained, the glider troops should be considered for use 
against the batteries at Varengeville and possibly to reinforce the 
paratrooper attack on the divisional HQ. It Is significant to note here that the
® COHQ, 'W i/ffer- Summary ol Outline', 11 May 1942, Annex 2-'Forcea Required', p.86; 
COHO Meeting. Minutes, 11 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, 'Ruder -  Appendix III', p.26.
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plan in its present form left the coastal defence battery at Varengeville in full 
operation.9
Surprisingly, with this serious defect, the plan was approved by the 
COS on 13 May 1942. The plan also stated that the heavy air bombardment 
was to begin at a time suitable to Bomber Command and to cease no later 
than one hour before nautical twilight (0430). The low level bombing by first 
Blenheim, then Hurricane bombers wouid begin at 0430 and end at 0450, 
while the fighter close-support would then take over, and for twenty minutes 
attack anti-aircraft and coastal batteries, beach defences and other targets to 
be decided later in the detailed plans.
In a later, undated 'Complete' Outline Plan for Rutter, the serious 
omission of not assaulting the battery at Varengeville was altered to read, 'At 
about 0430 a parachute force will land and attack Coastal and A.A. (anti­
aircraft) batteries some six miles east and west of Dieppe'. No mention was 
made of the German divisional HQ and it seems, at this point, the plan for an 
assault on it had been wisely dropped in favour of the assauit on the more 
dangerous batteries. No discussion concerning these changes are in the 
minutes or any of the planning documents.
The 13 May plan clarified the orders of the two reserve flights of four 
Tank Landing Craft (TLC) each, totalling thirty-two tanks. One flight would be 
on call to land at the main beaches, and the second would be available to 
land at either Dieppe or Pourville. Finally, the plan indicated some of the
»COHO Meeting, Minutes, 11 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, 'fluffer -  Appendix III', pp.26-7.
'0 CCO to Force Commanders, 13 May 1942, Appendix II 'Operation Rutter -  Outline Plan', In, 
PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHO, Rutter, Appendix I, p.93.
”  'Operation Rutter. Section l-The Outline Plan', nd„ PRO, DEFE 2/542, 'flutter -  Appendix I, 
p.97.
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colour code-names of the beaches which were later used -  Blue (Puys 
beach), Red (East Dieppe beach), White (West Dieppe beach). Green 
(Pourville beach). Before 22 May 1942 the allocation of Red and Blue 
identifications were reversed.
On the 19 May 1942 an American staff joined COHO as part of its 
permanent staff. Brig.-Gen. Lucien K. Truscott, Jr, was in command of 
the initial four-man delegation, which quickly expanded to a total of twelve, 
with personnel working in all sections of COHQ. Mountbatten gave him the 
new title of US Adviser Combined Operations (USACO). Truscott noted in a 
memorandum to his superior. General Eisenhower, that Operation Round- 
Up was the agreed basis for British-American joint operations, and that the 
original delegation was intimately related to that plan. He stated that the 
three main reasons for attaching officers to COHQ were to; 'Gain battle 
experience in raids to provide leavening for American troops; study of 
combined operations to aid in training American troops; [and] promotion of 
common understanding, good relations, and cooperation between Allied 
forces'. Therefore it was sometime after this point that the idea of using a 
small detachment of US Rangers (American equivalent to commandos) In 
Rutter developed.'3
’3 'Operation Rutter. Section l-The Outline Plan', nd., PRO, DEFE 2/542, 'flutter -  Appendix I, 
pp.97-8; COHQ, 'Combined Report', p. 8; (or reallocation of beach colour code-names from 
west to east, I.e. Green, White, Red, Blue, see COHQ, 'Operation flutter -  Minutes of 2nd 
Meeting', 22 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHQ, 'flutter', Appendix III -  'Minutes of 
Meetings', p.266.
13 COQH War Diary, 19 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2; Truscott to Eisenhower, Memo, 7 
September 1942. The memo Indicated that one of the officers who joined later was the actor 
Lieutenant Douglas Fairbanks Jr who was assigned to 'Intelligence' and whose duty was given 
as '(Camouflage B)', which was possibly to do with 'Plans-Development', Lexington, VA, 
George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute (QCML), Lucien K. Truscott Papers (LTP), 
9/1.
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The detailed planning for Rutter began in earnest in the middle to late 
May. The question was discussed whether German expatriates should be 
used or not, presumably on intelligence tasks in association with members of 
the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and other intelligence 
organizations, and if so, should they be given special training. It was agreed 
that the Military Adviser Combined Operations (MACO), Colonel Antony 
Head, should look Into this. On 17 May it was suggested that the three 
Churchill tanks that were presently being fitted with the Ronson flame­
throwing apparatus, should be transferred for 'operational reasons', from 40 
Royal Tank Regiment to 14 Canadian Army Tank Regiment (14 CATR). The 
following day this regiment was ordered to begin special training with TLCs 
on the Isle of Wight. It should be noted that on 25 May Baillie-Grohman was 
assigned a naval staff, and thus at some point after the 13 May COS 
meeting, he must have been officially designated Naval Force Commander 
for Rutter. Also in late May a great variety of details were examined, in order 
to begin preparation of combined orders and a chronological operational 
programme. These included the overall organization of the naval forces into 
'Groups', training of naval and military beach parties, medical preparations, 
use of balloons and smoke, and even such minutiae as the Army should 
provide the troops with 'refreshment', such as a 'rum issue', before the 
assault.’^
Of particular interest is the entry in the COHO war diary of the 
proposal, at an Examination Committee meeting on 21 May, of staging two
14 COQH War Diary, 16-30 May 1942, PRO, DEPE 2/2; COHO, Extracts from meetings and 
memos, 16-30 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHO, 'fluWer -  Planning', pp.12-16; COHO, 
Minutes of Meetings, 21-9 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHO, 'Ruffer -  Appendix III -  
Minutes of Meetings', pp.263-9.
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small commando raids, five to fifteen miles east and west of Dieppe, with the 
object being to 'distract attention from the ffuffer objective and to assist in 
Operation Rutter'. After discussion the proposal was dropped due to lack of 
landing craft, although it was agreed to consider it as a 'separate operation 
at some other time'. This is probably the origin of the later plan to substitute 
commando for airborne troops, for at a meeting of the same committee five 
days later, it was declared that buffer'must go forward, whether or not the 
Airborne Division takes part'.'^
Apparently the Force Commanders did not agree with the COHQ 
Examination Committee, for on 1 June 1942, at the first meeting of all the 
force commanders together, it was pointed out that the need for two 
additional squadrons, needed for the airborne troops, was 'essential'. The 
same day Mountbatten sent his Deputy-Chief Combined Operations 
(DCCO), Brig. Godfrey E. Wildman-Lushington, to deliver a letter to Portal, 
Chief of the Air Staff, which explained that the Force commanders were 
ready to cancel Rutter unless they received that required lift for the additional 
paratroopers, necessary to capture 'two vital batteries', which presumably 
were those at Varengeville.’®
On 7 June the decision was made to have 2 CID mount a full scale 
rehearsal for Rutter, code-named Exercise Yukon I, on the 11/12 June. The 
area chosen was West Bay, near Bridport, Dorset, on the south-west coast of 
England, which was thought to resemble the landing areas around Dieppe.
'Extract from Examination Committee Minutes', 21 & 26 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2, COHQ  
War Diary.
COHQ Secretary, 'Combined Force Commanders Meeting, 1 June 1942', 4 June 1942, 
PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHQ, 'Rutter -  Appendix III -  Minutes of Meetings', p.270; Extract of 
letter, CCO to CAS, 1 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, 'Rutter -  Planning', p.16, entry 
P/36.
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The exercise was to simulate the Rutter plan, excluding the airborne 
elements, by having three separate landings involving six infantry battalions, 
a tank battalion, and small parties of engineers and other support units. The 
landing was to be opposed by the 'normal beach defences', such as barbed 
wire, tubular steel scaffolding and 'dragons teeth' (anti-tank concrete blocks), 
defended by 114 Infantry Brigade, 38 (Welsh) Division, 5 Corps, Home 
Forces, who were to act as the Germans. The exercise was planned to be as 
realistic as possible, with the assaulting engineers using reduced charges 
for demolitions, and both sides using smoke. The 'Germans' were also to 
use searchlights and pyrotechnics, such as red and green flares and white 
star rockets. All civilians were evacuated from the area.^^
Paget, McNaughton, Crerar and other high ranking spectators 
attended the exercise, which was so disappointing that Mountbatten, who 
was in North America at the time, decided to postpone the execution of 
Rutter, which had been scheduled for 20/21 June, and ordered that a second 
full scale rehearsal be mounted in the same area, using the same forces, 
which he and Montgomery would attend. This exercise, mounted on 22/23 
June, known as Yukon II, and the first one, taught many lessons which were 
of value. The two most important points were encompassed in minutes by 
Paget and McNaughton to Montgomery. In Yukon I poor naval navigation 
resulted in landing craft beaching fifteen minutes late and as far away as a 
half mile from the two flank beaches, while the TLCs arrived at the centre 
beach over an hour late, and not at all at the designated flank beach. 
McNaughton pointed out the 'insufficiency' of the smoke cover provided.
b q s , 5 Corps, 'flu ffor- Meeting held to mount Yukon f, 7 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, 
COHO, 'Rutter -  Appendix III -  Minutes of Meetings', p.275-8.
99
while Paget called its use 'amateurish'. Paget also noted the 'failure to 
synchronise the approach of the TLC[s] with the attack of our fighters'.^^
More specific points were noted by McNaughton, Skrine, 114 Infantry 
Brigade, and officers of the 2 CID involved. Besides almost all reports noting 
lateness and errors in navigation of the landing craft, 114 Infantry Brigade 
warned of ALCs 'bunching up'. During the initial landings of Yukon I, 
McNaughton noted that the central beach consisted of 'fine gravel which 
completely defeated all wheeled vehicles including scout cars and blitz 
buggies [Jeeps]'. In the second exercise, engineers attempted to lay out 
chespaling mats to assist the wheeled vehicles across the beach, but this 
was 'frequently smashed by tanks and did not provided suitable surface for 
Scout Cars even when they managed to get to it'. In both exercises when 
vehicles became stuck, they had to be towed across the beach by bulldozers 
or carriers. Once ashore reports warned that liaison among infantry, 
engineers and tanks was poor, citing an example that during the first 
exercise, near the aerodrome, tanks and infantry were within five hundred 
yards of each other, and 'neither were aware of the other's presence'. This 
showed the need for better inter-service communications among all arms 
and more and better signals equipment. During Yukon I information on the 
second HQ ship, Femie, was 'practically nil', since the infantry brigades did 
not use the 'B' wave radio frequency, the radio set for direct communication 
with the HQ ship, Caipe, was not working properly, and 'the Navy had no 
information'. Concerning operations inland on Yukon /, it was stated that 
section leading, as opposed to platoon leading, was 'on the whole rather
McNaughton to Montgomery, 23 June 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10750/220C1.009 (03), QOC 1- 
0-4, 'Operations-Raids', Pari 1(b), fol.46; C-in-C, Home Forces to QOC-ln-C, South-Eastern 
Command, Minute 1627, 24 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHO, 'Ruffer -  Training', p.64.
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poor', while platoon commanders often ignored section commanders 
aitogether. One result was that many of the 'men in the ranks did not know 
what the units "intention" was'. In Yukon II use of smoke by the attacking 
infantry was considered 'excellent' by the exercise umpires, and effective 
use of the 2in mortar in this regard was noted, although during the 
withdrawal, smoke was laid too close, allowing the advancing 'Germans' to 
get so near that 'they could have landed 2in Mortars and rifle grenades' into 
the TLCs, 'in addition to shooting them up with rifles and L.A. [light artillery]'. 
This same report explained that the withdrawal on the beach was somewhat 
chaotic. At one point over three hundred troops, four completely loaded 
TLCs, two of which were grounded due to over crowding, several carriers 
and Jeeps, were packed into a bridgehead protected by only two infantry 
platoons of the Fusilier Mont-Royal (FMR). The two TLCs remained 
grounded for almost an hour and one of them finally needed to be pushed off
by a bulldozer.
Concerning the Yukon exercises and the general training for Rutter, 
Montgomery stressed the importance of assigning a conference room with 
the necessary air photos, maps, sketches and miniature model of the area, 
that should be used for all conferences and meetings of the Force 
Commanders and officers down to company level. Also each company
Reports dealing with Yukon I & //are: 'Exercise Yukon //22/23 June 1942 -  Points noted by 
Defenders on Coast of 114 Inf. Bde, 38th (Welsh) Division', nd., RG 24/13746/Serlal 152/QS 
Folder 6; McNaughton, Memorandum 64-2-2, 22 June 1942, MG 30 E133/248/1-30 June 
1942, Appendix F; Skrine, 'Ru/fer Training-Points raised by Battalion and Brigade 
Commanders', 11 July 1942; PRO, DEFE 2/549; Home Forces, 'Exercise Yukon 12 June 
1942-Report by P.M.L.O [Principal Military Landing Officer] Umpire', 16 June 1942; Brigadier 
Frere, 114 Infantry Brigade, to Skrine, 16 June 1942; and 'Report on Exercise Yukon', 14 
June 1942, all three reports in NAC, RG 24/10672/232C2 (D37); 'Notes taken at meeting of 
Officers 2 Cdn Div., Drill Hall-Newport', 14 June 1942; Skrine, 'Notes on Exercise Yukori, 13 
June 1942; Wright, Major P.E.R., 'Memo on Exercise Yukon', 13 June 1942, all three reports 
In NAC, RG 24 /10873/232C2 (DS4).
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should be given at least an hour to have the plan explained to them in detail 
in this room. All naval officers and crews of the various landing craft should 
also go through the same process. He warned that 'the Navy can never 
guarantee that they will land the various parties exactly at the right place in 
each case'. Therefore, the army must be familiar with all the landmarks in the 
area, so that if they are landed in the incorrect place, they can immediately 
take corrective action. Montgomery even concerned himself with minutiae 
such as ensuring that all men were provided with medicine to prevent sea­
sickness since, 'if troops are sea-sick they will not fight well on shore'. 
Concerning communications he stated that complete reliance should not be 
placed on radio and that alternative methods must be provided everywhere, 
such as 'visual, runner, motor launch from ship to shore'. He concluded his 
report warning that 'It is fatal to assume that everything will go according to 
plan; it is almost certain that this will not be so. Officers must be prepared to 
face up to unforeseen difficulties, and must have that robust mentality which 
will enable them to do something about it quickly.' Finally he stressed the 
need for confidence in success, from the Force Commander right down 
through the chain of command.“
The decision to mount Yukon II was taken on 15 June at an afternoon 
meeting at COHO of the Force Commanders, also attended by Montgomery 
and Mountbatten. At this time, the suggestion of having about 8 American 
officers and 14 NCOs take part in the operation was put forward, with 1 
officer and 2 or 3 NCOs landing with each battalion commander, and 1 or 2 
NCOS of the US Marines Corps with the Royal Marines on HMS Locust.
“  Montgomery, ‘Important points In training-Aurfer, 29 June 1942, NAC, RQ 
24/10872/232C2 (D37).
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Mountbatten had already arranged to have about ten men of the US 
Airborne troops on the parachute drop. Arrangements were also made to 
have the American contingent attend Yukon II. Finally, the date for Rutter was 
fixed for the first favourable day between 3/4 and 8/9 July 1942.21
Further meetings were held to put the finishing touches on the 
detailed orders. These examined the role of the SOE and other intelligence 
detachments, media personnel going on the operation and post-raid 
publicity arrangements, changes in the naval order of battle, such as the 
addition of ten smoke drifters (most likely a direct result of the experience of 
the Yukon exercises), allocation of medical ships, and finally, the issue of 
maintaining adequate security and cover stories for the unusual training and 
movements of units to ports of embarkation. Although the Detailed Military 
Plan for Operation Rutter was issued on 20 June, it was amended many 
times and numbered over two hundred pages.22
Rutter almost received premature cancellation when Churchill asked 
to review it on his premature return from the US on 26 June. The loss of 
Tobruk, the defence of which had gained almost mystical significance as a 
symbol of British resibtanceto Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's vaunted Afrika 
Korps, resulted In the tabling of a Motion of Censure in Parliament, a direct 
threat to Churchill's position as Prime Minister. Fearing a potential disaster at 
Dieppe would coincide with the Vote of Censure, he sought assurances that 
the operation would be successful.
21 'Operation Putter -  Minutes of meeting held at 1400 hours on Monday, 15 June 1942, to 
discuss certain points concerning Operation Putter, COHO, 'Putter -  Appendix III -  Minutes 
of Meetings', pp.30-1, PRO, OEFE 2/546.
22 Various planning meetings and decisions are In PRO, DEFE 2/542, 'Rutter -  Planning', 11 • 
30 June 1942, pp.20-4.
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Therefore on 30 June Churchill held a small private conference at 10 
Downing Street to discuss Rutter. The meeting was attended by Brooke, 
Ismay, Mountbatten, Hollis, Hughes-Hallett, two officers of the staff of Ministry 
of Defence and Mrs Churchill, who 'hovered in the background arranging 
flowers'. No Canadian representative was present, possibly because, as 
Villa acutely observes, Churchill did not want any witnesses if he decided to 
cancel Rutter tor domestic political reasons. Stacey interviewed Hughes- 
Hallett in 1946 and says that the latter got the date of the meeting from his 
diary, although Stacey never saw it and it has never come to light since.^
Unfortunately no minutes of the meeting seem to have been recorded 
and so one is left with only a few cryptic references, most of which are post­
war recollections. Brooke's diary contains a short entry confirming the 
meeting took place at 3pm, at Downing Street, to discuss a 'large scale raid 
which is to be carried out next Saturday morning on Dieppe', but gives no 
further details. Thus one is left with Hughes-Hallett's post-war recollections 
in his letters, memoirs and interviews. He describes in these that Churchill 
was 'reluctant to risk a serious military failure so soon after the disaster at 
Tobruk'. Also since Churchill had just persuaded Roosevelt to accept Torch, 
the invasion of North Africa, instead of the Sledgehammer, Channel 
operations became 'much less urgent'. Churchill first asked Hughes-Hallett 
his opinion about the morale of the Canadian troops. For a short time 
Hughes-Hallett had trained with one of the Canadian battalions.
^  Villa's discusses the 30 June 1942 meeting In Unauthorized action, pp.90-2,190, 201; 
Stacey, Notebook, 'Visit to Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, CB, DSO, HMS Vernon, 29/30 
September 1946, UTA, CSP/012; Stacey, 'Memorandum of Interviews with Capt. J. Hughes- 
Hallett, CB, DSO, RN, at Portsmouth, 29 and 30 September 1946', 1 October 1946, 
Appendix A, pp.1-6. In 'Operation Jubilee-, the raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942. Additional 
information on planning', 5 October 1946, DHist, CMHQ Report No. 159; Stacey, Six years of 
war, p.337; Stacey, Inten/iew by Terence Macartney-Pllgate, 1978, DHIst, 79/567/106.
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masquerading as a private. He replied, says Stacey, that 'they would fight
like heir. Hughes-Hallett then says Churchill asked him if he could
guarantee success? Stacey claims that Hughes-Hallett told him in 1946 that
it was to Mountbatten that Churchill directed this question, and that
Mountbatten replied that of course he could not guarantee success. Hughes-
Hallett seems to have become confused, since years later he recalls
in
replying, 'so far as I knew every ship might be a blazing wreck witty the first 
15 minutes of the beginning of the engagement', at which point Brooke 
quickly interrupted saying, 'If he, or anyone else, could guarantee success... 
there would indeed be no object in doing the operation. It is just because no- 
one has the slightest idea what the outcome will be that the operation is 
necessary'. At this juncture, Churchill stated that, at this moment, he had no 
wish, in Hughes-Hallett's words, 'to learn through adversity'. Hughes-Hallett 
claims that Brooke then said, 'no responsible General will be associated with 
any planning for invasion until we have an operation at least the size of 
Dieppe behind us to study and base our plans upon'. This adamant 
statement by Brooke, the most senior military man in Britain, with years of 
military experience, was what finally swayed the PM to accept the 
operation.*^
Villa says that it is strange that a man of Brooke's professional 
competence, would back such an flawed operation, and that it seems 
'scarcely credible', until, that is, one realizes that what Brooke was doing.
^  Churchill's account of the meeting is uninformative and even puts It at a later date, which 
would not have been possible as Rutter vtas scheduled from 3/4 July. Brooke, Diary, 30 June 
1942, KCL, Alanbrooke Papers, Notes on my life, 3/A/VI, p.429; Hughes-Hallett to 
Mountbatten, 18 August 1950, KCL, Ismay Papers, 11/3/260/4; Hughes-Hallett to Stacey, 30 
December 1952, DHIst 594,011 (D8); Hughes-Hallett, Memoirs, Before I torget, 1971, MAC, 
MQ 30 E463, pp. 165-6; Stacey to Editor, RUSI Journal, 10 May 1974, UTA, CSP/005; 
Stacey, Six years of war, p.337.
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'was buying time while he sorted out his strategic priorities'. Rutter was tied 
to another operation, Jupiter, a major assault on several Non/vegian ports, 
which Brooke considered very risky and wanted to squash. He realized that 
letting Hutter proceed, would permit Jupiter to die a quiet death, but on the 
other hand, if Rutter was cancelled, Churchill would push for Jupiter. Villa 
describes that to prevent this from happening, 'Brooke was prepared to keep 
Dieppe alive, and from this perspective the disaster that resulted may be 
said to be part of the price paid for the slow strangulation of Jupitei“. The 
Whitakers, in their discussion of the meeting, imply that not only Brooke, but 
Churchill also, regarded Dieppe as 'their last hope against the threat of 
Sledgehammer'. Strangely, the Whitakers do not seem to regard the 
Jupiter!Rutter connection as significant, as they do not discuss Jupiter, or 
even Norway, at all in their book.“
Although no Canadians took part in the preparation of the original 
Rutter outline plan, the senior Canadian commanders involved. Generals 
McNaughton, Crerar and Roberts, as will be shown, all had opportunities to 
review all preliminary and final operation orders for both Rutter arid Jubilee 
and thus, if need be, veto Canadian participation.“  The first instance was in 
the beginning of May after Crerar informed Roberts that his division had 
been selected and he, and the necessary staff, were ordered to COHQ to 
collaborate with the naval and air planning staffs, in the preparation of the 
detailed plans. Under the current procedures for combined operations, the 
Force Commanders had to decide whether to accept the outline plan as a 
basis for further planning or not. For his part, Roberts ordered his senior staff
“  villa. Unauthorized action, pp.90-3; Whitaker, Dieppe: tragedy to triumph, pp.171-2.
“  All three Generals, pointa out the official Canadian army historian, were confident In the 
success of the operation. See Stacey, Six years of war, p. 344.
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officer, Mann, 2 CID, to do a detailed review of the outline plan. This 
appreciation is undated and thus Stacey says it is unsure if it was started 
and/or completed before the outline plan had received COS approval.^
In the appreciation Mann noted that tanks assaulting Dieppe could 
give immediate fire support to the attacking infantry and engineers and 
cause a psychological shock to the Germans and civilian population. Tanks 
could receive ammunition and engineer support material easier on the main 
beach where the supply craft concentrated. The tanks would also be closer 
to their planned objectives and the beach front was the most convenient 
place for re-embarkation after the raid.
Mann recognized the disadvantages of frontally attacking the enemy, 
the need for engineer assault teams, and the difficulty of penetrating blocked 
streets caused by bombardment, but he pointed out that the garrison only 
consisted of two low-grade infantry companies. Opting in favour of the plan, 
he concluded that the tanks would play an important part in the withdrawal 
phase and that the tanks 'seemed to have a reasonable prospect of 
success'.“
The idea of trying to send slow-moving, infantry support tanks rapidly 
through the narrow streets of a defended enemy town, and out into the 
surrounding countryside, holding a defensive perimeter and then 
withdrawing through the town, all in the matter of four to five hours, seems 
ridiculously foolhardy and reckless. It also showed the gross ignorance of
^  Concerning the lack of a date on Mann's appreciation, Stacey explains that:
So much was don* vwbally tw t Vw n a n  no oSwr documanti wtilch M«v« to put It In Ms propw plao* In Sm*.
Tha natunri aaaumpiton I* to tf tta  OuMns Plwi dto not go to HO 2 Cdn. DIv. unW tis  ChM* of Staff had aptyovad 
It but this apparanny cannot b* actualty provad by t i*  avallabi* documant*.
Stacey to Slmonds, 22 April 1969, UTA, CSP/005.
“  Mann, 'Lecture notes. The Combined Services raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942', nd„ p.2, 
DHIst 594.019; Mann, 'Observations Upon the Outline Plan', nd., pp.3-4, NAC, RG 
24/10872/232C2 (D36).
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COHQ planners and senior Allied commanders of the capabilities and 
limitations of tanks. No one seems to have considered carefully the extreme 
vulnerability of tanks taking part in street-fighting in built-up areas. Tanks 
have extremely limited vision. If a crew commander stuck his head out of the 
turret to get a clear view, he would expose himself to enemy sniper fire.
Tanks could neither protect themselves nor return fire unless at some 
distance from the target because their guns could not elevate very high.
They would also be moving slowly since they depended on infantry for 
mutual support, especially in built-up areas.^
After Yukon II steps were taken to correct the many faults identified. 
These are outlined in a letter of 1 July to Paget, a copy of which he sent to 
McNaughton. Most important was the concern with navigation and getting 
the assault troops to the correct beaches and on time. To this end, three 
'special R.D.F. ships' were assigned to guide the groups into the respective 
flank (Green and Blue) and centre beaches (Red and White). Two officers, 
'with expert local knowledge of the coast in question', were also assigned to 
the lead the flank groups in. Montgomery noted that these arrangements 
'should ensure accurate navigation' and that they had not existed in Yukon I 
and II. He also explained provisions for improved close-support by fighters 
on the centre beaches, by having them controlled by radio from the HQ ship. 
Concerning smoke, SLOs (Smoke Liaison Officers) with 4in mortars, and a 
number of 'smoke-ships' were detailed to the expedition, while Mountbatten
^  In this period, astonishing as it may seem, no clear and established tactical doctrine for the 
employment of tanks existed In the British Army. The pre-war doctrines proved disastrously 
imperfect during the campaign preceding Dunkirk. The British High Command had not 
collectively decided the type of tank to be produced and how It was to be employed mainly 
because during the inter-war period British senior officers, schooled In the traditions of the 
Infantry or cavalry arms, were unwilling to recognize that the gradual mechanization of the 
cavalry arm. In turn required a radical revision of the cavalrys traditional roles. Lt-Qen. E.L.M. 
Bums, General Mud: memoirs o f two world wars (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970), pp.110-111.
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assigned his 'own smoke expert'. Montgomery explained that on 30 June, he 
met with all three Force Commanders on the Isle of Wight and went through 
all the detailed plans of the whole operation. He concluded that he was 
'satisfied' that the operation as planned 'is a possible one' and has 'good 
prospects of success', given 'favourable weather', 'average luck', and that 
the navy put the assault forces ashore 'in the right places, and at the right 
times'. In a hand-written postscript, he confidently stated, 'The Canadians 
are 1 st Class chaps; if anyone can pull it off, they will'.»
On the day of the operation Crerar wrote to McNaughton in the same 
vein, noting that he had met the previous day with Roberts and his 
brigadiers, who had expressed 'full confidence' in the operation, 'given a 
break in luck'. Concerning the previous navigational difficulties, he 
concluded that 'this is now pretty well disappeared', although he explained 
that he had warned Roberts that '100% accuracy should never be expected 
in any human endeavour*, and that any difficulties should be dealt with by 
'rapid thinking and decision'. One wonders what Crerar was thinking here, 
as later, in the same letter, he commented that he agreed with Montgomery, 
that once the operation was launched, it could only be influenced by 
airpower. He optimistically concluded that he agreed that the plan was 
'sound, and most carefully worked out', and that he would have 'no 
hesitation in tackling it, if in Robert's place'.»
With the Rutter plans completed, Roberts held a conference on 27 
June of all officers of the 2 CID assault force. Roberts opened the conference
»  Montgomery to Paget, 1 July 1942, and cover note, Montgomery to McNaughton, 1 July
1942, NAC, RQ 24 C17/13611/QS First Canadian Army HQ War Diary, April 1942 -  February
1943.
»  Crerar to McNaughton, 3 July 1942, NAC, RQ 24 C17/13611/QS First Canadian Army HQ 
War Diary April 1942 -  February 1943.
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by saying that the Division was going to have a 'party', and that if any 
information got out the 'party' would be cancelled. He stressed security and 
the need for speed In neutralizing the German beach defences once landed. 
Perhaps of significance is his statement that, 'Certain things which we are 
after may mean an important factor to the outcome of the war', possibly 
referring to the plan to raid the RDF station. Even at this late date the actual 
name of the objective was not given and the officers were ordered that 'other 
ranks were not to be informed until on board ship'. The next day a further 
meeting was held to discuss last minute details among the Navy, Essex 
Scottish, engineers, tanks and Royal Marine Commandos. The troops 
boarded the assault ships on 2 and 3 July and thereafter 'sealed' on board. 
Only now were the men Informed that what previously had been thought to 
be an exercise, code-named Klondike I, was an actual operation against 
Dieppe. Both Roberts and Mountbatten came on board to give pep talks to 
the men and each man was carefully briefed on his role and the details of 
the plan.32
Poor weather caused the operation to be postponed a day, and again 
for the same reason the following day. On 5 July the weather forecast was 
unfavourable for the next forty-eight hours and thus the operational plan 
undenwent a substantial revision. The next favourable day was 8 July which 
would have meant a two-tide operation, with the withdrawal not having 
begun until 1700 hours. As previously mentioned, this left the force in danger 
of a heavy counter-attack by German reserves of infantry, artillery, and more
^  'Notes on meeting held Informing Bdes [Brigades] about forthcoming operation Ruttei", 
1430 hours 27 June 1942, NAC, RQ24/10872/232C2 (D37); 'Notes on conference of Navy, 
Essex Scottish, Tanks, Engineers and Royal Marine Commando, 28 June 1942', NAC, 
RQ24/10872/232C2 (D37); Stacey, Six years of war, p.339.
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menacingly, 10 Panzer Division. Therefore, the plan was put onto a one-tide 
basis. The tanks now were not to support the infantry assault towards 
Argues, unless ordered, and the tank withdrawal would finish by 1000 hours 
and the infantry by 1100 hours.33
COHQ rather dubiously claims this alteration was an advantage. It 
would enable more concentrated air support due to the overall reduction in 
time of the operation and would give the Germans less time to develop a 
counter-attack. It concludes by saying, ‘the concentration of all our effort over 
a shorter period ought to produce good chances of success which would not 
be much less than to be obtained by the full Puffer plan’.^ *
This was an extremely optimistic appreciation and ignored several 
factors. The most important was that the infantry and tanks had to attain their 
objectives in much less time from the initial zero hour of 0515. Even with 
hindsight it is hard to imagine how they expected to scale defended cliffs and 
ravines, neutralize well-protected coastal and field batteries on the flanking 
headlands, clear a fortified town of its defenders, undertake demolition, and 
attack an airfield and headquarters four miles beyond. All these objectives 
were to be accomplished in Rutter II by 0730 hours, the time that the 
withdrawal code-word, Vancouver, would be announced. This gave the
33 'Alteration of the plan made necessary through postponement', nd. [probably 5 July 1942], 
PRO, DEFE 2/546, 'fluffer-Appendix IV -  Miscellaneous Papers', pp.347-9; COHQ War 
Diary, 3 to 6 July 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2; items P/65-8, 3 to 6 July 1942, PRO, DEFE 
2/542/COHQ, 'Ruffer -  Planning', 31 October 1942, pp.24-5; Mann, 'Notes regarding 
withdrawal plan', 6 July 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D37); Stacey, Six years of war, 
p.339; re 10 Parrzer Division move and affects, see Lt-Col B.H Darwin, Memorandum of 
discussion between Lt-Gen. McNaughton and Lt-Oen. Montgomery, at 'A' House, HO SE 
Army, at 1215 hours 5 July 1942 regarding operation Rutter, 6 July 1942, NAC, RQ 24 
C17/13611/QS First Canadian Army HQ War Diary, April 1942 -  February 1943; and 
Montgomery to Crerar, 5 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D3), fol.51.
34 Balllie-Qrohman, Considerations affecting Operation Rutter and the modification of this plan 
to be known as Rutter II, 5 July 1942'; and see also 'Operation Rutter and Jubilee: Notes on 
Principal Changes In the Military Plan', both In PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHQ, 'Ruffer-Appendix 
IV -  Miscellaneous Papers', pp.333-5, 345-7.
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infantry and tanks only two hours and fifteen minutes to attain their objectives 
before beginning to withdraw. They had to be reembarked completely by 
1100 and 1000 hours respectively.*
In the early morning of 7 July four fighter-bombers, believed to be 
Fock-Wolfe (FW) 190s carrying five hundred kilogram bombs, attacked the 
concentration of shipping gathering for Rutter m Yarmouth Roads, Isle of 
Wight. Two Landing Ships Infantry (LSI) were hit. Princess Astrid and Queen 
Josephine Chariotte, luckily the bombs went clean through and exploded in 
the water, although the latter received severe damage to her engine room. 
Both carried men largely of the Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC) and only 
four men received minor injuries. Stacey says the damage to these two ships 
was not enough to cancel the operation as the troops were disembarked to 
be loaded on other vessels. Other ships were also damaged by machine 
gun and cannon fire. Weather was still not suitable and in the late evening of 
7 July Brigadier Maurice Chilton, Home Forces, telephoned Crerar to say 
that the operation was cancelled on naval grounds. Montgomery supports 
this conclusion, stating in a letter to Crerar, a few days after, that the decision 
was taken 'on purely naval grounds, and was due entirely to adverse 
weather conditions'. The men were disembarked and the units sent back to 
the mainland to be dispersed to various parts of England.*
*  Balllle-Grohman, 'Considerations affecting Operation Rutter and the modification of this plan 
to be known as Rutter II, 5 July 1942', PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHO, 'Rutter -  Appendix IV -  
Miscellaneous Papers', pp.334-S; Mann, 'Notes regarding withdrawal plan', 6 July 1942, NAC, 
RG 24/10872/232C2 (D37).
*  Memo, 'Bombing of Yarmouth Road, 7 July 1942', nd., PRO, DEFE 2/324; Lt-Col B.H. 
Darwin, 'Memorandum, cancellation of Operation Rutter, 7 July 1942; and Montgomery to 
Crerar, 11 July 1942, both In NAC, RG24 C17/13611/GS First Canadian Army HQ W ar Diary, 
April 1942 -  February 1943; Stacey, Six years of war, p.339.
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On 7, 8 and 11 July meetings were held at COHO to discuss various 
matters and lessons learned arising from Rutter. Some of the conclusions 
were: the need for better inter-service liaison and coordination, especially 
concerning communications and dissemination of intelligence; that no 
combined operation must entirely depend on the use of airborne troops, as 
weather conditions are almost never appropriate for their use; that troops 
should embark immediately prior to sailing, as men had been sealed on 
board for up to three days in 'quite intolerable' living conditions, with little air 
or light; the need for better security and cover story arrangements; avoidance 
of concentration of shipping; and, finally, that at the same time as the outline 
plan is given to the force commanders, they also be supplied with an 
appreciation of it by the joint planning staff.
A week after Rutter was cancelled, Canadian news papers were 
permitted to report on the intensive amphibious training that Canadian 
troops had under gone in Britain during the last few months. Canadian Press 
correspondent Ross Munro had been with the 2 CID during this period and
^  Baillie-Grohman. Roberts, Air Commodore A.T. Cole, 'Rutter I I -  Considerations affecting 
Operation Rutter and the modification of this plan to be known as Rutter If, 5 July 1942, and 
Appendix -  'Selection of date for Rutter II (One tide operation)', [also in PRO, AIR 
16/760/fol.80A]; Baillle-Grohman to CCO, 'Naval aspects of the planning and the staffs 
appointed', 10 July 1942; G.2.P.I. to VCCO, 'Operation Rutter and Jubilee, notes on 
principal changes In the military plan', 14 September 1942; all three in PRO, DEFE 2/546, 
'Ruffer -  Appendix IV -  Miscellaneous Papers', pp.333-47; COHO War Diary, 8-11 July 1942, 
PRO, DEFE 2/2; items P/69-73, 8-11 July 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542/COHQ, Rutter-  
Planning, 31 October 1942, pp.25-6; 'Minutes of the meeting held on Operation Rutterai 
Combined Operations HQ 8.7.42', 9 July 1942; 'Minutes of meeting with the Rutter Force 
Commanders held at COHO on Saturday, 11 July 1942'; both In PRO, DEFE 2/S46/COHQ, 
'Ruffer -  Appendix III -  Minutes of Meetings', 31 October 1942, pp.294-302; A.H. Head, 'Draft 
-  Notes on the preparation and mounting of Operation Rutter, 8 July 1942, PRO, DEFE 
2/549, pp.1-4; Roberts and Baillie-Grohman to CCO, 'Notes on staffs and planning for Rutter, 
9 July 1942, PRO, ADM 179/220; on living conditions of troops on sealed ships see Naval 
Officer-In-Charge, Newhaven, to C-ln-C Portsmouth, 'Remarks on the preparations for 
Operation Rutter, 9 July 1942, PRO, ADM 179/220; to CCO and COS, 'Interim report on 
lessons learnt on Rutter, nd., PRO, DEFE 2/552; Colvin, I.G. to C.O.R., 15 September 1942, 
concerns his recollections of planning meetings for Rutter and Jubilee; COHQ Naval Staff 
Meetings Nos. 16-17 Minutes, 7 and 8 July 1942, London, Greenwich, National Maritime 
Museum (NMM), Baillie-Grohman Papers, GRO 23; Stacey, Six years of war, p.339.
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wrote the following accurate account, which was passed, perhaps 
surprisingly, by British censors;
Six battalions of infantry, supported by armoured elements, engineers, signals and 
miscellaneous units, set a new height in shock-troops training for the military forces in 
Britain.
Infantry and armoured vehicles poured ashore in the light of the early da./n, 
temfying the inhabitants of the district with the realism of their dress rehearsal.
Some time ago the Canadians were brought secretly to camps near this port 
and from the crack-of-dawn reveille to nightfall trained in all the complexities of 
combined operations.®
On 16 July similar news came out in all the British papers, trumpeting 
the Canadians’ training as 'a prelude to what may be major military 
operations on the European coast'. At least one of the papers, The Daily 
Telegraph, was, able to get the statement that 'three Ontario regiments' 
participated, past the censor. The Times opened a story with the statement, 
'The biggest raid and invasion manoeuvres ever held in European waters 
have just been completed by a powerful Canadian force working in 
cooperation with the Royal Navy and RAF'. This was two days after the 
decision had definitely been reached to remount the operation as Jubilee, 
and the same day that the first Jubilee Force Commanders meeting 
occurred.®
As previously noted, the operation was quickly revived as Jubilee. On 
13 July Mann had been promoted to Brigadier and appointed BGS, 1 
Canadian Corps. As he was familiar with the planning of Rutter, Roberts
®  Ross Munro, Globe and Mall, Toronto, 14 July 1942, In 'Operation Jubilee, the raid on 
Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part I; the preliminaries of the operation', CMHQ, Historical Report 
No. 100, draft. 16 July, p.24, DHIst 594.013 (D17).
®  'Army, Navy, And Airforce Rehearse Invasion-Canadian & US Troops Engaged', Dally 
Telegraph, 16 July 1942; 'Biggest Invasion Manoeuvres-Canadians, Navy, Arid RAF In 
Action', The Times, 16 July 1942; other British headlines on the same day were 'Lord Louis 
Watches Great Sea Landings', The Dally Mall, '3-Senrice Invasion Show', The Dally Mirror, 'War 
Chiefs See Biggest Invasion Exercise', The News Chronicle, all in NAC, RG 24 C17/13611/GS 
First Canadian Army HQ War Diary/AprI11942 -  February 1943.
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requested him to be lent for the duration of Jubilee and Crerar agreed. Mann 
immediately began work on revising the operational plans.^
At the Force Commanders' meeting of 16 July it was decided to 
substitute commandos for airborne troops, although it seems that COHQ, 
and definitely Hughes-Hallett, had previously decided against using the 
airborne element. His preliminary notes for the meeting, written the day 
before, state, 'Para-troops [s/c.]will not take part and flanked batteries are to 
be taken out by Commandos'. The reason given was that airborne troops 
needed ideal weather. The minutes show that the possibility of using 
airborne troops was to be examined but they would not be informed of the 
proposal, 'until about a week before the operation'. Later discussion 
concluded that, 'it seemed most improbable that any useful targets could be 
found for the Airborne Division under the conditions of light that will prevail, 
and it was provisionally decided to abandon the idea of using them'.*^
Although the commando groups would be responsible to the Military 
Force Commander for their plans, they had the freedom to compose their 
own operation orders, independent from the Detailed Military Plan. In the 
latter's Order of Battle, they are only shown as 'Under Command from 
Landing' only. After finishing their tasks they were to return to England, 
separate from the main force, and in the same craft they arrived in.<2
Stacey, Six year of war, p.342.
Hughes-Hallett, 'Brief discussion at Force Commanders meeting 1500,16 July, 1942', IS  
July 1942, London. Imperial War Museum (IWM), Vice-Admiral John Hughes-Hallett Papers 
(JHHP) JHH 3/2; 'Operation Jubilee. Force Commanders' Meeting at 1500 hours on Thursday 
16 July 1942', IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1.
^  'Operation Jubilee. Force Commanders' Meeting at 1500 hours on Thursday 16 July 1942', 
JHH 3/1; Stacey, Six years of war, p.343.
115
Most accounts pass over this alteration as having no effect on Jubilee. 
They ignore the fact, as Villa accurately points out, the commandos needed 
to land by sea. 'Complicating still further the navigation track chart and the 
naval congestion in the final approach to Dieppe... and one of the 
commando groups failed, at least in part - with serious consequences in the 
withdrawal phase'.^ It is significant to point out that it was one of these 
commando groups that collided with the German convoy, thereby raising the 
alarm at Blue Beach. If airborne units had been used, as in the original plan, 
this particular encounter would not have happened as no assault craft would 
have been in the area. One can speculate about whether the German 
convoy might have later run into other elements of the naval force and the 
subsequent results.
Other decisions taken at the 16 July meeting were the dates of the 
operation, which could be anytime during the period 18/23 August inclusive 
and 1/2, 6/7 September inclusive. General briefing of units would be 
'deferred until the last possible moment', that is, when the operation was 
'definitely about to take place'. However, Naval and Military Commanding 
Officers were to be warned under the 'strictest confidence that an emergency 
operation is being planned for August and may be ordered to take place at 
short notice'. These officers were to be told that the same personnel would 
be participating as in Rutter. The units' briefings just prior to the operation 
would be done on the exact same model of Dieppe as used for Rutter. This 
meant that no extra boat training or rehearsals would be necessary, further 
safeguarding security. The Rutter plan of having a protected anchorage for 
landing craft covered by smoke and special anti-aircraft, or Eagle ships, was
^  villa, Unauthorized action, p.288, (n.59.
116
dropped in favour of ordering all the landing craft to stay dispersed off 
Dieppe and, later, to take refuge in the harbour after the capture of the town. 
This had the advantage of cutting the already crowded Jubilee force down 
by thirteen ships, but, more importantly, 'the Admiralty' was worried, for 
security reasons, that the movement of these ships, from the Thames River to 
the South Coast, could be observed by German air reconnaissance.'*^
On 21 July 1942 a meeting of what was now termed the Combined 
Force Commanders was held at COHO, which was also attended by the 
Commando leaders Lt-Col J.H. 'Torchy' Dumford-Slater, CO No.3 
Commando, and Lt-Col The Lord 'Shimi' Lovat, CO No.4 Commando. The 
Air Force Commander, Leigh-Mallory, said it would be possible to have a 
Spitfire squadron support the commandos attack on the flank batteries and 
might even be able to supply some bombers. Mountbatten outlined the 
procedure for drawing up the operation orders for Jubilee. It was agreed 
that the three Force Commanders should, 'prepare and sign a combined 
plan which the CCO would forward to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for 
approval'. This seems never to have been done but as we have seen, it was 
not necessary as Mountbatten did not need their approval of the final plan. 
The Detailed Military Plan was drawn up on 5 August, the Naval Operation 
Order was issued five days later, and the Detailed Air Plan three days after 
that.^
** Hughes-Hallett, 'Brief discussion at Force Commanders meeting 1500,16 July, 1942', 15 
July, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/2; 'Operation Jubilee. Force Commanders' Meeting at 1500 hours on 
Thursday 16 July 1942', IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1; Hughes-Hallett to Commodore R.Q. DuKe, 17 
July 1942 and memo, 'Operation Jubilee/, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1; on Eagle ships see Hughes- 
Hallett to Leigh-Mallory, cover letter and memo, 'Military and Air Commander's meeting. 
Suggested points for discussion', 15 July 1942, PRO AIR 16/746, copy In IWM, JHHP, JHH 
3/2; Stacey, Six years of war, p.343.
^  'Operation Jubilee. Minutes of the first meeting of Combined Force Commanders at COHQ  
on 21 July 1942', 24 July 1942, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1; COHQ, War Diary 31 July-13 August 
1942, PRO, DEFE 2/3.
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On 11 August Crerar wrote to McNaughton, explaining that he had 
met with the Force Commanders to go over the Jubilee plans on six different 
occasions since 30 July. Concerning the last meeting on 11 August, he 
wrote:
I have today gone over the plans for the Exercise, as now agreed to by the Naval, 
Army and Air Force Commanders and am satisfied that the revisions made in respect 
to the previous exercise plans add, rather than detract, to the soundness of the plan 
as a whole. I am, therefore, of the opinion that, given an even break in luck and good 
navigation, the demonstration should prove successful.
Three days later McNaughton met with Crerar and Roberts to go over the
final plans himself, writing to Cerar the same day to confirm that he was
'satisfied with these plans and with the arrangements made in all respects',
and that he authorized the use of the Canadian troops for the operation.^
To give security cover to the massive and unusual preparations that 2
CID and various detachments needed to undertake for Jubilee, orders were
issued for certain exercises and demonstrations. On 10 August HQ 2 CID
ordered the 14 CATR to give a combined operations demonstration, thereby
giving a security cover to its tell-tale preparations, such as water-proofing of
tanks. Exercise Popsy was to cover other preparations of the signals units.
On 13 August 1 Canadian Corps HQ issued orders for three movement
exercises for each of its three infantry divisions, Ford I, II, and III, which were
to go for a month beginning on 15 August. This was just to act as a screen,
since Ford I was to cover the movement of the Jubilee force units to ports of
embarkation. On the evening of 17 August the loading of tanks on TLCs
began at Newhaven.^^
^  Crerar to McNaughton, 11 August 1942; and McNaughton to Crerar, 14 August 1942, NAC, 
RQ 24/10750/220C1.009 (D3)/QOC 1-O-4/’Operations-Ralds' Part 1(b), fols.66-7.
Stacey, Six years of war, p.344; see also 2 CID HQ 'Q Branch' War Diary, 13 August 1942, 
NAC, RG 24/13746/Serlal 152/QS Folder 6; War Diary, 16-18 August 1942, NAC, RG 
24/17510/August 1942.
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That same morning, at 1000 hours, the preliminary execution order
had been given by the CCO, C-in-C Portsmouth and the Force commanders,
for Jubilee force to sail on the night of 18/19 August. Despite poor weather,
improved weather was forecasted in the following days. Later the same day,
the question of heavy air bombardment was again raised at a meeting of the
CCO and the Force Commanders at RAF Station Tangmere. The fact that it
was brought up at such a late time, that is, after the preliminary execution
order had been given and units had begun to load, reveals what a vexing
problem this was for the Force Commanders, especially Roberts. The only
source come to light on this meeting is the Combined Report, which states
that Roberts held the view that the destruction of the port caused by the
bombardment, would be such that it would make the passage of tanks
through the town 'difficult, if not it impossible'. Therefore the decision not to
bomb was maintained. This issue of bombing, although discussed in the
previous chapter in connection with the adoption of the frontal attack, needs
further elaboration. Roberts thoughts on this question, some months after the
operation are revealing, and therefore are quoted in full:
The original plan for the bombing envisaged two or three minor bombing raids on 
Dieppe, prior to the operation. As these had not been carried out, it was felt that a 
large scale attack, probably Inaccurately placed, would merely serve to place the 
enemy on the alert. This was a considerable factor.
At all stages it was insisted that bombing could only be carried out by night, 
and Inaccuracy, rather that accuracy, was guaranteed.^
Ten days after the raid, David Owen, a staff member of War Cabinet
member Sir Stafford Cripps, in an interview with joumaiist, Basil Liddell Hart,
stated that the original air bombardment meant to take place the night
before, 'was canceiied by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, at General Robert s'
^  'Combined Report', p.10, paras.46-7: Roberts to Senior Officer, CMHQ, 18 March 1943, 
quoted in Stacey, Six years of war, p.344.
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request, on the ground that the destruction caused might hinder his tanks 
from getting through into the town'. That heavy bombing would probably 
result in the destruction of the port facilities and thus failure to achieve the 
main objective-capture of the port intact, was a major dilemma for invasion 
planners. This was outlined in a COS memorandum of 30 June 1942, 
entitled 'Bombing policy in relation to the French Channel ports'. This stated 
that in any offensive operations against the occupied coasts of France and 
the Low Countries, the 'early capture and repair of adequate base ports' was 
important, and that 'without port facilities at an early stage in the operations 
the offensive cannot be maintained and must fail'.^
The general policy against the bombing of French towns, to avoid 
killing civilians, was lifted for Rutter!Jubilee by the COS and Churchill, 
leaving the Force Commanders the decision. In a post-war letter Mann 
stated that, with the invasion of North Africa approaching, in November 1942, 
Churchill did not wish to antagonise the French by heavy bombing at 
Dieppe, as he hoped that the French Navy would surrender to the Royal 
Navy without resisting. He explains that at the 5 June meeting, Roberts was 
presented with theoretical situation, and was asked what he would do if, after 
passing the 'point of no return', that is, 0300 hours and the lowering of the 
ALCs, he was informed that the bombers had been grounded due to fog or 
other reason. His reply, Mann says, was 'sail on'; and therefore, it was 
immediately recorded that 'The Military Force Commander does not require
^  B. Liddell Hart, 'Notes for history -  David Owen', 28/29 August 1942, KCL, LHCMA, Liddell 
Hart Papers, BHLH 11/1142/68; Paget, Memorandum, 'Bombing policy in relation to the 
French Channel ports', 30 June 1942, COS (42) 326, PRO, CAB 80/37, p.96; Brigadier Head 
recalled the main planning problem associated with combined operations at the time, was the 
capture of a major port intact at the beginning of any operation, Stacey, 'Memorandum of 
Conversation with Brigadier A.H. Head', Appendix B, p.2, CM HQ Historical Report No.153, 
DHist.
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the use of heavy bombers to carry out the operation'. Mann concludes that 
'This neatly met The Prime Minister's wishes'.“
Another aspect of the cancellation of the bombing was its effects on the 
execution of the plan. In Rutter Vne infantry landed at Blue beach were to 
begin an attack half an hour after landing, with bomber support, against the 
guns and heavy coastal batteries on the East headland, with the aim of 
neutralizing them before the main landings took place on the centre 
beaches. In the Jubilee plan the Blue beach attackers only had half an hour 
in total before the main assault went in to do the same task. This would mean 
that the guns on the Eastern headland would still be in action when the main 
assault on Red and White beaches occurred. In these circumstances, the Air 
Force Commander recommended that C-in-C Bomber Command, Air 
Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, waive the rule against allowing bombers to 
operation in daylight, and have bombers used against the eastern headland 
and the houses on the Dieppe sea-front. Although later discussion ruled this 
out for reasons already discussed, no corresponding adjustments in the plan 
were made to compensate for this problem. As it turned out, the failure to 
take the east headland was one of the main reasons for the failure of the 
operation. Even after the operation, though, Leigh-Mallory, was still 
apparently of the opinion, claims the Air Adviser to Combined Operations 
(AACO), Group Captain A.H. Willetts, that a night bombardment of the east 
and west batteries would have been unlikely to put them out of action, since 
'continuous low day bombing which took place throughout the operation 
failed to silence them'. This letter refers to fighter- and dive-bombers, but
“  Concerning bombing restriction on French towns see Ismay to Churchill, Minute, 19 May 
1942, COHQ, War Diary, PRO, DEFE 2/2; Mann to John Mellor, 4 January 1974, Terence 
Macariney-Fllgate Dieppe Collection (TMFDC).
121
does not address whether heavy bombers, with extremely large bombs or 
loads, would have been effective.^^
Lelgh-Mallory, draft, 'Operation Jubilee. Memorandum by the Air Force Commander 
concerning the employment of bombers', nd., pp.1-2, 5, PRO, AIR 16/746; Group Captain 
(Qp-Capt.) A.H. Willetts to Gp-Capt. Grant, DDI(3), Air Ministry, 28 August 1942, PRO, AIR 
40/1783/f01.655.
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INTELLIGENCE, ULTRA, RADAR, DECEPTION 
AND THE MYTH OF GERMAN FOREKNOWLEDGE
Before addressing the actual assault phase of Jubilee, the 
intelligence available to the Jubilee planners, and other intelligence aspects 
of the operation need to be examined. At first glance the area seems to be 
adequately covered by the existing literature. The official wartime British 
intelligence historian, Professor Sir F.H. Hinsley, in British intelligence in the 
Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations (1981), expertly 
examines many of the issues concerning strategic and tactical intelligence, 
such as the Allied operational uses of wireless or signal intelligence 
(SIGINT). The official Canadian military intelligence history, S.R. Elliot's, 
Scarlet to green: a history of intelligence in the Canadian Army, 1903-1963 
(1981), primarily deals with the tactical intelligence aspects of the Rutter and 
Jubilee plans and their effects on the operation. His brief survey highlights 
and expands on some of the observations already stated in other secondary 
works.' For primary sources, he has depended almost entirely on the Rutter 
and Jubilee Detailed Military Plans, which are pari of the Ministry of 
Defence, Combined Operations Headquarters Records (DEFE 2 series), at 
the Public Record Office (PRO), copies of which are also available in other
' F.H. Hinsley, British IntelllgerKa In the Second World War. Its Influence on strategy and 
operations, 2 (6 vols., London: HMSO, 1981), Appendix 13, pp.695-704; and S.R. Elliot, 
Scarlet to green: a history of Intelligence In the Canadian Army, 1903-1963 (Toronto: 
Canadian Intelligence & Security Association, 1981), pp. 181-178, 713. Other works 
describing the tactical Intelligence deficiencies are Charles P. Stacey, Six years of war: the 
army In Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), pp.349-358; and 
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Captains without eyes: Intelligence failures In World War Two (London: 
Macmillan, 1969), p.196; John Mellor, Dieppe: Canada's forgotten heroes (Scarborough, 
Ontario: Macmillan, 1975), pp.12-13.
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repositories, such as the National Archives of Canada (NAC), Ottawa, and in 
those which hold peoples' private papers. A more thorough investigation 
and critical analysis of the documentary files concerned with RutteiiJubilee 
as a whole is necessary, for a comprehensive survey of the intelligence 
aspects. These records include those of the Admiralty, Air Ministry, Cabinet 
Office, Prime Minister's Private Office, and War Office, all located at the PRO. 
The records of the Canadian Army Overseas, specifically those of the HQ's 
of the First Canadian Army, 1 Canadian Corps, and 2 Canadian Infantry 
Division (2 CID), located at the NAC, also contain relevant material. Finally, 
the official, semi-official and personal papers of senior commanders 
involved, such as Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett, McNaughton and Crerar, are 
equally significant.^
The most significant recent contribution to the vast literature on the 
operation, and the first book to make a serious examination of this huge 
volume of primary and secondary sources from the intelligence point of view, 
is John P. Campbell's, Dieppe revisited: a documentary investigation (1993). 
Its first chapter, aptly entitled, 'Another book about Dieppe?', explains that 
the aim of the work is to analyse the raid's operational aspects, such as 
intelligence, radar, deception, naval and air operations, in the context of 
activities in the English Channel as a whole in 1942. He uses mainly Allied 
and German unpublished primary sources, many of the latter hitherto 
unused war diaries and after-action reports, although all previously available 
for many years to the public. In doing so Campbell demonstrates his 
knowledge of the period by pointing out gaps in the documentary record
2 Originals of the Detailed Military Plan for Jubilee, S August 1942, are In PRO, WO 106/4196; 
as well as In NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25).
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resulting from loss, destruction or continued classification. The Dieppe raid, 
he explains, 'was simply the obvious peg on which to hang such an 
investigation'.3
This investigation examines all the myths and misconceptions that 
usually flourish as a result of a military failure such as at Dieppe. Campbell 
puts these in their operational context and attempts to explain or, more often, 
disprove each scenario to the reader, acting like a detective/historian. 
Although this author usually agrees with his conclusions, Campbell does not 
always address all the issues fully, and the process he takes the reader 
through is often extremely confusing. He also does not go into the tactical 
intelligence detail necessary for a comprehensive examination of the battle 
itself. Since Campbell's book is the most significant contribution to the 
intelligence side of Dieppe in recent years, it deserves a thoroughly rigorous 
examination within the context of the following discussion.
Several intelligence related points and questions require attention. 
Allied estimates on the German order of battle were completely off. Although 
the incorrect identification of the defending German division and its 
headquarters (HQ) was not that important to the outcome of the battle, the 
inaccurate detection of the regimental (equivalent to the Anglo-Canadian 
brigade) and battalion dispositions and their several headquarters was 
serious. The inaccurately assessed location of the strategic Panzer reserves, 
in particular 10 Panzer Division (10 PzD), also is of interest. Evidence exists 
that the correct intelligence on its position was available much earlier but 
was not available to the planners. This shows that a breakdown in the
3 John P. Campbell, Dieppe revisited: a documentary Investigation (London: Frank Cass, 
1993), p.xiv.
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intelligence dissemination process occurred. Apparently this was again the 
case with the supposed chance encounter with the German Convoy. An 
Ultra intercept revealed its presence in enough time for the assault force to 
take evasive action. Questions and misconceptions to do with German 
foreknowledge, deception, cover plans and radar also need clarification.
Before addressing these matters, a cursory look at the intelligence 
available to the COHO planners. Force Commanders and their staffs, is 
necessary. This will give an idea of what kind of information was available 
with the aim of understanding, to the extent possible, what and how they 
were thinking when the plans were undergoing formulation. This 
background provides the framework for later consideration of the previous 
points raised.
The most important source of information of an intelligence nature for 
the operation was the forty-eight page Confidential Book, (CB) 04157 F(l), 
Dieppe. This was compiled by the end of May 1942 by the Intelligence 
Section of COHQ, under the direction of its Senior Intelligence Officer, Wing- 
Commander the Marquis of Casa Maury. The COHQ Planning Section 
received it on 8 June * The CB was essentially an updated version of the 
'Special Report on Dieppe: surrounding topography, beaches and 
communications 5 miles either side', put together by the Inter-Service 
Topographical Department (ISTD) and dated 5 April 1942. It included nine 
addenda, totalling over one hundred pages. The last addendum was dated
* COHQ, Intelligence Section, 'Dieppe. Confidential Book' (CB) 04157 F (I), May 1942, PRO, 
AIR 8/896; Reporl 1/57, 8 Juno 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, 'flutter. Intolllgonco', p.55; 
COHQ, 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid, BR 1887 (previously CB 04244), October 
1942', p.9, paragraph 43, DHIst 594.013 (D1); COHO War Diary, 8 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 
2/ 2 .
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29 May.5 In commenting on the CB the COHQ Combined Report on Dieppe 
explains it provided:
A full description of Dieppe, its port, its military objectives, defences, RDF [Radio 
Direction Finding] Stations, the enemy order of battle, scales of resistance, rate of 
reinforcement, and the German Air Force scale of attack. The Confidential Book also 
contained a full topographical and beach report, illustrated by photographs, as well as 
inforr.iation on the approaches to, the tides and tidal streams off Dienpe.,. There was 
[s/c] issued a series of General Staff Geographical Section standard and over-printed 
maps, town plans, defence traces, photographs and mosaics of the operational area.^
Although COHQ planners only received the CB on 8 June, they did
receive the individual intelligence reports that it comprised, from the COHQ
Intelligence Section soon after they arrived. Sometimes the Intelligence
Section only passed essential intelligence on request instead of
automatically.^ These separate reports arrived daily from various sources in
the intelligence community. These included prisoner of war (PoW) reports
from Naval Intelligence Division (NID) Sections (1 and 3), reports from Allied
Naval HQ, HM ships, British Missions, Diplomatic sources, the press,
escaped patriots, and postal (naval) censorship, passed through the NID
Geographical Section; as well as information from the Ministry of Economic
Warfare (MEW), the Admiralty's Operations Intelligence Centre (QIC), ISTD,
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), Special Operations Executive
(SOE), Bomber Command Headquarters, Air Ministry Intelligence Sections
(AI2b and 3b) and Scientific Intelligence Section (ADI[Sc]), General
 ^Inter-Service Topographical Department (ISTD), 'Special Report on Dieppe: surrounding 
topography, beaches and communications 5 miles either side'. Report No. C/32, 5 April 
1942, PRO. WO 252/108.
® COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.9.
 ^A list of the Intelligence reports received are classified as 'Reports l/t-69', 21 June 1941-30 
July 1942, in PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, Rutter, intelligence, pp. 27-58; see also Rufferand 
Jubilee entries In the COHQ War Diary, PRO, DEFE 2/2-3. On the problems of intelligence 
dissemination see Balllle-Qrohman and Roberts to the CCO, 'Notes on Stalls and Planning for 
Ruttef, 9 July 1942, and Balllie-Grohman to CCO, 'Naval Aspects of the Planning tor Rutter 
and the Staffs Appointed', 10 July 1942, p. 3, both In NMM, Baillle-Grohman Papers, QRO/29.
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Headquarters Home Forces, Military Intelligence (Ml 14), and air photos from 
the Central Interpretation Unit (CIU). The most highly guarded of all 
intelligence sources was intercepted German radio/signals communications, 
or SIGINT, which had the cover-names of 'Special Intelligence', 'Most Secret 
Source', or 'Boniface', and held the security classification Ultra Secret, one 
level above Top Secret. Since the revelation of this Ultra secret in 1974, this 
SIGINT has commonly been known as Ultra. Ultra provided such information 
as the German armed forces order of battle, dispositions and movements. 
Since Ultra was so highly secret, it was passed in a disguised form by the 
OIC, Ml 14 or Air Ministry intelligence sections, to COHQ, after they received it 
from the super secret Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS), located 
at Bletchley Park.®
Another important source of intelligence was photographs. Vertical 
and oblique aerial photographs taken by the RAF Photographic 
Reconnaissance Unit and 140 Squadron, were passed on for scientific 
analysis and interpretation, to the CIU HQ at Danesfield, .. Medmenham, 
Buckinghamshire, under the direction of Wing Commander Douglas Kendall. 
The ISTD HQ at Oxford collected for analysis snapshots of English tourists 
sunbathing on beaches and picture postcards of all areas of the French 
coast. These seem to have been the main source for calculating the beach 
gradients at Dieppe. The ISTD's 'Supplementary Photographs to Special 
Report on Dieppe', ISTD/C/32, 16 April 1942, contains forty-three tourist
s See Reports 1/1-69, 21 June 1941-30 July 1942, COHQ, 'Rutter, intelligence', pp. 27-58; 
sources listed on each page of the COHQ, Dieppe Confidential Book; and C. Morgan, 
Combined operation intelligence procedure', approximately 28 June 1942, PRO, ADM 
223/464, pp.247-9; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.159.
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postcards, family and aerial photographs, the latter vertical mosaics or close- 
up obliques, of Dieppe's environs, ianding beaches and Rutter objectives.^ 
The Combined Report claims these aerial photographs were 'very 
comprehensive and provided a complete picture of the area'. Using these 
and information from the other inteiligence sources mentioned, 
representatives from GHQ Home Forces and NID were able to coordinate 
the information about coastal and beach defences and plot them on War 
Office maps. On 9 May 1942, the COHO Inteiligence Planner (Naval), IP(N), 
minuted the COHO SIO, cancelling two previous demands, 19 and 21 April, 
for models of the different Dieppe areas. Instead, the IP(N) requested 
construction of an overali scale relief model of the whole operational area, in 
four sections, with a scale of one foot equal to one mile. Elliot states the 
compieted model measured 10-feet by 6-feet. It was to 'present a complete 
picture', of the terrain, such as landing beaches and gradients, cliffs, forests, 
woods, open spaces, roads, rivers, bridges and railways; of the town, and 
objectives within it, such as the dock area, which 'was to be given the 
greatest detail possible'; and of all Known and suspected German defensive 
dispositions, such as units' headquarters, coastal and field batteries, anti­
aircraft (AA) positions, beach and field fortifications, barbed wire, pill boxes, 
casemates, bunkers, machine-gun and observation posts, road blocks, anti­
tank obstacles and the RDF Station, 'were to be annotated from the latest 
available information'. Photographs of it from 'a very low angle from
® Elliot, Scarlet to green, p.163; Terence Robertson, The shame and the glory, (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1960), p.90; Qoronwy Rees, A bundle of sensations: sketches In 
autobiography {London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), p.152; Ewen Montagu claims these family 
photographs were 'the only basis from which could be calculated the slope of the Dieppe 
beach’. Beyond lop secret C/(London: Peter Davis, 1977), pp.24-5; and confirmed by 
Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2, p.699; ISTD, 'Supplementary Photographs to Special Report 
on Dieppe', ISTD/C/32, 16 April 1942, PRO, W O 252/108.
129
seaward, to represent the appearance of the coast at nautical twilight... 
Copies of these silhouettes, on which were marked all chosen landing 
places with their respective colours, were issued... as an aid to the 
recognition of the coastline'.
Before starting work on the Rutter outline plan, the COHQ military 
planner. Major Walter Skrine, sent a request on 17 April for additional 
intelligence information regarding the German order of battle, its dispositions 
and rate of reinforcement. Three days later, he was able to confirm that 
during the first two or three hours of the raid, one German battalion would be 
defending the Dieppe area, with the probable support of 'five hundred 
Divisional or Regimental troops', equalling about 1400 troops in total. During 
the next five hours, he estimated the arrival of not more than 2500 regimental 
reinforcements. After eight hours, divisional reserves, totalling about 2400 
men, could begin to arrive from Rouen and Amiens, respectively about forty 
and sixty miles away. He concluded that a total of 6500 troops could be in 
action in the Dieppe area at the end of fifteen hours.''
On 23 April Home Forces Intelligence informed Skrine that the 
known German armoured forces in France were located around Paris, that 
they were equipped with only 'one or two hundred light French tanks', and
'0 COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.9, paragraph 43; on plotting War Office maps see C. Morgan, 
'Combined operation intelligence procedure', approximately 28 June 1942, PRO, ADM 
223/464, p.248; Elliot, Scarlet to green, p.163; details of model request see copies of 
minutes 1/16,1/26 and 1/41,19/21 April and 9 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, ‘Rutter. 
intelligence', pp. 39-40,48. Later In the war the Dieppe model was sent to Canada and is 
presently at the Canadian War Museum storage facility, Vimy House, Ottawa. In August 1993 
this author attempted to view the model, but was unable to, as it was stored In plastic. In 
several small sections on shelves, and was deteriorating badly. Its authenticity was confirmed. 
Instead, this author was shown a second, much smaller relief model, that had previously been 
displayed in the Museum, the origin of which was unKnown.
"  Major Water Skrine, 'Operation Rutter, additional Intelligence requirements', 17 April 1942, 
PRO, DEFE 2/550/fol.4A; Major Walter Skrine, Troops In Dieppe area. Dieppe: Possible scale 
of resistance and rate of reinforcement up to 15 hours', 20 April 1942, PRO, DEFE 
2/550/fol.7C,
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these would not be able to be brought into action at Dieppe within fifteen 
hours. The report also explained that 'the Dieppe area was defended by 302 
Infantry Division (ID), which was equipped with the normal equipment of the 
German infantry division, 'except that it may be slightly short of mortars and 
anti-tank equipment'. The report stated that the troops were 'tecond-rate and 
not mobile', that there were 'not likely to be any additional first line troops in 
the Dieppe area', but that it was possible that there was 'up to a company of 
Local Defence troops (men forty to forty-five years old)', who might be used 
in the role of defending headquarters or vital points.
Based on the intelligence described above, the COHQ Planning 
Section and Home Force Planners, put together the Ffuffer Outline Plan of 13 
May, the very first sentence of which stated, 'Inteliigence reports indicate that 
Dieppe is not heavily defended and that the beaches in the vicinity are 
suitable for landing infantry, and AFVs [armoured fighting vehicles] at 
some'. 3^ As has been described, the plan was then submitted to, and 
approved by, the COS, and then sent on for further detailed planning by the 
Force Commanders. About a month later the 'Operation Rutter -  Detailed 
Military Plan' was produced, which contained the appendix 'Information -  
Enemy', as of 19 June 1942. This will be stated In detail for later comparison. 
It repeated the previous intelligence information received by Skrine, almost 
verbatim. The town was held by one infantry battalion of approximately 1500 
men, with the same rate of reinforcement, 2500 within three to eight hours, 
and another 2400 after eight hours, which it totalled, incorrectly, at 5400 
troops. Armoured forces could be expected after fifteen hours from the Paris
'2 Home Forces, Intelligence, 'Operation Rutter, 23 April 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/550/fol.9A.
’3 CCO to Force Commanders, 13 May 1942, Appendix II, 'Operation Ruffer -  Outline', NAC, 
RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D3S).
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area. Re-embarkation was to be completed within twelve hours. The 
appendix continued:
Three 4 gun troops are sighted right, left and centre, behind the town; some of these 
are probably divisional artillery. Possibly they are three troops making up a battery of 
field gun howitzers.
A mixed flak [anti-aircraft] battery defends the port...
There is no infantry on either side of the town. There is one troop of coastal 
artillery to the East, and one to the West, each being some three miles from the town 
defences...
The layout of machine-guns indicates the probably [s/<^  dispositions of the 
infantry. It is probable that one re-inforced [sk^ rifle company holds the town East of 
the River Arques [including the East Headland and Puys], another the town West of 
the River Arques [including the West Headland], and another the area [at Pourville] 
around the mouth of the River Scie.
This distributes the observed pillboxes in the proportion of 12:18:11, total 31 [s/c]; 
there are in all 48 machine-guns in the battalion.
The most interesting feature of the defences is the development of strong 
points inland and the rudimentary all round defence of the port itself.
Note the sloppy mathematics: the expected total of troops expected to
be in action after eight hours, 5400 instead of 6400; and the total of pillboxes
31, instead of 41. It is difficult not to agree with the former Canadian
Department of National Defence (DND) historian, and acknowledged
authority on Dieppe, Brereton Greenhous, in his recent, popular history of
the operation, Dieppe, Dieppe (1993), when he concludes that this reflected
'very well the slapdash nature of much of the work carried out at
Mountbatten's headquarters'.
On 2 July, just prior to the planned launch of Rutter, the previously 
quoted, incorrect figures were again confirmed, this time in some preparatory 
notes on Rutter, by Portal, Chief of the Air Staff. Only two important 
differences emerge from this document, compared with the previous 
information on the German order of battle and dispositions. First, the correct
Maj.-Gen. J.H. Roberts. 'Operation Ruffer -  Detailed Military Force Plan', 20 June 1942, 
Appendix A, Information -  Enemy', pp.1-2, PRO, DEFE 2/548; Brereton Qreonhous, 
Dieppe, Dieppe (Montréal: Éditions Art Global Inc. In cooperation with the Department of 
National Defence, 1993), p.48.
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position of 10 PzD was noted as three to four hours away at Amiens. The 
intelligence failure regarding this unit's disposition will be discussed in 
greater detail later. Second, the GAP was estimated to be able to bring into 
battle over Dieppe 200 fighters, up to 120 Focke-Wulf (FW)109F ground- 
attack fighter-bombers for use against ships, as well as 210 night bombers. 
Although Portal thought it 'unlikely' the Germans would use these night 
bombers in daylight, he stated that, 'we would undoubtedly welcome it' if 
they did. The document concluded that the German navy would be no threat. 
Although 'they might bring a few "E" [motor torpedo] boats into action', it was 
considered unlikely that these would be risked in daylight.'^
All through the period of July and August, from the cancellation of 
Rutter, to its revival and execution as Jubilee, the intelligence on Dieppe was 
constantly up-dated by COHQ and passed to Force Commanders' staffs, 
who were preparing their detailed plans. The 'Operation Jubilee -  Detailed 
Military Plan, Appendix A, Information -  Enemy', 10 August 1942, noted 
some changes from the previous Rutter intelligence appreciations. The 
actual coastal defences were held by a system of 'posts', of about thirty men 
and four machine-guns each, and located closer together at the beaches to 
ensure overlapping and supporting fire. Many machine-guns were protected 
all along the coast in concrete casemates and pillboxes, especially at the 
beaches, although some were known to be unoccupied dummies. In the 
town itself, many of the street junctions were covered by machine-gun posts 
to enfilade the main roads and cover open places. The appreciation then 
noted some of the more formidable ones on the promenade and in the town.
'Rutter. Notes for CAS (Chief of the Air Staff). Information -  Enemy', 2 July 1942, pp.1-3, 
PRO. AIR 8/895.
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and concluded that, 'It has not been possible to deny or confirm the 
existence of MG [machine-gun] posts in the low cliffs to the east of the 
entrance to the harbour'. Six coast guard stations were identified, two each 
in the areas of Varengeville and Berneval, and one each at Pourville and 
Puys, all were manned by an unknown number of German marines.’®
The barbed wire on the beach and promenade, it warned, could be 
electrified like it was at Boulogne, but this could not be definitely confirmed. 
No evidence existed of land mines planted anywhere on the main beach or 
inland within the area of operations. Concrete or masonry road blocks were 
confirmed as blocking all streets leading off the Dieppe town beaches, 
although the two streets at either end of the promenade, were said to have 
gaps up to nine feet wide, one of which could be closed. The blocks were 
estimated to be 3 to 4 feet thick and 5 to 6 feet high. The four road blocks in 
Puys were predicted to be movable wire. The caves in the east headland, by 
the harbour entrance, were reported to be storing about 2300 E-boat 
torpedoes. Four trawlers, each mounting two 4in guns, and ten E-boats were 
identified in the harbour. A note at the end, probably relating to the trawlers 
and E-boats, but which Elliot claims relates to the whole appreciation, states 
'This situation is changing all the time, therefore the information cannot be 
considered as firm'.’^
Concerning anti-aircraft and artillery positions, the assessment was 
much the same as previous, although further details on locations were given.
Operation Jubilee -  Detailed Military Plan. Appendix A, Information -  Enemy', 10 August 
1942, pp.1-2, NAC, RG 24/10871/232C2 (D25); the location of the coast guard stations Is 
annotated by hand on Home Forces map No.30, 'France-Dleppe Area Defences', scale 
1:50,000, PRO, AIR 16/747.
t7 'Operation Jubilee -  Detailed Military Plan. Appendix A, Information -  Enemy', 10 August 
1942, pp.2-4, NAC, RQ 24/10871/232C2 (D25); Elliot. Scarlet to green. p.172.
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The six-gun coastal battery at Varengeville was thought to be mobile. The 
forty-eight field and twelve anti-tank guns were noted to be mobile but their 
location was not known. For reasons to be discussed later, 302 ID defending 
Dieppe was now wrongly thought to have been replaced by 110 ID, which 
had recently arrived from Russia to rest and refit. This was considered a 'first 
line division', and the assessment warned that although it might not be up to 
full strength, 'it has a good fighting record'. Besides a battalion holding the 
town, a second battalion was thought to be holding the coastal area eight to 
ten miles west of Dieppe, with its HQ at Blosseville. The location of 110's 
third battalion was unsure but estimated to be in reserve, with its HQ 
probably at Bacqueville.
During the first three hours the strength of resistance in the 
operational area was expected to be not more than 1700 men. If the 
mechanised reconnaissance unit of 10 PzD was still located in the area of 
Abbeville, the assessment warned, it could bring its normal strength of 12 
heavy and 36 light armoured cars, and 130 motorcycles, to the outskirts of 
Dieppe in under three hours (see Map 1). After five hours, a further 850 
troops were expected to be in the area of operations. If the mechanised 
reconnaissance unit was located at Amiens, its arrival within five hours was 
also to be expected. Within eight hours, 1600 regimental reserves would be 
in action, as well as 10 PzD's tank regiment. The locations of the lorry-borne 
infantry and motorcycle battalion were known to be based in the area of 
Amiens, and thus able 'to reinforce the forward troops within 4 hours after 
leaving'. Within fifteen hours, the appreciation warned, the whole of 110 ID, 
10 PzD and elements of SS Adolf Hitler Division, near Paris, could be in 
action at the scene of operations (see Map 1). This latter division was
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motorized and possessed 'about 12-15 armoured cars but no tanks'. The 
appreciation stated that, 'In spite of continuous action in Russia, it is now 
considered to be up to strength after refitting. It is one of the German crack 
divisions'.’8
These general intelligence estimates concerning strength of 
resistance and rate of reinforcements proved accurate on the whole, but 
when it came down to exact statistics, such as gun numbers and calibre, 
troop, artillery and HQ dispositions, and identification of specific installations, 
they proved to be very superficial. The information concerning the three 
Army Coastal Batteries was essentially correct, except that Bemeval had had 
its armament increased with the addition of three 170mm guns in naval 
mountings. As previously indicated, the complete dispositions of the 
battalion's divisional artillery were unknown. Only two of four were identified, 
the others were not identified at all. One was located near Les 
Quatres Vents Parme (see Map 2) and the other south of Puys (262674), 
each consisting of four 100mm Czech field howitzers, and manned by 7 and 
8 Troop, 302 Artillery Regiment, respectively. Eight captured French 75mm 
were placed in the headland caves, in the promenade houses and behind 
the road-blocks, to be fired over the sites for direct beach defence. A further 
nine small calibre 3.7 and 4.7mm guns were in this area, as well as about 
thirty AA guns of various calibre. Further details concerning disposition, 
calibre and numbers is discussed in the battle narrative.
'8 'Operation Jubilee -  Detailed Military Plan. Appendix A, Information -  Enemy', 10 August 
1942, pp.1-3, NAC, RG 24/10871/232C2 (D25).
'8 Stacey, Six years of war, p.354 [Qemrran guns): Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the English 
attack on either side of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', pp.55-7, in Emil Kllgast, The history of 
the 302 Infantry Division In retrospect (Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, c.1976, translated 
1982), CWM [confirms gun numbers); Charles P. Stacey, 'Operation Jubilee: the raid on 
Dieppe, 19 August 1942. Information from German war diaries', pp.3-S, in Army Headquarters 
Historical Section Report No. 10, 5 December 1946, DHIst, AHQ Report No. 10 [gun statistics);
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The official Canadian army historian, Charles P. Stacey, did not seem 
to want to admit, what historians now agree, was an intelligence failure of the 
greatest proportions, when he flatly exclaimed, 'Our own intelligence 
concerning the enemy's defences and dispositions was on the whole 
excellent. Thanks to our efficient air reconnaissance, there was not much we 
did not know about the defences of the Dieppe area'. For evidence of this 
supposition, he cited two German after-action reports. Field-Marshal Gerd 
von Rundstedt, C-in-C Army Group West, who, three days after the raid, 
made a quick, superficial analysis of the first lessons to be learned from the 
operation, concluded that, 'The English had good maps showing nearly all 
our defences and minefields as of June 1942'. A report of 25 August, by the 
Operations Officer of the German 81 Corps, also commented on the 
'excellent' maps on which 'all the information obtained from aerial 
reconnaissance was plotted. This included the smallest detail of the German 
positions, and even the Dieppe anti-tank walls... All possibilities of ascent 
and descent were also clearly marked'. But the report indicated that 
information not so easily gleaned from aerial photo reconnaissance was 
usually lacking, noting that 'the locations of Regimental and other HQs were 
unknown', giving the example of the Divisional HQ, thought to be at Arques- 
la-Bataille, whereas it had actually moved several months earlier to 
Envermeu. Grudgingly, Stacey, who again appears not to want to 
acknowledge any intelligence deficiencies, states that there were some 
minor ones concerning disposition and identification of HQ, armaments and 
gun calibre. Deficiencies on such details were perhaps unavoidable given
none of the Jubilee battle maps show Battery 7 or 8, see Home Forces 'Dieppe Area 
Defences', Map No.30, 1:50.000, PRO. AIR 16/747.
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the poor capability of intelligence about the area at the time but were rather 
more major than minor, especially to the assaulting Canadians at the sharp 
end.2o
An Abwehr (German Military Counter-Intelligence Service) report of 
14 September 1942 was more to the point, stating that even though 
individual installations were marked on the maps 'fairly accurately' and 
'correct[ly] on the whole... a claim of completeness could not be made' and, 
overall, the maps were 'very incomplete and faulty in interpretation'. 
Attention was drawn to many overlooked and inaccurate tactical details, 
such as bunkers under construction, zigzag trenches and air cover ditches, 
which 'could easily be seen from the air and by agents'. It explained that the 
tactical function of many installations was unknown, noting the frequent use 
of the word 'possible', and that sometimes their purpose was not even 
guessed at. Often the generic term 'pill box' was used to describe many 
installations, such as MG emplacements, with no comment on the possible 
type or calibre of gun. On the other hand, the report sometimes referred to 
specific mistakes, such as, as a sound detector installation which was 
wrongly identified as a searchlight, with the annotation 'possible only'. This, 
the report states, should have been easily recognisable, even to an 
untrained observer. It criticised the lack of knowledge of the troop 
dispositions in the coastal zone, especially at battalion level and lower, 
calling it 'extraordinarily inexact'. The maps revealed the correct
^  Stacey, Six years of war, pp.357-8; 'Basic observations of the C-in-C West No.8, 23 August 
1942', p.23, in 'Report of the German C-ln-C West (Field-Marshal Von Rundstedt) on the 
Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, translated by Historical Section (QS) Army 
HQ, Ottawa, November 1946. The captured map of the main beach showed a suspected 
minefield In the vicinity of the beach below the west headland. Operations Officer, HO 81 
Army Corps, 'Combat report and experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 
August 1942', 25 August 1942, p.4, translation, NAC, RQ 24/10423/20551.023(D1).
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identification of only one battalion HQ while no regimental headquarters
were shown at all. Finally, it concluded, the fact that some camouflaged
installations, which could not be identified from the air, such as those in
forests, were not shown, should not indicate that air intelligence was not 
e
being complemented by individual agents or an espionage network. It noted 
the 'extraordinarily favourable conditions' for espionage -  having foreign 
forced labour actually doing the construction of most of the installations in 
question, and a local French population living in the vicinity of them. 
However, it concluded that if a 'well functioning and practised espionage 
organization' had existed, it would have a produced better results, and thus 
in this respect, 'the maps must be described as rather poor'.^i
COHQ also made no attempt to estimate the areas of responsibility of 
the German units or to pin-point in detail the individual infantry positions in 
the town of Dieppe. Using the basis of known German tactical doctrine 
COHQ should have made a more realistic appreciation of the beach 
defences themselves. Another serious error was the lack of an intelligence 
map enlargement of the town, which would have been indispensable to the 
assaulting troops, showing all known or suspected troop dispositions, 
objectives and defences, such as pill boxes, MG nests and other 
installations. One was prepared after the operation with the aid of statements 
from eight PoWs taken on the raid.“
21 Abwehr, German Military and Counter-intelligence, Intelligence Control Station Franco, 
'Evaluation of enemy operation on 19 August 1942', 14 September 1942, pp.3-5, NAC, RG 
24/20488/981 G1NT(D1).
“  Elliot, Scarlet to green, p.174; Lt-Col G.P, Henderson, 'Intelligence report on the Dieppe 
raid, 19 August 1942, Appendix A, sketch map of enemy defences on White and Red 
beaches', 22 September 1942, NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2(D2).
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The previously highly regarded source of Intelligence, vertical aerial 
photography, did not reveal the many natural and artificially constructed 
caves In the two headlands full of field, anti-tank and MG emplacements, 
although the caves in the west headland were known about. Thirty-six hours 
before the raid an air reconnaissance sortie flown very low over Dieppe 
revealed for the first time the suspected presence of defences built into the 
east headland. From these photographs It was not possible to tell the type or 
calibre of the guns nor did they show similar positions in the west headland. 
Elliot correctly points out that COHQ seriously underestimated the overall 
number of weapons. He claims that 'the known characteristics of certain 
guns, together with a knowledge of the order of battle and the equipment in 
use, should have enabled COHQ certainly, and 2 Canadian Division 
possibly, to make a more detailed evaluation of, and threat posed by, the 
weapons deployed'. Thus the COHQ Intelligence and Planning Sections 
and 2 CID planners were all at fault. The British intelligence history 
concludes that there was 'complacency in taking at its face value intelligence 
that was deficient and over-reliant on one source' (photographic 
intelligence), and in underrating 'the strength of the defences at Dieppe and 
the topographical difficulties that would be met by a landing there'.^
The Combined Report tried to be as uncritical as possible of the 
intelligence available. Attempting a positive face, it noted the 'Intelligence 
Section arranged its direct liaison service with the Force Commanders and 
right up to the time of the operation the latest intelligence was passed to 
them'. Looking back, what could the Military Force Commander do about the 
defences in the headlands thirty-six hours before departure? Not much
^  Elliot, Scarlet to green, p.163; HInsley, British intelligence, 2, p.699.
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except abort, which was extremely unlikely at so late a stage. The Combined 
Report concluded that beach reconnaissance for the operation 'was very 
complete', although it admitted that for future operations completion of all 
beach reconnaissance, with the aid of naval reconnaissance, was essential 
before the beginning of work on the outline plaii.^^
The intelligence error of incorrectly identifying 110 ID (and location of 
its headquarters), instead of 302 ID, was not that significant at the time of the 
raid, though the reason is of interest now. Stacey wonders, 'how this mistake 
came to be made remains a mystery'. In the spring of 1942 the detailed 
intelligence of the German order of battle, needed for the planning of cross- 
Channel operations on the Continent, was so sparse that the COS ordered 
the JIC to begin an intensive collection and analysis of intelligence on the 
whole north-west coast of Europe. As a result the Combined Intelligence 
Section, GHQ Home Forces, was formed and weekly intelligence reports, 
code-named Martian, began to be issued. These included information from 
all intelligence sources, including Ultra in a disguised form. Air and naval 
aspects were covered in great detail but the Army was more difficult to follow, 
as it used secure land lines mainly for communication. Thus information 
depended mainly on intelligence from other, less reliable, sources, such as 
that gleaned from PoWs or received from Resistance movements or agents. 
Periodically, sporadic intercepts from the Eastern Front were intercepted. 
Campbell explains that it is possible in May 1942, Ultra might have picked 
up some of the discussions involving Hitler, the General Staff and Army 
group Centre, concerning 110's transfer from Army Group Centre in Russia 
to Franco. The OKW (Oberkommando der Wohrmacht -  Armed Forces
^  COHO, 'Combined Report', p.9, paragraph 366.
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High Command) War Diary confirms these exchanges. Allied intelligence 
later assumed it had taken place. If transfer occurred the arrival of the 
division was assumed to have been on the 10 or 11 June.^
The General Staff (Intelligence) [GS (I)], GHQ Home Forces, 'Martian 
Report No. 7', 14 July 1942, stated that '302 Infantry Division has left the 
Dieppe area, and has been replaced by an unidentified division'. One week 
later, the next Martian report, concluded, 'The replacement for the 306 [s/c] 
Infantry Division in the Dieppe area is believed to be 110 Infantry Division, a 
good division but severely battered in Russia'. Further confirmation was 
received on 6 August 1942, when GS (I) GHQ Home Forces sent a 
memorandum to COHQ on the history of 110 ID. It stated the unit had arrived 
in France on 11 June 1942 and, although 'not yet located', was thought to 
have relieved 302 ID in the Dieppe area, 'although this cannot be regarded 
as absolutely certain'. Concerning its 'fighting value', the report said 'It is 
potentially a high-quality field-force division'. The correct intelligence 
concerning 110 ID did not come through until seven days after the raid.^ 
Confirmation of the possibility of 110 transferring to France is in the 
Abwehr report on the raid. While commenting on captured maps and the 
incorrect identification of the division, it noted 'there indeed was supposed to 
have been some talk of 110 Infantry Division really being transported from 
the East to Occupied France. A check would be interesting'. The report later
25 Stacey, Six years of war, p.357; Hinsley, British intelligence, 3(11), Appendix 2, 'The Martian 
Reports', pp.753-55; PRO, WO 219/1933, Martian Reports Nos.1-12, 12 June-19 August 
1942; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.1B3-4.
*  General Staff (Intelligence), GHQ Home Forces, Martian Report No.7*, 14 July 1942, PRO, 
W O 219/1933, p.111; General Staff (Intelligence), GHQ Home Forces, 'Marllan Report No.8', 
21 July 1942, PRO, WO 219/1933, p.129; GHQ Home Forces to COHQ, Memorandum 
HF/INT/222/2/40, 'Enemy Order of Battle information [110 Division History]', 6 August 1942, 
PRO, DEFE 2/330; General Staff (Intelligence), GHQ Home Forces, 'Martian Report No.13',
26 August 1942, PRO, WO 219/1934.
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concluded the mistaken belief of British intelligence that the 110 had moved 
to Dieppe was 'apparently the result of German deceptive measures'.^^
The disposition of 10 PzD and intelligence concerning it was 
inaccurate in all published works until Campbell's. Stacey asserts that an 
intelligence report (probably from the SIS through its agent Bertrand) 
received on 5 July that 10 PzD had moved from Soissons to Amiens, only 
eight hours from Dieppe, caused the change of Rutter Uom a two-tide to a 
one-tide plan {Rutter If). The complete raiding force would re-embark by 
1100 hours, eliminating the chance of any troops being caught ashore in the 
afternoon by a German armoured counter-attack. The Jubilee Detailed 
Military Plan, as a precaution, noted the departure 10 PzD as imminent but, 
as already explained, warned that its forward reconnaissance elements 
could arrive between three to five hours after Zero hour.^s
Hinsley explains on 11 May Bertrand reported the arrival of 10 PzD 
from Russia at Soissons. On 1 and 8 June GS (I), GHQ Home Forces, 
received indications that it was preparing to move. Accordingly on 13 July 
the SIS checked with Bertrand who relayed back that it had moved to 
Amiens on 12 July. Stacey states that an anonymous report received caused 
the operation to be switched to a one-tide basis.^
^  Abwehr, German Military and Counter-intelligence, Intelligence Control Station France. 
'Evaluation of enemy operation on 19 August 1942', 14 September 1942, pp.5-6, NAC, RG 
24/20488/981G1 NT(D1).
^  Stacey, Six years of war, p. 339; COHO, 'Combined Report', Annex 2, Appendix A, pp.90- 
1, paras 684,687-8, DHIst 594.013 (01); Robertson agrees with Stacey, The shame and the 
glory, p.124; Kirkpatrick also supports Stacey, using Robertson as his source, but then 
strangely says the division moved 'In June', Captains without eyes, p.172.
^  Hinsley, Bhtlsh Intelligence, 2, p.701; COS, 'Weekly Military Intelligence Summaries', Ml 
14/SIF/22, 23 and 34, dated 1 June, 8 June, 24 August 1942, PRO, WO 208/3573; 
Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.25-7.
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In fact, as Campbell elucidates, and which both Stacey and Hinsley 
failed to note, intelligence on 10 PzD disposition was available to the 
planners even earlier. As early as 23 June, 'Martian Report No. 4' notes the 
unconfirmed move of the 10 PzD HQ fonward to Amiens. The account 
continues. This report accords well with the reported arrival of tanks in 
Amiens in early Juné (this author's emphasis). It also seemed to confirm that 
the division was now part of the 15th Army Reserve.*^ German situation 
maps show 10 PzD HQ at Soissons on 28 May and at Amiens on 9 June. 
Campbell shows that at COHQ Examination Meeting of 30 June, at which 
key Rutter planners attended, including Hughes-Hallett, the true position of 
the PzD came up in discussion of another operation. Perhaps the Force 
Commanders had been informed of its presence but were waiting for definite 
confirmation; it is unclear, although they should have planned for this 
contingency. The extant documents do not explain why the they were only 
informed on 5 July of the PzD presence. An entry in the COHQ War Diary, 
states that on that day the Force Commanders and C-in-C Portsmouth were 
informed that 10 PzD 'moved with tanks to Flixécourt, half way between 
Amiens and Abbeville'. The report also noted that It was 'a first class fighting 
formation and up to strength in men and equipment', and that advanced 
elements could be arrive at Dieppe after four hours. Montgomery, in a 
meeting on 5 July (Campbell Incorrectly says this occurred on 6 July) with 
McNaughton at South-Eastern Command HQ, showed the latter a letter he 
had just dispatched to Crerar, definitely confirming that 10 PzD 'had indeed 
moved to Amiens, which is a distance of 80 miles direct, or about 120 miles 
by road, a time distance of about 8 hours. This dictates a short, i.e. "one tide"
General Staff (Intelligence), QHQ Home Forces, 'Martian Report No.4', 23 June 1942, p.2, 
PRO, WO 219/1933; Stacey, Six years of war, p.339, fn.
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operation'. Finally, he warned that if the operation was postponed again, it 
should be cancelled.^^
In conclusion, the available intelligence on 10 PzD was extremely 
slow in reaching COHQ. It seems that not only did GS (I) GHQ Home Forces 
and COHQ know about the division but also the Air Ministry. A document 
entitled 'Rutter. Notes for CAS' (Chief of Air Staff), dated 2 July, commenting 
on the German dispositions, undoubtedly refers to 10 PzD in remarking,
'One Armoured Division is thought to have been moved recently to Amiens, 
about 50 miles away. This might be expected to appear within 3-4 hours of 
the assault'. This intelligence would certainly been available to COHQ so it is 
a mystery why the plan was not changed until 5 July. Possibly somewhere in 
the intelligence process a breakdown occurred and the information was 
delayed in reaching the Force Commanders. One wonders how disastrous 
would have been the outcome if the operation had gone in on the original 
two-tide basis on any of the previously postponed dates.^^
The Abwehr report also noted that the captured orders and maps 
indicated correctly the designation of the Corps Command as 81st, which 
dated from 15 June 1942, and that 10 PzD Division was not in Corps 
reserve. Since 10 PzD was at Amiens, the logical assumption would be it 
was under Corps command. It concluded, 'the enemy was actually informed 
only with regard to information generally only known at higher headquarters. 
81 St Corps therefore believes that from this fact the conclusion must be
3’ COHQ Examination Meeting, 30 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2, COHQ War Diary, quoted In 
Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.27; COHQ, '1/67', July 1942, 'Rutter, intelligence', PRO, DEFE 
2/542, p.58; Lt-Col B.H. Darwin, 'Memorandum of a between Lt-Gen. McNaughton and Lt- 
Gen. Montgomery, at *A‘ House, HQ SE Army, at 1215 hours 5 July 1942 regarding 
Operation Ruttet, 6 July 1942, NAC, RG 24 C l 7/13611/GS First Canadian Army HQ War Diary 
April 1942-February 1943/T6672.
32 COHQ, 'Rutter. Notes lor CAS' (Chief of Air Staff], 2 July 1942, p.2, PRO. AIR 8/895.
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drawn that the existence of an espionage organization must be looked for 
primarily in that direction'. Instead of examining the security of their various 
ciphers, which throughout the war the Germans thought were unbreakable, 
the report implied that an espionage organization could be responsible and 
that this should be investigated.^s
Intelligence failures occurred on both sides and this is amply revealed 
in analysis of the use of radar by the opposing forces. In previous accounts 
of the operation, the radar story was not comprehensively examined, and 
sometimes hardly mentioned, until publication by Campbell. But even his 
thoroughly researched contribution still leaves some questions unclear. 
Professor Louis Brown, in his forthcoming book, A radar history of World War 
II (1997), explains the radar story of Dieppe is 'a curious one. Succinctly put, 
one might say that nothing happened, seemingly belying the extent of what 
follows, but there are occasions where "nothing" requires a bit of 
explanation'. What Professor Brown's is implying here is that certain events 
could have had a major impact on the operation, causing it to unfold very 
differently.^^
The role of radar in Jubilee can be divided into three aspects: first, the 
British operational use of radar by shore-based stations and the Jubilee 
force itself to detect German shipping movements in the Channel during the 
run-up and immediately prior to Jubilee's sailing (which also has an 
operational Ultra aspect); second, the similar German operational use of 
radar shore-based stations to detect and track the advance of Jubilee-, and
^  Abwehr, German Military and Counter-Intelligence, Intelligence Control Station France, 
Evaluation of enemy operation on 19 August 1942',14 September 1942, p.6, NAC, RG 
24/20488/981G 1 NT( D 1 ).
Louis Brown to H. Henry, 4 January 1996, and draft RAD13.DOC, 'The Channel, 1942', 
p.15, In A radar history of World War II (forthcoming 1997).
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third, the claim that the Allies gained some technical radar intelligence that 
was instrumental in the subsequent highly significant development of Allied 
radar and radar counter-measures, which were so successful prior to, 
during, and immediately after the final invasion of the Continent almost two 
years later.
The British use of radar failed due to what apparently was a break 
down in intelligence dissemination. The immediate result of the failure 
caused Jubilee the loss of tactical surprise at the eastern landing areas. At 
0347 hours Group 5 of the Jubilee naval force on the left flank suddenly met 
with a German coastal convoy from Boulogne. The engagement alerted the 
Germans at Puys and Bemeval. The brief battle scattered the majority of the 
assault craft carrying the commandos assigned to neutralize the coastal 
battery at Bemeval, resulting in it not being taken. The infantry attacking 
Puys did not get off the beach and this complete failure resulted in the east 
headland not being occupied. This was a catastrophe for the main landings 
at Dieppe half an hour later. The standard argument for this convoy collision 
is a failure in communications that resulted in the Naval Force Commander, 
Hughes-Hallett, on the headquarters ship Caipe, not receiving the warnings 
sent to him.
About a month after the operation. General Crerar, 1 Canadian Corps 
Commander, questioned the Recorder of Combined Operations, Hilary St 
George Saunders, about why this German convoy had not been picked up 
by British radar and a subsequent warning sent to the Naval Force 
Commander. This instigated Mountbatten to order an internal investigation 
which revealed that a different convoy had been detected at about 2300 off 
Boulogne moving westwards down the coast (see Map 3). The day after the
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raid, at a COHQ meeting to discuss the raid, Hughes-Hallett had stated that 
the ships plotted were another convoy, which he referred to as a 'tanker and 
escort', that passed about ten miles ahead of Group 5 and entered Dieppe at 
approximately 0330. This was later confirmed, according to the record of a 
telephone conversation on 1 October 1942, by Hughes-Hallett, who assured 
Mountbatten that:
The plots obtained at Newhaven and passed to Portsmouth and the signals passed 
out by WTT (wireless telegraphy] from Portsmouth were all in order and referred to a 
convoy which came down the coast and did in fact enter Dieppe at 0330.
The craft which encountered the Yellow beach party were never plotted by 
RDF and could not have been as they were well outside the range at which RDF can 
detect craft of this size.
Mountbahen replied to Crerar on 5 October, explaining that three 
signals were sent and received by Hughes-Hallett. These were at 0143,
0258 and 0334, and concerned this 'tanker and escort', which were about 
ten miles north and slightly east of Dieppe at 0300. He explained that 
Hughes-Hallett 'was satisfied at the time and is still satisfied that this convoy 
had nothing to do with the German vessels met with at 0350', and repeated 
his assurances that, 'These were closer into shore and were well outside the 
range at which RDF can detect craft of their size'. The Combined Report, 
which it will be remembered was composed under Hughes-Hallett and 
Mountbatten's direct supervision, toes the line by positively declaring that the 
convoy plotted was much farther out than the one engaged and repeating 
that the latter was 'not discovered by RDF because their small size made 
detection at that range impossible'. Crerar accepted this explanation at face 
value, since he was not in a position, in Campbell's opinion, 'to appreciate 
how intentionally misleading it was'.^
*  Mountbatten to Crerar, File No. SRP 2/7, 5 October 1942, and reply, 13 October 1942, 
PRO, DEFE 2/324; 'Analysis of preliminary reports by Force Commanders and their staff on 
Operation Jubilee, 20 August 1942', draft, p .t, PRO, DEFE 2/330; COHQ, 'Combined
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Hughes-Hallett, possibly with Mountbatten's acquiescence, appeared 
to be attempting some kind of cover-up, since the 1946 (revised 1959) 
confidential Naval Staff History of the operation does not make any mention 
of a second convoy, a 'tanker and escort', or of the three signals pertaining to 
it. It does reveal that the coastal RDF station at Fairlight, Dover, d/d track the 
first German convoy (Convoy 2437) moving down the coast. This radar 
station was part of a newly installed, secret chain along the south-east coast, 
that used the Mark IV High Power Type 271 equipment. The stations 
purportedly gave complete coverage 'from buoys to battleships' in the Straits 
of Dover, and were not yet being jammed by the Germans. An internal naval 
inquiry into the matter stated that 'on the night in question these long range 
naval plots were only obtained by anomalous propagation, and that the 
targets faded and sometimes reappeared in a most irregular way. Consistent 
plotting was not possible. Campbell defines anomalous propagation as 
'unusual atmospheric conditions that made it possible to plot a target at 
exceptional range but subject to intermittent fading'. Thus Portsmouth plotted 
the convoy's course as early as 2140 hours on the 18 August, until 2300 
hours when the contact faded (see Map 6). Ventnor RDF station K 86, on the 
Isle of Wight, picked it up again at 0040 and 0100 hours off the mouth of the 
Somme River.*
Based on this last plot C-in-C Portsmouth sent a signal at 0127 to 
Hughes-Hallett warning, 'small craft apparently patrolling approximately
Report', p.13, para.74, DHIst, 594.013(01); PRO, DEFE 2/324, Note with indecipherable 
signature, 1 October 1942, possibly by Cockroft; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.146-7.
*  Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History of the Second World War, BR 1736 (26), 
Raid on Dieppe (Naval operations) 19 August 1942', Battle Summary No.33, (Revised April 
1959 from 1946), p.17 and Plan 5, PRO, ADM 234/355; E.C. Varlay to Chief Superintendent 
J.D. Cockroft, 8 October 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/324; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.147.
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350° Trdport 15 miles at 0100'. At this point, the convoy did not seem likely to
enter the operational area, but further radar plots by Ventnor, showed that
this was very possible. At 0205, 0226 and 0251 Ventnor plotted it off Tr6port
moving down on a direct course of interception with the naval assault force.
Based on the 0226 plot a second warning signal was sent to Hughes Hallett
at 0244: 'Two craft 302° Tr6port 10 miles, course 190° 13 knots at 0226'.
Apparently, he did not receive either warning, seemingly the result of
communication problems. The stand-by HQ ship Femie received the second
signal but believing the Caipe received it also it took no action. The signals
log book of the gunboat Locust, between the entries of 0212 and 0245,
records, 'Signals received during passage indicating the movements of
certain small craft on the French coast'. The Naval Staff History concludes:
thus a full hour before the erKounter, warning had been given of the presence of 
unidentified craft, which were then but 4 miles from the projected track of Group 5 and 
were almost bound to intercept it, if course and speed were maintained. At 0300 the 
enemy was apparently not more than 2 miles from the line of advance of Group 5 .^
The official naval historian, Stephen Roskill, initially declared in his first draft
of The war at sea (1956), 'the enemy's progress was plotted at our shore
stations, and one hour before the clash the C-in-C, Portsmouth, warned the
Naval Force Commander of the presence of unidentified vessels on a course
that was bound to bring them into contact with the group of landing craft' [this
author's emphasis]. In the published version the two highlighted word
^  Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History of the Second World War, BR 1736 (26), 
Raid on Dieppe (Naval operations) 19 August 1942', Battle Summary No.33, (Revised April 
1959 from 1946), p.17, PRO, ADM 234/355. For the communication problems on Caipe, see 
Lucien K. Truscott, Command missions: a personal story (New York: Dutton, 1954), p.68, 
quoted in Jacques Mordal, Dieppe: the dawn of decision (London: New English Library,
1981, first edition 1963), p.161; Brian L. Villa, Unauthorized action: Mountbatten and the 
Dieppe ra/d (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989, revised 1994), p.16. In the Naval Force 
Commander's Report In its section on 'List of Important Signals' the two signals are not listed. 
No. NFJ 0221/92, 30 August 1942, Enclosure 5, p.1, NMM, Baillle-Grohman Papers, 
GRO/26.
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groups are deleted and the second group is replaced with the words 'which 
would probably. Mountbatten, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at the 
time, probably pressured Roskill to alter this section. Although Roskill cut out 
his previous assertion he still implies, albeit in a toned down manner, the 
plotting of the convoy from the shore stations.^»
Villa correctly explains no hard evidence exists about the 
communication failure. He believes Hughes-Hallett, instead of taking the 
obvious action after receipt of the warnings to abort the operation, 'decided 
not to throw away his last chance to carry out his mission. He was nothing if 
not determined'. Campbell claims the second signal at 0244 was 'hardly 
reason' to cancel the operation, as has been suggested, since 'there could 
be no cancellation after the LSIs [Landing Ship Infantry] entered the swept 
channels through the minefield, and by 0244 the first of the LSIs had already 
reached the lowering point for landing craft'. Campbell is correct that this 
procedure was in accordance with the operation orders, although the 
'Operation Jubilee -  Detailed Military Plan' only states that once Jubilee was 
under way, cancellation had to be ordered 'before 0300', and does not 
mention the minefield in this context. Campbell is incorrect quoting the 
lowering time of 0244.The first LSI, HMS Queen Emma with Group 3, did not 
reach the lowering point BB until 0257 (see Map 4). Therefore Hughes- 
Hallett had thirteen minutes, since receiving the second warning signal, 
which granted was not very much time, to decide whether or not to abort the 
operation.*
»  Stephen W. Roskill, The war at sea 1939-1945', first draft, PRO, CAB 101/335; and The 
war at sea 1939-1945: the period of balance 2 (2 vols,, London; HMSO, 1956), p.246,
*  Villa, Unauthorized action, p,16; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.147; C.C, Mann, 'Operation 
Jubilee -  Detailed Military Plan', 7 August 1942, p.6, NAC, RQ 24/10671/23202(025); 
'Extract of report by Commanding Officer HMS Queen Emnvi, Appendix 2A, p.5 to ErKsl. 13,
151
Evidence seems to indicate that Ultra probably also played a part In 
the detection and warning of the German convoy. As a matter of routine the 
Germans signalled in advance the time of departure, destination and 
composition of their coastal convoys. Since August 1941 the British shore- 
based stations had been intercepting signals sent in the German Navy's 
Heimisch key (Ultra decrypt series ZTPG) which was used by the ships and 
shore establishments in Home waters, including the Bay of Biscay and the 
Channel. GC&CS had been reading the SIGINT with 'virtual currency' since 
its introduction. He states that although much of Ultra was repetitive and 
administrative in content, when used in conjunction with other sources of 
intelligence, such as other forms of SIGINT and photo reconnaissance, 'it 
was possible to determine what was normal activity... and thus what was out 
of the ordinary'. He points out, correctly, that the Admiralty could exert direct 
control over any amphibious operations in its Home waters, and the OIC, 
although not having an executive function, was able to communicate directly 
with both the naval C-in-C concerned, in this case. Admiral Sir William 
James, at Portsmouth, and with any of his subordinate naval forces at sea, in 
this case Jubilee.*^
In 1980, and later in his 1993 book, Campbell first drew attention to 
the fact that Ultra had picked up the German Navy's reaction to the 
collision of its Convoy 2437 with Group 5 of Jubilee and the later landings. 
He notes the time lapse between the signals' interception, decryption, 
translation and transmission by teleprinter at GC&SC, to the Admiralty's OIC 
in London, meant that some decrypts, such as the one concerning Convoy
Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, 
RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48) (0257 lowering time).
^Cam pbell, Dieppe revisited, p.187,169.
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2437, had no immediate operational significance, which, he is correct in 
saying, is 'doubtless why they are not mentioned by Hinsley', in his official 
history/’
In a thoroughly researched section on German naval procedures in 
the Channel in 1942, Campbell shows that it was standard operating 
procedure for the OIC to make weekly estimates of German naval 
dispositions and activities, such as minelaying, based on all sources of 
intelligence, including, most importantly. Ultra. These estimates, he states, 
would have definitely been taken into account when planning amphibious 
operations, although none of the authorities on the subject, such as Hinsley 
and Patrick Beesly, Very special intelligence: the story of the Admiralty's 
Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945 (1977), say so. Thus, just prior to 
the departure of Jubilee, at 1620 on 18 August, C-in-C Portsmouth received 
a detailed OIC summary of all German naval dispositions between Ostend 
and St Malo, as of noon on the 17 August. This was updated with a photo 
reconnaissance survey of all the Channel ports on the afternoon of 18 
August.^
The Ultra decrypts of most interest are those referring to Convoy 2437. 
The first one was 'ZIP/ZTPG/68850', referring to departure south from 
Boulogne, and sent by German patrol boat UJ 1411 -  'From UJ 1411: 
Leaving Boulogne 2100 [2000 BST] for Dieppe with UJ 1404, M 4014 and
J.P. Campbell to Stephen W. Rosklll, 23 July 1980, and reply, 31 July 1960, CCA, Rosklll 
Papers ROSK 5/52; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.30.
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp. 173-4; Patrick Beesly, Very special intelllgerKe: the story o l 
the Admiralty's Operational Intelllgertce Centre 1939-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977), 
p.227; OIC, 'Dispositions of certain German naval units-from information available to 0930,17  
August 1942', O IC /SI 305,17 August 1942; OIC, 'German Naval dispositions -  17 August 
1942', OIC/SI 3 1 1 ,1 8  August 1942; OIC, 'Channel activltles-noon, 11 August to noon 15 
August', OIC/SI 312, 19 August 1942, all In PRO, ADM 223/95.
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convoy of 5 (corrupt group ?+ motor) ships. Speed 6 knots. Coastal H/F 
West'. The TCX) (Time of origin) was 1952 British Summer Time (BST) on 18 
August, and the TOI (Time of intercept) was 2022. The decrypted teleprinted 
message arrived at the OIC at 0316, half an hour before the convoy 
encountered Jubilee, but a third warning was not sent to Hughes-Hallett. It is 
not clear why not, and Campbell does not effectively explain this. He 
wonders, 'Is this one of those alleged instances when the full use of Ultra 
was inhibited by excessive regard for its security?'. First, he states that one 
reason a third signal was not sent was it risked interception and decryption 
by the German SIGINT agency, B-Dienst. But later he contradicts himself, 
while answering his own question, by showing that on many other 
occasions, when Ultra was the only source of vital operational information, it 
was still was passed on, albeit in a disguised form. In which case C-in-C 
Portsmouth could have sent another warning purporting to be based on 
radar if Ultra had indicated anything of value concerning the convoy. 
Campbell concludes that the Germans were not concerned about their 
cipher security because, 'Quite simply, there were too many other possible 
sources of intelligence, given the operational conditions in the Channel'. The 
probable reasons a third warning was not sent, are first, as previously 
explained, the 0300 time of cancellation, had already passed, and second, 
two warnings had already been sent about the convoy, and there was no 
reason to suppose that Hughes-Hallett had not received them. Besides, the 
two destroyers Brocklesby and Slazak were assigned to screen and protect 
the ships in that area and were more than a match for the German ships. The 
long period after interception before being passed to the OIC, and then on to 
C-in-C Portsmouth, was due to the sometimes long and difficult process of
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decryption. The intelligence historian, and wartime code-breaker, Ralph 
Bennett, adds that;
When we were (as so often in 1943 and 1944) very busy in Hut 3 [at Bletchley Park], 
crafters of signals often seemed to think that their latest decrypt contained the most 
important news since Waterloo. They therefore assigned their craft the highest 
signals priority. If others followed suit, W /T  [wireless transmission] channels would 
become so congested that there would be long delays in transmission. As officer in 
charge of all outgoing during my shift, it was my duty to prevent this and to see that 
only the really nnost important got the fastest treatment. I still recall some of the 
altercations that followed. No doubt the O IC found the same problem.^
The next Ultra decrypt of interest, and the first that noted a German
reaction to Jubilee, was -  'ZIP/ZTPG/68913: From Naval Communications
Officer Le Havre: Attack on convoy at 0450 [0350 BST] 4 miles off Dieppe by
surface forces'. The TOO was 0410 and the TOI was 0421. Campbell shows
that the Naval Signal Station in Dieppe passed this information by landline
to Le Havre, and to the air raid reporting centre and Harbour Commander in
Dieppe, and was being relayed by wireless telegraphy (W/T) from there to
Naval Group West, 3 Air Fleet and Army Group D, when intercepted by
GC&CS. It arrived at the OIC at 0710, too late to be tactically relevant to the
engagement already finished.^
Later in the morning UJ1411, after repairing its radio which had been
damaged in the fire-fight, signalled at 0641:
Convoy dispersed north of Dieppe owing to enemy landing. UJ 1404 hit in magazine 
has vanished burning fiercely. 1 Gunboat destroyed by ramming. Several hits on 
MTBs [motor torpedo boats] and on one flotilla leader. 2 A/C [aircraft] shot down.
^  For ease of reference, all times are shown in British Summer Time (BST). Greenwich Mean 
Time (GMT) was one hour before BST, and German Summer Time (GST) was one hour ahead 
of BST. Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68850, PRO. DEFE 3/187, p.871; Campbell. Dieppe 
revisited, p p .169 ,171,174; Ralph Bennett to H. Henry, 1 May 1994; Bennett also notes that 
'An elaborate plan for making Immediate [operational] use of fVT [radio transmissions] and 
Sigint broke down because the channels provided became choked' from heavy use during 
the operation. Behind the battie: inteiiigence on the war with Qeimany, 1939-45 (London; 
Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994), p.193.
Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68913, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.937; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, 
p.167.
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convoy is gathering at Le Tr6port. UJ 1404 and 1 motor vessel are missing. W/T watch 
on coastal M/F again.
This decrypt (ZIP/ZTPG/68938) did not reach the OIC until 0949 and thus 
was of no tactical value either.^
The first decrypt to indicate from Ultra that the Germans were aware of 
the Jubilee landings, was a signal sent at 0604 by the Sea Defence 
Commandant Seine-Somme, and intercepted thirteen minutes later, 
although it did not reach the OIC until 0826, over two hours later. This 
decrypt (ZIP/ZTPG/68930) stated, 'Enemy forces landed at Bemeval [sic] 
0625 [0525 BST]. Fire has been opened on the enemy’s ships’.^
Another convoy that might have caused some difficulty was 2412, 
made up of five patrol boats and four motor barges. It had been tracked since 
the evening of 17 August leaving Le Havre for Dieppe (ZIP/ZTPG/68844), 
where it arrived on the morning of the 18 August. This information, although 
intercepted at 1934 on the 17 August, did not reach the OIC until 0307 on the 
19 August. A further decrypt (ZIP/ZTPG/68882), indicated that the convoy 
was leaving Dieppe at 2000 on the 18 August at 6 knots, and was expected 
to arrive in Boulogne at 0500 the next morning. The OIC received this 
information at 0430 on 19 August, which confirmed that it had been out of the 
operational area since midnight. A final decrypt (ZIP/ZTPG/68945) confirmed 
its arrival at Boulogne at 0530. This account of Ultra decrypts and their 
onward transmission, although not tactically relevant to Jubilee, shows how 
the naval authorities, including the C-in-C Portsmouth, were tracking 
German naval movements before and during Jubilee, and would have
^  Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPQ/68938, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.983; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, 
p.189.
«  Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPQ/8893o, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.955.
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passed the information to the Naval Force Commander if it had been 
essential.
The other mystery is why ship borne RDF did not detect the convoy?
Roskill is at loss for clarification, calling it an 'unexplained feature', and only
offers the suggestion that 'the presence of so many friendly vessels may
have confused the ships' radar screens'. The whole Jubilee force was
maintaining RDF silence as a security precaution on naval sets Type 286
and 290, while 272 was to be used for protection against surface attacks.
The Naval Staff History says that none of the ships' radar detected the
convoy. In a footnote it mentions the destroyer HMS Garth picked up a
contact at 0328 of some ship about twenty-four miles to the west, bearing
260°, but they turned out to be false. The destroyers Brocklesby and Slazak,
although equipped with the 10-cm Type 272 radar, and passing within four
miles, did not detect the German convoy. Campbell believes this was
because the radar sets did not have a Plan Position Indicator (an electronic
map superimposed on the radar screen), 'which made it difficult for the
operators to untangle the confusion of so many ships'. Derek Howse
disagrees. He was on the raid as the First Lieutenant of the destroyer Garth,
although he was not concerned with radar or plotting, and is author of Radar
at sea: the Royal Navy in World IVar 2 (1993). He comments:
I think that the German convoy could only have been detected by a destroyer on the 
left flank. If she had type 286/290 -  an airborne [radar] set modified for ship use which 
had a beam width of nearly 30° - 1 am not surprised she didn't do so. With a crowd of 
friendly ships, the chances of Identifying a specific group of echoes as enemy would 
be almost nil (unless they were at a far greater range than the friendlies) and would 
have required good plotting arrangements. Type 272 with a beam width of only a 
degree or so would make it easier, but identification would still require good plotting.
Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68844, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.865; Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68882, 
PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.905; OIC, 'Channel activities-noon, 17 to noon, 19 August', OIC/SI 315, 
21 August 1942, PRO, ADM 223/95; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.169.
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To say that detection did not take place for the lack of PPIs is a bit naive. British
destroyers did not begin to be so fitted until over a year later.'*^
The second aspect of radar and Jubilee concerns the German 
operational radar detection capability in 1942, and particularly its plotting of 
the approach of Jubilee. In the summer of 1942 the Germans had an 
improvised radar chain covering the whole coast of occupied Europe. Its 
main purpose, Campbell states, was 'to report the bearing, range, altitude, 
time of observation and approximate strength' of an approaching aircraft 
formation to the local aircraft reporting centre and fighter control HQ. Coast­
watching radar was the responsibility of the German navy and not the GAP, 
as one might have expected. The Seetakt radar equipment (60 to 90 cm 
wavelength) used naval gun-laying and surface detection. Technically, it 
was supposedly able to detect large ships, such as LSIs, from 30 to 40 km, 
and destroyers from 20 to 30 km. On 19 July 1942 a Seetakt on Pointe 
d'Ailly, near Varengeville, became operational, only to be removed a week 
before Jubilee, and subsequently reinstalled in September. From this 
superb, cliff-top location, Campbell explains, it could have 'stood an 
excellent chance of detecting' eight stationary LSIs lowering their landing 
craft 16 km offshore. Referring to a German source, Campbell states that they 
'considered detection by radar in such circumstances a virtual certainty'. At 
no time during the planning of Rutter/Jubilee was British intelligence, and 
therefore the planners, aware of its existence. The Seetakt closely 
resembled the GAP Freya in size and appearance, and only an expert PR 
[photo reconnaissance] interpreter could detect the minute differences. The
^  Roskill. The war at sea, p.246; Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History of the Second 
World War, BR 1736 (26), 'Raid on Dieppe (Naval Operations) 19 August 1942', Battle 
Summary No.33. (Revised April 1959 from 1946), p.17, PRO, ADM 234/355; Campbell. 
Dieppe revisited, p.148; Derek Howse, Radar at sea: the Royal Navy in World War 2  (London: 
Macmillan, 1993); Derek Howse to H. Henry, Letter, 11 May 1996.
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Freya (240 cm) was long-range early-warning equipment used for coastal 
and air defence. Campbell explains that it, 'worked on the vertical beam 
principle, with a width of about 15 degrees, some rotating continuously while 
others reciprocated through an arc'. It could detect aircraft up to a range of 
300 km, depending on their altitude. Although the Freya was capable of 
judging the range, bearing and approximate numbers of aircraft, it could not 
give the altitude. Therefore, the Freya was usually coupled with another type 
of radar known as Würzburg. This equipment was a shorter-wave (53 cm), 
anti-aircraft gun-aiming and fighter-control radar, with a steerable 'micro- 
wave dish' antenna, which utilised a narrower beam, approximately 10 
degrees, had a range of about 40 km, and counted on the Freya to initially 
direct it to a target. Campbell notes that the Würzburg 'measured altitude by 
calculating range and the angie of elevation of the reflector disc required to 
produce the targets maximum response on the receiver'. Campbell says 
'There was no theoretical reason why both types could not detect surface 
vessels'.^
At Dieppe, on the west headland, the Germans had one Freya (F 28) 
and a Würzburg (W 223) close to it. The former could detect large surface 
targets up to 30 km range. The latter could obtain accurate bearings on 
surface targets by using horizontal polarisation, and often in conjunction with 
two other Würzburgs, could join in to plot a target. However, the GAF 
controlled Würzburgs, had 'earned a reputation for eccentricity', Campbeil 
shows, due to inexperienced operators and poor location of some stations 
for surface plotting. Thus GAF plots resulted in a number of false alarms.
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.125,130-2; see also J.R. Robinson, 'Radar Intelligence and 
the Dieppe raid', Canadian Defence Quarterly 20/S (SprIng/AprII, 1991), 37-8.
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such as on 16/17 July 1942, when an invasion force was reported to be 
approaching Le Havre. The approaching amphibious force actually proved 
to be just a cloud bank. Another example was when the GAP, in attempting to 
track a convoy from Le Havre to Cherbourg, produced a piot overland across 
the Cotentin Peninsula.®®
The British oniy became aware of the effectiveness of German radar 
capabiiity in early 1942. The British expert on German radar was Professor 
R.V. Jones, Assistant Director Inteiiigence (Science), ADI (Sc), Air Ministry, 
who aiso served on the Low Cover RDF Committee. In 1979 he stated that 
only about a dozen of his approximateiy five hundred wartime files on radar 
had not been destroyed. One of these was the 'Interim report on German 
Coast Watching Stations', 29 July 1942, which gave a complete and current 
survey of British knowiedge of the German radar capability and dispositions. 
This report makes it clear that the British did not possess the capability to jam 
or spoof the Freya and Wurzburg before, or for some time, after Jubilee. 
Indeed, one of the Jubilee mission objectives of RAF radar technician, Flight- 
Sergeant Jack Nissenthai (iater Nissen), was to find out with what, if any, 
anti-jamming devices the Freya was equipped. Therefore the planners' only 
options were diversion or evasion of the German radar. Some of the 
measures suggested for Rutter were to stage diversionary air bombing raids 
on airfieids at Bouiogne, Cr^cy and Abbevilie, or to have two motor boats 
each tow a bailoon with a radar refiector off of Boulogne. To add to the 
realism, MGBs were to cruise around the area with full motors going. With
®® Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.132,135.
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these measures it was hoped to preoccupy the German radar and thereby 
screen the final approach of the Jubilee landing craft.®’
By the end of July 1942, at the latest, the British were definitely aware 
of the German Freya ability to detect LSIs at 'optical range' (15-25 miles) and 
that the Würzburg could give accurate horizontal plots on surface targets. 
Campbell states that whether this intelligence information, so important to 
amphibious operations, was known to COHQ during the planning of 
Rutter/Jubilee, has not been confirmed. F.A. Kingsley, who worked with radar 
at the time, in the Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment, believes that 
there is 'little doubt' that this information was available to the Jubilee 
planners and that 'the risks of radar detection were certainly taken Into 
account'. Derek Howse, another veteran of the radar war, agrees that 'it was 
common knowledge to operational commanders and staffs'. Perhaps this 
awareness of German capability was a reason that led to the decision, 
regarding Jubilee, not to use diversionary tactics but, instead, to depend on 
evasion. A more probable reason was that the nights were longer in August 
than in June, and thus meant less risk of the assault force being detected by 
GAP reconnaissance units. Leigh-Mallory concluded, 'It is therefore highly 
probable that surprise can be achieved. This in turn will make it unnecessary 
to carry out diversions, either by bombing or naval craft'. Campbell states 
that the Jubilee planners 'apparently assumed that the LSIs and destroyers 
would escape detection at 10-12 miles and that the landing craft, some of 
which were wooden, would not be picked up at all'. Campbell does not 
source this but it probably comes from Hughes-Hallett's memoirs. In these he
Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp. 125,130, 136-7; Jack Nissen and A.W. Cockerlll, Wirrning 
the radar war: a memoir (Toronto: Macmillan, 1987), p.147.
À
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states that it was on his insistence that the lowering point for LSIs was 
changed from the usual four mile distance. At the time he expected it 
standard procedure for the Germans to be operating their radar at night, and 
'felt strongly that it would be rash to assume that the German coastal radar 
was inferior to our own'. The resulting navigational problems of the landing 
craft, he explains, were an acceptable risk in the effort to avoid radar 
detection. Howse agrees that the LSI lowering point chosen was the 'best 
compromise' between two 'conflicting requirements': one which entailed the 
lowering point comparatively close to the coast, and the other, which wanted 
it to be as far out as possible, 'to reduce the consequences when they were 
detected'.sz
The Head of the British Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, 
J.D. Brown, confirms the veterans' views. His comments are instructive and 
thus quoted at length. He believes that a Jubilee military planner could have 
considered early detection to be 'acceptable under certain circumstances', 
and that:
There was no way of preventing warning being given (either by detection or jamming): 
the LSIs lowering position was dictated by the known range of enemy radar and 
although the LCAs [Landing Craft Assault) and LCTs [Landing Craft Tank] would take 
about an hour to reach the beaches, it was believed that the under strength low- 
quality brigade(!) holding Dieppe could not be reinforced for four hours. Surprise Is 
sometimes relative. In other words, if the margin of security remains sufficient for the 
objective to be achieved then total tactical surprise, though desirable. Is not 
necessary. This concept appears to have been in the planners' minds for they were, 
throughout, more concerned about the German reserves than about the garrison.
Concerning German radar detection capabilities Brown confirms the Allies
did not have a 'full and complete' knowledge. He explains that many
** Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.137, 139-41; F.A. Kingsley to H. Henry, letter. The Dieppe 
raid/Qerman radar detection', 12 April 1995; Derek Howse to H. Henry, letter, 'Operations 
Jubilee, Dieppe 19 August 1942', 19 March 1995; Leigh-Mallory, 'Employment of Bombers 
by Air Force Commander, nd., PRO, AIR 16//746; John Hughes-Hallett, 'Before I forget'. 
Memoirs, 1971, p.114, NAC, MQ 30 E463; Howse to Henry, letter, 'Dieppe', 30 March 1995.
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variables affected radar performance and that a radar operator at the time
could only guess what the day to day variations from the mean performance
of his own set would be. Although the scientists might well have known
about this mean expectancy, Brown asks:
did they anticipate ttie worst-case situation which actually prevailed on the day, of 
coastal radar looking down-wind? Had the wind in the Channel on 19 August been the 
prevalent westerly, instead of from the south-south-east, sea clutter (echoes from the 
steeper fronts of wind-driven seas) would certainly have much reduced the German 
radars' surface detection ranges, quite possibly by 50% .^
*g
Therefore Hughes-Hallettj^categorical claim, concerning German radar 
performance during the whole war, that he knew 'of no case in which British 
Assault Ships [such as LSIs] were detected from the shore before their 
Landing Craft had got well clear of them', was wrong, as were so many of his 
other post-war comments.5<
Stacey categorically asserts that radar gave the Germans 'no warning 
whatever*. The source he bases this on is the post-action report of the 
German C-in-C West, Field-Marshal Von Rundstedt, dated 3 September 
1942, which states that 'No identification about enemy forces were reported 
by RDF equipment up to the receipt of the report of the sea battle off Dieppe'. 
Ten days later, though, Campbell reveals that Rundstedt had received new 
information and changed his mind. The Army Group West War Diary 
explains how Freya 28, detected the LSIs as early as 0232, showed them to 
be stationary at 0330, and then tracked what seemed like five columns 
approaching Dieppe (see Map 4). But, the Navy believed the plots were 
either incorrect or were related to the expected German convoy. This 
information first came to light in 1958 in an anonymous article in a German
^  J.D. Brown, Head of Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, London, to H. Henry, 
letter D/NHB/9/2/17, 10 April 1995.
»  Hughes-Hallett, Memoirs, p.115, NAC, MG 30 E463.
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magazine. The author was Willi Weber, former commander of 23 Heavy 
Radar Company, of which Freya 28 was a subordinate unit. His version was 
soon cited in various forms by other authors, of whom the most widely read 
was Jacques Mordal Dieppe (1963). Campbell gives a detailed account, and 
it is unnecessary to do so here. The main point is that Jubilee was detected 
by the GAP RDF station, but was not believed by the naval authorities, 
because of previous reasons stated, such as interservice mistrust. Therefore 
tactical surprise was maintained.^
Campbell raises the point that the collision of Jubilee with the German 
coastal convoy actually proved to be a 'stroke of good fortune' since it 
'provided a form of cover'. The German radar operators ignored the radar 
plots of Jubilee at 0232 and 0330, since they had a convoy of their own in 
the area. This would have been the case, though, even if Jubilee had not 
collided with the convoy. Here Campbell is using confusing language for it 
was the presence of the German convoy, that deflected the German 
operators from their important radar plots, not the convoy's collision with 
Jubilee. Actually, the collision was a stroke of misfortune because the 
German defenders of Puys who, Campbell correctly states, had been on a 
night exercise, 'did not stand down before dawn because of the gunfire at 
sea'. However, one wonders whether the assaulting Canadians would have 
got off the beaches even if complete surprise had been attained at Puys.
This question will be considered in the battle chapter.^
^  Stacey, Six years of war, p.360; Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 'Report of the C-in-C 
West on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, translated by Historical Section 
(QS), Army HQ. Ottawa, November 1946, p.4, PRO, NAC RQ 24/20429/981.013(06); 
Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.28-9 (Rundstedt]; For the Willi Weber version see Campbell 
(pp.141-5); Mordal, Dieppe: the dawn of decision, pp.157-160; James Leaser, Qreen beach 
(New York: Macmillan, 1975), pp.126-30; Kirkpatrick, Captains without eyes, pp,188-9.
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp. 142-3.
164
The previous examination of the use of operational radar and SIGINT 
has, ironically, revealed that although both British and German sides had 
timely and valuable intelligence available to them, neither side utilised it 
effectively. Hughes-Hallett failed to react to C-in-C Portsmouth's warning 
signals, originating from shore RDF stations, about the German coastal 
convoy, while German army and naval authorities were sceptical and did not 
take seriously the invasion alert given by the GAP Freya 28.
The third, and final, aspect of radar and Jubilee to be dealt with, is the 
myth that the primary aim of the operation was to gather radar intelligence, 
and therefore the primary objective was the attack on the RDF station Freya 
28. The assault on the RDF station was not 'a Commando raid' nor was the 
installation, or any of its equipment, captured. These rumours were first 
started by COHQ communiqués based on initially inaccurate reports 
received during, and immediately after, the operation. The Chiefs of Staff 
Weekly Resume for the period also noted capture of the radar station. These 
official reports, although renounced later, spread quickly into the media and 
inevitably into popular and scholarly accounts of the operation. The Royal 
United Services Institute Journal's, 'Diary of the war' (November 1942), 
reported, 'a radiolocation station was destroyed'. Richard Deacon, an 
intelligence historian, wrote 'great success was achieved in capturing enemy 
radar equipment', in The silent war: a history of Western Naval intelligence 
(1978). Another scholar. Jack Haswell, noted that 'a valuable German [radar] 
installation was destroyed and much information gained from it', in The 
intelligence and deception of the D-Day landings (1979).®^
COHQ Communiques Nos.3 and 4 ,1 9  August 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/330; COS Weekly 
Resume No. 155,13 to 20 August 1942, p.2, PRO, CAB 80/37; RUSI Editor. 'Diary of the war*. 
Royal United Services Institute Journal 67ISA6 (November 1942), 123; Richard Deacon, The  
turning point'. In The silent war: a history of Western Naval Intelligence (Newton Abbot: David
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J.R. Robinson's article 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid', 
Canadian Defence Quarterly (^99^) should have dispelled this myth but it 
has survived. More recently, an interesting variation was put forward by 
Canadian journalist Mary Mackie. She believes that the operation was 'radar 
driven' from the beginning, and that 'radar espionage... was the imperative 
objective', which is the thesis of her unpublished paper, 'Top secret victory at 
Dieppe' (1993). Her most significant point is that the 'radar links between the 
4 decision-makers could have been the overriding factor which pushed the 
Dieppe Raid into its final realization'. The four decision-makers of whom she 
is speaking of are Prime Minster (PM) Winston Churchill, Mountbatten, 
Hughes-Hallett, and Lt-Gen. McNaughton. These men, she explains, had 
technical radar knowledge ranging from above-average to exceptional. She 
states Churchill had urged the RAF, as early as 1936, to investigate radar 
development. As PM, he not only chaired his own weekly Scientific 
Committee but recruited Professor Frederick A. Lindemann (later Lord 
Chenwell) to be his personal scientific adviser. Since 1931 Mountbatten, she 
explains, had been involved in the development of signals equipment, from 
which radar evolved. He was head of the naval experimental staff at 
Portsmouth where he not only taught but reformed the syllabus. She quotes 
one of his superiors saying he was 'a magnificent technician and the 
outstanding signals officer of his generation'. She notes that he recruited a 
full professor of physics to the COHQ staff in 1942. Hughes-Hallett was for a 
time chairman of the Low Cover Radar Committee in 1941-2, which was in 
charge of setting up the British coastal radar chain. McNaughton was a
& Charles, 1978), p.185; Jack Haswell, The operational problems', in The IntelllgerKe and 
deception of the D-Day landings (London; B.T. Balslord, 1979), p.23.
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graduate in Electrical Engineering and, in 1935, was appointed president of 
the National Research Council of Canada (NRC), the leading government 
sponsored, scientific think-tank. In this position, Mackie states, he instigated 
and pushed research into radar development. He also was the co-inventor, 
with Dr Robert Watson-Watt, of the Cathode Ray Direction Finder, termed 
'Radar's Middleman'. Although GOC First Canadian Army Overseas, he did 
not resign from the NRC but went 'absent on duty', and was kept informed 
about developments by his personally chosen, interim president. Dr C.J. 
Mackenzie. Mackie concludes that 'he knew the value and power of radar 
intelligence'. Her argument although persuasive, is based almost entirely on 
circumstantial evidence. No primary sources examined have so far directly 
supported her thesis, although more investigation of presently closed 
sources could possibly shed new light on it. However, all present evidence 
about the planning and launching of Jubilee shows that it was not radar 
driven.“
One final aspect of radar and Jubilee concerns the claim of the 'radar 
expert', Nissen, that his observation of the movements of the antennae array 
of Freya 28, and cutting some telephone cables, resulted in valuable 
intelligence that was instrumental in the development of radar counter­
measures used before, during and after the 1944 Normandy landings. His 
claims were first put forward by James Leaser, in Green beach (1975), 
which received wide circulation, but unfortunately, described Nissen's 
mission inaccurately and credited it with over-inflated importance, out of all
“  J.R. Robinson, 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid', Canadian Delence Quarterly 2015 
(Spring/AprII, 1991); Mary Mackie, Top secret victory', unpublished paper, 18 August 1993, 
pp.4,10-12; Mary Mackie, interview by H. Henry, Cambridge UK, 11 February 1996; Mary 
Mackie to H. Henry, letter, 18 February 1996.
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context to the true situation. The book, which is devoid of references, and 
fails to live up to even minor cross-checking with the relevant primary 
documents, perhaps should be relegated to the fiction area of libraries. 
Sadly, it had been the basis of many other examinations of the subject, 
propagating the myth still further. Nissen himself published his own account. 
Winning the radar war: a memo/r (1987), in which he claims his mission on 
RutterfJubiiee was to discover such information as what were the anti­
jamming devices the Freya 28 was equipped with, did it have navigational 
features associated with ground control of air interception? He was also, he 
writes, to find out what was the quality of the German cathode-ray tubes, 
pulse generator and receiving equipment.^
In recent interviews Nissen makes claims that seem to support 
Mackie's interpretation, saying that Jubilee was the first ever electronic 
intelligence gathering mission. An attack against a defended German 
strongpoint would reveal, it was hoped, what radio frequencies and modes 
of operation and communication were used for contact among the various 
German HQs within the Dieppe area. The LSI Prince Albert was not only 
employed as a troop transport but also had been fitted out with special 
electronic gathering equipment, much of it American and scrounged by 
Mountbatten from other ships, for monitoring and recording the resulting 
German radio transmissions. On board the Prince Albert Chief Petty Officer 
Ken Dearson was in command of the team responsible for the mission.^o
^  James Lessor, Green beach (New York: William Morrow & Company Inc., 1975); Nissen and 
Cockerill, Winning the radar war, pp.147,171-5,192-200;
^  Nissen, inten/iew for CBC Newswodd, 11 November 1991, audio-visual VHS recording, this 
author's Dieppe Collection; Nissen, telephone interviews by author, 15-16 April 1996;
Nissen, extracts from unpublished manuscript on radar In the war, chapter ‘Orange and 
Green', received by this author 4 July 1996.
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In 1991 Prime Minister John Major was approached on Nissen's 
behalf and asked to waive the 1949 order ending the awarding of citations 
for wartime duty, in order to award him the Victoria Cross (VC), the highest 
British armed forces award. According to the newspaper report, he was not 
recognised at the time due to the highly secret nature of his mission. 
Consequently, Dr William A.B. Douglas, head of the Directorate of History, 
National Defence HQ, Ottawa, was contacted, and after some research, the 
evidence seemed to prove Nissen's claims wrong. Dr Douglas's decision 
seems to have been based to a large extent on the article by Robinson. 
Campbell describes this whole story in great detail and in the end, agrees 
with Robinson.®'
After Robinson conducted a thorough examination of the secondary
and primary sources concerned, corresponding and confirming his article
with R.V. Jones, he came to the following, categorical conclusion:
No independent evidence was found to support the concept that important, or novel, 
radar intelligence was achieved as a result of the Dieppe Raid. The station was not 
captured, and the RDF expert was given no opportunity to examine equipment or 
documents. The enemy was not 'forced' to resort to radio transmission of his radar 
observations; this was his common daily procedure and nothing of significance was 
heard by British monitors all day. Pre-raid observation of the German radar chain had 
already determined the electronic characteristics, jamming vulnerability and precision 
of the Freya type of equipment in use there. Military plans to seize the station merely 
offered an 'extra target of opportunity'. The definitive summary belongs to the wartime 
Director of Air Scientific Intelligence [Jones]; 'The Dieppe Raid did not provide 
sufficient new information regarding the German Freya radar system to justify the 
preparation, subsequently, of any Scientific Intelligence Report about it'.®^
The most commonly held myth about Jubilee also has an intelligence
dimension. This is that it did not achieve surprise and that the Germans
received forewarning, resulting in the massacre on the beaches. This
rumour, begun immediateiy after the raid by the men who managed to return
®' 'VC urged for Scientist in Dieppe raid'. Daily Telegraph, 7 October 1991, in Campbell, 
Dieppe revisited, pp.29, 146, 202, 204-5
®2 Robinson, 'Radar Intelligence and the Dieppe raid', 40, 42.
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to England, and which gained credence in the post-war years through 
repetition by veterans and historians, is understandable given the scale of 
the defeat and the unbelievably heavy sixty percent Canadian casualties.^
All the investigations into the possibility that some kind of agent report 
gave forewarning are not merely inconclusive. They are pointless because 
they do not establish a link between any leak and the massacre on the 
beaches. They assume that the leak was listened to and that this explains 
the disaster but this ignores the fact that the Germans were not at alert 
readiness, except, for reasons discussed later, at Puys, and even there they 
were not at action stations, the highest stage of alert.
The 'historian', David Irving, took this line in 1963, writing a series of 
articles in the Evening Standard. Although the official British naval historian, 
Stephen Roskill, soundly refuted all his claims, the myth still lingers today. 
This led to a personal feud between the two, the evidence of which is clearly 
documented in Roskill's personal papers and in the Cabinet Historical Office, 
the latter, which are not open to the general public, are under a process of 
review and scheduled to be available at the Public Record Office (PRO) in 
1998. Campbell reiterates the debate in detail, adds nothing new, and 
concludes by agreeing with Roskill.^«
^  Some of members of the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment, who landed at Dieppe and 
were taken prisoner, are still convinced that the Germans knew they were coming. Personal 
interviews, Red Deer, Alberta, June 1990. On German forewarning see the letters to The 
Times, 1 August 1963, The Evening Standard, 2 October 1963 and The Dally Telegraph, 9 
September 1963, CCA, Roskill Papers, ROSK 5/51.
^  S.W. Roskill, 'The Dieppe raid and the question of German foreknowledge'. Royal United 
Services Institute Journal 109/633 (February 1964), 27-31; the Roskill and Irving debate is in 
CCA. Roskill Papers. ROSK 5/51, 9/12, 8/14, and In CAB 146/349/ll/4/lv, The Dieppe raid', 
1955-67, fols. A-H, 1-67 [Officially closed but viewed with special permission); Campbell, 
Dieppe revisited, pp. 13-20.
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Many other books followed the Irving lead, despite RosklH's 
denunciations. The most widely known is Anthony C. Brown's, Bodyguard of 
Lies (1975). He puts forward the ridiculous assertion that Churchill planned 
Jubilee to fail, intentionally informing the Germans, to extinguish insistent 
American and Soviet demands for a second front in 1942. The supposed 
reason behind this statement is that it is better to lose five thousand men in a 
raid such as Jubilee than many times that in a premature full-scale 
invasion.®®
No author undertook a serious, comprehensive examination of the 
many secondary and German primary sources that deal with possible 
reports of German foreknowledge of the raid, until Campbell. For this reason, 
and the fact that he still leaves some issues unresolved, it is necessary to 
critically analyse his arguments in detail. He begins by canvassing each of 
the many supposed reports received by the Abwehr, from various secret 
agents or spies, only to discount each one in the end. One agent, code- 
named Tate, was controlled by the XX or Twenty Committee, the 
organization responsible for running double agents usually for 
misinformation purposes. Unless some incredible mix up occurred, this 
eliminates him. But could Tate have been allowed to send a warning in order 
to build up the credibility of XX agents with the Abwehr? Campbell adds that 
Tate would not have been useful in this role since, as opposed to the 
controlled agents reporting to Madrid and Lisbon, his traffic passed by 
landline between Hamburg and Berlin, and therefore could not be
®® Anthony C. Brown, Bodyguard of lies (London: Harper & Row, 1975), p.86. Brown is 
supponed by Günther Pels, Mirror of deception: how Britain turned the Nazi spy machine 
against Itself {London: Weldenteld & NIc olson, 1976), pp.122-5; Deacon, The silent war, 
p.158; David Elsenhower, Eisenhower aYwar, 1943-1945 (New York: Macmillan, 1986), p.96.
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intercepted and deciphered by GC&CS. Here Campbell errs. In the first 
place, Tate's messages still had to get to Hamburg, and could therefore be 
intercepted by GC&CS. Secondly, GC&CS was not interested in what Tate 
sent since they already knew what it was. At the very least they had some 
input into all of his reports and sometimes even compiled them. They were 
interested in the German reaction to his reports which they could read 
through Ultra decrypts.®®
Campbell concludes that another agent could possibly have given 
warning in a report of 13 August 1942 which is cited in the German Naval 
Staff War Diary for the following October. This was the very successful and 
inventive Ostro. Unfortunately, he gives absolutely no evidence.®^ He 
discusses the Ostro signals read by the GC&CS between January and 
October 1942, but does not mention the evidence for believing that none 
contained any report about Dieppe. Undoubtedly, a huge enquiry would 
have ensued had such an report from Ostro been decrypted.®® Concerning 
the report of 13 August, Campbell says on the present evidence one does 
not know what was reported and why it failed to make an impression until 
later. He fails to consider that the obvious reason it made no impression at 
the time is that it did not mention Dieppe. The Naval Diary only states the 
Abtvehr claimed in October that it had warned of a raid on Dieppe.
This already complicated story is confused further by the oft quoted 
agent report, T 1022 1677 of 29 October 1942. This Campbell unfortunately
®® Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.48; information on QC&CS and Tate relationship from 
Professor Sir F.H. Hinsley.
®^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.56.
®® Ostro's reports caused great anxiety in the British Intelligence community and were always 
carefully scrutinised. See Hinsley, British intelligence, 4, pp.200, 256, 279-80.
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refers to under several different dates. It is first mentioned as being 'in 
October 1942' with the endnote giving '20 October'; then as at the 'end of 
October 1942', followed by 'the report earlier referred to of 29 October', 
which is the correct date. More important this is relevant to the Dieppe raid 
only because the Naval Diary quotes the Abwehr as saying it came from the 
same agent that reported in advance of the August raid.^
Given that we know that the Germans were not alerted it is not 
surprising that Ultra provided no evidence that they expected the raid. 
Commander Ian Fleming of the Naval Intelligence Division so reported to 
the Director of Naval Intelligence at the time. Campbell nevertheless raises 
the question of whether or not Ultra could be relied on to warn that the 
Germans had advance knowledge of the raid? Although he does not directly 
answer, undoubtedly It is yes. The Naval Section of the GC&CS read all 
German naval SIGINT in the Channel and this, as Campbell himself says, 
provided 'a ready check on the occasions when the German defensive 
machine reacted to the threat of an Allied operation'.^
A mystery remains to which Campbell gives generous treatment, but 
does not adequately address. This is the claim by Lt-Col Haines, in a history 
of Ultra and the United States strategic air war against Germany, that 'There 
is hard and fast evidence in Ultra that as early as the 12th of August the 
Germans knew of the forthcoming Dieppe operation'. Since Campbell 
believes Haines had access to various still classified sources, Campbell 
warns that the claim should not be 'rejected out of hand, if only because it 
has something of the authority of a primary source'. But Campbell provides
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.23, 38 (note 36), 32. 
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp .162,166.
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no evidence for his belief and only says that Haines gives no references or 
the text for the decrypt in question. Campbell continues that, 'Assuming for 
the moment that this claim was valid, it seems strange that the evidence on 
which it was based was evidently left out of the GC&CS's Naval Section's 
paper', entitled, 'Increase of German Defensive Measures, Western Area 
1942'. This summarized all Ultra decrypts concerning Channel activity and 
alerts for over four months up to the 15 August 1942. What would be more 
strange is if a decrypt existed and the British intelligence community missed 
it. The fact is that if any evidence had existed, such significant information 
would never have been omitted from the Naval Section's paper. Another 
way to view this scenario is to compare it with other operations that were 
cancelled after Ultra revealed the Germans had warning. Campbell explains 
that provided the intelligence arrived in time, Mountbatten had the authority 
to cancel or recall an operation. Campbell gives the example of Operation 
Coughdrop, a raid on the Lorient U-boat base, but does not seem to make 
the obvious connection that any report received by British intelligence 
concerning Jubilee being compromised, would have resulted in immediate 
cancellation just like CoughdropJ^
All these explanations, though, are really not necessary and are 
irrelevant to the basic question of German foreknowledge because, as 
Campbell demonstrates, with all the Allied and German documents 
available, it is obvious that the Germans received no warning and were 
surprised. If any reports were received before the raid, they were either not 
passed on to the local garrison or ignored by the respective authorities in
Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.161,164-5; Lt-Col. Haines, 'Pearl Hartxiurto Rouen', In 
Ultra and the history of the United States Strategic Air Force In Europe vs. the German Air 
Force (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980), p.6.
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Berlin. This is obvious since, as Campbell points out from the evidence of the 
previously mentioned Naval Section paper, after receiving reports in May, 
June and July of an intended landing the Germans sounded the alarm 
dozens of times, at many places along the coast from Norway to France, but 
did not do so for the 18/19 August in the Dieppe area. Further evidence 
Campbell points to is that the bulk of two long-range bomber groups, the 
only torpedo bomber unit in the GAF and an E-boat unit, the latter two 
extremely effective in the anti-raid role, were moved away from the 
operational area to Holland and Norway, three to ten days before the raid. 
The fact that the number of strategic reserve divisions on land gradually 
increased is put down 'almost entirely to one man's susceptibility to the 
threat of a second front'.^
Another aspect of the foreknowledge debate brings in the possible 
Allied use of deception. Concerning this and Rutter, three possible 
explanations exist. First, that it was not leaked. Second, that it was leaked 
inadvertently because of poor liaison between COHQ and the intelligence 
community. Third, which is the recent theory put forward by Villa, is that it 
was leaked as part of a deception plan, to let the Germans know of the raid 
and then they would never suspect that it was being remounted. This is 
supported by Mountbatten's post-war comments to the same effect. More 
importantly, though. Villa believes it was conspiracy on the part of 
Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett, to deceive the relevant British authorities, 
who would have opposed its remounting for obvious security reasons.
The first scenario, that it was not leaked, is maintained by the official 
British intelligence historian of strategic deception, Michael Howard, who
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp. 112-3,162-4.
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shows implementation of no specific deceptive operation for Dieppe. He 
notes the formal strategic deception of a feint across the Channel, Operation 
Overthrow, designed to cover the North African landings, did not get formal 
COS approval until 18 August 1942. This effectively refutes Anthony Cave 
Brown who insists the deception 'had been going full blast ever since the 
late spring [and] the raid on Dieppe would be launched to give teeth to 
Overthrow'. However, Howard admits ad hoc operations were underway. 
One almost certainly had COS approval and started on 8 June 1942. This 
was the BBC (British Broadcasting Company) nightly warnings to French 
civilians of the coastal regions to evacuate their homes because of the 
increasing chance of second front.^
Howard does not comment on the second possible scenario 
concerning deception, which is that indications might have inadvertently 
been passed to the Germans. Ewen Montagu, in Beyond Top Secret U 
(1977) states, 'to conceal the actual target of an operation -  say the Dieppe 
Raid -  if the preparations of men and ships were to leak or if our old 
bugbears, the neutral diplomats, picked up the fact that something was afoot, 
we were asked to try and give the Germans the idea that we were going to 
attack somewhere else'.^<
Nigel West reluctantly admits that the operation might have been 
inadvertently given away for deception purposes. He asks, 'did someone 
decide to capitalise on an abandoned plan by feeding details of Rutter Xo the 
enemy through a double agent, only to be caught by the reinstatement of
^  Michael Howard, BrWst} intelligence In the Second World War. strategic deception 5 (6 vola.. 
New York; Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.56-7. Brown, Bodyguard of lies, p.83. 
Brown quotes the BBC appeal as printed the following day in the New York Times, 9 June 
1942.
Montagu, Beyond top secret U, p.129.
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JubHeel... Clearly there was an opportunity for advantage here, but Tate, 
his Radio Security Service supervisor, Russell Lee, and Tates's MIS [British 
counter-intelligence service] case officers have denied any involvement.' He 
concludes that there is 'no evidence to support an allegation of treachery or 
ineptitude'. Sir John Masterman, in his pioneering work on the Double-Cross 
System (XX) and its agents, states that Mountbatten had the offer of the 
services of one double agent. Supposedly, this agent, code-named 
Dragonfly, could cover the Isle of Wight where the Dieppe raiding force was 
training and could pass the Germans so much information that they would 
not plant new sources in the area. Masterman indicates the reason for 
refusal of the suggestion was lack of organization within this new agency, 
the London Controlling Station (LCS).^
The third scenario concerning deception and Rutterf Jubilee, is that of 
Villa's additional epilogue to his revised flagship book (1994). His basic 
contention is that Rutter was intentionally leaked to the Germans, to allow 
COHO and the units already trained for Rutter, to prepare to remount the 
operation. If the relevant authorities, such as the COS, ISSB, Paget, or 
Montgomery, had been put in the picture they would have most probably. 
Villa explains, squashed the operation on security grounds. By making it out 
as a deception operation, any opposition would be nullified. This Internal 
deception conspiracy is based on the following evidence which requires 
examination. Concerning Ultra and German foreknowledge Villa is off the 
mark. He claims that if Ultra had picked up any indications that the Germans
^  Nigel West. 'Jubilee or betrayal', in Unreliable witness: espionage myths of the Second 
World War (London: Weidenfeld & NIcolson, 1984), pp.130, 133; Sir John C. Masterman, The 
Double-Cross System In the war of 1939 to 1945 (London: Yale University Press, 1972),
p.108.
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had discovered information on Jubilee, it would have confirmed to British 
intelligence authorities that deception was working. But this information 
would not need to have been passed to the Force Commanders of a 
'fictional' raid and thus they would not have been informed. Villa does not 
mention that the naval C-in-C's were on the Ultra list of recipients. The key 
reference that Villa uses for this scenario is explained below.^
After the cancellation of Rutter on 7 July the COHQ Examination 
Committee held a meeting on 9 July to discuss, by orders from the COS, 
offensive operations to replace abandoned Sledgehammer and dismounted 
Rutter and a deception scheme to simulate Sledgehammer, the plan for an 
emergency Allied invasion of Northern France to relieve pressure on Russia. 
The Minutes explained:
It is proposed that the cover plan for these operations should take the form of a 
holding operation in the Dieppe and Havre [sfc] area. For this purpose, it is proposed: 
a) To train and brief one Division for an attack on Dieppe (already done by 
/buffer which can now be 'leaked'.)
(b) Earmark and brief one Division for an attack on Havre [sk^. It is intended 
that the cover plan should reach a climax by the end of September, the date of the 
original Sledgehammer... The proposed operations would take place about a 
fortnight before the climax of the cover plan.^
From this document clearly Rt/ffercould have been leaked. The permission 
was there but whether the LCS acted on it Villa and no one else has 
confirmed. In fact, they have confirmed the opposite since if the Germans did 
receive intelligence about the operation, they ignored it. Ultra would have 
revealed if they had taken notice of it and their subsequent reactions. No 
such indications occurred. The reports also would have showed up in the 
higher documents of the various German commands. No references have 
come to light and all German documents were captured Immediately after
^  Villa, 'Epilogue -  The last major piece of the puzzle'. In Unauthorized action, pp.248-67. 
^  COHQ, 'Examination Committee Minutes', 9 July 1942, pp.1-2, PRO, DEFE 2/2.
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the war and made available to official researchers such as Stacey and 
Hinsley. Perhaps the simple explanation of this possible order for a leak is 
that it is a good example of the tension that developed between the notional 
threat of deception and the operational build-up of COHQ. There existed two 
planes, the higher one of strategic deception and the lower of tactics, such 
as raids like Dieppe. Both had the same long-term aim of preparing for the 
future invasion but in the summer of 1942 the apparatus for strong central 
control and coordination was in its infancy and not yet prepared to prevent 
such inadvertent leakage as may have occurred. This is confirmed by Ralph 
Bennett:
Dieppe was the first combined operation (Norway was not planned as a combined 
op[eration], and was a complete shambles anyway; St Nazaire, though planned by 
Mountbatten's Comb[ined] Op[erations] staff, was mainly a naval operation) so that 
there were no precedents and no one knew what to expect and what problems would 
emerge. Everything remained to be discovered. Torch [1942 invasion of North Africa] 
was a bit better (but Sigint was very badly planned and under-used, Husky [1943 
invasion of Sicily] still left a lot to be desired, and the learning process did not mature 
until Overtord [1944 invasion of Normandy].™
Campbell, in describing the strategic context in which Jubilee was 
decided on, states that an atmosphere of semi-crisis prevailed in COHQ 
during early June and early July 1942. The crisis became especially acute 
after Rutter and Operation Sledgehammer were cancelled. Campbell 
wonders whether small raids leading up to the deception of a notional 
Sledgehammer in September 1942 would have been better than Jubilee?
Of course this would have been better but, as Campbell has clearly 
demonstrated, COHQ met in a state of desperation and that is why they 
decided on Jubilee. He explains, within the context the German situation and 
order of battle in the Channel area in 1942, that small scale deception would 
not have been effective if only because the Germans did not seriously
™ Ralph Bennett to H. Henry, 1 May 1994.
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believe in the threat of an invasion in 1942. No good would have been 
served pretending a big invasion was in the offing because the Germans 
were just not listening to such warnings.^
Concerning deception and cover Campbell correctly states that the 
former, using the XX organization, was not being practised actively until the 
end of September 1942 but does not make it clear why this was so. The 
reason was that the security authorities were not fully convinced that all 
German agents in the United Kingdom were under control (only one rogue 
agent was needed to blow a deception operation). Even by the time of 
Operation Torch the XX system was barely used. Concerning the use of a 
cover story, Campbell states. That the raid might have been somehow 
saved by a cover plan remains doubtful, as will be argued later*. 
Unfortunately, he never raises or addresses the point again. He also asserts 
that Masterman 'regretted' Jubilee had not been properly covered, which 
meant using the XX system to gain surprise, by referring to Masterman's 
earlier quote that, 'It is sad, but interesting, to speculate whether the Dieppe 
raid might have been more successful, or at least less costly, if it had been 
effectively covered'. This is not 'regret' on Masterman's part but actually 
pure, worthless speculation. It is pointless regretting or speculating Jubilee 
might have been more successful if covered using the XX organization, 
since Jubilee gained surprise without it. When Masterman asks whether it 
would have been 'less costly', he is assuming that Jubilee might not have 
been defeated if the German strategic reserves had not been redeployed. 
Campbell does not comment on this, possibly because it is an irreievant 
question, although the answer is definiteiy no. The operation was defeated
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.64-8.
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by the static coastal defence forces. The strategic reserves, such as 10 PzD, 
were the only units that would have been affected by any cover or deception 
operation. Besides, as previously discussed and Campbell shows, the 
strategic reserves would have taken too long to get into action to be of 
significance to operations of such short duration as Jubilee.^
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.17, 28, 57,70; Masterman, The Double-Cross System,
p.108.
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EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION 
PHASE 1: FLANK ATTACKS
With the planning and intelligence assessments completed, and the
weather forecasts suitable for the next forty-eight hours, the expedition was
issued the preparatory order for the operation on 17 August 1942. This
meant the beginning of the night loading of the tanks. The same day the
Naval Force Commander, Hughes-Hallett, issued the following instructions
to all COs of ships and craft taking part in Jubilee:
We are about to undertake an unusually complex and hazardous operation, the 
success of which from now onwards is likely to depend far more on the action of 
individual Commanding Officers than anything I shall be able to do from the Command 
ship.
It is partly for this reason that the operation orders have been prepared in 
such detail...
No doubt however unforeseen situations will arise, and when dealing with 
them, Commanding Officers should be guided before all else by the following broad 
and simple objects...
To get the troops there at the right time and place...
To protect the LSIs [Landing ship. Infantry] and landing craft.'
Possibly these instructions led to confusion and catastrophe. The Rutter 
Naval Force Commander, Vice-Adm. Baillie-Grohman, certainly thought so, 
for after the operation he noted that they illustrated 'the pressure brought to 
bear by the Army on a naval operation', and also 'what can occur when the 
other Services interfere in what is known to experienced NO [naval officers] 
to be strongly advisable, from the seaman's point of view',2
' John Hughes-Hallett to COs of ships and craft taking part In Operation Jubilee, 17 August 
1942, IWM, John Hughes-Hallett Papers (JHHP), JHH 3/2.
2 Baillle-Qrohman, Dieppe Raid August 1942', December 1942, hand-written note 
concerning Enclosure 14 to Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force CommarKfer's Report No. NFJ 
0221/92', 30 August 1942, NMM, Balllle-Qrohman Papers (BQP), QRO/26.
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The launch now depended solely on the weather. Several forecasts 
indicated that it would improve by the morning of 19 August. Thus, after 
Mountbatten consulted with the three Force Commanders and the C-in-C, 
Portsmouth, he gave the executive order to proceed on 18 August. During 
that day the troops embarked at five different ports -  Southampton, Gosport, 
Portsmouth, Shoreham and Newhaven. Hughes-Hallett had suggested this 
dispersal for the security reason of negating any chance of a large 
concentration of ships being recognized by the GAF. The Jubilee naval force 
amounted to 253 ships. The military force was approximately 6100 all ranks, 
of whom 4963 were Canadian, about 1075 were British, about 50 US 
Rangers and about 20 all ranks of No. 10 Inter-Allied Commando, some of 
whom were French and German ex-patriots. This was supported by a total of 
74 air squadrons, including 48 fighter squadrons, as well as those to give 
close-support, lay smoke and do tactical reconnaissance.^
Simultaneous surprise flank attacks were to begin at 0450 (British 
Summer Time-one hour in advance of Greenwich Mean Time) over a front of 
about ten miles, at four different places. This was during the period of
3 On weather forecasts see Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), 'Combined Report 
on the Dieppe raid', in BR 1867 (formerly CB 04244), October 1942, London; COHQ, 15 
October 1942, pp.9-10, DHist 594.013 (01); and BGS, HQ First Canadian Army, Memo for 
File, 17 August 1942, MAC, RG 2410584/215C1 (D233). The Jub//ee force amounted to 253 
ships, and included 8, one thousand ton, Hunt class destroyers, 1 Gun Boat, 1 Sloop, 7 Free 
French Chasseurs, 9 Landing Ships, Infantry (LSI), 4 Steam Gun Boats (SGB), 12 Motor Gun 
Boats (MGB), 16 Motor Launches (ML), 10 Landing Craft, Tank (Mark 2) (LCT(2)], 14 Landing 
Craft, Tank (Mark 3) [LCT(3)], 6 Landing Craft, Flak (Large) (LCF(L)], 8 Landing Craft, Support 
(Medium) (LCS(M)], 7 Landing Craft, Mechanised (Mark 1) (LCM(1)], 8 Landing Craft, Support 
(Medium) [LCS(M)j, 60 Landing Craft, Assault (LCA), 74 Landing Craft, Personnel (Large) 
(LCP(L)), and 16 minesweepers, see COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.11; Charles P. Stacey, Six 
years of war: the Canadian Army In Canada, Britain and the Pacific, 1, Official history of the 
Canadian Army In the Second World War, ed. Charles P. Stacey (4 vols., Ottawa: Queen's 
Printer, 1955), pp.345, 347-8; Rear-Admiral H.E. Horan, COHQ, 'Designation of Landing Craft 
and Ships', 9 July 1942, DHist 81/520/1250/1; Hughes-Hallett, 'Jubilee Craft Requirements', 
31 July 1942, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/2 [Landing Craft, Tank (LCT) Marks and numbers).
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'nautical twilight', or still dark (see Map 2). * The attacks were to go in from 
east to west against the battery near Bemeval, at Puys, at Pourville and upon 
the battery at Varengeville. The main attack against Dieppe itself was to go 
in half an hour later at 0520 hours. This included two simultaneous frontal 
assaults on the east (Red) and west (White) beaches. The first flight of nine 
tanks of the 14 Canadian Army Tank Regiment (14 CATR), commanded by 
Lt-Col J.G. 'Johnny' Andrews, was to land simultaneously with the first 
assault troops in support. Within the following two hours the remaining forty- 
nine tanks were to land in four successive flights. Their mission was to 
support the infantry in the capture of the town and the various objectives, 
such as the aerodrome, previously outlined in the Rutter p\an. At 0600 the 
British Royal Marine 'A' Commando, commanded by Lt-Col Joseph P. 'Tiger' 
Phillipps and embarked on the Gun Boat HMS Locust and the Chasseurs, 
were to enter the inner harbour to capture or destroy several invasion barges 
and other craft. Held as a floating reserve was Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
(FMR), commanded by Lt-Col Dollard 'Joe' Ménard.®
Two of the destroyers, Ca/pe and Femie, were designated HQ ships 
and outfitted with extra communications equipment. Ca/pe had the Naval 
and Military Force Commanders, Hughes-Hallett and Roberts, plus a
* All limes are British Summer Time (BST) unless indicated. On 19 August 1942 nautical 
twilight (defined as the Sun 12° below horizon) commenced at 0431, civil twilight (Sun 6° 
below horizon) at 0515, and sunrise at 0550, see Admiralty, 'Raid on Dieppe (naval 
operations)19 August 1942', In BR 1736 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle 
Summary No.33, revised 31 December 1959 [released In 1990], London: Admiralty Historical 
Section, p.11 , PRO, ADM 234/355.
* Unit assignments: Berneval, the British No.3 Commando, commanded by Lt-Col J.F. Torchy' 
Dumford-Slater; Puys, The Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC), commanded by Lt-Col D.E. 
Doug' Catto; Pourville , The South SasKatchewan Regiment (SSR), commanded by Lt-Col 
C.C.I. 'Cec' Merritt, followed later by The Oueen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada 
(QOCHC), commanded by Lt-Col Alfred C. Qostling; Varengeville, the British No.4 
Commando, commanded by Lt-Col The Lord S.F. 'Shlml' Lovat; Dieppe's east beach. The 
Essex Scottish Regiment, commanded by Lt-Col F.K. 'Fred' Jasperson; Dieppe's west beach. 
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI), commanded by Lt-Col R.R. 'Bob' Labatt.
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representative of the Air Force Commander, Air Commodore AT. Cole. 
Leigh-Mallory stayed at HQ No.11 Fighter Group, Uxbridge (which was the 
best point for him to control his squadrons). Mountbatten and Crerar were 
also there. Fernie was to act as a back-up HQ ship in case Caipe was put out 
of action and had a duplicate staff and communications arrangement. Both 
HQ ships had a Air Fighter Controller who could direct incoming sorties on to 
targets requested by the Military Force Commander.^
To aid in navigation some vessels, such as the LSIs, were equipped 
with the RAF Type 7000 electronic position-finding system device GEE (’G‘ 
for grid lines). It had been effectively used by Bomber Command in the 
Thousand plane raids' and strategic bombing offensive against Germany. 
Specifically, it provided 'accurate navigation, timing and concentration of the 
bomber stream'. COHQ quickly recognized the potential of this as an aid for 
surface navigation. Robinson, in 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid' 
(1991), recounts how the Telecommunications Research Establishment 
(TRE), the main radar research centre, modified aircraft GEE sets for 
shipboard use. This modified set was sometimes referred to as 'RDF receiver 
QH'. Robinson defines GEE as 'a pulse modulated hyperbolic navigational 
system' and notes that it should not be confused with radar. It was 
successfully used during the Yukon I and II rehearsals and first used 
operationally on ships during Jubilee. Hughes-Hallett recalled it was 
extremely accurate in mid-Channel but became progressively less accurate 
east or west of there 'and would not have done for the particular purpose for 
which we required it’. This post-war claim contradicts a contemporary report 
on navigation, issued over his signature, that states it 'proved highly
* Stacey, Six years o l war, pp.348.
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valuable' to the overall operation. Robinson points out that it is incorrect to 
assume that the similar use of GEE during the Normandy landings resulted 
from experience at Dieppe, since many electronic aids and 'spoofs' were 
already being planned by 'The Aids to Invasion Panel', whose formation was 
ordered by TRE on 2 August 1942, two weeks before the raid.^
Jubilee set off about 2110 in thirteen different groups (see Map 4 
illustrating tracks of units on passage), preceded by 13 and 19 
Minesweeping Flotillas. These craft, nicknamed 'Swipers', swept two paths 
through the suspected German minefield, although only one mine was 
found. All craft cleared the minefield without major incident by 0300.^
Once at the point just clear of the suspected German radar range for 
ships of this size, the LSIs lowered their various landing craft for the final run 
in. This was completed at 0300 according to plan. The landing craft then 
formed up into their various attack formations along with their assigned 
escorts. During the June Yukon Exercises the problem of landing craft 
flotillas not finding the correct beaches was most significant. The method 
chosen to solve this was to have specially equipped craft lead them Inshore. 
Unfortunately, the only craft suitable at the time was the MGB, since it had 
the speed to keep up with the LSIs, was fitted with echo sounders (to 
measure water depth) and had GEE for navigation. A contemporary report 
on GEE states its accuracy for direction varied 'between 200 and 800 yards 
according to locality; one-quarter mile is normally practicable'. But warned its 
accuracy for distance was 'not so good'. The disadvantages of the MGBs
 ^Robinson, J. R„ 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid'. The Canadian Defence Quarterly, 
20/5 (April 1991), 38-9, 40.
8 Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.13; Admiralty, 'Weekly naval notes/Newhaven-Dleppe', 
in Weekly Intelligence Report, 129, London; Naval Intelligence Division, 1942, p.12, PRO, 
ADM 223/155 ['Swipers'].
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were that they were too noisy and their slowest speed (6-7 knots) was too 
fast for the landing craft. This entailed many halts to allow the flotilla to catch 
up and resulted in inaccuracies in navigation, in spite of the use of GEE.^
ENCOUNTER WITH GERMAN CONVOY
The detection by shore radar stations and SIGINT of the German 
convoy, before it encountered the eastern flank of Jubilee, has previously 
been examined. The naval action itself and its effects on the rest of the 
operation, though, need to be looked at. The German convoy had left the 
previous evening from Boulogne for Dieppe and consisted of five Dutch 
coastal motor sailing vessels, escorted by two anti-submarine chasers 
(converted deep-sea trawlers), U-J&ger (\JJ) 1411 and UJ 1404, and a M- 
Class minesweeper, M 4014. First Lieutenant S. Wurmbach was the convoy 
commander and captain of UJ 1411 All ships were fitted with an 
apparatus, that in the same translated German report, has been variously 
called 'sound detector', 'search receiver' and 'direction finding equipment', 
which can be concluded was probably a type of RDF.^^
 ^On GEE see ‘Notes on navigational aids In combined operations', nd. [probably June 1942], 
NMM, BGP, GRO/23, pp.1-3; on MGBs see 'Navigation of landing craft flotillas', 24 June 1942, 
NMM. BGP, GRO/23.
The equivalent British ranks will be used where possible.
While the motor sailing vessels were lightly armed with single 20mm Flak (anti-aircraft) guns, 
the three escort craft were better equipped. UJ 1411 was armed with a  37mm gun as main 
armament, two 20mm Czech/1938 Flak guns, two or three (some double barrelled) MG 34 
machine-guns, depth charges and smoke drums. UJ 1404 was simllarty equipped except that 
it had a powerful 88mm gun as main armament. M 4014 had four 20mm guns. The crews for 
the submarine chasers were 1 Officer, 2 Warrant Officers and 43 NCOs and men, and was 
probably similar for the minesweeper, although this cannot be determined from the available 
records. See First Lieutenant S. Wurmbach, 'Dieppe Operation -  Combat Report of Sub 
Chaser 1411, August 1942', 21 August 1942, pp.2, 6, Translation, DHIst SGR 11/270; 
Lieutenant BOgel, 'Dieppe Operation -  Combat Report of M 4014, August 1942', nd., p.1. 
Translation, DHIst SGR 11/283; 'Dieppe Operation -  Combat Report of the four Motor Coastal 
Ships', 22 August 1942, p.1. Translation, DHIst SGR 11/285; HQ Naval Group West, 'Report of 
Naval Group West on Dieppe landing', 21 August 1942, p.S, Translation, DHist SGR 11/271.
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Naval Group 5, commanded by Commander D.B. Wyburd carrying 
No.3 Commando and US Rangers to assault the Yellow beaches east of 
Dieppe, consisted of 1 and 24 LCP(L) Flotillas, which were to land at Yellow 
beaches I and II respectivelyThey embarked from Newhaven and the 
passage over was without incident, although at 0345 Wyburd noted that his 
GEE/QH receiver was 'working erratically'. He estimated the Group to be 
'half a mile to the east of the approach course, and six to seven miles' from 
the coast (see Map 5). A few minutes later, a German convoy suddenly 
loomed up in the da rkness .l CP(L) 15, 24 Flotilla, carried the Yellow Beach 
Master, Sub-Lt David J. Lewis, who relates the shock of the initial 
engagement; 'A starshell went up on the starboard hand and lit the whole 
fleet in a horrible quivering semi-daylight'. Lewis's boat, which was leading 
the starboard column, 'was immediately enveloped in the hottest tracer fire I 
have ever seen. The air was filled with the whine of ricochets and the bangs
'2 Group 5 consisted of 23 LCP(L), SGB 5. ML 346 and LCF(L) 1A. The LCP(L)s each had 1 
Officer per 3 craft, a crew of 3, and could carry 25 fully equipped troops. They were 
unarmoured, wooden craft armed with a Great War vintage Lewis .303 light machine-gun. The 
usual complement for a LCF(L), a shallow draft beach-protection craft, was a crew of 10. 
including 2 Officers, plus 46 Royal Marines, including 2 Officers, to operate the two 4inch QF 
(quick firing) guns and three 20mm Oerllkons. ML 346 was armed with a 3pdr, Oerllkon, Lewis 
MG and depth charges. SGB 5 was similarly armed, with a 3ln as main armament, arKf equipped 
with the Gee/QH apparatus. See COHO to Lt-Cmdr K.A. Maclachlan, 'Complement of Craft',
12 August 1942, DHist 81/520/1250/1; and David K. Brown, ed.. The design and 
constmction of British warships 1939-1945: the official record-. Landing craft and auxiliary 
vessels 3 (3 vols., London: Conway Maritime Press, 1996), pp.43-4, 54; and Arthur D. Baker, 
Allied landing craft of World War It (London: Arms & Armour, 1985).
Most of the later secondary accounts of the convoy encounter are based on that In the 
COHO, 'Combined Report', pp.12-13; and Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, pp.15-19.
These two confidential studies avoid mentioning that Group 5 was off course, although it is 
slated in Wyburd's official after-action report, 'Extract of report by Commander D.B. Wyburd, 
RN', Appendix 7 to Enclosure 13, p.47, In 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 
0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48).
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of exploding shells. While after every burst of the streaking balls of fire came 
the clattering of Oeriikons'.^^
Lt Wurmbach, aboard UJ 1411 in the lead of his convoy, first heard 
motor sounds ahead at 0300 and sounded the alert. Although the sounds 
soon faded he again alerted his convoy half an hour later as a result of 
noises registered on his RDF equipment. Within the next half an hour, 
Wurmbach reported that 'faintly discernible shadows' had appeared to the 
starboard and at 0348 therefore ordered the convoy to open 'volley fire'. UJ 
1404, bringing up the rear, immediately fired four star shells in succession 
within the following ten minutes, brightly illuminating Group 5. 
Communications aboard the three escorts were quickly put out of action. 
James Leaser, in Green Beach (1975), claims that Wurmbach instantly knew 
this to be an amphibious attack and, therefore, 'shouted one hoarse, 
dreadful word to his radio operator: "Invasion!"'. Leaser also states that 
Wurmbach was unable to report the encounter to the naval authorities 
ashore. This was not the case according to Campbell. When Wurmbach 
ordered the first star shell fired, Campbell explains, he thought this to be 
another of the common ambushes by British MGBs and Motor Torpedo Boats 
(MTBs), and did not realize that this was an amphibious force. Although it is 
true that the escort's communication equipment was not functioning, it is not 
true he had no means of communication with the shore. Campbell's 
research reveals that Wurmbach had the option of firing a pre-arranged 
rocket signal to alert the naval signal station in Dieppe of an amphibious
Sub-Lt D.J. Lewis, 'Report written by Sub-Lieutenant D.J. Lewis, RCNVR [Royal Canadian 
Naval Volunteer Reserve], and given to Major Charles Stacey, QSO 2(Hlstory), CMHQ', 24 
August 1942, DHIst 594.019 (D4); Lt-Cmdr K.S. Maclachlan, 'Memorandum of Interview at 
Navy Office of Canada, 25 August, 1942 with Sub-Lieutenant D.J. Lewis', 1 September 1942, 
DHist 594.019 (D4).
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operation. That is, if he had realized this before 0523, when he claims to 
have rammed one of the landing craft carrying 'fifty men'.’®
Prior to sailing Commander Wyburd had issued orders to the effect 
that that if any German vessels were encountered during the passage, they 
should maintain course and fight their way through. His reasoning here was 
that any deviation in course and speed would lead to so much disruption that 
an organized landing would not be possible later. His order was in direct 
contradiction to the operation order, which stated that Senior Officers of 
Groups and detached groups, 'must take drastic avoiding action if contact is 
made with enemy forces or to avoid contact if the enemy are known to be in 
the vicinity'. Possibly Wyburd had in mind Hughes-Hallett's vague, 
contradictory order of 17 August, 'to get the troops there at the right time and 
place' and, at the same time, 'to protect' the landing-craft. Wyburd also had 
specific orders to break radio silence if the 'success of the landing at Yellow 
beach' was 'seriously jeopardised'. In his official after-action report on the 
operation, Hughes-Hallett did not comment on this, except to say that in his 
opinion, Wyburd 'would have done better to use the speed and smoke laying 
capabilities' of the escort vessels 'in order to protect the LCPs'. Wyburd does 
not mention either of these points in his after-action report. As will be seen 
later, the Group assaulting Orange beach had successfully landed their
First Lieutenant S. Wurmbach, ‘Dieppe Operation -  Combat Report of Sub Chaser 1411, 
August 1942', 21 August 1942, pp.1, 5, Translation, DHIst SQR 11/270; Lieutenant BOgel, 
'Dieppe Operation -  Combat Report of M 4014, August 1942', nd., pp.1-2. Translation, DHist 
SQR 11/263; HQ Naval Group West, 'Report of Naval Group West on Dieppe landing', 21 
August 1942, pp.3-5. Translation, DHist SQR 11/271; James Lessor, Qreen beach (New York; 
William Morrow & Company Inc., 1975), pp.123-4; John P. Campbell, Dieppe revisited: a 
documentary Investigation (London; Frank Cass, 1993), p.123.
190
troops on time, despite having to alter course 'fairly drastically' to avoid a 
German convoy in their path.’®
During the initial engagement, SGB 5 continued on course and was 
the main target of the German convoy. In the first ten minutes, SGB 5 
sustained five hits to its boiler room, all its guns were put out of action. Its 
wireless sets were damaged and it sustained forty percent casualties, 
remarkably only one man being killed. SGB 5 was forced to break off contact 
and in the resulting confusion Group 5 scattered. ML 346, which was leading 
the Group, although 'hit a number of times by cannon shell' which damaged 
the port side of the wheelhouse, had no casualties. During this initial 
engagement the ML did not return fire and soon lost contact with the Group. 
Repeated attempts were made to contact SGB 5 by wireless but no answers 
were received and 'all waves of W/T [wireless telegraphy] appeared to be 
jammed [with heavy traffic]'.
LCF(L)1 meanwhile had joined the melee and continued resistance 
after the remainder of the group had dispersed. In the ensuing time, its 
gunnery control was damaged and a large number of men were wounded, 
including all officers. Although no contemporary reports by its crew have 
come to light, the post-war recollections of two of them give an idea of the
’® COHO, 'Combined Report', p.12 [Wyburd's order); Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Operation Order 
No.V, 31 July 1942, pp.4-5, NAC, RQ 24/10872/23202 (D47); Hughes-Hallett to COs of 
ships and craft taking part in Operation Jubilee, 17 August 1942, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/2; 
Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Narrative', Enclosure No.1, p.1 ['smoke-laying 
capabilities'], and 'Extract of report by Lt Cmdr H.H.H. Mulleneux, RN', Appendix 4 to 
Enclosure No. 13, p.1 [Orange beach), both in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 
0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48).
'Extract of report by Commander D.B. Wyburd, RN', Appendix 7 to Enclosure 13, pp.47-51. 
In 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RQ 
24/10872/232C2 (D48), [SQB 5); Lt Alex D. Fear, 'Report of Commanding Officer of ML 346 
on Dieppe raid -  Yellow beach landing', 21 August 1942, Terence Macartney-Fllgate Dieppe 
Collection (TMFDC).
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situation. Signalman Kevin J. Gamier recalls that he was challenged by a 
German ship but before he had time to answer, 'hell broke loose... It was 
pitch dark and we steamed through the German convoy which made things 
worse as we didn't know who we were firing on and they the same -  dog eat 
dog!'. His opposite number, Signalman C.J. 'John' Crisp, remembers 
receiving permission for him and Gamier to move aft to render assistance to 
a wounded gunner, 'I spotted a burst of tracer approaching us, I called to him 
[Gamier] and dropped to the deck. As I hit the deck I felt an almighty blow on 
my right knee, followed by a series of explosions above my head. I had been 
hit by a 20mm tracer and Kevin Gamier had received a number of nasty 
shrapnel wounds'. Gamier confirms this account, stating 'A shell hit the 
bridge and the Captain and myself were hit by shrapnel. I placed my hand to 
my face and it was full of blood. I began to feel dizzy... When I came to my 
senses, my opposite number [Crisp] lay on the deck near me, with his leg 
half blown off'. At 0450 LCF(L)1 broke of this engagement. The wounded CO 
decided that he had insufficient forces to undertake an assault, especially 
with the increasing daylight, and therefore steered towards the Caipe for 
instructions.’®
Engagements flared up and quickly died out among the units of the 
two convoys as they moved around in the darkness. Since 0400 three 
German harbour protection boats and a pilot tugboat, waiting to meet the 
incoming German convoy, were stationed of Dieppe. These were really 
'floating listening posts', billeted outside main ports when the weather and 
tides were favourable for landings or when bad weather restricted aerial
’® Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.16; Herbert Wells, 'Kevin J. Garnler-C/JX246S90', In 
Under the White Ensign (St. John's, Newfoundland: Robinson Blackmore Printing & 
Publishing Ltd, nd.); C.J. Crisp to Macartney-Fllgate, Letter, 26 November 1977, TMFDC.
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reconnaissance. They were equipped with alarm rockets and a machine- 
gun, although they did not have radar. Campbell states the boats 'narrowly 
escaped being run over by the first wave of landing craft at Dieppe'. The 
official report of Dieppe Port Commandant Wahn states that the one at 
Position 36, off the east headland, and the Signal Station, simultaneously 
fired the first alarm rockets at 0435, after boats approaching Pourville did not 
acknowledge the challenge for identification signals and gunfire was seen 
'from sea landwards'. These alert rockets were immediately reported to HQs 
of the Port Commander, Strong Point Group, and the Naval Signals Officer at 
Le Havre. Ten minutes later, the tugboat commander, Sonderführer 
(Boatswain) Achtermann, obsen/ed 'destroyers' and many other craft one 
and a half nautical miles (approximately 2.4km) away. By about 0530 the 
German convoy had reassembled again and began to head out of the 
operational area on their original course. Losses included one of the coastal 
sailing vessels sunk and UJ 1404, which had to be abandoned, being sunk 
later by the Brocklesby.^^
The action of the LCPs in Group 5 after the convoy encounter is not 
altogether clear. According to Wyburd's after-action report, and supported by 
the Admiralty Battle Summary, four broke down before the engagement and 
turned back to Newhaven and one followed SGB 5. Lt-Col Dumford-Slater 
and Wyburd, deciding that a landing under the circumstances was futile, 
boarded a LCP to report in person to the Calpe. Mistakenly, three others 
followed their LCP instead of SGB 5. Three closed on LCF(L)1, six were led
HQ Naval Group West, 'Report of Naval Group West on Dieppe landing', 21 August 1942, 
p.3. Translation, DHIst SGR 11/271, [protection boats]; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.107-8 
['listening posts'); Wahn, 'Port Commandant Dieppe. Report on the fighting at Dieppe', nd., 
translation, pp.1-2, NAC, RG 24/20488/981GN (D13). A nautical, or marine, mile -  1.6km; a 
land mile -  1,8km.
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in by ML 346 to Yellow I, one found its own way to Yellow II, and four, 
damaged in the melee, managed to return to England. One of these, its 
naval crew wounded, was navigated by Commando Sergeant Clive E. 
Collins, using his army prismatic pocket compass.^
Some misconceptions over the roles of the destroyers ORP Slazak, 
under Cmdr Romuald Nalecz-Tyminski, Free Polish Navy, and HMS 
Berkeley, under Lt Cmdr E.N. Pumphrey, in this encounter, need to be 
clarified. These two destroyers formed 3 Destroyer Division which, the 
operation order states, were to accompany Group 4 to point RR (see map), at 
which time, 0330, they were to detach, and make a sweep 'eastward to cover 
the passage of the landing craft to the beaches'. Terence Robertson, in The 
shame and the glory: Dieppe (1960), caused much controversy when he 
made, among other claims, incorrect statements about the mission of 3 
Destroyer Division. He states that they were detailed to protect Group 5, 
during passage were stationed 'just off the port bow', and at the moment of 
the convoy encounter, were 'off station'. He concludes that Group 5's 
misfortune was further 'compounded' by the 'absence of Slazak and 
Brocklesby from their proper stations and the Polish commander's 
subsequent failure to intervene in the battle'.^^
20 'Extract ot report by Commander D.B. Wyburd, RN', Appendix 7 to Enclosure 13, p.47. In 
'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RQ 
24/10872/232C2 (D48); Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.17; Lt-Col J.F. Durnford-Slater, 
'Recommendation of award for Sergeant Clive E. Collins, No.5499772, No.3 Commando', 
nd„ London, National Army Museum (NAM). Brigadier Peter Young Papers (PYP) 
9010 /31 /726 .
21 The exact orders lor Slazak and Brocklasbyviere:
From RR itM f to pan tm xigh Ih* poattlorw BB and JJ at 10 Knott... At JJ, IncrMM lOMd to abcxX 1S knoti and 
prooMd tvough Î» Mowtng poaHtm: (a) 50° OS' Nofth 01* 13' East, (b) 50° 05' NotSi 01* 05' East twnca to ba 
In a position ana and a half to two mUss off Rad and WhHs baachst at 0530. (Sss Map 4]
'Instructions to destroyers J.N.0.3', pp.1-3, In 'Naval Operation Order No.1', 31 July 1942, 
NAC, RQ 24/10872/23202 (D47); Terence Robertson, The shame and the glory (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1960), pp.208, 211.
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Robertson was not the first author to criticize Tyminski's actions, since 
Reginald Thompson made the accusations four years earlier, in Dieppe at 
dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid (1956). The controversy was only sparked, 
though, after Tyminski read, and was affronted by, what he described as the 
'incorrect, derogatory and injurious' passages in Robertson's book. After this 
Tyminski attempted to set the record straight. This is reflected in his later 
correspondence and writing, lamenting that Robertson, and most Dieppe 
authors, had never bothered to interview him, or any of the other Slazak 
officers, for their side of the story. In fact, as of 1983, only two authors had 
ever contacted him concerning this, John Mellor, Dieppe: Canada's forgotten 
heroes (1975), and Ronald Atkin, Dieppe, 1942: the Jubilee disaster 
(1980).22
After the operation, Hughes-Hallett stated in his official report that he 
considered Tyminski made an 'error of judgement' by not going to 
investigate the flare-up, since 'the sole reason for his patrol was to provide 
support for vessels engaged in the landing in the event of a contingency 
such as this'. In 1974, E.N. Pumphrey, former Capt. of the Brockiesby, 
responded to an enquiry of Mellor, stating, 'It was my opinion that we should 
certainly intervene and I signalled Slazak and said so; but Tyminski did not 
agree... in my judgement he was at fault in sticking too rigidly to his orders'.^
22 Reginald W. Thompson, Dieppe at dawn: the story o f the Dieppe raid (London: Hutchinson, 
1956), pp.29-33, and is In Robertson's bibliography; on Tyminskl's straightening the record, 
see Tyminski to John Mellor, 9  December 1973 and 21 April 1974, DHIst 78/52; and Romuald 
Nalecz-TymInskI, 'Polish destroyer ORP Slazak ir\ the raid on Dieppe', unpublished paper, 
August 1983, p.21-2, this author's Dieppe Collection; John Mellor, Dieppe: Canada's 
forgotten heroes (3rd revised edn.. Kitchener, Ontario; Melco Canadian History Series, 1975, 
1985), pp.30-1; Ronald Atkin, Dieppe, 1942: the Jubilee disaster (London: Macmillan, 1980), 
pp.75, 78-9.
22 Hughes-Hallett, ‘Naval Force Commander's narrative'. Enclosure 1, p.2, to 'Naval Force 
Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D48); 
E.N. Pumphrey to J. Mellor, Letter, 1 March 1974, Calgary, University of Calgary Special 
Collections (UCSC), John Mellor Papers (JMP), 508/92.6/Correspondence 3.17
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At the time, Tyminski believed that the flare-up was either the result of 
an LCP, or LCPs, of Group 5 landing prematurely and coming under fire; or 
that some escorts may have been sent ahead on reconnaissance and 
encountered a German patrol. The two warnings sent by Portsmouth, 
concerning the German convoy, were never received by either Slazak or 
Brocklesby. This was not because of inexperienced Polish radio operators, 
as they were duplicated by experienced RN operators. During the whole 
engagement a RN Liaison Officer was stationed on the Slazak bridge and 
oversaw decoding of all signals. Both ships had RDF Type 285 (anti-aircraft 
gunnery radar), and although the Slazak's had no return, the Brocklesby's 
temporarily picked up surface echoes. Accordingly, Pumphrey ordered a star 
shell search towards land on this bearing but it revealed nothing so Tyminski 
ordered it to stop. Tyminski's after-action report entry for 0350 states that he 
'Observed heavy gunfire bearing 190(°], coming from guns, light guns [20- 
40mm], and automatic weapons. At the same time, a dozen or so star shells 
were fired from the land. A barely visible gunfire can be seen in the opposite 
direction’. However, when told immediately aftenward that the engagement 
was between a MGB and a German trawler, he did not believe it and opined 
that 'the fire was too intense for an encounter between light units'.^
As the destroyers' mission was to protect the landing craft and prevent 
contact with German naval forces, Tyminski was correct in believing that 
once the encounter had started, it was too late for Slazak to Investigate an
^  R. Nalecz-TymInskI, 'Polish destroyer ORP Slazak In the raid on Dieppe', unpublished 
paper, August 1983, pp.7-8, 21-3; R. Nalecz-TymInskI to Mellor, 9 December 1973,21 April 
1974, DHIst 78/52; on RDF Type 285 and star shells, see Lt Cmdr E.N. Pumphrey, 'Extract of 
report by HMS Brocklaaby', Appendix 27 to Enclosure 13, p. 101, to 'Naval Force 
Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48); 
and R. Nalecz-Tyminski, 'ORP Slazak. report on the participation In the raid on Dieppe on 18- 
19 August 1942', 22 August 1942, pp.8-8, London, Polish Institute and SIkorski Museum 
(PISM), MAR.A.V 23. This report has never been used in any previous account of Jubilee.
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uncertain situation. The accusations, made in hindsight, that Slazak could 
have provided effective assistance and protection to the scattered units of 
Group 5, are invalid since he did not know the true situation. He also had in 
mind the specific orders to avoid contact with German forces. Intervention of 
destroyers in a fire-fight would very likely have led to the surprise element, 
vital to the success of the whole operation, being compromised thirty or forty 
minutes before touch down time. One final addendum to this controversy. If 
Tyminski had been at fault, undoubtedly Mountbatten or Hughes-Hallett 
would have instigated an internal inquiry into the affair. This was never done. 
Instead, he was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC), 'for 
skill and gallantry' while in command of Slazak during Jubilee.^
The results of this convoy encounter on the rest of the operation, the 
Naval Battle Summary warns, must not be 'overestimated'. It correctly points 
out that the German Naval HQs initially considered this engagement to be 
another of the common night actions between opposing naval forces, and 
not a landing. It concludes correctly that the general alarm was not given 
along the general area of Dieppe until 0500. It is incorrect, though, in 
claiming that the 'effect of surprise was not compromised', and that the only 
result of the encounter was to alert the 'coast defence system', army coastal 
batteries code-named Goebbels (Yellow beach) and Hess (Orange beach), 
and 'the radar stations, whose role was to engage hostile shipping rather 
than to repel a landing'. The coastal batteries were under orders to go 
immediately to 'Action Stations', in the event of imminent enemy landings, 
and then to give predicted barrages at certain distances in front of Dieppe.
2® R. Nalecz-TymInskI, 'Polish destroyer ORP Slazak in the raid on Dieppe', unpublished 
paper, August 1983, p.23; Admiralty to R. Nalecz-TymInskI, 6 October 1948 [Decoration], 
attached to Nalecz-Tymlnskl to H. Henry, 17 January 1995.
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This happened with the approach of Jubilee. At 0430 German 302 Divisional 
artillery observation posts saw 'fast patrol boats' off Puys and so fired a 
barrage out to sea in front of the town. Five minutes later, posts observed a 
'large number of fast patrol boats' heading for Pourville and therefore two 
batteries laid down interdictory fire. As previously noted, the German radar 
system detected, plotted, and reported the advance of Jubilee, although 
were not believed. The Summary also fails to mention that the defenders of 
Blue beach were also alerted. Concerning the Goebbels battery, the 
Summary states that even if it had been captured, 'it does not necessarily 
follow that the main landings would have been successful'. In fact, even 
though it was not captured, it did not make much of a difference to the main 
landings, as will be explained below.^
ALLIED SPECIAL OPERATIONAL UNITS
Before examining the land assault, an examination of the background 
of the numerous special operational units involved is necessary. One was 
the British Army Commandos. As a result of their origins, organization, 
training, function, discipline and high morale, the level of skill and 
effectiveness of the commandos was much higher then that of the Canadian 
troops, and this had a direct bearing on the commandos conduct and 
performance during Jubilee.^ J.E. 'Jimmy' Dunning, the 1992-3 President of
^  Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.19; Campbell also notes that some of the landing craft 
on the way in passed smail ranging flags for the army coastal batteries, Dieppe revisited, 
p. 108, note 53; Emil Kllgast, The history of the 302 Infantry Division In retrospect (Translation 
Bureau DGIS Multilingual Section, National Defence Headquarters, 7 June 1982, cl 976), 
pp.27, 59, CWM [batteries firing).
^  In the dark days of June 1940, when Britain 'stood alone', Churchill requested the formation 
of specially trained troops for 'butcher-and-bolt raids' on the coasts of occupied Europe, 
Churchill to COS, Memorandum, 3 June 1940, PRO, CAB 120/414, quoted In Ian Dear, The  
international experiment'. In Ten Commando 1942-1945 (London: Leo Cooper, 1987), p.1; 
on p.2 Dear states that the word 'Commando', although In general use during the Boer War,
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the Commando Association, and a No.4 Commando Dieppe veteran, recalls
that all these factors contributed to what Dunning calls 'the greatest
factor of all on the battlefield, high morale', which he says was at the highest
possible level in the commandos.^
In the last three weeks before Jubilee No.4 Commando carried out an
intensive refresher course, each troop specializing in the part it was going to
carry out. Also collective training was done for all troops and Force HQ.
Presumably No.3 Commando undertook a similar schedule of training. The
high degree of training achieved had a direct connection with the
performance of the commandos on Jubilee. This training included;
Hardening exercises, PT (physical training] with weapons. Swimming... Doubling fully 
loaded over specified distance in wet clothes... Crossing beach wire with rabbit 
netting. Use of Bangalore torpedoes. Fire and movement on the range; battle drill 
with live ammunition, bayonet fighting, and unarmed combat... Practice in withdrawal, 
first as a drill, then with smoke, opposition, and casualties..,. Firing of LMGs (light 
machine guns] from LCAs.,. Practice of each troops' own role on full scale lay-out [of
was proposed for the new units, not by Churchill, but by the Lt-Col Dudley Clarke, Military 
Assistant to the CIGS. In early 1942 a wholly Royal Marine Commando was formed and later 
became No.40 (RM) Commando, although at the time of the Jubilee was designated Royal 
Marine 'A' Commando. Each Army Commando was made up of six fighting Troops'. Each 
consisted of fifty all ranks, with a captain and divided into two sections, commanded by 
lieutenants. During operations, such as Jubilee, this total increased to over sixty all ranks, with 
the attachment of intelligence, medical and other specialist personnel. A Section was the 
normal capacity of a LCP(L) or LCA. Sections were split into subsections under sergeants.
The Commando also contained a HQ, consisting of 7 officers and 77 other ranks, divided Into 
Administrative, Intelligence, Signal, and Transport Sections; a surgeon and 7 men of the 
Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) and 2 armourers from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps 
(RAOC) were also attached. See War Department, Origins and organization', in 'British 
Commandos', 9 August 1942, Washington: Military Intelligence Senrice, pp.5-6,
Pennsylvania, Carlisle Barracks, US Army Military History Institute, U15/U635/1; J.D. 'Jimmy' 
Dunning (No.4 Commando and Dieppe veteran and President of the Commando Association 
1992-3) to H. Henry, 'Comments on Hugh Henry's rough draft on Dieppe -  Commando 
training role In Jubilee', 4 July 1996. The full title of the Association is 'Old Comrades 
Association of the Army Commandos'.
28 j.E . Dunning to H. Henry, October 1993. Concerning training, Dunning states;
I contiind that tha tin t pfiortty w ai to Inttll SELF-OISCtPLtNE and HIGH MORALE -  tha M iar davatopina through 
tlnrough training, lound laadarthip arto mutual conlldanca In Wtow comradaa... In my oplnlan. aalftoltdpllna It 
davalopad arto l i  a vital itaga turthar than 'dladpllnt' a t It ganarally accaptad a t a mwtary conoapt -  mart 
obadlanca to ordart -  and if  IrKtorporata* InHMIva and talf-rtIM toa. So that whan lha Irxllvktoal Commando It 
tacad with a siluallon wltara thara la no ona around to providt toa ordan lor him to futlH toa oUacllva of N t 
particular m lulon ha hat toa wM, datarmlnallon and ra tourctfulnatt to conllnut with h it original ordan. Thaft 
lalltolacipllna -  toa hlghaat ptonada of military ditcipllna.
J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, Comments on Chapter 5 ,4  July 1996.
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German battery] daily. Training in special equipment, i.e. RT [radio telegraphy] sets...
personal camouflage.^
For communications on Jubilee the mobile commando parties in No.3 
and 4 Commandos were equipped with the light, man-pack, high frequency 
(HF) Army Wireless Set No.38, which provided voice communications only, 
over a range of one-half to two miles, and was used for inter-Troop 
communication. The more static commando parties, such the Beach Signal 
Stations and those on supporting landing craft, used the more bulky, longer 
range, HF Army No. 18 set.*>
Besides Nos.3 and 4 Commandos, two Troops of No. 10 Inter-Allied 
(lA) Commando also were on Jubilee. No documentary proof has come to 
light on who was responsible for the formation of this latter Commando, but It 
appears to have been Mountbatten's idea, or suggested to him. The 
Commando was made up of foreign nationals from the occupied countries of 
Europe. The 'lè re  Compagnie de Fusilier Marin Commando', consisting of 
Free French Marines, started commando training in March 1942 and in July 
it was renamed No.1 Troop (French) Inter-Allied Commando. Fifteen of this
2® War Office, Training', Appendix A, p.18, in 'Destruction of a Gorman Battery by No.4 
Commando during the Dieppe raid', February 1943, Notes from Theatres of War, No.11.
A Canadian signals team was attached to both No.3 and 4 Commandos for the purpose of 
maintaining communications with their parent unit, the nearest infantry battalion. A No.18 set 
was used for this purpose and put on the Internal Bn-Coy (Battalion-Company) wave. These 
sets used telegraphy and Morse code and could be used as a ground station or as a man- 
carried pack. A No.46 set on 'A' wave, also operated by a Canadian, linked the Commando HQ 
to 4 Bde HO. If this wave was too busy, he could also pass information via his own Bn. The 
Army No.46 set was a light, high frequency, crystal controlled, man-pack, providing voice and 
Morse communications up to a range of ten miles over land, and fifty miles over sea. It was 
considered ideal for amphibious operations. 2 CID Signals, J Section, War Diary, 1S August 
1942, Kingston, Canadian Forces Communications and Electronics Museum (CFCEM) 
[Commando netted to RRC]; COHO, 'Report on army signals communications, Operation 
Jubilee/, 11 September 1942, pp.1-2, PRO, DEFE 2/333; John S. Moir, ed. 'Glossary of 
technical terms'. History of the Royal Canadian Corps of isignals 1903-1961 (Ottawa; Corps 
Committee, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1962), p.321 [details of wireless sets]; Mann, 
Signals orders. Instructions and diagrams', 7 August 1942, Appendix O, pp.S, 9, In 
Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 
(D25) [Bde 'A' & 'B' waves].
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Troop, under Lt Francis Vourch, were assigned to Jubilee. Their mission was to 
select up to twelve French Nationals for evacuation, liaise with the French 
population and to distribute propaganda leaflets and posters.^^
The second troop from No. 10 (lA) Commando involved was No.3 
(Miscellaneous) Troop, or more commonly, X-Troop. This again, was 
probably formed by Mountbatten. Churchill allegedly stated that this name 
was adopted because they would be 'unknown warriors', and as such, must 
'be considered an unknown quantity. Since the algebraic symbol for the 
unknown is X, let us call them X-Troop'. Ian Dear, in Ten commando 1942- 
1945 (1987), writes that it was 'undoubtedly one of the strangest, if not the 
strangest, sub-unit to serve in the British Army' during in the war. The Troop 
was made up mostly of German and Austrian refugees, usually Jewish, and 
men of Germanic origin. With the outbreak of war In 1939, these foreign 
nationals were not allowed into His Majesty's armed forces, but were instead 
permitted into the non-combatant 'Alien' Pioneer Companies of the General 
Service Corps, although some actually became involved in fighting during 
the withdrawal at Dunkirk. Many of these men yearned to join the regular 
Services, and this led to the involvement of MIS (Military Intelligence 
Department 5, or counter-intelligence/espionage Security Service), and the 
SOE (Special Operations Executive), in vetting and recruiting many of these 
men for certain formations or units, such as X-Troop, No. 10 (IA) Commando. 
On joining X-Troop, SOE arranged for the men to have false British
3'' Besides the French No.1 Troop -  Belgian (No.4), Dutch (No.2), Miscellaneous (No.3 or X), 
Norwegian (No.5), Polish (No.6), and Yugoslavian (No.7) ones were also formed, Dear, Ten 
Commando, p.207, pp.1,4 [formation, training]; Maurice Chuavet, 'La lòre Compagnie de 
Fusilier Marin Commando à Dieppe', nd„ pp.1-8, TMFDC [history]; War Diary, No.10 Inter- 
Allied (lA) Commando, 19 August 1942, PRO, WO 218/40 [names of members]; Mann, 
Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, p.3. In 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military 
Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10871/23202 (D25) [mission].
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identities, regimental numbers, papers, and complete personal 
backgrounds, including false next-of-kin to write and receive mail from.
SOE's involvement in recruiting for No. 10 (IA) Commando, probably led to 
the confusion in the exact designation of these men in the operation orders, 
and to later current errors in the secondary sources. This is clarified below in 
discussion of SOE.32
Dear explains that X-Troop members were highly educated, intelligent 
and one of the most highly trained groups in the British army. Besides the 
usual commando training, these men also learned more exotic skills, such 
as, driving a train, lock picking, and being able to identify every known 
German Wehrmacht unA and rank. The six men of X-Troop chosen for 
Jubilee, were German-speaking, Sudeten Czechs. Although references to 
this group are sparse, a close comparison of fragmentary records gives the 
story. The COHQ War Diary first noted a telephone conversation on 5 June 
1942, to make arrangements for 'six Intelligence Officers of the Rutter force to 
be sent to Ml 19 [Military Intelligence Department dealing with repatriated 
PoWs and escaping] for special training'. Two weeks later, the diary 
recorded a minute to Wing Commander Casa Maury, SIO, COHQ, stating 
that 'all arrangements for briefing them and producing faked identities had 
been carried out by their organization (SOE). This memo also explained that, 
in future, these men should be attached to No. 10 Commando. On the same
^  Dear, Ten Commando, p.6 ['X-Troop', formation]. Dear sates on p.47 that a letter from the 
SOE Archivist, dated 22 January 1986, confirms that the SOE did aid in recruitment for No.10 
(lA) Commando and that this is recorded In a SOE document outlining the wartime history of 
the liaison between SOE and COHQ. This document, entitled 'Provision of Allied and Alien 
Personnel', states:
Th* provWon ol Qaiman ipaaktra to acoonipany •  raiding loica, anhsr to act as Intorpratars, or to shout 
conMcfng comnands to ttis Qsrman troops, was snothar ot ths psraonnsi taslu undtrtakan by SOE. Many of ths 
man wara Sudatan Qaimans airsady In this country, arto thair Inclusion In a raiding lores proasnlad many 
sscutHy dMIcuMss^  tisas wars uMmatsly sdvad by toa lormaSon o l a unit known as No.10 Commando, undsr 
tos commwid o l too SS (Spadal SanrIcssI Brlgads. which was oompoasd d  lorsign nationals.
202
day, the diary, in referring to the iast memo, recorded a request to the War 
Office for the Sudeten Germans be 'made avaiiable for special duties', and 
iisted their reai names. The finai entry that referred to the group, 24 June 
1942, was a minute ordering the six men to report to HMS Tormentor II, at 
Cowes, isie of Wight. Their duties were described as; 'Shouting instructions 
calculated to mislead and confuse the enemy'; and to 'Act as interpreters to 
locai Commanders to whom no reguiar Inteiiigence Officer or Interpreter had 
already been allotted'. Their adopted Engiish identities were then listed 
Privates (Ptes) George Bates, Waiter Harvey, Maurice Latimer, Brian Platt, 
Charles Rice and Joseph Smith. 3^ Although Rutter vias cancelled, these 
men were again caiied on for Jubilee, and their mission unchanged, as 
shown in the military operation orders, memoranda and War Diary of No. 10 
(lA) Commando through August.^*
US Army Rangers, the equivaient of British Army Commandos, 
received this same specialized training. Fifty of the Rangers were attached to 
various units for Jubilee. The Rangers were involved, states Brig.-Gen. 
Truscott, the American Adviser at COHQ, since one of his instructions from 
Eisenhower, was 'to gain battle experience in raids to provide ieavening for 
American troops'. Therefore, forty Rangers were attached to No.3
^  Dear, Ten Commando, pp.19-20 [training], p.21 [mission], pp.36-50 [recruitment, false 
identities]; COHO, 'R u tte r- intelligence', p.54,1/53 [Ml 19], p.56,1/63 ['(SOE)'],l/62 ['special 
duties'], p.57,1/65 [Tormentor, duties], 31 October 1942, PRO, DEPE 2/542. Records 
referring to X-Troop on Jubilee are: Brig. C.C. Mann to Col Neville, COHQ, 10 August 1942, 
'SOE -  Operation Jubilee' [Sudetan], and attached hand-written list of 'Special Intelligence' 
Detachment. NAC, RQ 24/13747/Qeneral 152/QS8; full names and ranks of all six X-Troop 
members, although referred to as SOE, are given In 'Allotnient of FS Personnel and SOEs', 
nd., NAC; War Diary. No.10 Inter-Allied (lA) Commando, 19 August 1942, PRO. WO 218/40 
[five X-Troop members names].
The real names of the X-Troop men were Res Klaus L.O. Ascher, Karl W. Blllmann, Sgt 
Peter H. Gaspari, Res Helmut Qelser, Paul Glaser, and Joseph Hall, COHQ, 'Intelligence', 
p.56,1/63, in COHQ, 'R u tte r- Intelligence', PRO, DEFE 2/542.
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Commando, four to No.4 Commando, and six to the 2 CID, spread through 
the infantry battalions. Although most sources are not in disagreement on the 
total of fifty, they are when it concerns to which units they were attached. On 
joining a Commando the Ranger ORs automatically functioned in the 
capacity of a British Pte, and on raids were expected to wear British uniforms 
and no insignia of rank. This was true for all commando operations and was 
done 'to confuse enemy snipers as to the priority of target', according to 
Ranger Alex J. Szima, 'thereby insuring [sic] continuity to a chain of 
command while under fire'.*
Another special formation involved in Jubilee was the GHQ Liaison 
Regiment {Phantom).^ Phantom members from 'J' Squadron, commanded 
by Maj. the Honourable J.J. 'Jakie' Astor, had been receiving commando 
training since May 1942, and were attached to COHQ for Jubilee. Although 
the contemporary press described Phantom as 'the eyes and ears of the 
Commander-in-Chief, an official definition of its function was 'to transmit vital 
information from the battle front, ignoring the usual channels, to the
*Truscott to Eisenhower, Memorandum, 'American staff at COHQ', 7 September 1942, 
GCMF, Brig.-Gen. L.K. Truscott Papers (LTP), 9/1 ['battie experience']; Robertson, Shame 
and the Glory, p.197 [ciaims 4 officers, 15 ORs -  No.3 Commando, 1 officer 6 ORs -  No.4 
Commando, 7 ail ranks -  RHLI, remaining with other battalions); Reginald W. Thompson, 
Dieppe at dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid (London; Hutchinson, 1956), p.62 [claims a 
'dozen' -  No.4 Commando); Brigadier C. Churchill Mann, 'Allotment of personnel, equipment 
and stores'. Appendix C -  Part 1, pp.t,2,4,5,7,29,31 [Rangers allocation]. In 'Operation 
Jubilee Detailed Military Plan', 10 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25); William O. 
Darby and William H. Baumer give the names of the men, see 'List of men on Dieppe raid'. In 
Darby's Rangers: we led the way (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1980), p.147; one of these 
Rangers, Marcel G. Swank, confirms which units each Ranger was attached to, but disagrees 
with the operation order in that he believes four, as opposed to five. Rangers were with No.4 
Commando, and six, as opposed to five, were with the 2 CID, see Swank to B. Greenhouse, 
28 January 1979, DHist 79/139; Alex J. Szima to AmVETS Post #72, 30 January 1976, p.2 
[British uniforms).
*  Pharrfom originated In November 1939 as an RAF unit, named No.3 British Air Mission, and 
was tasked with ascertaining from the Belgian General Staff the deployments of Allied units, 
and then to send this information direct to the CO of the British Air Forces In FrarKe. By doing 
this, it was hoped to avoid Irlendly fire' from planes or artillery hitting Allied troops. See Philip 
Warner, Phantom, London: William KImber, 1982, pp.12-13.
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Commander'. Phantom was under the direct command of GHQ Home 
Forces.37 On Jubilee they were to liaise closely with the infantry, commando 
and naval signal groups on their assigned beaches. Using special long- 
range, portable W/T sets, they were to pass timely operational reports on an 
independent 'Phantom' wave, direct to the Phantom base in Fort Southwick, 
HQ of C-in-C Portsmouth. Astor, with one Phantom operator, was to maintain 
an intercept watch on the HQ ship Calpe. This extra communication with the 
units ashore could, if needed, be used for emergency transmission by the 
Force Commanders.“
Liaison between the 4 and 6 Brigade HQs and the Force HQ ships, 
Calpe and Femie was to be supplemented by five Liaison Officers (LOs) 
from 8 Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (14 Hussars). Two 
detachments, of a captain and lieutenant each, were to land an hour and 
fifteen minutes after zero hour, on Red and White beaches, and to establish 
contact with their respective Bde HQ. Their task was to maintain liaison 
between the two Bde and engineer HQs ashore, to ensure that Force HQ 
was kept fully informed with brief situation reports (sitreps), and to aid the 
Bde HQs with communication to Force HQ if need be. The information 
communicated was to be sent on B wave, and to be supplementary to that 
sent by the Bde HQs over A wave. Also an officer was stationed on Femie to
^  An example of the type of man recruited into Phantom, was film star David Niven, who 
commanded 'A' Squadron as a major in 1940; Warner, Phantom, p.25 [Home Forces], p.27 
(Niven); R.J.T. Hills, Phantom was there (London: Edward Arnold, 1951), p.14 ('eyes and 
ears', definition).
“  Mann, 'Liaison orders. Instructions and diagrams', 10 August 1942, Appendix R, pp.1-2 
[see also signals diagram. Appendix Q, p.9], in 'Operation Jubilee Detaiied Miiitary Plan, 5-16 
August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25); Major J.J. Astor, 'Report by J.J. Astor, 
Dieppe -  August 1942', 4 September 1942, Appendix C, p.1. Annex 1, ‘Phantom W/T 
layout', to GHQ Liaison Regiment, War Diary, PRO, W O 215/16; COHO, 'Report on army 
signals communications. Operation Jubilee!, 11 September 1942, p.2, PRO, DEFE 2/333 
[portable W/T sets).
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maintain personal contact with both Bde HQs. *  Another detachment of four 
men was to embark on LCT-11 and report to Capt. James King, Royal 
Engineers, who acting as a SIO (presumably Senior Intelligence or 
Interrogation Officer), and to assist him on an unidentified, 'special mission'. 
One history states, witl\put corroborative evidence, that their seciet mission 
was to capture a senior German officer, and as a cover story they were just to 
bring back samples of German uniforms.^
Other units were also involved in general intelligence missions, such 
as battle or tactical intelligence collection and PoW interrogation. A member 
of the Ministry for Economic Warfare (MEW) had the curious job of searching 
for material of interest to his department, which ranged from tooth brushes 
and civilian underwear, to civilian gas-masks and foodstuffs
The 2 CID Intelligence Officer, Capt. T.H. Insinger, assisted by Capt. 
E.D. Magnus, was charged with establishing a PoW 'cage' in the area of 
White beach, with the help of three Provost personnel. Whenever possible, 
PoWs were to have their hands tied to prevent them destroying their 
documents. All PoWs were to be searched for documents and interrogated
^  Mann, 'Liaison orders, instructions and diagrams', 10 August 1942, Appendix R, pp.1 [also 
signals diagram, Appendix Q, p.9], in 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 
1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25).
Mann, Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, pp.1-3 [SIO, 'special mission'], 
'Allotment of Personnel, equipment, and stores', 10 August 1942, Appendix C-Part 1, p.19 
[Capt. King), in 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 
24/10871/23202 (025); S.R. Elliot defines SIO as Senior Intelligence Officer, see 'Dieppe', in 
Scarlet to green: a history of Intelligence In the Canadian Army 1903-1963 (Toronto: Canadian 
Intelllgertce and Security Association, 1981), p.169; Terence Robertson, The shame and the 
glory (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960), p.167 [secret mission).
The Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) was charged with gathering Intelligence on 
Germany's Industrial capacity and ability to wage total war. It analysed, for example, the effects 
of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. Col A.H. Head, COHQ, to Lt-Col C.C. 
Mann, 'List of articles of Interest to MEW', 14 May 1942, NAC. RG 24 Q 3/10872/23202 (D31); 
Mann, Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, p.3. In 'Operation Jubilee Detailed 
Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25) [mission].
A
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for intelligence information of immediate tactical value, such as order of 
battle and unit dispositions. Several intelligence gathering parties were 
detailed. A Divisional Party, made up of one Special Interrogation Officer, Lt 
I.T. Burr, accompanied by a one Field Security Personnel (FSP), was 
attached to the QOCHC. It was to advance with the QOCHC, after meeting up 
with tanks of 14 CATR, on the aerodrome at St Aubin. Burr's mission was to 
search it for German Air Force (GAF) papers, pamphlets, code-books, signal 
papers and equipment. After this, it was to search the suspected German 
110 Divisional HQ, a chateau and/or L-shaped building at Arques-la- 
Bataille, although the operation order warned that this may have moved. 
Here they were looking for secret files, pamphlets. Order of Battle, and 
information code-books.^
A second party, also consisting of a Special Interrogation Officer, Lt F. 
Morgan, and one FSP, were attached to the RRC to perform several 
searches of the barracks. Coastguard Houses, and HQs at Puys, and the 
Dieppe prison. The want list included military and civilian papers and 
records, battalion files, engineer pamphlets and maps, and the capture of 
military PoWs.^
Five groups of two FSP each, with an additional 'SOE', or 'Special 
intelligence', man were also formed. The operation order uses both these 
descriptions, possibly mistakenly or as a security cover, for these men were 
actually the Czech members of X-Troop, No. 10 (lA) Commando. No other
^  Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, pp.1-2 (PoWs], p.3 [Officers' 
names], p.5 [search]. In 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RQ 
24/10871/23202 (D25); Elliot, Scarlet to green, p.170, for some reason, states this group 
was known as ‘(British) Special Intelligence Officers' party'.
^  Mann, Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, pp.3,11. In Operation Jubilee 
Detailed Military Plan, S-16 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10871/23202 (D2S).
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account of Jubilee has yet grasped the significance of this. Elliot, the official 
wartime Canadian military intelligence historian, takes at face value that they 
are SOE men. Another history refers to them as a different unit altogether 
known as the 'Special Intelligence' group. But a close examination and 
comparison of the documents, one not yet open to public scrutiny, reveals 
the true state of affairs. This is confirmed by the SOE Adviser to the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, who states that there is 'no trace in the SOE 
archives of the names [and]...It would be unusual in any other area of SOE 
activity for them to be privates. Privates would certainly not be SOE 
observers'. The mission of these five three-man teams was to conduct 
systematic, half hour searches of all the major buildings in Dieppe, such as 
the wireless station. Custom House, hospital, railway stations, post office, 
telephone exchange, municipal buildings, justice courts, police stations, 
military HQs and barracks, and thirteen hotels. Items of interest were all 
military documents, code-books, military and civilian rubber stamps, address 
lists, technical information, maps and charts. A recent biography of 
Commander Ian Fleming, inventor of the James Bond character, states that 
he was in on the Fernie and in command of these 'prototype' intelligence 
detachments.**
** Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, pp.3-4,6-10 ['SOE', mission], 
'Allotment of personnel, equipment and stores'. Appendix C -  Part 1, pp.2, 15-18, ['Special 
Intelligence'], In 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RQ 
24/10871/23202 (D25); Elliot, Scarlet to green, p.170; Robertson, The shame and the glory, 
p.137 ['Special Intelligence' group]; 'Allotment of FS personnel and SOEs', nd., NAC [names, 
teams]; Brig. C.C. Mann to Col Neville, COHO, 10 August 1942, 'SOE -  Operation Jubilee', 
and attached hand-written list of 'Special Intelligence' detachment, NAC, RQ 
24/13747/General 152/GS8 [the names In the last two sources are the same as those of X- 
Troop, No.10 (lA) Commando War Diary, 19 August 1942, PRO, WO 218/40]; Gen/ase 
Cowell. SOE Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), to H. Henry, 21 February 
1994 [no trace]; E.Q. Boxshall, Foreign Office, to S.S. Wilson, Cabinet Historical Office, 16 
June 1967, gives three ofherSOE names, all officers, who took part In Jubilee, London, 
Cabinet Office, Historical & Records Section (COHRS), CAB 146/349/The Dieppe Raid, 
1955-67', [This volume, although closed to public scrutiny at the time of viewing, 10 April
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Another search group, known as the Pourville Party, has had a great 
many myths propagated about it. It consisted of one FSP, Sgt Roy Hawkins, 
an 'SOE', or more correctly, X-Troop Commando, Re Bate, and a 'RDF 
expert', RAF Flight-Sgt Jack Nissenthal (Nissen). Their objective was first the 
Officers' Mess at Pourville, thought to be in a 'White House', where they were 
to gather officers' papers, then forty-five minutes later, they were to move on 
to the RDF station at Caude-Cote above Pourville, where Nissen would 
gather technical information and radar apparatus parts of interest. The 
operation order noted that Nissen 'must be given sufficient protection to 
prevent his falling into enemy hands (FSP and SOE to assist RAF expert)'. 
What this meant was that he should be killed if in danger of being captured. 
Actually, this was a grave slip-up by a Canadian intelligence officer, Capt. 
Magnus, on the Jubilee planning staff. Originally, Professor R.V. Jones, 
Assistant Director of Intelligence (Science), Air Ministry, was earmarked for 
Rutter, but the foolishness of this was quickly realized, and a FIt-Sgt 
technician was asked to volunteer -  Nissen. Unfortunately, and unforgivably, 
for him, the execution order was never cancelled. On the decision to send 
Nissen, Jones explains that since there was a chance of the radar at 
Pourville being captured, it was decided to have someone go along to check 
if anything of interest could be brought back to England. As an objective, he 
concluded that it 'came into the category of "a target of opportunity" rather 
than the prime objective'.*^
1996, Is scheduled for future transfer to the PRO]; the three SOE officers' names are 
confirmed In Michael R.D. Foot, SOE in France: an account of the work of the British Special 
Operations Executive In France 1940-1944, United Kingdom Series, History of the Second 
World War (London: HMSO, 1966), p.184; Andrew Lycett, Ian Flemming: a biography 
(London; Wledenfeld & NIcolson, 1995), pp.139-41.
^  Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, p.4. In 'Operation Jubilee Detailed 
Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25), [Objective]; R.V. Jones.
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One final group was the SOE. This was a British secret service 
organization, set up in 1940 to, in the words of Churchill, 'set Europe ablaze'; 
in other words, to initiate, support and guide resistance movements in the 
occupied countries of Europe. The SOE Adviser, Gervase Cowell, explains 
that 'the SOE role was, in theory, limited to providing advice, instruction and 
special devices, and sometimes observers... the Dieppe raid was an 
exception'. As explained, six supposed SOE men listed in the operation 
orders, were actually commandos from X-Troop. But eight or nine SOE men, 
the operation order gives both totals, actually did go on the raid. They were 
known as the 'Gillies Party', five officers and three ORs, under command of 
Capt. Percy J. Harratt. Other officers able to be identified were Capt. Edward 
G.A. Bisset, D. Wyatt, SOE Liaison Officer to COHO, and Major Jacques 
T.P.M. Vaillant de Gu6lis. The official historian of the SOE, Professor Michael 
R.D. Foot, explains that de Guslis went on as an SOE officer but never made 
it to shore, and that Harratt was only an obsen/er. Contradictory 
contemporary evidence seems to point to the latter being more than just an 
observer. Harratt's personal file, held in the closed SOE Archives, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, states that he was 'In command of SOE party -  4 
officers and 10 other ranks, with various missions to perform'. A 
memorandum, dated eight days before the raid's launch, states that he and 
Bisset were to be issued 'two permits... to carry out their special mission on 
Operation Jubilee [and]... a town plan showing marked areas'. The 
operation orders also state that Harratt was to set up a SOE HQ in the vicinity
D-Day', In Most secret war (London: Hamilton, 1978), pp.402-3 [alip-up]; J.R. Robinson, a 
wartima RCAF radar officer, confirms this analysis quoting personal correspondence with R.V. 
Jones, 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid'. The Canadian Defence Quarterly 20/5 (April 
1991), 39-41; R.V. Jones to John Mellor, 7 January 1986, borrowed from John Mellor, 
Kitchener, Ontario ['target of opportunity'].
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of the Dental School, assisted by seven men from 3 Canadian Light AA 
Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery (3 Cdn Lt AA Regt, RCA), and that his 
SOE group were to be provided with twenty-seven grenades and a 'sled', 
the latter usually used for transporting stores and material. Finally, the orders 
stated that the SOE detachment was to search the 'Town Hall', and repeated 
again the task, 'carry out special mission'.^
The assault landings themselves were to take place in two specific 
phases and with two specific objectives. The first phase, at 0450, was 
simultaneous flank assaults on six beaches either side of Dieppe, Yellow I 
and 2, Blue, Green, Orange I and 2, the object being to destroy the heavy 
coastal defence and divisional artillery batteries. This would clear the way for 
the second phase half an hour later, the main assault on Red and White 
beaches in front of Dieppe, the object being to capture the town.
The assault will be examined on a beach by beach basis, as opposed 
to an analysis based on a simultaneous, chronological, time continuum. The 
air battle will be dealt with separately. It is important to note that the actions 
on the various beaches, and the air battle, were taking place at the same 
time. This method was used in COHQ's 'Combined Report', the Admiralty's 
Naval Battle Summary, and subsequent secondary accounts, and seems the 
most suitable.^^
^  Gervase Cowell, SOE Advisor, to H. Henry, 13 March 1996 ['SOE role']; Mann, 'Intelligence 
plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, p.3 [nine men, SOE HQ], 'Allotment of personnel, 
equipment and stores', 10 August 1942, Appendix C-Parl 1, p.21 [eight men, grenades, 
'sled']. In 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RQ  
24/10871/23202 (025); Brig. C.C. Mann, to Col Neville, COHO, 'SOE -  Operation Jubilee!, 
10 August 1942, NAC. RG 24/13747/General 152/GS8 ['Gillies Party', eight men. 'two 
permits']; the SOE officers names are In Foot, SOE In France, p.184; and confirmed by E.G. 
Boxshall, Foreign Office, to S.S. Wilson, Cabinet Historical Office, 16 June 1967, COHRS, 
CAB lAB/OAg/'The Dieppe Raid, 1955-67'; 'List of operations'. In P.J, Harratt Personal File, 
SOE Archives, FCO.
Some secondary accounts using the beach by beach analysis are Stacey, Six years of war, 
p.360, and Ronald Atkin, Dieppe, 1942: the Jubilee disaster {London-. Macmillan, 1980).
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FLANK ATTACK I: BERNEVAL (YELLOW BEACHES) 
OPERATION FLODDEN -  N0.3 COMMANDO
Dumford-Slater's orders were to destroy or neutralize the Army 
Coastal Battery at Bemeval-le-Grand, which was sighted to cover the main 
ianding beaches and sea approaches, and reembark from the same beach 
within four hours.^ The Detaiied Miiitary Plan stressed that if the battery 
couid not be destroyed, during the period of occupation the commandos 
'must remain and pin' down the German gunners with harassing fire. Under 
this generai order, the commandos had the freedom to form their own 
specific pians of attack. Dumford-Slater's plan, code-named Operation 
Flodden, envisaged two landings -  at Yellow I (Petit Bemevai) and II (near 
Bellville-sur-Mer) -  followed by a rapid ascent of the cliffs, and an attack on 
the battery in a pincher movement (see Maps 2 and 6).^
Unfortunately for Dumford-Slater, as previously recounted. Group 5 
was dispersed by 0430. Aithough he had orders that if any of his LCPs were 
sunk, he was to carry out his 'ailotted tasks with reduced numbers', he and
^  Durnford-Slater had under his command a total of 422 personnel, consisting of 360 men of 
No.3 Commando, 40 US Rangers, the Principal Beach Master (PBM) Party of 6 men, a Naval 
Signals Party of 5 men, 3 RRC battalion signallers, a Phantom detachment of 4 men and 2 
pressmen. See Mann, Movements arrangements to ports of embarkation', 12 August 1942, 
Appendix C-Part 2, Table V, in 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, 
NAC, RQ 24/10871/23202 (D25). The PBM, Sub-Lt Lewis, was the chief naval authority on 
the beach and responsible for the beach area and Its defence. He was to keep the Naval 
Force Commander constantly informed of all events on the beach through the Naval Signals 
Party. Also he was to liaise directly with Dumford-Slater. See Hughes-Hallett, 'Orders for Naval 
Beach Parties', Appendix JN07, pp.1-3. In 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation Jubilee]', 
31 July 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/23202 (D47).
^  Mann, 'Assault and occupation', 9 August 1942, Appendix D, pp.1,4 [see also Appendix F, 
p.6], 'Operation Uub//ee Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10871/23202 
(D25); Lt-Col John F. Dumford-Slater, 'Operation Flodden. No.3 Commando Operation Order 
No.V, 14 August 1942, pp.3-7, NAM, PYP, 9010/31/725; see also Major Peter Young, 
Operation Plodded, (probably 20 August) 1942, p.1, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D49); John 
F. Dumford-Slater, 'Dieppe', In Commando: memoirs of a fighting commando In World War 
Two (London; Qreenhill, 1953, 1991), pp.93,95.
212
Wyburd decided that an assault during daylight, with the meagre forces 
available, was not feasible. Thereafter, he was unable to effect any influence 
on the operation and returned to England, not knowing that seven LCPs had 
actually landed some of his troops.^
The German Bemeval Battery was an independent strongpoint 
(Stützpunkt), separate from Dieppe and its environs, which was still under 
construction at the time of the raid. The unit was 2 Troop, 770 Army Coastal 
Defence Artillery Battery, with seven heavy guns. A field picket, or guard 
post, was located on the cliffs, in a defensive position, above the entrances 
to the two narrow gorges leading down to Yellow beach I. One 20mm AA 
gun was in a pillbox situated on the cliffs between Yellow I and II, while 
pillboxes and machine gun posts were also situated overlooking Yellow I. 
The gorges were strewn with dense barbed wire entanglements, booby 
traps, and in the case of the western defile, anti-personnel mines.^^
^  Mann, 'Appreciation of aitemative courses', 10 August 1942, Appendix T, p.6, in 'Operation 
Jubilee Detaiied Miiitary Pian', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10671/23202 (D25) ['allotted 
tasks']; Durnford-Slater, Commando, p.105; Stacey, Six years of war, p.361 [seven LCPs].
S' The German Order of Battle at Bemeval consisted of 2 Troop, 770 Army Coastal Defence 
Artillery Battery, with four 105mm K35 Czech guns, three 170mm guns, in howitzer or naval 
mountings, and two 20mm /VA guns, all manned by 127 men. The GAP had a radar station 
(G/e/fw/fz Equipment Unit), Identified by British intelligence as a 'Beam Station', and one 
section of 20mm AA guns from, the Dieppe Beach Defence Unit, manned and defended by 1 
officer, 16 NCOS and 97 men. A field picket of 1 Coy, 570 Infantry Regiment (IR), 302 ID, of 1 
NCO and 9 men was stationed at Yellow I, Petit Bemeval. This was a total of 251 all ranks, not 
including local resenres. The German gun type designations of that period K(anone) 35 
Hschechlsch) -  stand for 'gun, 1935, Czech'. See Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the 
British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, In The history ot 
the 302 Infantry Division In retrospect, ed. Emil Kllgast (DGIS Multilingual Section Translation 
Bureau, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), 1962, c l 976, CWM, p.55, [guns], p.93 
[defences, gorges], (an earlier translation Is in Charles P. Stacey, 'Operation Jubltee: the raid 
on Dieppe, 19 August 1942. Information from German war diaries'. In 'Army Headquarters 
Historical Section Report No.10', 5 December 1946, DHist AHQ Report No.10); Lt-Col John F. 
Durnford-Slater, Operation Flodderr. No.3 Commando Operation Order No.1', 14 August 
1942, p.1, NAM, PYP, 9010/31/725 ['Beam Station']. The beach was four hundred yards 
long, about twenty yards wide at high tide, and composed of small rounded boulders arxl 
rocks, comrrranly referred to as 'shingle'. See Mann, 'Information -  Own troops', 5 August 
1942, Appendix B, p.2, in 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, 
RG 24/10671/23202 (D25); and Hughes-Hallett, 'Navigational data'. Appendix C to JN 01,
2 1 3
According to the after action report by the 302 ID commander, Lt-Gen. 
Conrad Haase, the field picket reportedly first heard noise of the convoy 
naval battle at 0345, while the GAF radar unit defence force manned their 
defensive position two minutes later. At 0450 the picket and observation 
post of 2 Tp, 770 Bty, spotted 'four small boats and a freighter*, the latter 
responding to a recognition signal, after which the small boats were seen to 
steer for Petit Berneval. These were actually ML 346 and five LCPs of No.3 
Commando. As the Bty could not reach them, the field picket opened up on 
the approaching craft with machine gun and small arms fire. ML 346 
answered with its 3pdr and Oerlikon on a pill box to the west side of Yellow I. 
The German report explains that at 0455, under protection of this fire, the 
commandos landed at Yellow I in the 'dead ground below the cliffs', scaled 
them and proceeded towards the eastern gully. At 0500, the 2 Tp, 770 Bty 
tried to contact the field picket but was not answered, so it sent a four-man 
MG patrol to reconnoitre the gully at Petit Bemeval. It also reported to Bn HQ 
and requested for infantry reinforcements. At the same, the GAF defensive 
strongpoint also sent an assault patrol of eight men to the gorge, and 
recalled the radar operators from their station. Five minutes later, the 
strongpoint was strafed by fighter-bombers, and later had smoke bombs 
dropped on the area. The air attack was responded to by three 20mm AA 
guns (one section of 3 Tp/237 AA Bty). The air attack set fire to buildings and 
caused a magazine to explode. These air attacks continued for four hours.^
p.lO, in 'Naval Operation Order No.1 (Operation Jubilee]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RQ 
24/10872/23202 (D47).
^  Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', 25 
August 1942, in The history o f the 302, ed. Emil Kllgast, CWM, pp.58-9, 61-2; Lt Alex D. Fear, 
Report of Commanding Officer of ML 346 on Dieppe raid -  Yellow beach landing', 21 August 
1942, p.1-3, TMFDC.
*
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Of the six LCPs that actually landed at Yellow I, five beached at 0510 
(twenty minutes later than that stated in the German report), and the last one 
arrived thirty-five minutes later. This is according to Wyburd, and based on 
his after-action reports of his LCP Officers. One of these was LCP(L) 42, 
commanded by Lt-Comdr C.L. Corke, and had Lt. Len W. Druce and his 
Section of No.3 Commando aboard. This LCP had been hit in the convoy 
fire-fight and all the crew, except Corke, had become casualties. On request 
from him and Druce for someone to help navigate the boat. Commando 
Trooper Higgins volunteered, and successfully steered the boat towards 
shore. These craft touched down in echelon formation, without the Germans 
firing at this point. This is confirmed by Wyburd's report. Druce believes that 
this was due to the German defenders being preoccupied with an air attack 
during this period, which agrees with the German report of one about this 
time.53
The majority of the approximately 120 men landed were from 6 Troop. 
The advance up the mined gorge was initially held by a single row of barbed 
wire on the beach in front, and inside it. Captain R.L. 'Dick' Wills, ordered his 
men to cut through it.®* After this delay, the commandos were able to 
carefully make their way up to the top. While advancing up it, the field picket
®®The other four LCPs were; LCP(L) 1, Lt D.R. Stephens; LCP(L) 157, Sub-Lt K. Child; 
LCP(L) 81, Sub-Lt B. McCosh; LCP(L) 41, Sub-Lt D.H. Spring; the sixth to arrive was LCP(L) 
85, Lt A.M. Button. See Hughes-Hallett, 'Extract of report from Commander D.B. Wyburd, RN‘, 
Appendix 7 to Enclosure 13, in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 
August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48), p.49; Lt Len W. Druce, 'Report on landing at 
Yellow I, Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942, by No.3 Commando', 5 January 1943 [written while a 
PoW In Eichstatt, Bavaria, and hidden in an ecclesiastical book until the end of the war], 
received from Mary Mackle, Pender Island, British Columbia (BC), Canada [Higgins].
®* Stacey, Six years of war, p.361 [120 men]. The account of the Commandos' actions on 
Yellow I is based on, unless otherwise indicated, COHO, 'Combined Report', pp.13-14; Lt Len 
W. Druce, 'Report on landing at Yellow 1, Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942, by No.3 Commando', 5 
January 1943, received from Mary Mackie; Dumford-Slater, Commancto, pp. 105-6; Transcript 
of interview of Geoffrey Osmond, No.3 Commando', pp. 16-65, c.1977, for T. Macartney- 
Filgale 1979 CBC production, 'Dieppe 1942', DHist 79/567/86.
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opened up with a MG, wounding Capt. Wilis. Ranger 2Lt Edwin V. Loustalot 
reached the top, and was killed trying to silence it, the first American casualty 
on land in Europe during the war. Finally, the MG was captured single- 
handedly by Corporal Halls. Corporal A.W. 'Mick' Taylor recalls, 'Under 
constant fire we reached the top of the cliffs to be confronted by nests of 
machine-gunners and, further on, pillboxes... We silenced those'.^
Once out of the gorge, the commandos fanned out and attempted to 
head for their objectives. They quickly came under intense German fire and 
were only able to advance a short way into Petit Bemeval, before having to 
go to ground or take cover in the various houses. With this group was the 
Phantom detachment, under Lt Michael Hillems, with CpI J. Masterton, L/CpI 
Craggs and Driver (Drv) Richardson. They had tried to set up their radio on 
landing but the fire was too intense. At 0645, though, when about two 
hundred yards inland, they were able to set up station. The Phantom patrol 
attached to No.4 Commando was heard passing messages and UCpI 
Craggs, recounts CpI Masterton, 'tried to get through, and thought he had 
finally passed a message which stated how hard pressed we were'. But 
Major Astor, on Caipe, never received it, and never knew that Hillems patrol 
had landed. Masterton recalls moving further inland, with a improvised 
commando HQ that had been formed, until they were in sight of the German 
battery. At this point, they started to receive MG and small arms fire, which 
they replied to with their own weapons. Meanwhile, Craggs was trying to get
^  James J. Altierl, The First Ranger Battalion in Britain', In Darby's Rangers: an Illustrated 
portrayal of the original Rangers ^ o r td  War II) In training and In action (Duitiam, North Carolina; 
Seeman, 1945), p.29 (Loustalotj; another Ranger, Sgt John J. Knapp, was previously 
wounded In the convoy fight atxiard SOB 5, see Marcel Q. Swank to Brereton Qreenhous, 
'List of men on Dieppe raid', cover letter, 28 January 1979, DHIst 79/139; Ashton W . 'Mick' 
Taylor, No.3 Commando, to T. Macartney-Filgate, 'A personal account of the Dieppe raid, 19 
August 1942', 15 December 1977, TMFDC.
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through on the radio. Soon the frequency changed and before he could 
make contact on this new frequency, the order was received to withdraw. 
Masterton recounts that, 'smoke bombs were put down to give us some 
cover as we made a dash for the gully we had come up.' While returning, 
they were opened up on by a MG which killed Graggs, and wounded 
Richardson and Masterton. Taking cover in a garden, Hillerns tore up the 
code books and ordered Masterton to destroy the radio. They then headed 
back to the gorge.se
Arriving on the same LCP as the Phantom detachment, were five of 
the fifteen French detachment of No. 10 (lA) Commando. Before the 
operation, the majority had chosen not to wear the prescribed British battle 
dress and steel helmet, instead donning their own blue, serge Marine 
uniforms, berets with distinctive red pom-pom, and retaining their 'France' 
shoulder insignia. Attached to No.3 Commando were Sgt Raymond de 
Wandelaer, Sgt Serge Montailler, CpI Maurice César, CpI Georges Ropert 
and CpI Jean Errard. They also made it up the cliffs, although were forced to 
retreat with the rest of No.3 Commando in the face of a concentrated German 
counter-attack. During this action Sgt Montailler was wounded and captured. 
César was also later captured on the beach. Previously, he had stripped off 
his French uniform and thrown away his beret in fear of being shot as a Free 
French commando. This probably saved his life, according to two historians, 
for when the Germans captured Montailler, on seeing his uniform, beret.
^  This account Is based the lollowing primary source, which the subsequent secondary works 
seem to be entirely based on, CpI. J. Masterton, 'Dieppe operation, 19 August 1942', c.1945 
(written after repatriation), TMFDC; Warner, Phantom, pp.57-8; Hill, Phantom was there, p.79; 
Major J.J. Astor, Dieppe -  August 1942', 4 September 1942, p.1. Appendix C, QHQ Liaison 
Regiment, War Diary, PRO, WO 215/16 [Astor].
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'France' and 'Commando' insignia, summarily executed him. The other three 
successfully returned to Britain.^^
One hour after the initial commando landings, the Germans 
responded to the request by 2 Tp, 770 Bty for reinforcements, by forming the 
'Blücher Battle Group', under Major von Blücher, OC 302 reserve Anti-tank 
and Reconnaissance Unit. He was put in command of all troops in the 
Bemeval area and ordered to clear the area of the enemy. His battle group 
consisted of 3 Coy/302 Engineer Bn, hastily put into lorries, 302 Cyclist 
Squadron, and 11 light AA Combat Detachment. He deployed his units and 
counter-attacked the commandos at 0845 in Petit Bemeval. A second 
counter-thrust by 3 Coy/570 IR came from the south-east towards the village. 
Within thirty-five minutes the commandos, running low on ammunition and 
talking heavy casualties, were forced to withdraw to Yellow I. Lt Druce's 
section was the last down the gorge, and he recalls, the 'not very funny' 
experience of, being shot at by his own men, who could not see his section 
very well through the thick barbed wire, and mistook them for Germans.^
^  Although the Detailed Military Pian does not indicate it, other contemporary records, and 
post-war information from veterans, show that five members of 1 Troop (French), No. 10 (lA) 
Commando also were attached to No.3 Commando and may have been included In the 360 
total. Lt-Col John Durnford-Slater, 'Official account -  Operation Plodder/, 22 August 1942, 
p.1, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D49); Maurice Chauvet (Intelligence Section, No.4 
Commando), 'Operation Jubilee, Dieppe 19 Août 1942', in D-Day Le B.F.M. Commando, 
(Paris: Amicale des Ancien Parachutistes SAS & Commando, nd.), p.6; a summary of the unit 
is Maurice Chauvet, 'La 1ère Compagnie de Fusiller Marin Commando à Dieppe', nd., pp.5-7, 
TMFDC; Cpl. J. Masterton, 'Dieppe operation, 19 August 1942', c.1945, TMFDC [LCP];
No. 10 Inter-Allied (IA) Commando War Diary, 19 August 1942, PRO, WO 218/40 [last names, 
ranks, uniforms]; M. Chauvet to Alain Buriot (President, Association Jubllée), 5 February 
1992, [list of raid participants with full names, ranks], A. Buriot Dieppe Collection (ABDC); 
Dear, Ten Commando, p.23 [pom-pom, executed, César], the source Dear uses concerning 
Césars capture is, 'Report by Leading Seaman Maurice César, 5 May 1943, Paris, Chateaû de 
Vincennes, Service Historique de la Marine, TT Ibis; Rear-Adm. Adolphe Lepotier claims that 
César found Montaillers grave in Dieppe In 1950, and was told he had been shot while trying 
to escape, Raiders from the sea (London: William Kimber, 1954), p.128.
^  Lt-Qen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 
1942', In The history of the 302, ed. Emil Kllgast, pp.64-6 [Blücher]; Taylor to Macartney- 
Filgate, 'A personal account of the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942', 15 December 1977, TMFDC
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Earlier, at 0615, the Naval Beach and Signals Parties had signalled 
the waiting LCPs to evacuate them, as they had had no communication with 
the commandos, and feared the worst. Although the official COHQ account 
states no commandos were evacuated from Yellow I, two probably were. 
These were UCpI Sinclair, who apparently swam out to a LCP, and CpI 
'Mick' Taylor, who claimed to have reached a LCP and returned to England 
'at mid-day'. More LCPs were sent at 0950 to attempt evacuation but they 
mistakenly navigated to the wrong beach, and instead picked up survivors 
off Blue beach. Back on Yellow I beach, Masterton states they were being 
sniped at from the cliffs, and as no LCPs were at the beach to take them off, 
took refuge in a cave with about twenty commandos, including Lt Druce.
Both he and Masterton recall that Capt. Hlllems attempted to swim out to a 
drifting LCP, with the intention of bringing it in, but was shot in the attempt. By 
1000 the Germans were on the beach and advancing down it taking 
prisoners. Having no more ammunition, the senior officer in the cave ordered 
the men to break their weapons and surrender. The commandos surrounded 
on Hill 101 had also previously surrendered. The Germans state two officers 
and eighty ORs were taken PoW, some of which were wounded presumably. 
No definite figures are available on the exact casualties but it seems that 
approximately one-third were killed-in-action (KIA). The RN also lost three 
LCPs and had seven crew killed, eight wounded, and one missing.^
[low ammunition, casualties]; Len Druce, Dieppe raid tour, August 1995', audio recording, 
MMDC ['not very funny'].
Hughes-Hailetl, 'Extract of report by Commander D.B. Wyburd', Appendix 7 to Enclosure 
13, p.49 [0615], p.50 [0950], p.51 [LCPs lost], 'Casualties to Naval Personnel', Appendix A to 
Enclosure 11, p.2. In Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', In 30 August 
1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D48); COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.14 [no commandos 
evacuated]; Dumford-Slater, Commando, p.106 [Sinclair]; Taylor to Macartney-Filgate, 'A 
personal account of the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942', 15 December 1977, TMFDC ['mid­
day']; J. Masterlon, Dieppe operation, 19 August 1942', c.1945, TMFDC; Len Druce, 'Dieppe
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Of the seven LCPs to land at the Yellow beaches, only one landed at 
Yellow II. This was LCP(L) 15 carrying Yeilow Beach Master Sub-Lt Lewis, 
commanded by Lt A.T. Buckee. During the convoy encounter, they had found 
themselves alone and, remarkably, unscathed. Buckee, and the senior 
commando officer aboard. Major Peter Young, 2ic No.3 Commando, 
conferred and decided to proceed, according to orders, to Yellow II. Expert 
navigation by Buckee led the LCP to the correct beach, although Young was 
initially sceptical. At 0445, five minutes early, Buckee beached at high tide, 
about fifty yards to the west of the single gully, to avoid any MG posts that 
could be there. All the commandos disembarked and quickly crossed to 
base of the one hundred-foot high cliffs. The stony beach was approximately 
100 yards long, and twenty yards wide at the time of landing. Lewis stayed 
on board as there were not enough commandos to form a beach party. The 
LCP withdrew and waited offshore, sometimes hidden in a smoke screen, 
and at other times shot at from the cliffs.“
Major Young had with him two officers. Captain John J. Selwyn, and 
Lt Anthony F. 'Buck' Ruxton, and seventeen ORs, consisting of Selwyn's HQ, 
part of Young's, and two mortar detachments. At this point they had not been 
fired upon and appeared to have landed unnoticed. Pte P.R. Dodd, HQ 3 
Troop, part of the 3in mortar detachment, recalis, 'The only funny part about
raid tour, August 1995', audio recording, MMOC; Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British 
attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in The history of the 302, ed. Emil Kllgast, 
CWM. p.66 [1000, Hill 101]; 81 Army Corps Headquarters, 'Combat report and experiences 
gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, SHAEF 
translation, 24 February 1944, MAC, RQ 24/20438/981.023 (DIO), p.6 [PoW].
“  Sub-Lt D.J. Lewis, 'Report written by Sub-Lt D.J. Lewis, RCNVR, and given to Major Charles 
Stacey, GSO 2 (History), CMHQ', 24 August 1942, DHIst 594.019 (D4), p.2 [conferred, 0445], 
p.3 [Lewis/LCP actions]; Maj. Peter Young, 'Operation Floddert, nd. (about 22 August 1942), 
p.1, PRO, DEFE 2/337 [conferred]; Hughes-Hallett, 'Navigational data'. Appendix C to JN01, 
pp.9-10, in Naval Operation Order No.t [Operation Jubilee]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 
24/10872/23202 (D47) [terrain].
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the whole operation', was after being squashed together on the LCP during
the whole trip over, 'the sight of all our men lining up at the foot of the cliffs
urinating, before taking on the German army'.®^
A delay occurred at the barbed wire blocking the gorge to the tops of
the cliffs because of the lack of proper breaching equipment. Young set the
example of pulling himself up the sides of it using the wire and iron stakes
holding it. Toggle ropes were put together and used over the most difficult
part. The whole group was up after forty-five minutes, including the No. 18
wireless set, but having left the heavy 3in mortar behind. During this climb, a
commando observed the five LCPS heading onto Yellow I. Young
assembled his group in a wood inland and gave them a pep talk. After which
d
he split them into three sections, each under an officer. He hope^to go into 
Bemeval and meet up with the commandos from Yellow I.
Advancing to the rear of the battery into the town, they moved through finally 
coming to a church, at which point they were fired upon. They returned the 
fire and then Young chose to advance on the battery through an orchard to 
the North-west of the Battery. After coming under fire here, he moved his 
men out into some cornfields beyond. From this position some of his men 
were only two hundred yards from the guns and began a steady harassing 
fire for about an hour and a half. This prevented the guns from firing at the 
main anchorage off Dieppe. A German artillery after-action report records 
that from 0510 until 745 the battery did not fire out to sea at all. At 0610, the
®^ The account of the commandos' actions on Yellow II is based on the only contemporary 
record to survive, and as such, was the basis for are all the later official arKf secondary 
accounts, Maj. Peter Young, 'Operation Floddert, nd. (about 22 August 1942), p.1, PRO, 
DEPE 2/337; Young expands on this account In his memoir of the war, 'Dieppe', In Storm from 
the sea (2 revised edn., London; Lionel Leventhal Ltd., 1958, 1989), pp.80-9; P.R. Dodd to 
T. Laurel Crosby, CBC, 'Dieppe raid landing, 19 August 1942', January 1978, OHIst 
79/256/27 ['funny part').
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frustrated gunners did turn one of their guns around and fire four rounds over 
open sights at the commandos, which landed harmlessly inland. Stacey 
makes the point that the battery was neutralized for a period of at least two 
and a half hours, during a critical phase of the landing [see Map 6].^
Young, having realized that ammunition was becoming short and 
expecting to be counter-attacked in force at any time, sent Selwyn back to 
form a bridgehead. He was to signal with three white Very lights if a LCP was 
there to take them off. On seeing this signal. Young began his withdrawal 
and on nearing the gully, exchanged fire with the Bty observation post on the 
cliff edge. As the men retreated down the defile, one man was wounded by a 
mine. The Sin mortar detachment fired off all its HE (high explosive) rounds 
at the battery, before wading out to Lt Buckee's LCP, which had come in. The 
Germans were now on the cliffs firing at the LCP and men on the beaches. 
ML 346 covered the LCP using all its guns on the cliffs. Young and Ruxton 
were the last two to go down the cleft, making a fighting withdrawal. The LCP 
was now moving out and they and one other commando were towed out 
holding to lifelines, scrambling aboard about three hundred yards out. The 
time was 0810. Remarkably, all the men landed had been successfully 
withdrawn. The commandos transferred to the ML 346 and both craft headed 
back to England. Hughes-Hallett, in his post-raid report, stated that the 
actions of Major Young and his men, averted 'the exceedingly serious 
consequences which might have resulted from the failure of the Yellow 
Beach landings. In my judgement this was perhaps the most outstanding
^  Dumford-Slater, Dieppe', p.93 [map]; see also Peter Young, ‘Attack on a German Battery 
(Goebbels) near Berneval', hand-drawn map, nd., NAM, PYP, 9010/31/716; arid; Lt-Qen. 
Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in 
The history of the 302, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM, p.64 (0610); Stacey, Six years of war, p.361,
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incident of the operation'. Both Young and Buckee were decorated for their 
actions with the Distinguished Service Order (DSO).“
FLANK ATTACK II: VARENGEVILLE (ORANGE BEACHES) 
OPERATION CAULDRON -  N0.4 COMMANDO
On the western flank of Jubilee was Group 1, under command of Lt- 
Cmdr H.H.H. Mulleneux, Senior Officer Landings, Orange Beach, and 
consisting of the LSI (Small) HMS Prince Albert, carrying Lord Lovat's No.4 
Commando, and the escorts MGB 312 and SGB 9. The LSI reached the 
lowering position 'SS' on time and, according to plan, lowered its LCAs, 
which formed into two divisions in line ahead columns, and proceeded 
towards the coast. MGB 312 was In the lead navigating with its GEE/QH 
receiver, escorted by an LCS and SGB 9. At 0350, Mulleneux states, 'three 
darkened vessels' were spotted off the port bow, moving up the Channel 
from west to east. Concerned that these were probably a German convoy, he 
thought 'it prudent to evade rather than investigate more closely', and 
therefore altered the flotilla's course 'drastically to starboard In order to pass 
well clear and astern of the suspicious vessels'. No navigational difficulties 
were experienced, and the flotilla was able to get a fix on the lights of the 
Pointe d'Ailley light house and Dieppe breakwaters. While approaching the 
shore, one white Very signal light was fired from near the light house.
Lt Alex D. Fear, Report of Commanding Officer of ML 346 on Dieppe rald-Yellow beach 
landing', 21 August 1942, pp.2-3, TMFDC; Sub-Lt D.J. Lewis, 'Report written by Sub-Lt D.J. 
Lewis, RCNVR, and given to Major Charles Stacey, QSO 2 (History), CMHQ', 24 August 1942, 
DHist 594.019 (D4), p.4 [ilfeiines]; Hughes-Haiiett wrote iater, 'I have iittie doubt that the failure 
of the coast defence battery at Bemeval to play an effective part in the operation was largely 
due to the action of Major Young', in 'Naval Force Commander's narrative'. Enclosure No.1 to 
No. NFJ 0221/92, Covering letter to report on Operation Jubilee, NFJ.0221/92', 30 August 
1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D48), p.1 ['outstanding incident']; Stacey, Six years of war, 
p.361 [DSO],
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followed by a green one from the eastern end of Orange II beach. The first 
close support fighters passed low over head at this time, which probably 
occupied the Germans attention, as all the LCAs landed unopposed at zero 
hour. Only after they returned to MGB 312 to ferry in more troops and stores, 
did the Germans open fire. After all troops were ashore, the landing craft and 
LCS then withdrew to a quiet place, about fifty yards off Orange I, where they 
were not being fired at. Here they waited for the reembarkation signal.^
Like at Bemeval, the German 813 Army Coastal Artillery Battery at 
Varengeville, consisting of six heavy guns, also formed an independent 
Stützpunkt, although it was scheduled to be moved to within the Dieppe 
defensive zone. The area around the Phare d'Ailly lighthouse, the highest 
point on the coast in the Dieppe area, was designated a 'Resistance nest', or 
defensive position, made up of the Naval Signal Station and Special 
Equipment Unit (radar). Aircraft Reporting Detachment of the 23 (Heavy) 
Aircraft Reporting Company, and 813 Bty OP, with a strength of seventy- 
seven men. On the heights between the River Saane and Ste. Marguerite 
was the Quiberville-East defensive position, made up of 3 Coy, 571 IR (less 
one platoon) and one Heavy MG section from 4 Coy, 571 IR. The area was 
protected by 'all-round obstacles and field-type combat installations'. As at 
Bemeval, the lack of men meant that the stretch of coast between Pourvllle
^  At 0430 the flotilla spilt Into two groups, LCAs 2, 4 ,6 , escorted by MOB 312, proceeded 
into Orange I (Vasterival), while LCAs 3, S, 7, 8, escorted by SGB 9 and the LCS, proceeded 
to Orange II (Quibervllle). Hughes-Hallett, 'List of Ships, Groups and Senior Officers', 
Appendix A to JN01, p.1, in 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation Jubilee]', 31 July 1942, 
NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47) [Group 1 craft): the account of the approach and landing Is 
based almost entirely on Hughes-Hallett, 'Extract of report by Lt-CnKfr H.H.H. Mulleneux', 
Appendix 4 to Enclosure 13, pp.1-2, and 'Operation Jubilee -  Detailed narrative', Enclosure 
3, pp.S-6, in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 
24/10872/232C2 (D48).
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and Quiben/ille-East, with the exception of some of the wire-blocked gullies, 
was only protected by night patrolling.^
Lord Lovat's orders were to destroy the Army coastal Defence Battery 
'with all possible speed'. Besides the six guns, the Battery area also 
included AA and MG defences, ammunition bunkers, and billets. All 
objectives had code-names, such as Pigeon for the guns themselves, and 
Hess for the Battery area (see Maps 2 and 7). Lovat split his Commando into 
two groups to land on Orange I and II. Group 1, under the 2ic, Major Derek 
Mills-Roberts, consisted of Group 1 HQ, C Troop, 3in mortar detachment, the 
PBM and the two SSR signallers, a total of seventy-one all ranks. After 
establishing a bridgehead on Orange I, reinforcements of approximately ten 
men, the remainder of the Beach and Naval signals Party, and the Phantom 
detachment, would be ferried in. Group 1 possibly totalled ninety-one men, 
although an official account gives a figure of eighty-eight. Group 2, under 
Lord Lovat, consisting of the remainder of No.4 Commando, made up of 
Cauldron Force HQ, A, B, and F Troops, landed on Orange II. Lovat's simple 
plan was to have Group 1 engage the battery positions from the front with 
mortars, LMG and small arms fire, while Group 2 would make a wide sweep 
to a position behind the Battery, and on a prearranged signal, assault the
The battery comprising six 150mm (5.9in) K16 Krupp guns, two 20mm Fiak guns, one on a 
two-story piatform, and one tank gun', with a strength of between 93 and 112 men, Lt-Gen. 
Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in 
The history of the 302, ed. Emii Kiigast, CWM, pp.54-7; Fieid Marshai Gerd von Rundstedt, 
'Report of the C-in-C West on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, 
transiated by Historicai Section (GS), Army HQ, Ottawa, November 1946, p.19, PRO, NAC RG 
24/20429/981,013(D6), [112 men]. The beach at Orange I was about seventy yards iong and 
twenty yards wide at high tide, with two ciefts ieading up to cliffs covered with thick vegetation. 
At Orange II, It was about nine hundred yards long and approximately twenty yards wide at 
high tide, and led straight onto the coast road Quibervllle -  Ste. Marguerite, Hughes-Hallett, 
'Navigational data', Appendix C to JN 01, p.6, 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation 
Jubilee]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47), [beach lengths]; Lt A.D.C. Smith, 
'Report by Lt A.D.C. Smith, IntelllgerKe Officer, No.4 Commando, on Dieppe -  Area 
Varengeville', 26 August 1942, p. 1, PRO, DEFE 2/550 [beach widths].
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Battery from behind (see Map 7). He also had two contingency plans, in case 
any, or all, the LCAs were late. The first involved Group 2 moving past the 
town of Ste. Marguerite to attack the battery's flank and rear, while the 
second entailed all of Group 2 landing at Orange I for a direct attack.^
The dress to be worn by all commandos was to be 'Skeleton Order' -  
belt and cross braces, basic pouches, denim slacks, cardigans, specially 
designed rubber soled boots and stocking caps. The four US Rangers chose 
to wear their own American uniforms and rank insignia. Sgt Szima relates
^  Cauldron Force totalled 278 personnel, consisting of about 257 men of No.4 Commando, 
the PBM Party of 3 men, a Naval Signals Party of 5 men, 2 SSR battalion signallers, a Phantom 
detachment of 3 men, 4 US Rangers, 3 Frenchmen of 1 Troop, No.to (lA) Commando and the 
noted correspondent of the London Times, Alexander B. Austin. The records do not agree 
on the exact numbers of each unit, especially concerning the commandos and naval 
personnel. The Detailed Military Plan, appears to be very inaccurate in this respect. Therefore 
a comparison of several contemporary records, confirmed by post-war sources, gives the 
closest estimate possible. The numbers for the Rangers, No. 10 (lA) Commandos, SSR and 
Phantom are definite. Only one pre-raid contemporary record exists concerning operational 
planning and arrangements tor Cauldron, Lt-Col Lord Lovat, 'Operation Order No.t:
Cauldrorf, 14 August 1942, [p.t -  250 commandos plus 7 'attached allied'; confirmed by 
Appendix B -  247 commandos, 2 SSR, 4 'Americans', 3 'Allies', 1 press: but p.5 notes a 
separate MGB detachment -  13 commandos, 3 Phantom, 3 PBM; p.6 confirms 3 Phantom 
and 2 SSR], NAC, RG 24/13747/Serial 152/GS8; Sir Martin Lindsay, 'Destruction of a German 
Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe raid'. Notes from Theatres of War, No.t 1, 
London: War Office, February 1943, pp.7 [Group 1 -  eighty-eight men], pp.8-10, EJDC; see 
also his post-war account, 'The battery', British Army Review 50 (August 1975), 30-1 [Map 7]; 
Mann, 'Movements arrangements to ports of embarkation', 12 August 1942, Appendix C-Patl 
2, Table E, in 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 
24/10871/23202 (D25) [225 commandos, 5 Naval Signals, 3 PBM, 5 US Army, 3 Phantom, 3 
RCCS, 1 press); No.4 Commando, War Dairy, 12 August 1942 [3 Phantom], 17 Augusi 1942 
[3 French, 2 SSR], PRO, WO 218/35; No. 10 (lA) Commando. War Diary, 19 August 1942, 
PRO, WO 218/40 [3 French]; Capt. A.R.M. Sedgwick, 'Report by Capt. Sedgwick, Phantom 
atlached to No.4 Commando', 20 August 1942, Appendix C-Annex 3, p.1, to GHQ Liaison 
Regiment, War Diary, PRO 215/16 [3 Phantom]; Ranger, French, SSR, and Phantom 
commando statistics and names are confirmed by post-war sources, most important of which Is 
the nominal role prepared by Emyr W. Jones, 'Operation Cauldrorr. No.4 Commando attack on 
the Hess Battery Varengeville, Wednesday 19 August 1942', July 1990, E.W. Jones Dieppe 
Collection (EJDC). Dunning states these varied statistics reflect;
(h* log  or w ar -  and a lto how m hasty praparalona. vtrtM l ordsn. dscWons. tvan bslort opsratlons. oftsn raault 
In poor -  tvsn  abaant -  rapoda. Lovaf alao cut down Na numbaia to tha bars mtnkriuin lor ths lob. This altowad 
Nm to asisct oniy toa' crsarrV arto alao It mads chaps train avan haidar lor Isar ol bsing M l ouf o l Iho party*. Ha 
also was abla to draft soma rsally usslul aupar shota/markaman and dsmoWlonlats Irom D E Troops, who wars 
basically M l out o l battis' (LOB). Into A. B. C. and F Troops.
J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, Comments on draft Chapter 5 ,4  July 1996. The probability of last 
minute changes is confirrned by the fact that two Officers and seven Other Ranks stated in the 
Cauldron Operation Order, did not participate. Evidence for this Is from verbal testimony of 
surviving commandos carried out by Gordon Hurley and Emyr Jones, E.W. Jones to H. Henry, 
3 July 1996.
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that, 'So it was that I was able to substitute fear with audacity, my only 
weapon to match the coolness of the seasoned British Commandos whom 
we had come to respect so much'. No rations, steel helmets, or water bottles 
were to be carried to cut down on weight. Therefore the commandos, in the 
words of Dunning, were able to 'go "split-asse", that is at full speed -  a nice 
steady double -  it also enabled us to carry just that little bit extra ammunition, 
explosives. Bangalore [torpedoes] etc.'. This is in contrast to No.3 
Commando who carried the latter two items. Faces and hands were to be 
camouflaged brown, while those of snipers were to be green. Snipers were 
also to use camouflage nets and telescopic sights on their rifle. The exact 
weapon and amount of ammunition to be carried per man was more than 
usual and specified for each man. Six men each of F and B troop were to 
carry specially made-up demolition charges and detonators to blow the 
guns. Bangalore torpedoes for blowing gaps in barbed wire, a roll of rabbit 
netting for crossing it, and wire-cutters were carried in the majority of LCAs. 
The signals set up was similar to that of No.3 Commando. Concerning 
PoWs, none were to be taken during the hours of darkness, although after 
daylight PoWs were to be taken, and 'securely tied by their thumbs with fish­
line in the best Japanese tradition'.^^
^  Lord Lovat, 'Operation Order No.1: Cauldron/, 14 August 1942, p.6, NAC, RQ 
24/13747/Serial 152/GS8, ['securely tied']; Szima recalls that their decision to wear US 
uniforms came after hearing a speech on the 18 August, on board ship prior to leaving, In 
which Mountbatten ended by exclaiming. Tomorrow we deal the Hun a bloody blow... we 
expect over 60 per cent casualties, and to those of you that will die tomorrow, may Qod have 
mercy on your souls', Alex J. Szima to AmVETS Post #72, 30 January 1976, TMFDC; Lt-Col 
John F. Dumford-Slater, 'Administrative Instructions', Appendix B, to 'Operation Flodderr. 
No.3 Commando Operation Order No.V, 14 August 1942, NAM, PYP, 9010/317725 [No.3 
Commando]; Special Sen/lce Brigade, 'Some points and lessons from operations Jubilee as 
carried out by No.4 Commando on 19 August 1942', 28 August 1942, NAM, PYP, 
9010/31/725 [green camouflage]; J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, letter and comments on draft 
Chapter 5, 4 July 1996 ['split-asse'].
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Group 1 landed, according to Mills-Roberts, at 0430, and the leading 
sub-section of C Troop, under Lt David C.W. Style, quickly went off to 
reconnoitre the left-hand gully, soon reporting back that it was hopelessly 
filled with wire and thus impassabie. The right-hand gully was therefore 
chosen and two Bangalore torpedoes were needed to blow a suitable gap, 
fortunately about the same time a strike of aircraft went over and this together 
with heavy firing further aiong the coast masked the explosions. Once at the 
top, a bridgehead was established by a Sub-Section of C Troop whilst the 
rest moved with all speed to the wood in front of the battery. Meanwhile 
searches were made of the deserted houses and enquiries made at the 
occupied houses by two of the French commandos, CpIs Rene Taverne and 
Raymond Rabouhans attached to A Troop. They gained valuable information 
about German unit dispositions from the locai inhabitants. Later Rabouhans 
advanced with Mills-Roberts party and he took up a firing position in the area 
of a bam which had a good view of the battery. During the withdrawal to the 
bridgehead, travelling in singie fiie, he was the last in the group and recalls 
always looking nervously over his shoulder in case they were being 
outflanked. For their part in the operation they were decorated with the Croix 
de Guerre avec étoile.^
The records are not clear on the disposition of the third French 
Commando, Sgt. Francois Balloche. Three primary sources refer to him. An 
amendment to the Operation Order's landing craft composition refers to him
"  Major Derek Mills-Roberts, 'Report on the landing by Major D. Mills-Roberts', 20 August 
t942, p.t [0453], PRO, DEFE 2/337; Maurice Chauvet, 'Fondation de la 1ère Cie Fusilier 
Marin Commando (Troop t)/Operatlon Jubilee, Dieppe t9  Août 1942', in D-Day Le B.F.M. 
Commando (Paris; Amicale des Ancien Parachutistes SAS & Commando, nd.), p.6 [Croix de 
Querre); E.W. Jones to H. Henry, 3 July t996 [Rabouhans actions); Dear, Ten Commando, 
p.24 [decorated].
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as '1 Ally', probably as a cover, assigned to Advance Force HQ, A Troop, 
under Lt A.F.S. Veasey, in LCA 3, scheduled to land at Orange II. An after­
action report by Capt. B.W.S. 'Bill' Boucher-Myers, states that his HQ A 
Troop, plus another section of A, landed in the second flight at Orange I, and 
'included three of the French Fighting Forces'. The third reference to him is a 
citation by Lord Lovat for the Military Medal, later awarded to him by 
Mountbatten, which stated that 'He was attached to one of my Troops and 
played a conspicuous part in the searching and occupation of the village of 
Le Haut'.®9
The secondary sources also describe Balloche's story somewhat 
differently. Dear not only recounts that 'Balloche and Mills-Roberts led C 
Troop off the [Orange I] beach while Rabouhans and Taverne became part of 
a defensive perimeter', but that Balloche's took part in the final assault on the 
battery. One of Dear's sources is Adolphe Lepotier, Raiders from the sea 
(1954), who claims to have interviewed Balloche. Lepotier has him 
'accompanying' Mills-Roberts from Orange I, 'participating in the final attack' 
on the battery and finally, 'arrived among the first' on the battery's parapets. 
This appears inaccurate since none of Group 1 or Lt Veasey's 1 Section, A 
Troop, of Group 2, took part in the final hand-to-hand combat to capture the 
guns.^
Lovat's citation continued that 'He proved of great assistance to the Troop leader [most 
likely Capt. Boucher-Myers], who could not speak French, and having gained the infomnation 
required, he subsequently went Into action, and with the rest of the Troop, Inflicted heavy 
casualties on the enemy*, Dear, Ten Commando, p.24 (citation); 'Operation Order No.1: 
Cauldrort, 14 August 1942, Appendix B -  Amendment, NAC, RQ 24/13747/Serlal 152/QS8, 
(Orange II, LCA 3, A Troop -  Lt Veasey, '1 Ally']; Capt. B. Boucher-Myers, 'Report on A Tp. 
Orange Beach I', 21 August 1942, NAM, PYP, 9010/31/725].
^  Lepotier also writes that Balloche claims he received a Mentioned In Dispatches for having 
carried a 'British comrade on his back across the beach sprayed by bullets and into the water 
as far as the assault craft'. He explains about a French-Canadlan volunteer [SSR7] who 
refused to embark, because he wanted to stay 'to fight for France' (p.134). No supporting
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While Mills-Roberts, his HQ, and the rest of C Troop, proceeded at the 
double towards the battery, Lt E.L.K.A. Carr, moved east with a fighting 
patrol, to find and cut the telephone cable between the observation post 
(OP), in the light house area, and the battery. Cutting this in two places by 
0600, he then moved south towards the double cross-roads near the village 
of Le Haut, east of the village of Ste. Marguerite, rendezvousing with A 
Troop, under Capt. Boucher-Myers. Here they took up defensive positions to 
block any move towards the battery by the German troops known to be in 
Ste. Marguerite.^1
By 0540 Mills-Robetls Troops were all in their assault positions, his 
Bren gunners and snipers in well concealed in scrub, a house and a bam, 
some not more than a hundred yards from the battery, while his mortar OP 
had a buzzer line going back to the mortar position. The men were so close 
that they could here the commands for the guns to fire and also could see a 
German in what appeared to be a cook's uniform and tall hat -  evidence that 
the Battery was unaware of the commandos' presence. Two US Rangers,
Sgt Szima and CpI Franklin M. 'Zip' Koons, acted as snipers, the latter 
becoming the first American soldier to kill a German in the war. For his 
actions Mountbatten later awarded him the Military Medal. Back on the 
beach, the Phantom patrol had left the MGB at 0525 and headed towards the 
beach under fire. On touching down, Capt. Alister R.M. Sedgwick, sent 
Fusilier C. King off to guard the left flank against any infiltration and ordered 
Tpr B. Randall to set up station and open up the W/T set. Sedgwick recalls.
evidence has been found for these claims. Lepotier, Raiders from the sea, pp.131-4; Dear, 
Ten Commando, pp.24-5.
Capt. R.W.P. Dawson, 'Report on C Troop during Operation Cauldrorf, 21 August 1942, 
PRO, DEFE 2/40 [0600 cable cut).
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This was operated from inside a small portable wigwam which was 
somewhat akin to an Eskimo's igloo with an entrance tunnel which 
accommodated the set and the head and shoulders of the operator who was 
thereby screened from any outside noise or disturbance'. At 0609 he 
informed Caipe and Portsmouth of the successful landing. Sedgwick kept in 
touch with the Commando Troops using W/T and runners, and relayed 
messages for the whole time the Commando was ashore, and after, while 
aboard ship during the return journey.^
Before Phantom had landed the battery had already opened fire, and 
therefore Mills-Roberts ordered his men to engage. The accurate Bren and 
sniper fire quickly silenc^three of the four heavy MG positions in front of the 
battery. Later the 2in mortar, under direction of Troop Sergeant-Major (TSM) 
Jimmy Dunning, opened fire. His first shot fell short but his third one, landed 
in the area of No.1 gun causing a huge explosion and fire. The battery did 
not fire again. Men attempted to fight the flames but were quickly shot by the 
snipers and Brens, allowing the flames to spread to the other cordite dumps, 
causing them to explode. The time was 0607. Harassing fire was kept up, 
while contact was received from Group 2, who were now in position. At 0625, 
just before zero hour for Group 2's attack, Mills-Roberts ordered smoke fired 
from both mortars on Hess. At this time the pre-arranged air attack.
^  Lindsay, The battery', 32 [cook]; 'Report of Sergeant Szinrta, 1 Section, 2 Platoon', and 
'Report of Corporal Koons, 2 Section, 2 Platoon', nd., US National Archives, EJDC [possibly 
from 'Report of Dieppe Operation', 1 Ranger Battalion, 29 August 1942, USMA Microfilm 
MP63-8/1): Recommendation for Military Modal, CpI F.M. Koons, nd., EJDC [first American to 
kill Gorman); confirmed by James J. Altlorl, The First Ranger Battalion In Britain', In Darby's 
Rangers: an illustrated portrayal of the original Rangers (World War II) In training and In action 
(Durham, North Carolina: Seaman, 1945), p.30; Koons was later awarded the American Silver 
Star by Patton, Lt-Qon. George S. Patton to Koons, 16 May 1943, EJDC; Capt. A.R.M. 
Sedgwick, 'Report by Capt. Sedgwick, Phantom attached to No.4 Comrrtando', Appendix C, 
Annex 2, p.2, 20 August 1942, GHQ, Liaison Regiment, War Diary, PRO, WO 215/16 [0525, 
0609); Allster R.M. Sedgwick, 'Phantom's operation on Orange beach during the Dieppe raid, 
19 August 1942', audio recording by Emyr W, Jones, 30 October 1990, EJDC.
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previously referred to as masking Group 2's initial beach assault, came in 
and strafed the whole battery area. At 0630 Lovat's assault signal of three 
white Very lights went up. In the post-war period, disagreement rose over 
whether or not the huge explosion was from a mortar bomb or due to air 
attack. Mills-Roberts commented on this, explaining that the 2in mortar bomb 
was not a 'chance shot but a carefully aimed bomb fired by an expert... It 
had been expressly agreed with the RAF that no aircraft should be over the 
battery till 0630 precisely. No doubt the mortar bomb, which landed, so to 
speak, from the air (i.e. High trajectory) gave the Germans the impression 
that it was from an aircraft'.^
At 0445, the German Quiberville defensive position received the 
report, 'Enemy ships approaching the coast', from 813 Bty, presumably 
informed by its OP. The position went to action stations and five minutes 
later, opened fire on the landing craft unloading on Orange II. Lord Lovat 
states Group 2 landed on schedule, the first flight landing in V formation, 
under Lt A.F. Veasey. With him were the other two US Rangers, S/Sgt 
Kenneth D. Stempson and CpI William R. Brady. In his after-action report, 
Brady explained the landing procedure for the first Section ashore, 'the 1st 
man that landed had the Scaling Ladder (all three sections), 2nd man had 
Bangalore torpedoes, 3rd man was a scout, 4th man was a Platoon 
Sergeant and I was the fifth man with 6 grenades'. Veasey's Section quickly 
overcame the beach wire with rabbit netting (1m 20 wide), scaling the cliffs
^  Major Derek Mllls-Roberts, 'Report on the landing by Major D. Mllls-Roberts', 20 August 
1942, p.1 [0607], PRO, DEFE 2/337; Lindsay, 'The battery', 33 [0625]; Lindsay, 'Destruction 
of a German Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe raid', Notes from Theatres of War, 
No.11, London: War Office, February 1943, p. 12 [0630]; J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, 4 July 
1996 [third one hit No.1 gun]; Notes by Mllls-Robens on N orw ay-the Commandos -  Dieppe 
[1951] by C. Buckley', nd., DHIst 594.009 (D2), ['chance shot'].
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with the aid of tubular ladders. He quickly captured two pillboxes, both
unoccupied according to Sgt Stempson, but received minor casualties from
an unidentified MG. Lateral telephone wires were cut. The main landing
touched down a few minutes after the first wave, suffering casualties from a
German mortar, before they could get clear oi the beach. A minefield,
marked in French and German was bypassed and the force formed up to
advance along the River Saane. Lt Veasey section moved off towards the
double cross-roads to meet up with the rest of A Troop. Meanwhile, Lovat's
force moved at the double along the river about 1600 yards. At this point,
they turned inland and headed east towards the wood behind the Battery. At
the wood B and F troops divided, and Force HQ moved fonward to the edge
of an orchard near the Battery's perimeter wire. F Troop moved through the
orchard and surprised a large group of Germans in the village of Le Haut,
preparing to counter-attack C Troop. They were quickly killed. '^*
By 0625 both of the flank troops were in position and had Bangalores
under the wire ready to blow. Precisely at 0630 the air attack came in and
Lovat signalled that assault. According to Lovat;
B and F Troops then attacked with fixed bayonets; It was a stupendous charge which 
went in, in many cases over open ground swept by machine-gun fire, through a 
barbed wire entanglement, over running strong points and finally ending on the gun 
sites themselves, where all crews were bombed and bayoneted Into submission. F 
Troop who behaved magnificently suffered heavy casualties. All their officers were 
killed...Considerable numbers of Germans who had hidden In underground 
tunnels...and outbuildings, were either bayoneted or shot at close range by sub­
machine guns. Two officers including the Military Commander was also killed.^
Lord Lovat, Operation Cauldron. Report on Orange beach II landing by Lt-Col The Lord 
Lovat', 21 August 1942, pp.1-2, PRO, DEFE 2/337; Lt-Qen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the 
British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in The history of the 302, ed. Emil 
Kilgast, CWM, p.88 ['Enemy ships']; Report of Sergeant Stempson, 1 Section, 1 Platoon, 
Troop A', nd., and 'Report of Corporal Brady', nd„ ['1st man'], USNA, EJDC.
^  Lord Lovat, 'Operation Cauldron. Report on Orange beach II landing by Lt-Col The Lord 
Lovat', 21 August 1942, p.2, PRO, DEFE 2/337,
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The Germans, in the meantime had been taken by surprise, at 0650 
reporting to 770 CD Bty, 'Enemy has penetrated into Bty position... tank gun 
knocked out by direct hit. Five guns are put out of commission by the enemy 
with explosive and incendiary charges'. The report continued to explain that 
the Battery Comdr had tried to re-take the position with a fighting patrol from 
the Bty OP but was repulsed with severe casualties. At 0702 the last report 
sent out was, '813 involved in fierce close combat, Bty Com[mander] 
seriously wounded, Varengeville being attacked in force'; this also was the 
first report to reach 302 ID HQ about the plight of the Bty. It prompted an 
urgent telephone order to 1 Bn, 571 IR, to proceed towards the area from its 
position around Ouville-la-Rivi^re, and counter-attack it with a reinforced rifle 
Coy.76
Back on Orange I, the Times correspondent, Austin, arrived and 
informed Capt. Sedgwick of the destruction of the guns. By 0715 Sedgwick 
had duly sent the message: 'Pigeon demolished. Withdrawing 0700'. In the 
battery area B Troop proceeded to 'mop up', while F Troop destroyed the 
guns and ammunition stores. The commando dead were left, as were some 
of the more seriously wounded (a medical orderly, Pte Joe Pascale, 
volunteered to stay behind to attend to them and thereby became a 
prisoner), the other wounded were assisted or made their own way through 
Group 1 to the beaches to withdraw. These wounded included Capt. Pat 
Porteous who was carried on a make-shift stretcher (a door from the battery) 
by four PoWs. The withdrawal. In spite of harassing enemy fire, Dunning 
explains, 'was carried out in accordance with a well-rehearsed phased
^  Lt-Qen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 
1942', In The history of the 302, ed. Emil Kllgast, CWM, pp.90-91.
234
thinning-out covered by smoke from mortars and smoke generators taken 
ashore and sited [s/'c] in the bridgehead'. The reembarkation began at 0730 
and was completed by 0800. At 0855, Sedgwick sent the following message, 
'To CCO from OC No.4 Commando. Everyone of gun crews finished with 
bayonet. OK by you?'. Porteous was awarded the Victoria Cross for his part 
in Lovat's charge on the guns. In a post-war interview Porteous explained 
that the original VC citation, written by Lovat, was 'mislaid in the army chain 
of command' and it had to be written again from memory. This resulted in a 
description of his actions that Porteous regards as 'pure... imagination'. 
Unfortunately, the story was immediately seized upon by the newspapers 
and quickly put into print, being repeated in the official commando history 
and subsequent secondary sources.^
^  Capt. A.R.M. Sedgwick, 'Report by Capt. Sedgwick, Prianfom attached to No.4 
Commando', Appendix C, Annex 2, p.2, 20 August 1942, GHQ, Liaison Regiment, War Diary, 
PRO, W O  215/16, [0855]; Lt Brent Hutton-Wiliiams, 'Base Message Log', 21 August 1942, 
p^['P igeorf, 'OK by you?'], GHQ Liaison Regiment, War Diary, PRO, WO 215/16; J.E.
Dunning to H. Henry, 4 Juiy 1996, comments on Chapter 5 [describes withdrawal, R e  
Pascale]; Commando casualties were 2 officers and 14 ORs KIA, 3 officers and 17 ORs 
wounded (of these 20 wounded, 12 were back on duty within 2 months), and 9 PoW. All the 
men who became PoW, except for Pte Pascale, were wounded too seriously to move. All 
Phantom, French Commandos and Rangers returned. See Lindsay, 'The battery', p.35; Sir 
Martin Lindsay, 'Destruction of a German Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe raid'. 
Notes from Theatres of War, No.11 (London; War Office, February 1943), p.17; Jones lists the 
Roll of Honour, Including full names and rank, 'Operation Cauldron, EJDC. Although Lovat 
claimed to have killed the whole German crew, this is incorrect and German records reveal that 
of a crew that varied between 93 to 112 men, about 30 were KIA and 30 wounded -  a 
proportion, states Stacey, 'which reflects the use of the bayonet'. At the time Lovat was 
justified In reporting this, since from his perspective, no crew were seen alive, thus some were 
probably wounded, shaming death or hiding. Four men were also taken back to England. See 
81 Army Corps Headquarters, 'Combat report and experiences gained during the British 
attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, SHAEF translation, 24 February 1944, 
NAC, RQ 24 G3/20438/981.023 (DIO), pp.6-7, [German losses -  28 KIA, 29 wounded, 4 
PoW], p .19 [six 150mm guns]; Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 'Report of the C-in-C West 
on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, p.19, translated by Historical 
Section (QS), Army HQ, Ottawa, November 1946, PRO, NAC RQ 24/20429/981.013(06) [30 
KIA, 21 wounded, 10 missing]; Stacey, Six years of war, p.363 [about 30 KIA, 30 wounded, 4 
PoW]. Colonel P.A. Porteous, transcript of intenrlew by T. Macartnoy-Fllgate, c.1977, pp.10- 
13, DHist 79/567/92; Saunders, The green beret, p.94 [Porteous's exaggerated actions]; 
Dunning states that Porteous's comment was a typical over-modest, to the extent of self- 
denlgratlon tongue-in-cheek P ^ o u s  remark', Dunning to H. Henry, Comments on Chapter 
5 ,4  July 1996. *
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Although the contemporary and post-war, official and personal, Allied 
sources records show that all the six guns were destroyed, two German 
after-action reports indicate the contrary. At 0903, 81 Corps reported to GHQ, 
C-in-C West, 813 Tp had been recaptured and was 'again firing with two 
guns'. Maj.-Gen. Kurt von Zeitzler, CGS, GHQ West, went to Dieppe to gain 
some personal impressions of the course of the battle, and concerning 813 
Tp actions at 0910, he noted that the 'Guns still intact fired to the last'. Stacey 
believes that the first report is 'quite unsupported by other evidence and is 
probably an error' for two reasons. First, the Air Force Commander's report 
shows no air action against the battery at this time, and, second, the same 
German report states that 'six 150mm coastal defence guns' were lost, which 
was the battery's full complement. Stacey does not mention Zeitzler's report. 
The Admiralty Battle Summary argues that all of the six guns claimed 
destroyed did not have to belong to Hess. Two could have belonged to 
other batteries and may have been destroyed in air attacks. This 
supposition is possible, since other batteries had exactly the same type of 
gun and were under 81 Corps command. Although not a Jubilee objective 
and not in the Dieppe defensive zone, they were subjected to air bombing 
during the battle.^
^  Sources claiming a//guns destroyed are: COHQ, ‘Combined Report', p.16; Lindsay, 
'Destruction of a German Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe raid'. Notes from 
Theatres of War, No.11, London: War Office, February 1943, p.15; Lord Lovat, 'Operation 
Cauldron: Report on Orange beach II landing by Lt-Col The Lord Lovat', 21 August 1942, p.3, 
PRO, DEFE 2/337; Lt Brent Hutton-Wllllams, 'Base message Log', Appendix C, Annex 2, 
OHO Liaison Regiment, War Diary, 21 August 1942, PRO, WO 215/16. Rundstedt, 'Report of 
the C-in-C West on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, p.7 ['again firing'], 
p.19 ['Guns still intact'], translated by Historical Section (GS), Army HQ, Ottawa, November 
1946, PRO, NAC RG 24/20429/961.013(D6); Stacey, Six years of war, p.362; 81 Army Corps 
Headquarters, 'Combat report and experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 
August 1942', 25 August 1942, p.19, SHAEF translation, 24 Febmary 1944, NAC, RG 24 
G3/20438/981.023 (DIO), [six 150mm coast artillery guns]; Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, 
p.23, PRO, ADM 234/355.
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The available information confirms that the battery never fired again 
and definitely ceased to exist as a fighting unit. Thus the objectives of 
Cauldron were achieved and turned out to be the only successful land 
operation. Dunning concludes that 'It was conducted with panache and 
daring -  plus, admittedly a little luck -  according to a carefully worked out 
plan based on "fire and movement", thoroughly and tirelessly rehearsed by 
men who were confident, efficient and of high morale.' Rightly, Cauldron has 
been acknowledged as 'a classic infantry operation'.^
FLANK ATTACK III: PUYS (BLUE BEACH)
THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF CANADA
The attack on Puys was regarded by Hughes-Hallett as the most 
significant of the flank landings. Their mission was to neutralize the German 
defences on the east headland overlooking Dieppe (see Map 2). Obviously, 
this must have gravely concerned him, for just two days before Jubilee 
sailed, he sent a letter about this to Mountbatten, with copies to C-in-C 
Portsmouth and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Home). In this, he 
stated that if any of the LSIs carrying the troops to land at Blue beach were 
sunk, the operation should be aborted. This letter is the only pre-raid 
indication to come to light concerning this matter. Post facto, he clarified his 
thoughts, speaking at the 'Conference on Landing Assaults', held at the US 
Assault Training Centre (UK), from 24 May to 23 June 1943, 'it had always 
been realized that unless the Eastern Cliff... was captured, the frontal 
assault on the town, on which the whole operation chiefly depended, would 
fail. It was, therefore, a serious disaster that this landing was totally
^  J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, Comments on Chapter 5, 4 July 1996.
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defeated'. He replied in the same vein to questions put to him in 1972 by the 
BBC, 'Nothing could have been more serious, since the main landings were 
doomed unless the east cliff could be captured'. Ten years earlier, while 
giving the key-note speech at a Royal Regiment of Canada Association 
dinner in Toronto, he lamented about the rigidity of the plan. He blamed 
himself for failing to have an alternative plan in case the attack on the 
eastern headland failed. One such plan could have had the RM Commando 
assault the headland from the rear. He concluded that he 'had always 
attached greater importance to the East Cliff than the Army', and that they 
'had concluded that the capture of the Cliff was not vital' to overall success of 
the operation.“
The Naval Operation Order specified that 'Surprise is the element 
upon which reliance is placed for the success of the landings on Green and 
Blue beaches and they will not be supported by gunfire from destroyers'. 
Although the orders did have a provision that if the landings were delayed 
the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) on both beaches could request it. As 
it turned out, the FOO on Blue was In regular touch with the destroyer Garth 
from 0541, and his operator maintained contact until the general surrender 
of the Bn on the beach. Garth bombarded the east headland for a short time 
but had to cease, as the shelling was coming trocióse to the troops on the
“  Hughes-Hallett, 'Conclusions and recommendations'. Enclosure 2, p.3, to 'Naval Force 
Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D40) 
[aborted]; Hughes-Hallett, 'Summary of an address by Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett, RN: the 
Dieppe raid', 26 May, in 'Conference on landing assaults 24 May-23', 1943, p.3, USNA, RQ 
492/Admln File ETO/109/Adm 491 'Conference on Landing Assaults'; Hughes-Hallett to 
BBC, 'Dieppe', 25 February 1972, p.3, NAC, MQ 30 E/463/11; Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe 
raid: Address by Vice-Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett', 20 January 1962, Royal Regiment of Canada 
Association Dinner, Toronto, pp.9-10, PRO CAB 106/6.
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beaches. She had to turn away as she was being bracketed by the effective 
fire of German 75mm artillery.®’
The defences of Puys, natural and artificial, were formidable. On 
either side were rising cliffs, in between was a sea-wall from ten to twelve 
feet high, topped by thick barbed wire, which intelligence had not been able 
to identify from aerial photos, although the RRC were prepared for this 
eventuality. The two exits through the sea-wall were also heavily wired. The 
most serious defensive point, from the Canadians’ point of view, was a large 
brick house on the left (east) flank of the RRC landing. This had been turned 
into a fortified strong-point, and just below it was a camouflaged, concrete 
pillbox, with a wide arc of fire, and excellent view of the beach. Another 
heavy MG was in a second, well camouflaged pillbox, on the opposite slope. 
A third pillbox was located in between. On the right slope were two other 
fortified houses, beside various concealed infantry positions and two LMG 
posts. All these positions were sited in the best possible positions to bring 
the most effective enfilade covering the whole beach. Inland were mortar 
and the B Tp, 302 ID artillery battery, consisting of four 105mm field 
howitzers. This whole area was part of Stützpunkt Dieppe-Ost (Dieppe-East), 
part of Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe (Dieppe Group of Strongpoints), and thus 
was completely surrounded by barbed wire and prepared for all-round 
defence. 'Dieppe-East' was from the eastern harbour mole of Dieppe to Puys 
inclusive, and encompassing the immediate hinterland. Holding this area 
was the 3 Bn, 571 IR, commanded by Capt. Richard Schnösenberg, who had
®’ John Hughes-Hallett, 'Orders for naval supporting lire', JNB, p.1, to 'Naval Operation Order 
No t', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (047) ['Surprise']; Capt. Q.A. Brown, 
Operation Jubilee: Outline report of the operation at Dieppe 19 August 1942 by 2 CIO and 
attached Troops', 3 February 1943, p.2, PRO, DEFE 2/332 [FOOJ.
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his HQ on the eastern headland. Holding Puys itself were only two platoons, 
one army and one GAP, plus some GAP technicians, amounting to less then 
one hundred men. During the assault, apparently only two men were killed 
and nine wounded.sz
A detailed description of the RRC assault on Blue beach is 
unnecessary, the grim ninety-five percent casualty figure say it all. Writers 
have ranked not only the whole operation, but especially this episode, with 
other infamous military disasters such as Gallipoli and the Charge of the 
Light Brigade. This was not only the highest fatal casualty rate of any unit on 
the raid but was also the highest of any Commonwealth or American unit, 
per proportion of forces engaged, during the war.^^
Why was Blue beach a dismal failure when the other flank attacks 
achieved surprise and some success? Several reasons, not least of all, the 
terrain and German defences already mentioned. This, combined with the 
fact that the RRC landed sixteen or seventeen (German records say twenty)
^  The beach was about two hundred yards long and about fifty yards wide, and rising at the 
time of the assault, and composed of rounded rocks, 4-6in. in diameter, with a gradient of 1 in 
16, Hughes-Hallett, Navigational data'. Appendix C to JN 01, p.9, 'Naval Operation Order No.1 
[Operation Jubilee]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47); Rundstedt, 'Map 
StuUpunktgruppe Dieppe 19.8.42', Appendix 4 to 'Report of the C-ln-C West on the Dieppe 
raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, translated by Historical Section (GS), Army HQ, 
Ottawa, November 1946, PRO, NAC RG 24/20429/981.013(06) [units]; Richard 
SchnOsenberg, interview by Fiona McHugh, 5 February 1978, translated transcript, DHist 
79/567 [2 MG, 2LMG); D.J. Goodspeed, The Second World WaT, in Battle myal: a history of 
the Royal Regiment of Canada 1862-1962 (Toronto: The Royal Regiment of Canada 
Association, 1962), p.395 [one hundred men); Gordon Churchill to C.P. Stacey, 11 
September 1962, DHist 594.019 (DIO) [German casualties).
^  Of the 554 all ranks landed, 95 percent were casualties -  killed, wounded, or PoW -  only 64 
men returning to the UK, 37 of which were unwounded. The majority of the unwounded ones 
had not even landed, Capt. W.R. Bennett, RRC Regimental Historian & Museum Curator, 
Operation Jubilee 19 August 1942, The Royal Regiment of Canada', August 1988, pp.1-12, 
and Dieppe Raid Casualties', January 1990, pp.1-2, Toronto, Royal Regiment of Canada 
Museum, received from Tim Stewart. Sources consulted for these were 'RRC Part II, Routine 
Orders, Cdn Section GHQ 2nd Echelon 21 Army Group', NAC; 'Casualty Returns', National 
Defence HQ, Ottawa, Commonwealth War Graves Commission; Peter Worthington, 'Dying at 
Dieppe; the last word', Sun, Toronto, Tuesday 18 August 1992 [Gallipoli].
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minutes late, without the benefit of darkness and a smoke screen which had 
both lifted. The tardiness was due to the naval error of the LCAs forming up 
behind the wrong MGB. As they were then late, they advanced at a higher 
speed, thereby leaving the two slower LCMs, each with one hundred men, 
and other LCAs behind. These landed at 0525. Thus the first assault wave to 
land was not at full strength. A second wave, which was expecting the beach 
to have been consolidated, landed at 0545 and the Coys became 
intermingled. Gaps were blown in the wire with Bangalore torpedoes but 
men were immediately cut down trying to get through. The German MGs fired 
on fixed lines initially, then independently later. These MG sweeps forced the 
men to huddle in groups against the dubious cover of the sea-wall, then 
mortars started, previously zeroed-in, the bombs exploding on the rocks, 
causing flying splinters and more casualties. Commenting on the casualties, 
Capt. Schndsenberg stated, 'such a concentration and such a slaughter of 
dead, I have scarcely ever seen in Russia myself. The 3 Bn doctor. Dr 
Grahamer, was at the scene, and recalls the Canadians, 'were simply 
decimated by our machine-guns... there were four, five, men lying on top of 
one another... the badly wounded were often undemeath'.B«
The battle was decided before it could even get momentum going. 
Beside the MG and mortar fire, howitzers were precisely ranged to land their 
shots right at the water line to effect maximum damage, as this was exactly 
where the LCAs were disembarking their troops. The Germans’GAP men 
hurled stick grenades from long distances, from well hidden positions, on to
^  Lt-Qen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 
1942', p.67, in The history of the 302, ed. Emil Kllgast, CWM [twenty minutes); Richard 
SchnOsenberg, interview by Fiona McHugh, S February 1978, translated transcript, pp.12,23, 
DHIst 79/567; Dr Qrahamer, Interview by Fiona McHugh, 5 February 1978, translated 
transcript, p.3, DHIst 79/587.
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the men pinned against the wall and cliffs. All these factors led the FOO, 
attached to the RRC, Capt. G.A. Brown, to later observe, 'in five minutes time 
they were changed from an assaulting Battalion on the offensive to 
something less than two Coys on the defensive being hammered by fire 
which they could not locate. The narrow confines of the beach did not permit 
moving away from the fire to engage it from another position'.“
The only group of men to have any success were the twenty-five led 
by the RRC CO, Lt-Col Doug Catto. About 0700, after breaching a hole in the 
wire with a Bangalore, his group succeeded in gaining the high ground on 
the right flank. This path through the wire was quickly covered by a German 
MG and Catto and his men were cut off and on their own, with no 
communications. Although clearing some houses, and moving west to 
attempt link up with the elements from the main beaches, they were forced to 
surrender in the afternoon when they ran out of ammunition. Although the air 
force accurately bombed the German batteries and defences on the 
headland, this only temporarily had any affect on the intensity of the German 
fire. Naval attempts at evacuation, although futile, were tried and resulting in 
further casualties to naval personnel, and with hindsight, probably should 
not have been sent in. Thus after just over three hours the remnants of the 
RRC were forced to surrender. The German divisional war diary recorded at 
0835, 'Puys firmly In our hands; Enemy has lost about 500 prisoners and 
killed'.“
“  Capt. Q.A. Brown, RCA, 'Report on the Dieppe operation’, nd.. Appendix A, p.4. In C.P. 
Stacey, 'CMHO Historical Officers Report No.89', 31 December 1942, DHist CMHQ Report 
No.89.
“  Lt Willie Weber, a platoon commander at Puys, claimed after the war that the only reason 
that the twenty-eight men managed to get through was because, 'fortunately one of our 
machine-guns jammed', Gordon Churchill to C.P. Stacey, 11 September 1962, OHist 594.019 
(DIO); Lt-Qen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 
August 1942', p.75. In The history of the 302, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM.
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The other reason for the failure of the RRC, was that the Germans 
were manning their posts before the RRC reached the beach. Contrary to 
popular belief, this was not true for the other garrisons of Pourville and 
Dieppe, as will be seen. At Puys, just before the convoy encounter broke out, 
Capt. Schnosenberg was just finishing an anti-raid drill, normal for times of 
high tension', that is when the tides and moon are appropriate for raiding. He 
was told of the encounter by his adjutant but chose to ignore it as a normal 
occurrence between German ships and British patrol boats. Even the Naval 
Signal Station, near his command post on the east headland thought It 
nothing unusual, but his adjutant would not let Schnòsenberg get to sleep, 
so the latter decided, 'if you won't let me sleep anyway, then we'll throw the 
whole battalion out [of its beds] and we'll make a morning alarm exercise'.
He alarmed the artillery batteries OPs as well. Therefore, when the first LCAs 
appeared the Germans were already at their posts, first training searchlights 
on them, and then, at one hundreds yards, opening fire with light MGs.^^
An addendum to the Blue beach landing is a controversy that is still 
bubbling concerning the alleged cowardice of the RRC. This was recently 
referred to by Brereton Greenhous, Dieppe, Dieppe (1993). The background 
of the debate goes back to a debriefing held the day after the raid on 
Mountbatten's request, to examine the reasons for the raid's failure. At this 
meeting, according to Hughes-Hallett, Lt-Cmdr Goulding, the SO Blue Beach 
Landings, claimed that some of the RRC troops 'were afraid to land'.
Although he was immediately shut up, this incident caused Hughes-Hallett to
Richard Schnôsenberg, Interview by Fiona McHugh, 5 February 1978, tranalated tranaciipt, 
pp.1 -2, DHist 79/567; that the Germans were alert at Puys due to the convoy clash Is 
apparently confirmed by Lt Willie Weber, Gordon Churchill to C.P. Stacey, 11 September 
1962. DHist 594.019 (DIO).
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order an official investigation. This revealed that some of the young naval
officers in charge of landing craft had been forced to threaten RRC men with 
them
revolvers to get^o go ashore, and that this applied to 'perhaps one-quarter of 
the men'. Hughes-Hallett notes that he did not take the matter any further at 
the time, as all the men concerned were either killed or captured.^»
Greenhous quoted at length from some of the witness statements and 
agrees with the naval conclusions. This resulted in a storm of anger from 
veterans and their families, and consequently in letters, and responses, to 
the Editor of The Infantry Journal. In a reply to a critical letter of his book by 
Dieppe veteran and author Brig.-Gen. Whitaker (the latter who was at the 
meeting of 20 August 1942), Greenhous stated that perhaps some of the 
naval officers concerned, such as Goulding, 'were giving false evidence'. But 
he thinks this 'seems unlikely, however, for there was nothing in it for them. 
Their reputations were not on the line'. In response, Whitaker wondered why 
Greenhous only used navy, and no military, sources, such as a that of Capt. 
Brown, who gave the opposite view. They believed that Goulding navigated 
wrongly, by steering on two sides of a triangle, until he got a fix, hence 
making the RRC even more late, instead of going on a direct course to the 
beach. Whitaker recalled that at the meeting, Goulding planted 'the first 
seeds of a shameful lie', that has been 'steadfastly perpetuated by Mr 
Greenhous. Instead of admitting his navigation errors, Goulding avoided 
personal accountability by accusing some Royals of having to be forced off 
the craft at pistol point. This, he said caused the debacle'. Whitaker believes
^  Brereton Qreenhous, Dieppe, Dieppe (Montréal: Éditions Art Global Inc. in cooperation with 
the Department of National Defence, 1993), pp.88,99 ; 'Reports of Naval Enquiry aboard 
Queen Emma', 21 August 1942, JHHP, JHH 3/2; Hughes-Hallett to Terence Robertson, 'mid- 
June' 1962, p.1-3. (Source unknown}
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that the following naval investigation was an 'attempted cover-up... that has 
caused long-term damage'. The debate is on-going.^
FLANK ATTACK IV: POURVILLE (GREEN BEACH)
THE QUEEN'S OWN CAMERON HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA
The attack at Pourville was the only other relatively successful part of 
the operation, the leading elements penetrating some two miles inland, and 
probably could have gone further, if it had not been for the withdrawal order. 
Pourville was within the Dieppe Stutzpunktgruppe and therefore the majority 
of positions were prepared for all-round defence. In the German Order of 
Battle were two artillery batteries of 3 Bn, 302 Artillery Regiment, each with 
four 105mm 14/19 Czech field howitzers -  7 Tp, located on a golf course; 
and A Tp, near the village of Janval, both in the area of Quatre Vents Farm 
(see Map 2). This latter battery was an objective and code-named Gdring. 
Pourville itself was garrisoned by two Coys of 2 Bn, 571 IR, 302 ID. Six Coy 
held the village itself, while 5 Coy was in reserve behind Quatre Vents 
Farms. On top of the eastern slop was the artillery OP, and the RDF station 
Caude Cote, protected by two 20mm Flak guns, surrounded by a ten-foot 
high, mixed heavy wire entanglement. Also on the cliff edge were a 
searchlight and two 47mm Pak anti-tank guns. COHO Intelligence Section 
estimated that along the whole front of Pourville were distributed seven MG 
pillboxes. Many had trench systems and barbed wire around them and were 
connected to each other by telephone.^
^  Brereton Qreenhous, 'Letters; Dieppe debate continues'. The infantry Journal 26 (Spring 
1994); Denis Whitaker, 'Letters: Dieppe the real issue'. The Infantry Journal 27 (Winter 1994), 
1-3.
Pourvllle lies two and a half miles to the south-west of Dieppe at the base of the Scie River. 
The beach, approximately 800 yards long and was about 25 yards wide at high tide, stretches
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The Allied plan was to have the SSR, under Lt-Col Cec Merritt capture 
Pourville itself, the heights on either side of it, including the RDF station and 
German 7 Tp battery, and form a bridgehead. Half an hour later the QOCHC, 
under Lt-Col Gostling, would land and move through the consolidated SSR 
positions and advance up the Scie valley, linking up with tanks coming 
through Dieppe, with the aim of capturing the aerodrome, 265 CD battery at 
Rouxmesnil Bouteilles, code-named Hitler, and German divisional HQ 
thought to be at Arques-la-Bataille. The battery consisted of six 150mm field 
howitzers.9’
At 0452, two minutes after zero hour, the SSRs touched down. They 
had experienced no German fire on the run-in and had taken the German 
garrison by surprise. The Germans reacted quickly and opened up 
immediately with MG and small arms fire. Unfortunately, the navy had landed
between rising cliffs. Its composition Is similar to that of Puys and the other beaches, with a 
gradient of about 1 In 30, and several groynes leading into the water at 100 yard Intervals. 
Along the length of the beach Is a ten-foot high sea-wall, surmounted by 4  to 8 feet in height 
and up to 30 feet in depth triple Dannert (colled) barbed wire with gaps at the eastern and 
western ends, the latter passable by vehicles. See Hughes-Hallett, 'Navigational data'. 
Appendix C to JN01, p.7, in 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation Jubilee]', 31 July 1942, 
NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (047) [beach statistics]; and COHO Intelligence Section, 'Dieppe 
CB 04157 F(1)', May 1942, pp.32-3 [beach], p.41 [defences], PRO, AIR 8/896. Lt-Qen. 
Conrad Haase, Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', In 
The history of the 302, ed. Emil Kllgast, CWM, p.56 [batteries]; Rundstedt, 'Map -  
StuUpunktgruppe Dieppe 19.8.42', Appendix 4 to Report of the C-in-C West on the Dieppe 
raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, translated by Historical Section (GS), Army HQ, 
Ottawa, November 1946, PRO, NAC RG 24/20429/981.013(06), [guns, units]; COHO 
Intelligence Section, 'Dieppe CB 04157 F(1)', May 1942, p.41, PRO, AIR 8/896 [specific 
defences].
9' The SSR strength was 484 all ranks, but Merritt had many other detachments and units 
under his command, such as naval and military beach and naval signal parties, the special 
operational groups, such as the SOE, FS Sections, and X-Troop, besides four liaison 
members of the 14 CATR. The total landing strength was 525 all ranks which landed In ten 
LCAs and two LCMs. The OOCHC strength was 488 all ranks, besides 12 attached men, 
including 3 signallers, 1 FS Section, 1 SOE, 4 FOO, 1 US Ranger, 1 RAF, and 1 journalist. 
They travelled across the Channel In 25 LCP(L)s of Group 6. Mann, In 'allotment of personnel, 
equipment and stores', 10 August 1942, Appendix C-Part 1, pp.2-3 [SSR], p29 [QOCHC], In 
Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10671/23202 
(D25),
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all the troops to the west of the Sole river, contrary to what was hoped for,
and thus the Coys attempting to take the high ground with the RDF station,
first had to cross the Scie river. This complication meant that eventually the
SSR were only able to gain a small, tenuous foothold on the slope, and
never reached, let alone get near the RDF station. Thus, Nissen's mission,
despite what has been written about him, could never accomplish anything.
ri
The beach, sea-wall and town defences were tempor^y cleared, except for 
one MG post on the east flank, and sporadic German mortar and artillery fire 
on the beaches. Therefore, when the Camerons touched down half an 
hour late, they had suffered no casualties on the run-in. Unfortunately, one of 
the first of the SSRs to land was the CO, who was immediately killed by the 
one remaining MG post.
The SSRs were meanwhile still trying to take the eastern heights. At 
one point, when the attack was stalled across a bridge over the Scie, Lt-Col 
Merritt walked out into the middle of the hailstorm and rallied his troops to 
cross. For this action he was awarded the VC. Of the special units ashore 
little is known. Of the three US Rangers at Pourville, First Lt Joseph H. 
Randall, was apparently killed with the SSR inland. Sgt Marcel G. Swank 
relates that he heard an SSR man had taken a Browning pistol, standard 
side-arm of an US officer, from a dead American near a farm house. Another 
witness stated that he saw an American 'with little brass stripes' on his 
shoulder get killed near a farm house. The wartime history of the Rangers 
disagrees, stating, 'Though wounded three times severely soon after 
landing, Randall continued to lead a charge across a narrow fire-grazed 
beach. He was killed as he reached a German machine-gun nest'. Swank 
and Sgt Lloyd N. Church were with the QOCHC, although all that is known is
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that they were both wounded, the former being evacuated and the latter 
captured. Swank writes that the claim made in a book that he lost part of his 
finger is false, although he did get the back of his hand creased. The search 
group known as the 'Pourville party', consisting of Nissen, FSS Sgt Hawkins 
and X-Troop member George Bates did not accomplish their missions, and 
Bates was killed. Curiously, the former two do not mention Bates at all in 
their after-action reports.“
As the Camerons could not advance inland up the valley according to 
plan, due to the fire coming from Quatre Vents Farme, the 2ic, Major A.T.
Law, adopted the contingency plan of moving into the woods on the western 
slope with the object of circling around to assault the village of Petit 
Appeville, and crossing the bridges there to meet up with the tanks. Although 
assaulting the village he could not dislodge the German defenders who 
grew stronger throughout the morning. At 0930 he overheard an order to 
SSR that a general withdrawal on all beaches would begin in half an hour. 
Therefore he ordered his own troops to withdraw the way they had come. 
German documents reveal that this penetration was what the Germans were 
most concerned about during the course of the engagement, and were not 
only sending local reinforcements there in strength, but also had slated the 
first strategic resen/e element to be arriving in the zone of operations, 10 
Panzer Division, to counter-attack this point. It is now clear that the majority 
of the SSR and QOCHC casualties occurred during the withdrawal. The
“  For a stirring contemporary account of Menitt's actions, which has been repeated In most 
narrative accounts of Jubilee, see 'Roll of honour: ‘for matchless gallantry“', Macleans 
Magazine (15 November 1942), 22, 25 UCSC, JMP; M.Q. Swank to B. Greenhous, 28 January 
1979, DHIst 79/139 [Randall with SSR, Church wounded), A.J. Szima to M.G. Swank, 3 
February 1979, p.1, TMFDC [Randall KIA Inland); AKIarl, The First Ranger Battalion In Britain', 
In Darby's Ranger, p.30 [Randall KIA on beach); M.G. Swank to 'Harry*, 4 February 1979, 
TMFDC [finger); Dear, Ten (lA) Commando, p.21 [Bates KIA).
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navy also lost heavily. Many of the men had to wade and swim out to the 
LCAs. At about 1130 Merritt formed a rearguard of about one hundred men, 
which facilitated the withdrawal of a great proportion of the SSR and 
QOCHC, but led to the capture of the whole rearguard. At 1337 the HQ 571 
IR reported to divisional HQ, 'Pourville is firmly in our hands’.s^
^  The total SSR and QOCHC casualties were respectively 6 officers and 70 ORs, and 3 
officers and 81 ORs, Stacey, Six years of war, p.367; Lt-Qen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the 
British attacK on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', In The history of the 302, ed. Emil 
Kilgast, CWM, p.86 ['In our hands'].
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EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION 
PHASE 2: CENTRE ATTACKS
THE INITIAL LANDING,
GERMAN DISPOSITIONS AND REACTION
The frontal assault on Dieppe itself was timed to take place half an 
hour after the flank assaults went in. This was judged to be enough time to 
neutralize the main German coastal defences, especially on the headlands 
commanding the approaches to the town. The failure of most of the flank 
attacks doomed the centre attacks before they had begun.
Dieppe lies at the mouth of the River Argues and is very conspicuous 
from seaward because of the mile wide gap between the steep cliffs on 
either side. The eastern half of the beach was code-named Red beach and 
the western portion White beach (see Map 2 Inset). At the western end of the 
beach was a large Casino which the Germans had begun to demolish. 
Behind the promenade was a line of buildings, mostly three or four storey 
hotels.^ Two rows of barbed wire stretched along the full length of the beach 
between the promenade and the sea. The first ran in front of the sea-wall.
' Its beach is 1500 yards long and was estimated to vary between 180 to 360 yards wide at low 
tide. The gradient was 1 in 40 although the last fifty yards before a sea-wall varied between 1 1n 
4 to 1 In 7. The vertical, concrete and masonry sea-wall stretched the length of the beach and 
was approximately six feet high, although this was not constant, since the tides had washed 
the rocks up to with In two feet of the top In many places. The beach was similar composition to 
the other beaches, the stones being six Inches and less In diameter. Wooden groynes 
extended between high and low tides at Intervals of one hundred to one hundred and fifty 
yards. Behind the sea-wall was a wide promenade, about 165 feet wide, stretching the length 
of the beach. COHQ Intelligence Section, 'Dieppe CB 04157 F(1)', May 1942, pp.6, 32-3, 
PRO, AIR 8/896; John Mughas-Hallett, 'Navigational Data', Appendix C to JN 01, p.8, 'Naval 
Operation Order No.1 [Operation Jubilee]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/23202 (D47) 
[beach width, length, gradient].
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while the second ran along its top, the latter being about seven feet in depth, 
six feet high and, in the words of a post-raid intelligence report, 'constituted a 
formidable obstacle'. Only two gaps existed for personnel access to the 
water, one a hundred yards west of the Casino, and the second near the 
junction of Red and White beaches. A natural ridge of rocks about the same 
height as the sea-wall had been formed by tidal action, approximately fifteen 
feet from the wall on which the wire ran. The ditch in between extended 
along certain parts of the beach and formed a natural anti-tank obstacle. It 
was further deepened by labourers collecting stones and rubble for 
construction purposes.^
The town and western headland, included in the Stutzpunktgruppe 
Dieppe West (which also Included Pourville), were held by 7 Coy, 2 Bn, 571 
IR, consisting of about one hundred and fifty men. 1 Platoon (PI) held the 
area fronting Red beach, while 2 PI held that of White beach. 3 PI was 
positioned on the west headland, in numerous depressions and caves 
connected by tunnels, and equipped with two 81mm (Sin) heavy mortars, two 
75mm French light beach defence guns, and four heavy MGs. Elements of 8 
Coy manned heavy MGs and 81mm mortars along the entire 2 Bn sector of 
approximately 5000 yards. As previously noted 3 Bn, 571 IR held the east 
headland and Puys. Besides the weapons already mentioned, 7 Coy was 
equipped with a 105mm howitzer, positioned to fire over open sights as a 
beach defence gun, six 37mm anti-tank guns, four MGs per PI -  one heavy 
and three light, two heavy flame-throwers, two small searchlights, and one
* 'Report on information obtained from Pa/W captured at Dieppe, 19-20 August 1942', 27 
August 1942, p.7, PRO, DEFE 2/324 ['formidabie obstacie']; Lt-Coi Q.P. Henderson, 
'inteliigence report: raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 22 September 1942, p.3 and Appendix 
A 'Map -  Defences of Dieppe West (according to statements by prisoners of war)', NAC, RQ 
24/10870/232C2 (D2) [beach Wire],
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obsolete light French tank, type FT 17/18. Positioned at the extreme eastern 
end of the beach at the base of the west jetty, and embedded in concrete up 
to its operable turret, its 37mm gun covered Red beach and the sea before it. 
One 37mm anti-tank gun was located on the end of the west jetty and one on 
the middle. About a hundred naval personnel were also detailed to defend 
the town. As previously noted the four 302 Divisional batteries, two of which 
were located within the Stutzpunktgruppe Dieppe West, were sighted to 
bring supporting barrage and interdictory fire down on the beaches and 
approaches to Dieppe.^
In general, 7 Coy defences, particularly MGs, were sited to fire out 
to sea at approaching and retreating craft. Due to their positions they were 
unable to see the dead ground below the sea-wall and lower down the 
beach. It was the fire-missions of the troops holding the two headlands to 
enfilade the beach. These positions and weapons were considered the main 
defence. Besides the numerous caves in both headlands, with guns that 
could be brought out to fire and then pulled back in, the majority of the 
weapons on the promenade were also concealed and protected in concrete 
pillboxes, casemates and bunkers, or behind road blocks. The Germans had 
even constructed underground bunkers on the promenade covered with 
grass and completely invisible from the air. Shallow slit trenches or grenade 
pits were located to cover wire obstacles or bottle-necks where assaulting 
troops were likely to bunch up, such as the angle of the groynes. These 
areas were also covered by predicted mortar fire which was coordinated with
3 Lt-Col Q.P. Henderson, 'Intelligence report; raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 22 September 
1942, Part II 'Enemy Order of Battle' and Appendix A, 'Map -  Defences of Dieppe West 
(according to statements by prisoners of war)', NAC, RQ 24/10870/232C2 (D2) [unit 
dispositions]; 'Report on information obtained from PsA/V captured at Dieppe, 19-20 August 
1942', 27 August 1942, p.4 (7 Coy weapons], p.7 [150 men], PRO, DEFE 2/324.
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the MG fire-plan and were directed by OPs. Dual purpose AA guns were 
sighted on both headlands, able to enfilade the beaches and approaching 
craft. All access roads from the town to the promenade were blocked by 
seven feet high, four-five feet wide concrete walls, some of which had a 
small space for personnel to pass. These were mounted with barbed wire, 
had a firing step behind them for infantry, and two had 37mm guns sighted 
behind them. All roads leading into Dieppe had removable road blocks with 
booby traps on either side of the roads. The whole town, including Pourville 
and Puys was set up for all round defence, being surrounded by a 
continuous belt of barbed wire, all defences being sighted in an anti-raid, as 
opposed to anti-invasion, role.*
The specific German defence dispositions of 2 PI, 7 Coy, are 
instructive for examining the assault later. Each Section had one MG. No.1 
Section, 2 PI, 7 Coy, held the area on the promenade, immediately to the 
east of the Casino, in front of Hotel Verdun, and was centred in a large 
rectangular block house and in zigzag trenches around it. The blockhouse 
also acted as HQ 7 Coy. No.2 Section, 2 PI, was billeted in the east wing of 
the Casino from which it patrolled. No.3 Section, 2 PI, held the west comer of 
the Casino, and a concrete pillbox attached to the north-west comer of the 
Casino, housing a rapid-firing Czech 47mm anti-tank gun and attached
* Lt-Col G.P. Henderson, 'Intelligence report; raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 22 September 
1942, Part III 'Enemy defences and weapons', pp.1-3, and Appendix A, 'Map -  Defences of 
Dieppe West (according to statements by prisoners of war)', NAC, RQ 24/10870/232C2 (D2); 
Report on Information obtained from PsA/V captured at Dieppe, 19-20 August 1942', 27 
August 1942, pp.6-7, PRO, DEFE 2/324. See also after-action summaries 'Red beach' and 
White beach', nd„ NAC, RG 24/1076S/222C1 (D126). Underground promenade bunkers are 
not indicated in any German or Allied records or secondary accounts but this author has 
identified one in a post-raid German photograph. This shows Churchill tank BETTY, 7 Tp, 
stuck in a ditch, which Is actually the entrance to a underground bunker, shown by the 
ventilation Intake In front of It. Paris, Fort D'lvry, ECP Armées, DAM 1137/L04, pictured In this 
author's, Dieppe through the lens o! the German war photographer {London: Battle of Britain 
Prints International Ltd., 1993), p.50.
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heavy MG. The Casino itself was not used as a strongpoint. No.4 Section, 2 
PI, was positioned in centre block at the extreme western limit of the of the 
house frontage on the sea, west of the Casino, directly below the west 
headland.^
The Jubilee Military plan called for a short preliminary air and sea 
bombardment after which the Essex Scottish and RHLI, supported by 14 
CATR (Calgary Tanks), engineers and other specialist units, would assault 
Red and White beaches. After clearing the beach defences and capturing 
the town, a perimeter would be set up around it. Meanwhile, the engineers 
would carry out demolition tasks, German military locations would be 
checked for documents of intelligence value, while Royal Marine 'A' 
Commando would enter the harbour on the gunboat Locust, to capture 
armed trawlers, in conjunction with units of the Essex Scottish and Calgary 
Tanks. Units of RHLI and Calgary Tanks were to push through Dieppe and 
link up with the advance elements of the QOCHC advancing from Pourville, 
to capture the aerodrome and German divisional HQ. The Essex Scottish 
were to consolidate the eastern side of the town and link up with the RRC. 
The FusilierMont-Royal was to act as floating reserve and to land later as a 
rear-guard to cover the withdrawal.^
 ^'Report on information obtained from Ps/W captured at Dieppe, 19-20 August 1942', 27 
August 1942, p.3, PRO, DEFE 2/324.
B Brigadier C. Churchill Mann, 'Assault and occupation', 9 August 1942, Appendix D, pp.1-12. 
In Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 
(D25) [detailed explanation of unit tasks]. The Jubilee unit embarkation strength for the centre 
beaches consisted of 32 Officers and 521 ORs of the Essex Scottish, 31 Officers and 551 
ORs of the RHLI, 32 Officers and 552 ORs of the FMR, 125 Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG), 
17 Officers and 352 ORs of Royal Marino 'A' Commando, 7 Officers and 309 ORs of the Corps 
of Royal Canadian Engineers (RCE), 14 Officers and 256 ORs of the Royal Canadian Artillery 
(RCA), 10 Officers and 116 ORs of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (RCAMC), mortar 
detachments of the Calgary Highlanders and Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of 
Canada, 32 Officers and 392 ORs of 14 CATR with 58 tanks, plus smaller and ancillary support 
detachments of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (RCCS), Royal Canadian Army Service 
Corps (RCASC), Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (RCOC), Canadian Provost Corps,
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The RHLI were transported across in LSI Glengyle, the Essex Scottish 
in the LSIs Prince Charles and Prince Leopold, while the numerous other 
units crossed in twenty LCTs. The LSIs transferred their troops to LCAs for 
the final run-in. Before touch down close-support aircraft laid a smoke screen 
along the Dieppe sea-front and over the east headland (code-named 
Bismarck) which the Air Force Commander later reported, 'was most 
effective lasting from 0510 to 0600'. For ten minutes, from 0515, Hurricane 
fighters, bombers and Spitfires strafed the German defences in the sea-front 
buildings, on the beach, promenade and west headland. Air attacks were 
also mounted prior to and during the centre amphibious assaults on two of 
the German divisional batteries, A and B, code-named Gdring and Rommel, 
and on 265 CD Battery, Hitler. The remaining two divisional batteries were 
not targeted as they had not been identified by aerial reconnaissance or 
intelligence sources.^
The assault received a preliminary bombardment of the sea-front 
houses by four destroyers -  Berkeley, Bleasdale, Garth and Albrighton -  
which began minutes after the air attacks and lasted until 0520, at which time 
the bombardment was raised to the headlands and continued for fifteen 
minutes. The initial phase set three buildings on fire and damaged several
Canadian Intelligence Corps, and Naval Beach/Signal parties. Special operational units 
Included Ranger, No. 10 (lA) Commando and SOE personnel, besides a selection of 
journalists and 'spectators'. These embarkation strengths are taken, unless otherwise 
Indicated, from Stacey, 'Dieppe Raid: Embarkation strengths -  Casualties -  Disembarkation 
Strength (Canadian Units)', In Six years of war, p.389. The strength of 14 CATR Is based on 
this author's extensive research Into the tank role, see Dieppe through the lens, pp.12, 60; 
and The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe', Canadian Military History 4/1 (Spring 1995), 74, fn.25. 
Robin Nelllands, 'Dieppe, 1942', In By sea and land: the Royal Marine Commandos, a history 
1942-1982, London: Weldenfeld & NIcolson, 1987, p.32 (RM Commando strength]; 
confirmed by J.C. Beadle, The light blue lanyard: fifty years with 40 Commando Royal Marines, 
Sansome Place, Worcester; Square One Publications, 1992, p.26.
 ^Air Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory, 'Report by the Air Force Commander on the 
combined operation against Dieppe -  August 19,1942', 5 September 1942, p.6, NAC, RQ 
24 Q3/10870/23202 (D5) [timings).
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Others. According to the Naval Force Commander's after-action report, this 
did not prevent German defensive MG and sniper fire from the same 
buildings being 'intensive as soon as landings commenced'. Commenting 
on the second phase, Hughes-Hallett stated that, 'little destruction to mortar 
and small arms posts was caused as considerable fire continued from these 
areas throughout the operation'.^
The Adjutant to the 571 IR, Capt. P. Hinz, recalled that the air and sea 
bombardment on the west headland were 'not entirely without effect'. He 
noted that Capt. Ullrich, commander, 8 Coy, 2 Bn, was killed 'In the very first 
bombardment', while the searchlight battery attached to the 8 Coy was 
destroyed by shelling and the crew burned to death. More importantly, he 
noted that 'all the telephone lines were broken', although his only 
elaboration on this was that the 7 Tp, 302 Divisional Artillery, OP in its 
concrete bunker on edge of the headland, just below the Golf Hotel, had no 
communications with its guns, making fire control from this point impossible. 
A post-war interview with former A Tp lieutenant. Dr Schlie, who had been in 
an OP on the west headland, confirms the death of Ullrich and cutting of 
telephone communications. Hinz further explained that the assembly areas 
for 5 Coy, 2 Bn, held In reserve behind Quatre Vents Farm, also were 
'carpeted with heavy fire' from air and sea, and that '5 Coy escaped 
annihilation only because of the fact that its commander, Lt Oldenburg, had 
disobeyed standing orders and had not occupied the assembly areas'. The 
302 Divisional report appears to confirm these claims, stating that the 
telephone connections between 571 IR, divisional artillery batteries, AA units
® John Hughes-Hallstt. 'Bombardment Report', Enclosure No.7, p.1, to ‘Naval Force 
Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D48).
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and Aircraft reporting Centre, 'were for the most part disrupted and required 
the constant attention of the telephone iinesmen'. Pians to use biinker iights 
for communication between the two headiands did not materiaiize due to 
constant smoke screens. On the larger scale, the air/sea bombardments 
seem to have been much less effective. The report noted that althougii air 
attacks caused 'brief periods of disruption' to telephone lines, they were 
'quickly repaired', and Division 'kept up contact' with the HQs of 1 Bn/571 IR, 
571 IR, and 770 Army CD Battery, while it also maintained communications 
with HQs of 570 IR, 572 IR, flanking divisions and 81 Corps.»
The Prince Charles and Prince Leopold Flotiilas carried the Essex 
Scottish and consisted of eight LCAs and one LCS(M) each. They touched 
down, respectively, at 0520, on time, and 'a few minutes after schedule'. The 
Glengyle Flotilla carried the RHLI and consisted of ten LCAs, two LCM and 
one LCS. The Flotilla Officer, Lt. P. Cork, later reported that the flotilla came 
under MG and mortar fire about five minutes before touch down on White 
beach, badly damaging LCAs BL5 and BL7, which were abandoned on the 
beach. Touch down, he noted, occurred at 0522, about two hundred yards 
east of the Casino as planned. The Senior Officer Landings, White beach, Lt- 
Cmdr C.W. McMullen, on board the LCS, records the RHLI touch down one 
minute iater and confirms that two LCA were lost. The LCS, equipped with a 
mortar, lobbed smoke bombs onto the beach during the approach and 
continued to lay this smoke screen and give covering fire for forty-five
9 P. Hinz and H. Titzmann, 'Organization and operational employment [571 Infantry Regiment] 
In France', p.13, and Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of 
Dieppe on 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, p.126, both In The history of the 302 Infantry 
Division In retrospect, ed. Emil Kllgast. DQIS Multilingual Section Translation Bureau, National 
Defence Headquarters, Ottawa; 1982, c1976 Hamburg, CWM; Dr Schlie, Transcript of 
Interview by Fiona McHugh, 3 February 1970, Hamburg, DHIst 79/567/100, p.3 (Ullrich), p.5 
[telephone lines cut).
256
and Aircraft reporting Centre, 'were for the most part disrupted and required 
the constant attention of the telephone linesmen'. Plans to use blinker lights 
for communication between the two headlands did not materialize due to 
constant smoke screens. On the larger scale, the air/sea bombardments 
seem to have been much less effective. The report noted that although air 
attacks caused 'brief periods of disruption' to telephone lines, they were 
'quickly repaired', and Division 'kept up contact' with the HQs of 1 Bn/571 IR, 
571 IR, and 770 Army CD Battery, while it also maintained communications 
with HQs of 570 IR, 572 IR, flanking divisions and 81 Corps.®
The Prince Charles and Prince Leopold Flotillas carried the Essex 
Scottish and consisted of eight LCAs and one LCS(M) each. They touched 
down, respectively, at 0520, on time, and 'a few minutes after schedule'. The 
Glengyle Flotilla carried the RHLI and consisted of ten LCAs, two LCM and 
one LCS. The Flotilla Officer, Lt. P. Cork, later reported that the flotilla came 
under MG and mortar fire about five minutes before touch down on White 
beach, badly damaging LCAs BL5 and BL7, which were abandoned on the 
beach. Touch down, he noted, occurred at 0522, about two hundred yards 
east of the Casino as planned. The Senior Officer Landings, White beach, Lt- 
Cmdr C.W. McMullen, on board the LCS, records the RHLI touch down one 
minute later and confirms that two LCA were lost. The LCS, equipped with a 
mortar, lobbed smoke bombs onto the beach during the approach and 
continued to lay this smoke screen and give covering fire for forty-five
® P. Hinz and H. Titzmann, 'Organization and operational employment (571 Infantry Regiment) 
in France', p.13, and Lt-Qen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of 
Dieppe on 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, p.126, both in The history of the 302 Infantry 
Division In retrospect, ed. Emil Kllgast. DGIS Multilingual Section Translation Bureau, National 
Defence Headquarters, Ottawa; 1982, c l 976 Hamburg, CWM; Dr Schlie, Transcript of 
Interview by Fiona McHugh, 3 February 1978, Hamburg, DHIst 79/567/100, p.3 [Ullrich], p.5 
[telephone lines cut).
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minutes in the area of the Casino and below the west headland, only 
withdrawing when she was low on smoke bombs and her two Sin guns were 
jammed.’®
Most troops successfully disembarked from the LCAs without heavy 
casualties and the suppressing effect of the close-support fighters lifted as 
the initial assault troops were still trying to get through the heavier than 
expected wire obstacle on the beach and wall. A most serious naval error in 
timing occurred which had a serious result on the fortunes of the infantry.
The ten to fifteen minute late arrival of the first flight of LCTs, with the 
supporting tanks of 14 CATR, meant that a gap in suppressing fire occurred, 
allowing the Germans to quickly recover after the short air/sea 
bombardment. The German reaction was instantaneous and the results 
deadly. Action stations for the Dieppe garrison had been called about twenty 
minutes before, after receiving news of the attack on Pourville. Thus the 
Germans were able to quickly pin down the assaulting infantry as they 
attempted to cross the wire, get over the sea-wall, or cross the promenade. 
Stacey observes that 'In any opposed landing, the first minute or two after 
the craft touch down are of crucial importance; and it may be said that during 
that minute or two the Dieppe battle, on the main beaches, was lost. The 
impetus of the attack ebbed quickly away, and by the time the tanks arrived 
the psychological moment was past'. The Admiralty Battle Summary
’0 Lt Phillips, 'Extract of report by the Flotilla Officer HMS Prince Charles/, Appendix 3Q to 
Encl.13, p.32 [0520]; Lt-Cmdr W.S. Byles, 'Extract of report by Commanding Officer HMS 
Prince Leopold, Appendix 2E to Encl.13, p.11 ['few minute after]; Lt P. Cork, 'Extract of 
report by the Flotilla Officer HMS Qlengyle/, Appendix 3F to Encl.13, p.30; 'Extract of report by 
Lt-Cmdr C.W. McMullen', Appendix 5 to Encl.13, pp.39-40, all In Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force 
Commanders Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (048); 
an after-action German photograph clearly identifies LCAs BL5 and BL7 abandoned on White 
beach, Paris, Fort D'lvry, ECP Armées, DAM 1141/L13, pictured in this authors Dieppe 
through the lena, p.48.
258
concludes failure was due to the 'murderous enfilade fire' from the guns 
concealed in the east cliff face which was greater than had been 
anticipated.^^
ACTIONS OF INFANTRY ON RED AND WHITE BEACHES
Personal accounts by RHLI officers and men who landed and 
managed to return to the UK, clearly indicate the terrible carnage and 
difficulties the Coys suffered on landing. D Coy was reported to be almost 
wiped out, two of its Pis being in the LCAs hit on the approach in. The troops 
first assaulted the barbed wire which they successfully blew gaps in with 
Bangalore torpedoes. Suffering heavily from the fire of a concrete pillbox 
located to the north-east comer of the Casino, attacks on this were finally 
successful by the use of a Bangalore torpedo stuck through one of the 
embrasures. A report received at 0619 by the second HQ ship, Femie, stated 
the RHLI were still 'held up on beach by heavy firing'. After cutting through 
more wire around the Casino, small RHLI units supported by engineers, 
were able to filter into it. A room-to-room, clearing procedure was undertaken 
throughout the maze of rooms in the large building. Many snipers were killed 
and about thirty PoWs were taken. The troublesome concrete bunker built 
into the north-west comer of the Casino was also neutralized with explosive
John Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Narrative', Encl.1, p.3, to 'Naval Force 
Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48) 
[LCTs 10-15 minutes late]; Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides 
of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', p.60, in Tha history of the 302, ed. Emil Kllgast, CWM (action 
stations called at 0501]; Stacey, Six years of war, p.375; The Admiralty Battle Summary 
continues that It is these guns were 'Impossible to detect even at close range until they fired 
and... could not easily be silenced by our own fire. This enfilade fire made the capture and 
retention of the beaches almost Impossible and was therefore the main cause of the failure to 
press on through Dieppe and attain objectives laid down In the plan, Admiralty, Battle 
Summary No.33, p.27, PRO, ADM 234/355.
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charges. The mop up process took about an hour and at 0712 the Caipe 
received the report -  'Casino taken'.^z
Even before the three-storey Casino was cleared, a group of fourteen 
men, led by Capt. A.W. 'Toni' Hill, 2ic B Coy, had penetrated through to the 
back of the Casino, into the first row of buildings and town. At one point they 
engaged an German anti-tank gun positioned at the intersection of the Rue 
de Sygogne and Rue Claude Groulard. The position of this gun and crew 
are shown in a German photograph taken during the battle. They engaged 
other parties of Germans before being forced to withdraw the way they had 
come, due to increasingly heavy German resistance. At least one other RHLI 
group of eighteen, led by L-Sgt G.A. Hickson, also managed to use the 
Casino to penetrate into the town; covered in their sprint across the open 
Boulevard de Verdun, to the relative safety of the sea-front buildings, by 
Churchill tank BERT (SSM Gerald M. Menzies, 6 Tp, B Squadron). They 
reached an area north of the Church of St Remy but were soon forced to 
withdraw to the Casino because ammunition was exhausted and no support 
was in evidence. For this action Hickson was decorated with the 
Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM).^3
After-action reports by three RHLI officers -  Capt. W. Denis Whitaker, Lt W.C. Dick, Lt J.B. 
Halladay -  are In MAC, RQ 24/10870/232C2 (D6); revealing post-war interviews of RHLI 
officers, Capt. D.W. 'Wes' Clare (Medical Officer), Capt. John Foote (Chaplain), Capt. A.W. 
Toni' Hill (B Coy), Lt-Col Robert R. Labatt (CO), are in the largely unused block of 125 
interviews done by Terence McCartney-Fllgate for the CBC 1979 production Dieppe 1942, 
DHIst 79/567/22, 36, 46, 62; ‘Femie Intelligence Log', p.1, HQ 2 CID, War Diary, August 
1942, Appendix 63, NAC, RQ 24/13747/Serlal 152/QS Folder 9 ['held up on beach']; 'Caipe 
Intelligence Log', p.4, HQ 2 CID, War Diary, August 1942, Appendix 51, NAC, RQ 
24/13746/Serial 152/QS Folder 7 [0712 'Casino taken'].
The Qerman anti-tank gun photo Is in Koblenz, Bundesarchiv 611/2124-5, pictured in this 
author's, 'The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe', p.64; Charles P. Stacey, ‘Operation Jubilee', the raid 
on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Pari II; the execution of the operation. Section 2; the attack on 
the main beaches', 17 December 1943, amended 12 July 1950, p.10-11 [Hill penetration], 
p.11-12 [Hickson penetration], DHIst, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.108; Stacey, Six 
years of war, p.376 [Hickson DCM].
4 ,
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The Essex Scottish were worse off than the RHLI since they did not 
have the cover of the Casino, once captured, and received fire not only from 
both headlands and the sea-front buildings, but also from the flank, from the 
French tank at the base of the west jetty, and from the rear, from the 37mm 
gun half way along the jetty. On landing, Capt. D.F. McRae, the only Essex 
Scottish officer to land and return to England, reported that his men were 
able to overcome two belts of wire on the beach and reach the wall, but by 
0545 had received thirty to forty percent casualties. Stacey believes this 
estimate to be high.^*
Some men did make it across the promenade and into the houses 
about five minutes after landing, before the German fire became too intense. 
A group of about twelve men across were able to cross, the most senior of 
which was CSM Cornelius Stapleton, and were joined by
CpI C.H. Grondin and a Pte Fleming. The latter reported, on repatriation in 
1945, that he and Grondin had been the only two of nine to make it across. 
Stapleton took charge and led the group through the buildings, killing 
snipers and penetrating as far as the harbour, before being forced to retreat 
to the beach. This penetration is confirmed by two sources, a signal from the 
Essex to the RHLI and recorded on the Caipe, and the German divisional 
history, which recorded at 0816 that its troops 'had thrown the enemy back 
from the harbour railway station (100 metres distant from the beach)'. For this 
action Stapleton was awarded the DCM.'^
Essex Scottish, War Diary, NAC, RQ 24/17513/August 1942/Appendix 6 [MacRae report); 
Stacey, Six years of war, p.337,
Charles P. Stacey, Operation Jubilee', the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part II; the 
execution of the operation. Section 2: the attack on the main beaches', 17 December 1943, 
amended 12 July 1950, pp.14-15 (Stapleton penetration, Caipe], DHist, CMHQ Historical 
Officer Report No. 108; see also CSM Cornelius Stapleton, Transcript of interview, 1978, 
DHist 79/567/107; Lt-Qen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of 
Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in The history of the 302, ed. Emil Kilgast, p.74.
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McRae reported that soon after landing three attempts were made to 
overcome the wall, wire and promenade, but all were repulsed with heavy 
casualties. McRae states that by 0630 the Essex Scottish had suffered 
seventy-five percent casualties, including the majority of officers being killed 
or severely wounded, thus were no longer able to continue organized 
assaults and could only maintain defensive fire from behind the wall. By 
1030 he records that ammunition had been exhausted, including that of the 
casualties, and men resorted to scrounging what they could from abandoned 
tanks.’®
ACTIONS OF THE TANKS AND ENGINEERS
The first nine tanks and supporting engineers, in three LCTs, were 
supposed to land simultaneously with the initial assault infantry. The tanks 
were to suppress or destroy all pillboxes and other difficult German 
defences, while the demolition engineers, infantry support and beach 
parties, were to remain in the LCTs until this had been done. In the event, the 
tanks were unable to complete this task. Many of the army troops thus did not 
disembark, ieading to later unfounded accusations of cowardice by certain 
naval personnel.
A major intelligence failure was the incorrect identification of the exact 
composition of the beach at Dieppe which proved to be the main technical
’® Later McRae grimly depicted the situation:
The 3-Inch nvxtan war* aat up but almoat Inttanlly daitroyad by bomb or aha« Dr*. Smok* covar waa put ovar 
by th* 2-Inch mortar* and th* croaaing ct th * aaa wall wa* attarnptad. TN* croaaing wa* mat with Intanalv* gun 
arxl mortar Hr* a* wall a* LMQ lira and almoat all o l th* aaaaultirig troop* war* klMd or badly woundad. Th* 
CompanI** ralormad and daapit* Ih* loaa o l aom* oflicar* atartao a aaoond aaaault undar tia  oovar o( arrok*. By
tta* ttm* aorrt* o l tft* 2-Inch mortar* had baan daaboyad by anamy llr*  and th* aacond attack auflarad almllar 
to th* firat. ^  th i* tim * ttt* w lral*** aat* war* laigaly daatroyad: thar* baing only Vt* 18 aat m C  Companyta ta
atm hirvtlonlng. Th* anamy oontlnuad to ah*» th* baach with haavy mortar and MQ lira on Via llanka cauaing 
many caauana*. A turd altampi on a raducad acal* wa* mad* to croaa tia  wan arto wa* mat by a hat oMk* 
cauaing moat ol tw  paraonnal to baoom* caauaHI**.
Essex Scottish, War Diary, NAC, RQ 24/17513/August 1942/Appendlx 6 [MacRae report].
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difficulty for the tanks. The whole beach is composed of chert rocks which 
range from one to six inches in diameter. All Dieppe accounts refer to the 
beach in general terms, such as 'shale' or 'pebbles'. The Allies had carried 
out landing tests with the tanks on the firm, sandy beaches of the Isle of 
Wight and on the small, pebbly beaches of Dorset, but not on a chert beach, 
such as found at Dover.
The Germans, who had conducted at least one such trial, six months 
previously during an anti-invasion exercise, found their tanks became 
bellied down and stuck. The Port Commandant is reported as concluding, 
'now we know the British cannot land here with tanks'. Since they thought 
the beach was not negotiable by tanks no heavy anti-tank guns or anti-tank 
mines were allocated to its defence.^^
The RCE were divided into two main groups -  the Beach Assault 
Party, commanded by Major Bert Sucharov, and the Demolition Party,
Stan A. Kanik, a former trooper of A Squadron, 14 CATR, who was on the raid but did not 
land, returned to Dieppe several times after the war, most recently in 1992. Drawing on his 
knowledge as a geological engineer his analysis of the beach clearly explains why many tanks 
had difficulty manoeuvring on the beach. He notes, 'the white cliffs are composed of siliceous 
chalk, interspersed with chert lenses and beds'. The chalk is easily dissolved and leaves 
behind the chert which under beach erosion is 'shaped Into rounded and oblong stones 
(rocks) that resist cracking or breaking'. He continues. The entire beach is composed of chert 
stones, boulders and rubble', which after tidal action, 'eventually rest at an 'angle of repose' 
of about 15 to 20 degrees... these rocks will extend many meters in depth, so vehicles cannot 
dig down to a solid rock base for traction. When a tracked or wheeled vehicle tries to climb up 
this slope, it Immediately digs Itself down; when the tracks are turned to either side the stones 
roll in between the drive sprocket and track and the object that first gives way is the pins 
holding the track links'. See Stan A. Kanik, 'Chert Beach -  Allas Dieppe', The Informal history 
of The Calgary Regiment -  14th Canadian Armoured Regiment, eds. Lt-Col R.Q. 'Dick' Maltby 
and Major W.R. 'Jesse' James (Vancouver; 50/14 Veterans Association, Calgary, 1989), 
Chapter 2, p.1; see also E.L. Waldo Smith, What time the tempest: an army chaplain's story 
(Toronto: Ryerson, 1953), p.75.
Wahn, 'Report of the Port Commandant Dieppe on the fighting on 19 August 1942', 30 
August 1942, p.4, NAC, RQ 24/20488/981 ON (D13) [beach tank exercise); a former Canadian 
Army Historical Officer states that the Germans had not overlooked the possibility of an 
amphibious assault with tanks. However, he continues, 'after conducting trials with a tank on 
the pebbly beach, the Germans had concluded that it was impassable to tracked vehicles', T. 
Murray Hunter, Canada at Dieppe 17 (Canadian War Museum Historical Publication, Ottawa: 
Canadian War Museum, 1982), p.33.
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commanded by Lt-Col L.F. Barnes, and then subdivided into various sized 
detachments and squads depending on their missions and distributed 
throughout the LCTs. The Beach Assault Party was responsible for getting all 
tanks, vehicles, troops, and materials, from the point of touchdown by the 
naval craft onto, across, and clear of the beach area. This meant clearing 
minefields, demolishing any anti-tank concrete road blocks at the exits of the 
promenade and, using bulldozers to clear boulders, prepare ramps for 
evacuation and generally keep the beaches clear. If needed, these 
machines could also help vehicles stuck on the beach and push off 
grounded landing craft. Their most important task was ensuring that the 
tanks quickly crossed over the beach and the sea-wall. Four-man squads, 
carried in the first six LCTs, were to run out ahead of the lead tanks to lay 
chespaling tracks, which were flexible rolls of chestnut fencing, 'similar to 
wood-slat snow fencing but made with tough split-slats'. The bundles 
weighed about two hundred and fifty pounds, were approximately twenty-five 
feet long and could be wired together to form a continuous roadway. These 
tracks could be moved around by the engineers to suit the later flights of 
incoming LCTs.A l l  tanks, carriers and jeeps then passed over these tracks, 
only becoming bogged down if they swerved off them. Since many of the 
scout cars had experienced difficulty during training even on the chespaling, 
it was decided that during the operation these should be towed ashore by 
the tanks. Note that the pebbles on the Dorset beach were small, up to two 
inches in diameter, whereas at Dieppe they were up to six inches. The sea­
wall was estimated to be up to six feet in height. The Rutter plan of using
Major Bart Sucharov, 'Report ol the training carried out by the Engineer Group from 2 
Canadian Division during the exercises Rutter and Jublleet, 20 August 1942, to Chief 
Engineer, 1 Canadian Corps, p.6 and Appendix 2, DHIst 594.019(08).
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sappers to blow gaps in the wall was changed in favour of building timber 
crib ramps beside it for the tanks to climb. On the morning of the operation 
the intensity of German fire was such that no timbers were ever unloaded.^ 
From 7 August 1942 Major Sucharov was assigned to develop and 
test a device to enable the tanks to get over the sea-wall. He came up with a 
carpet-laying device using chespaling. He designed an apparatus to hold 
one roll of chespaling, three feet wide (the width of one track was twenty-two 
inches) and about twenty-five to thirty feet long, in front of each track. 
Controlled electrically from the turret, the ends of the rolls could be released 
when the tank was the appropriate distance from the sea-wall. The rolls 
would then be gradually dragged under the tank's tracks. The tank could 
then mount up to a twenty-eight inch wall without problem. After use, the 
whole apparatus could be jettisoned by an explosive charge, electrically set 
off from inside the turret. The device was demonstrated to Lt-Col Andrews 
and approved by him on 14 August.^' Finally, the Beach Assault Party was 
responsible for preparing for the successful reembarkation of all tanks and 
vehicles.
^  Under favourable conditions', which supposedly meant not under heavy fire, a highly 
trained detachment of thirty engineers could carry the five tons of material necessary thirty 
yards and build a ramp beside a seven-foot wall in five minutes, Major Bert Sucharov, 'Report 
of the training carried out by the Engineer Group from 2 Canadian Division during the 
exercises Rutter anti Jubilee/, 20 August 1942, to Chief Engineer, 1 Canadian Corps, p.10 
and Appendix 2, DHist 594.019(D8).
Major B. Sucharov, 'Report of the training carried out by the Engineer Group from 2 
Canadian Division during the exercises Rutter anti Jubilee/, 20 August 1942, to Chief 
Engineer, 1 Canadian Corps, Appendix 3, DHist 594.019(D8) [beach track laying device]; also 
explained in A.J. Kerry and W.A. McDill, The history o f the Corps o l the Royal Canadian 
Engineers, 1936-1946, 2 (2 vols., Ottawa: Military Engineers Association of Canada, 1966), 
p.99; Major B. Sucarov, 'Combined operations, Dieppe', 2 September 1942, Appendix 1, p.1, 
NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2 (D3) [Andrews approval]. The only known photograph of a 
Churchill tank Mark III (FI in a circle, OC C Sqn, Major Allen Glenn) training with the track laying 
apparatus, was taken by Lt Edwin Bennett, 10 Tp B Sqn, pictured in this author's. The Calgary 
Tanks at Dieppe', p.62.
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The Demolition Party was charged with demolishing Dieppe's 
transportation, communication and power infrastructure -  power stations, 
petrol dumps, dockyard, dry-docks, swing bridges, gas works, pumping 
stations, telephone exchanges and rail facilities. The group was split up into 
many small squads, each with its own commanding officer, and assigned 
precise objectives to be sabotaged once the infantry and tanks secured a 
perimeter around the town. Most of these squads never got off the beach.22
Thirty minutes prior to the LCTs touchdown, the tanks warmed up their 
engines. The first wave of tanks arrived about fifteen minutes late due to 
navigational error. As noted, during this critical period, the infantry had no 
fire support and the Germans were able to recover from the short preliminary 
air and naval bombardment and man their weapons. The assaulting infantry 
were thus caught trying to breach the heavy belts of wire, the majority 
becoming pinned down at the sea-wall, unable to dig slit trenches for cover 
in the rocks. The majority of infantry that passed these obstacles, and later 
took the Casino, were only able to do so with the support of the engineers 
and tanks.23
^  The engineers suffered 87 to 90 per cent casualties -  the highest rate of any unit in the 
raid, see Lt-Col L.F. Barnes, 'Report on combined operations', 5 September 1942, p.7, NAC, 
this author's Dieppe Coliection; Kerry, Royal Canadian Engineers, p.108, shows a breakdown 
of the types of casualties; as does Brigadier C, Churchill Mann, 'General Operational 
Questions and Answers -  Operation Jubilee!, I 8  October 1942, p.4, NAC, RG 
24/10870/231 C2(D2).
^  Hughes-Hallett states a fifteen minute delay by the LCTs was due to navigational error by 
Femie, Navigational Report', Enel.9, p.1, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 
0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D48). The unarmoured LCTs (Mks 2 
and 3) could hold three or four tanks and one or two smaller vehicles, such as scout cars, 
jeeps or universal carriers. They had a  crew of two officers and ten men and were armed with a 
dual set of 2pdr pom-poms, see Admiralty, 'Types of landing craft'. Appendix D, p.S3, Battle 
Summary, PRO, ADM 234/355 [no armour, two 2pdr pom-poms]; further details of LCT 
specifications are from Baker, 'LCT(2 & 3) Landing Craft, Tank', Allied landing craft of World 
War If, Brown, The design and construction of British warships, pp,48-50; Ladd, Assault from 
the sea 1939-45, pp.91-S. The tanks themselves had been adapted for amphibious 
operations up to a depth of six feet using rubber balloon fabric. Tall, box-shaped ducts, known 
as louvre extensions, were fitted to the air Intake vents and the exhaust pipes were extended
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Flight 1, consisting of three LCT(2)s carrying a total of nine tanks, 
meant to land simultaneously with the LCAs, touched down at approximately 
0525 and 0535 hours, five to fifteen minutes late. Sources do not agree on 
the time. Flight 1 A, also consisting of three LCT(2)s carrying nine tanks, 
touched down on time at 0535. On touching down four of the LCTs were 
heavily shelled, becoming so badly damaged and killing the majority of the 
naval crews, that one was sunk and three were unable to withdraw, 
becoming stranded on the beach. Flight 2 of four LCT(2)s carried a total of 
twelve tanks and beached on schedule at 0605 hours. All tanks 
disembarked except for one, unable to do so due to the intensity of fire. 
Although only one LCT was sunk, the others were so severely damaged that 
they had to be towed back to England.^
Of the twenty-nine tanks that attempted to land, two exited prematurely 
and drowned in deep water, while the rest landed dry-shod. Of these twenty- 
seven, fifteen crossed the sea-wall (German records claim sixteen), although 
ten ultimately returned to the beach in the area of the Casino, where one 
was immobilized by the chert.^s The remaining twelve tanks never got off the
so as to be well above the water line. The waterproofing and the louvre extensions could be 
blown off by electrically-triggered cordite charges placed underneath them. The 
waterproofing procedure was still in the experimental stage and had never been tested under 
battle conditions. Detailed waterproofing Instructions were first Issued 9 June 1942, Lt W.H. 
Payne, Technical Adjutant, 14 CATR, '14 Cdn Army Tank Bn (The Calgary Regiment): 
Waterproofing Infantry Tank Mark IV, Churchill I, II, and III', 9 June 1942, pp.1-2, plus 
attachment, '14 Cdn Army Tank Bn (The Calgary Regiment): Instructions in the use of 
complete sealing kK on Churchills I, II, and III', nd., pp.1-3, both In 14 CATR, War Diary, NAC, 
RG 24/14242/January-August 1942/Appendix 4.
The most thorough account to date of the actions of each of the twenty-nine tanks landed. 
Including hitherto unpublished photographs of every one, and based on primary and 
secondary sources, including personal communication with at least one crew member of each 
tank and most other vehicles, is this author's, Dieppe through the lens, pp.9-60; see also this 
author's summary, with further unpublished photographs, 'The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe', 
pp.61-74.
^  Fifteen tanks across the wall is the standard figure quoted by Allied documents and 
confirmed by Stacey, Six years of war, p.379; 81 Army Corps Headquarters, 'Combat report 
and experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August
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beach; four had their tracks broken by shellfire, four by the chert and three 
most likely by the chert, although this is not certain. The last tank chose to 
stay on the beach and was mobile for the duration of the battle.^ Of the tanks 
on the promenade, one's track soon broke from the pressure of the chert 
stuck in it, while the others drove back and forth, unable to penetrate the 
town because of the huge concrete road blocks, on which the tanks' armour 
piercing shells had no effect. The engineers and sappers had suffered 
tremendous casualties and could not get across the promenade to demolish 
these barriers. The remaining two flights of LCT(3)s carrying the whole of A 
Squadron and the remaining three troops of C Squadron, a total of twenty- 
eight tanks, were never sent in. Although they did receive a signal at 0850 to 
land at White beach, this order was counter-manded ten minutes later during 
the approach. The two tank beach parties, instead of carrying out their 
planned initial tasks of directing the tanks to their objectives, spent most of 
their time in assisting wounded and organizing tank cover for the general 
withdrawal.27
At 1 too hours, the senior tank officer ashore. Major Allen Glenn, OC C 
Sqn, ordered all remaining mobile tanks to withdraw to the beach and take 
up defensive positions to cover the infantry withdrawal. On doing so another 
tank broke its track in the chert. It seems that the Germans were preparing an
1942, p.14, SHAEF translation, 24 February 1944, NAC, RG 24 G3/20438/981.023 (DIO) (16 
tanks crossed]; air reconnaissance on 20 and 21 August revealed tank tracks crossing the 
sea-wall at eight places, 'Memorandum of Interview of Major Tweedsmuir by Major J.D. Halbert, 
QS02, CMHQ', 27 August 1942, Bovington, The Tank Museum, File 5025.
^  The crew commander. Major Allen Glenn, OC C Sqn and the senior tank officer ashore, 
chose to do this as the ridge on the beach was the best place for command and control, since 
he could see both flanks of the beach and promenade clearly, see this author's Dieppe 
through the leris, p.14.
^  SO LCTs Red and White beaches, 'Extract of report from the Commanding Officer of ‘ B* 
LCT, Appendix 15 to Enel. 13, p.2, Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. 
NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48) [signal 0850).
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infantry counter-attack which the tanks probably deterred. By noon all tanks 
had been immobilized, fourteen with broken tracks, although many 
continued to fire until they ran out of ammunition. All 14 CATR veterans and 
Allied reports claim no tanks' armour was penetrated by anti-tank fire while 
crews were still in them, although German reports and a photo, reveal that 
two were penetrated by 37mm shots.2» This probably occurred after the 
crews evacuated and the Germans moved their anti-tank guns closer. Any 
casualties to 14 CATR personnel occurred outside the tanks. Contemporary 
reports that some tanks actually entered the back streets of the town are 
false,29
Dieppe's chert beach defeated at least six, and probably nine tanks, 
or thirty percent of those ashore. The beach track laying device attached to 
some of the lead tanks had not, as many historians claim, been meant to aid 
the tanks over this hazardous obstacle but was designed to give a tank 
traction at the moment of crossing the two-foot-high sea-wall. Two of the 
three tanks carrying this device successfully used it as it was designed, 
although COUGAR, 13 Tp C Sqn, had problems jettisoning the apparatus
29 Report by Lt-Col G.C. Reeves on the raid carried out on Dieppe on 19 August 1942', 
Assistant Director of Tank Design (ADTD), 28 August 1942, p.5, PRO, DEFE 2/344 
[ammunition exhausted]; 81 Army Corps HQ, Operations Officer, 'Combat report and 
experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, 
p.14, NAC, RG 24/20438/981.023 (D10) [two 37mm penetrations]; Rundstedt, 'Principal 
comments of the C-in-C Army Group West. No.11 (Based on practical examination of and trials 
with English tanks captured at Dieppe)', 15 September 1942, translation, p.2, PRO, WO  
232/37 [states two tanks penetrated by something between 37mm and 50mm calibre]; ECPA, 
DAA 2815/L04, pictured In this author's, Dieppe through the tens, p.29 [close-up photo of 
BACKER (F t), HQ F Tp, B Sqn, showing 37mm penetration],
29 Reports that tanks entered town are in Jacques Mordal, Dieppe: the Dawn ot Decision 
(London: NEL, 1981, c1963), p.203; Kerry, Royal Canadian Engineers, p.107; a contrary 
report Is Christopher Buckley, Nonway. The Commandos. Dieppe (London: HMSO, 1951), p.- 
258.
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which had either been damaged by enemy shell fire or was technically 
faulty.**
The success of the experimental waterproofing and deep wading 
attachments on the tanks cannot be determined because almost all the LCTs 
landed dry and many tanks received damage to their exhaust and air intake 
louvres and waterproofing before and while exiting the LCTs, resulting in two 
drowning. Most of these problems were caused either by the tanks scraping 
against the sides of the LCTs or by enemy fire. At least one tank, BULL, 8 Tp 
B Sqn, had one of its louvres knocked off before disembarking, probably by 
the concussion of an exploding shell.3’ Some tank crews were unable, or 
only partially able, to blow the waterproofing and wading attachments, 
probably because the charges had been damaged by enemy fire. A few 
crews even had to manually cut this away, either because the partially blown 
fabric had jammed their turret traverse or obscured their vision ports. Proper 
testing of this equipment under actual fire, especially during disembarking 
training, would have revealed its vulnerability. A former Churchill tank officer 
claims that due to the fact it was still in the experimental stage, there had not 
been enough time to undertake this kind of training and testing. No 
arrangement was made for shedding the exhaust extensions.^z
** This authors, Dieppe through the lens, p.18 [COUGAR).
'^'‘Report by Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Reeves on the Raid carried out on Dieppe on 19 
August 1942', AOTD, 28 August 1942, pp.4-5, PRO, DEPE 2/334; an air louvre of BULL can 
be clearly seen In the photo of the stranded LCT-3, ECPA, DAM 1141 L09, pictured in this 
authors, Dieppe through the lens, p.23.
^  Director Mechanical Engineering, 'Lessons of the Dieppe Raid-19 August 1942', 18 
September 1942, Bovington, The Tank Museum, File 5608 [exhaust extensions); this 
authors, Dieppe through the lens, pp.21, 39, 49 [waterproofing problems); John F. Wallace, a 
former Tp Leader in the Three Rivers Regiment, In a critical reply to this authors article. The 
Calgary Tanks at Dieppe', states. There were no pilot models to play with. There was simply no 
time to play with tests!', 'Letter to the Editor, Canadian Military History A/2 (Autumn 1995), 6.
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The tanks were also severely under gunned. Eleven of the tanks had 
obsolete 2pdrs, while the other eighteen had 6pdrs (approximately 57mm 
calibre). Commenting on the latter was former 9 Tp Leader, B Sqn, the 
Honourable Marcel J.A. Lambert, 'The tank development up to that time 
made us woefully undergunned, I mean we had just converted to a 6pdr gun 
on a forty-two ton tank. I mean it was like sending an elephant with a BB 
gun'. Although the 6pdr was the most modem British gun, a German military 
appreciation concerning the Churchill tank in the operation, and intended for 
internal distribution (as opposed to use for propaganda purposes), 
concluded that, 'so far as its performance is concerned, [it] does not 
approach that of the Russian guns of the same calibre'.^^ The 6pdr tanks did 
not even have high explosive shells since they were still in the development 
stage. Turret traverse jams were caused by shellfire hitting the 6pdr turret 
ring. Some tanks had either their radio, electrical, hydraulic or steering 
systems damaged by anti-tank and dive-bomber hits. All these difficulties 
were technical problems that could have been foreseen with more testing, 
especially under actual fire. The necessary firing tests were carried out after 
the operation. The new 6pdr turret gun also jammed on many occasions, 
even though it had been tested before the raid. However, the guns were test 
fired with only five or six rounds, due to the shortage of ammunition, and at a 
low rate of fire. During the battle crews obviously fired as quickly as possible, 
the majority of crews exhausting all their ammunition of about one hundred 
rounds. The high rate of fire was concluded as the reason for the jams and
^  R u n d a^ , 'Principal comments of the C-ln-C Army Group West, No.11 (Based on practical 
examination of and trials with English tanks captured at Dieppe)', IS  September 1942, 
translation, p.1, PRO, WO 232/37.
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also revealed the tanks normal stowage of ammunition was insufficient for 
an operation of this type.3<
The German appreciation noted that it, 'offers nothing worthy of 
consideration by technical personnel, nor has it any new constructive 
features either in the metallurgical field or in the field of weapon technology'. 
Commenting further on their armament, the Sin howitzer and 2pdr were 
considered obsolete. The armour thickness was considered good but of poor 
quality, compared to that used on German and Russian vehicles. The shape 
of the tank was considered outdated with the armour offering 'a considerable 
angle of impact'. The report concluded that the tracks were 'made of very 
brittle material' of 'clumsy design' and 'fractured every time' they received a 
direct hit, which did not occur with German and Russian tracks. On testing 
the tanks it was found that the considerable track noise definitely inhibited 
the use of the wireless, to the point where the tanks had to stop to be able to 
hear radio transmitted speech. On the whole, the report gave the Churchill a 
very low rating, finishing that it, 'in its present form, is easy to combat'.^s
Concerning the other vehicles landed, at least two scout cars were 
rammed by their towing-tanks, probably because tank crews forgot about 
them in the excitement of battle and confusion caused by the unexpected 
fierce enemy resistance. Four others were towed ashore as planned but then 
became bogged down or were hit by shell-fire. One, named HECTOR, did
3* Report by Lt-Col G.C. Reeves on the raid carried out on Dieppe on 19 August 1942',
ADTD, 28 August 1942, pp. 3-5, PRO, DEFE 2/334. All tanks were supplied with an extra box 
of Besa ammunition.
^  CBC, 'Their springtime of life', Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, television 
production, 29 August 1972, CBC, VHS Cassette U-0S717 [Lambert interview]; Runddbdt, 
'Principal comments of the C-in-C Army Group West, No. 11 (Based on practical examination of 
and trials with English tanks captured at Dieppe)', 15 September 1942, translation, p.1, PRO, 
W O 232/37.
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make the promenade but, on returning to the beach, was disabled by a 
mortar bomb. Only one universal carrier and one jeep landed, both not 
moving off the beach. None of the bulldozers landed, although one was left 
in the back of the stranded LCT-3.*
THE LANDING OF RESERVES AND MISCELLANEOUS UNITS
Not much information is known concerning the three Rangers who 
were to land on the centre beaches. Sgt. Kenneth G. Kenyon, was with a 
Canadian unit he could not identify, that closed on the beach and then 
withdrew. This would put him in one of the LCT(3)s that were ordered in at 
0850. According to Ranger Swank, Kenyon was off loaded on to the Caipe, 
and 'helped lift me aboard the Caipe after I came off Green beach and I was 
with him when he was wounded a few moments later". First Lt Robert 
Flanagan also never got ashore. Swank relates that Szima, who returned to 
the UK with Flanagan, stated that Flanagan was 'visibly disturbed by the 
events of 19 August', and as a result of his own request, was transferred out 
of the Rangers shortly after the raid. According to information related to 
Swank by Edwin Bennett, 10 Tp Leader, B Sqn, 14 CATR, Technician Fourth 
Grade (T/4) Howard M. Henry, was believed to have been attached to the 
RCE Beach Assault Party. Bennett states T/4 Henry was on LCT-7 with him 
and saw him killed on landing on White beach at the waters edge near the 
Casino. A post-raid German photograph shows a dead American, identified 
by the style leggings, near the tank BLOSSOM, in front of the C as in o .3 7
3B Photograph of Interior of LCT-3, ECPA, DAM 1141 L09, pictured In this author's, Dieppe 
through the lens, p.23.
^  M.Q. Swank to Brereton Greenhous, 'List of men on Dieppe raid: Officers and man of the 
First Ranger Battalion who participated In the raid on Dieppe, Franca', cover letter, 28 January 
1979, DHIst 79/139 [Kenyon, Flanagan, Henry]; Alex J. Szima to M.Q. Swank and Sid
27 3
Five members of X-Troop, No. 10 (lA) Commando, were scheduled to 
land in the four LCT(2)s of Flight 2. Their names and missions were outlined 
previously. None of the men achieved their objectives or even made it off the 
beach. Little is known of Smith and Rice except that they were captured and 
'never heard of again'. Platt returned without having landed. In his after 
action report, he states he was switched from LCT-8 (No. 125) to LCT-7 
(No. 124) in Harvey's place, but the rest of his account indicates that this was 
not the case and he definitely was in LCT-8. He explains that he was on 
board the same LCT as HQ 4 Canadian Armoured [s/c] Brigade, which 
beached one tank at about 0605, withdrew, let off a second one, and the 
third did not land. The craft was then towed back to the UK. This corresponds 
exactly to the actions of LCT-8, the only LCT to be left with one tank. During 
this encounter Platt received a gunshot wound to the leg and was then 
transferred to another boat. He explains that he and the two FS Sgts, 'would 
have been hard put to have finished' their four missions 'in the allotted time'. 
He concluded that during the operation he did not see any other members of 
X-Troop.»
Latimer, whose real name was M. Loewy, was on LCT-10 with two FS 
Sgts he had never met before. Together they were known as the 'Brown
Salomon, National President Ranger Association, 3 February 1979, TMFDC [Bennett on 
Henry]; Eric Maguire, Dieppe: August 19, London: Jonathan Cape, 1963, p.69, Plate entitled 
Dieppe.Debris of Battle' [dead American).
»  R e  Smith landed In LCT-7, R e  Platt in LCT-8, R e  Rice In LCT-9, and Latimer In LCT-10.
R e Harvey, who was to have been in LCT-7 with Smith, failed to turn up, and he Is not shown 
as having taken part In the unit war diary. Brig. C.C. Mann to Col Neville, COHO, 10 August 
1942, 'SOE -  Operation Jubilee/, and attached hand-written list of 'Special Intelligence' 
detachment, NAC RQ 24/13747/General 152/QS8 [names, LCT allotment); 'Statement by 
Pte. B. Platt on his part In operation against the enemy at Dieppe', 22 September 1942, 
Appendix B, and entry tor 19 August 1942 [names of participants]. War Diary, No. 10 (lA) 
Commando. PRO, WO 218/40; Dear, Ten Commando, p.21 ['never heard'], pp.21-2. Dear 
quotas Platt's account at length, not noting the discrepancy concerning LCTs, and repeating 
Platt's error of HQ 4 Canadian 'Arrrraured' Brigade.
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Party'. Three tanks of 15 Tp C Sqn, a jeep, motorcycle and some engineers 
were also aboard. He states his orders were 'to proceed independently to 
German General HQ in Dieppe to pick up all documents etc. of value, 
including, if possible, a new German respirator'. The operation orders 
indicate that his group was to search the 'Artillery Regiment HQ probably in 
Hotel Select'. They were also permitted to bring PoWs back. He recalls 
touching down on Red beach, 'shortly after 0600', and the 'MG and howitzer 
fire was intense (cross and frontal fire)'. He states that he and the two 
sergeants swam to the beach and found 'it was impossible to go fonward'. 
They then swam back to another LCT which had both steering gear and 
main door broken and were later towed back to England.^^
The seven members of the French 1 Troop, No. 10 (IA) Commando, 
under command of Lt Vourch, did not fare any better then those of X-Troop. 
The men were Sgt. Raymond Dumanoir, Ptes Antoine Borettini, Georges 
Jean, Gabriel Loverini (or Loverigny), Jean Simon and Pierre Tanniou. 
These men had trained with the Royal Marine Commando and landed with 
them. Although Dear writes that none of them landed, this is disputed by 
other sources, which claim that they were on shore and later managed to 
return to the England that evening.^
^  Qervase Cowell, SOE Advisor, to H. Henry, 13 June 1996, with attached list of names, 
aliases and birth dates of members of 3 (Mise.) Troop, No.10 (lA) Commando, nd„ p.2 [M. 
Loewy]; 'Report of R e  Maurice Latimer on his part in the Dieppe raid', 23 October 1942, 
Appendix C, War Diary, No.10 (lA) Commando, PRO, WO 218/40; Brig. C.C. Mann, 
'Intelligence Plan', 8 August 1942, Appendix L, p.10, 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military 
Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10871/23202 (D25) ['Artillery Regiment HQ'].
^  No.10 (lA) Commando, War Diary, 19 August 1942 [surnames, ranks); Maurice Chauvet to 
Alain Buriot, 5 February 1992, and attached list participants, ABDC [full names, ranks); Dear, 
Ten Commando, p.23; Maurice Chauvet, 'Operation Jubilee, Dieppe 19 Août 1942', In D-Day 
Le B.F.M. Commando, Paris: Amicale des Ancien Parachutistes SAS & Commando, nd„ p.6 
[actions ashore).
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Information is scant concerning the eight SOE officers and men 
involved on the centre beaches. Major Valliant de Guelis never made it 
shore, D. Wyatt, SOE liaison officer to COHQ, was left behind and later killed 
while trying to establish contact with the local resistance movement, and 
Capt. Harratt, 'remained within hailing distance of the beach for five hours 
and then received orders to retire'. He was wounded but made it back to 
England and later recommended for the Military Cross (MC). Bisset's 
personal file in the SOE Archives only contains the entry 'August 1942, 
Dieppe Raid', in a summary of his career, giving nothing else to indicate if he 
landed or not.^’
The actions of the other special operational groups and 
miscellaneous detachments suffered a similar fate, none fulfilling their 
missions, the majority either being pinned on the beach or unable to land. 
The fate of the RM Commando and Fusiliers Mont-Royal now requires 
examination.
Roberts unfortunately received little signal information and what he 
did receive was often fragmented. This was the case when he received the 
report that the Essex Scottish was across the beach and into the town. This 
report was actually only referring to Stapleton's little group. He also had the 
signal that the RRC had not actually landed and therefore ordered them to 
land at Red Beach. Subsequently, he ordered the FMR to land at Red beach 
also. His thinking was to exploit the success of the Essex by landing two
Foot, SOE in France, p.184 (Guelis, Wyatt, Harratt wounded); 'List o( operations'. In P.J. 
Harratt Personal File, SOE Archives, FCO ['remained within']; Gervase Cowell, SOE Advisor, 
to H. Henry, 13 March 1996 [Blsset]; George Hirst, One tide to Dieppe, London; Transwortd 
Publishers Ltd., 1979, makes many claims about SOE agents being parachuted in prior to 
Jubiiee, their observation of the operation, repotting back to London by radio, capture and 
Interrogation. The SOE Archivist states that he found 'no trace of any of the names' claimed In 
the book, and thus It must be regarded as fiction, Gen/ase Cowell to H. Henry, 'SOE agents 
and 1942 Dieppe raid', 7 June 1996.
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more Bns, and with support of tanks, secure Bismarck, the east headland, at 
all costs. Thus at 0630 he ordered in the FMR. In the confusion of battle the 
LCPs landed along the whole length of Dieppe's beach, some directly below 
the west cliffs. Many casualties were incurred on the approach. Only one 
small group, led by Sgt. P. Dubuc, succeeded in getting into the town. These 
men were quickly captured although they later overcame their guard and 
made it back to the beach.^
Roberts received the further inaccurate report, just after 0800, that
RHLI 'have control of White beach'. Based on this signal he ordered the RM
Commando to transfer to LCAs to 'support the Essex Scottish through White
beach... the object... being to pass around the West and South of the town,
and attack the batteries on the eastern cliff from the South'. Stacey calls this
plan 'over-optimistic' which is a somewhat reserved judgement for an
operation that was on the verge of fantasy and just would not have been
possible. It did not matter since the Marines received withering fire as soon
as they cleared the smoke screen. The fire being so intense that the CO, Lt-
Col Phillipps, called off the assault, being mortally wounded doing so. Of the
seven craft that went in only three touched down, the remainder having
withdrawn or suffered engine trouble. The report of the senior Officer
Chasseurs, Lt M. Buist, gives a graphic account of the landing:
It was not long before I realized that this landing was to be a sea parallel of the Charge 
of the Light Brigade. There was Barrage fire coming from the cliffs on the East side of 
the harbour and from the houses on the promenade which showed only too well that 
White beach was under heavy fire... Shells started to burst all round the group of 
landing craft, which we endeavoured to screen by smoke.
^  The FMR suffered a total of 8 officers and 111 men killed, Stacey, Six years o l war, p. 382.
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From two of the landing craft officers who had turned back, Buist, heard that 
'the beach was a shambles with the bodies of the soldiers lying in 
arrowhead formation as they had advanced from the Landing Craft'.^
GERMAN ACTIONS AND MOVEMENT OF RESERVES
The two infantry platoons holding the Dieppe town itself were 
supplemented by the Naval Experimental Coy, which manned the eight 
beach defence guns. This latter unit suffered heavily within the first half hour. 
At 0546, consequently, 5 Coy, 571 IR, the sector reserve, assembled at the 
garrison commandant's HQ to counter-attack, although the first reference to 
its commitment was not until 0955 when it was ordered, along with 2 and 3 
Pis, 2 Coy, 302 Engineer Bn, 'to push fonward into the beach at Dieppe in 
order to mop up any enemy personnel still firing there' [see Map 2]. This 
counter-attack started about 1100. The next reference was not until 1310 
when it reported that 'mopping up is proceeding well on the Dieppe beach'.^
At 0800, in reaction to the landing of the tanks, which the light German 
anti-tank guns were having no effect on, the German command ordered 302 
Anti-tank Coy, with nine German Pak 97/38 75mm anti-tank guns, located 
south-west of Divisional HQ at Envermeu, to proceed to Dieppe. Put under 
command of 571 IR, it committed one PI to Dieppe East, one to the Dieppe 
harbour near the drawbridge, and the last to the west headland. These guns
*^'Calpe: Operation JuP//ee -  intelligence Log', 19 August, p.6, NAC, RQ 24/13746/Serlal 
152/QS Folder 7/Appendlx 5-1 [0817 signal); Stacey, Six years o l war, p.382 [plan 'over 
optimistic']; Lt. M. Buist, 'Extract of report from the senior Officer, Chasseurs', Appendix 19 to 
Encl.13, pp.2-3, Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 
August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (048).
^  Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 
1942', p.68 [0545], p.79 ['to push forward'], p.168 [1100, 1310 -  'mopping up']. In The 
history o l the 302, ed. Emil Kllgast, CWM.
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probably had a limited effect on the battle as the road blocks, which 
prevented the tanks from penetrating the towns, also prevented the anti-tank 
guns from engaging the tanks at close range. The heavy smoke screen, 
added to by the smoke of battle, also limited the effectiveness of the anti-tank 
guns assigned to the west headland. At 0920, hospital patients fit for action 
were moved up to replace the Engineer Coy as Regimental Reserve Coy. 
About the same time the 3 Bn, 570 IR was ordered to move to the western 
edge of the Forêt d'Arques. Fully motorized, this reserve Bn was to be 
prepared to counter any airborne landing attempt. The Dieppe garrison, with 
the attached units, were expected to be able to hold the town and no Corps 
reserves were assigned to the area.^
AIR OPERATIONS
The air aspect of the Dieppe raid generated much documentation, 
including numerous after-action reports and analyses. This was because of 
the magnitude of the Allied air forces involved -  seventy-four squadrons. As 
previously explained one of the objectives of the raid had been to bring the 
GAF fighter planes to battle and inflict wastage on them. The role of the air 
force in close-support actions was previously examined, though the vast 
majority of the airforces were not involved in this way, but in what became
^  Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 
1942', pp.101-2, in The history of the 302, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM. The former commander of 
the German 7 Bty, Capt. H.H. Ditz, commented on the Canadians situation on the centre 
boschos*
To b * sura It m utt ba ha* down, bacauaa our shatta wara stdMng avarywhara, up and down tha atfiola batch, and 
thair affacts w art muMpllad tan-lotd by tha rain o l atona tragmanta hurtad out with tvary aha« burat...
Navarthalaaa. wa cantad on with our annihilation firt on lha batch, avan If with only two guna. Attar all, 
no matlar how aorry wa might laal tor tha poor battarda down tia rt, wa had to contlnua to katn tha ditambaitiad 
troopt plrmad down no manar what, bacauaa If tia y  got Stair tacorxl wind and ranawad thair attack It could hava 
gona badly lor ua. H art only ona watchword appkad, arxl It waa: aWtar lham or ut.
H.H. Dltz, 'A Battery Commander remembers; the landing attempt by the Englishmen at 
Dieppe on the 19th of August 1942', p.34 [To be sure'), p.40 ['Nevertheless'], In The history 
of the 302, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM.
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the greatest single-seat fighter air battle of the war. This aspect, and all 
Jubilee air operations, have been adequately covered in a scholarly manner 
by Norman L.R. Franks, The greatest air battle: Dieppe, 19 August 1942 
(1979). Thus it is not necessary to examine it in any detail. The major myth 
resulting from this aspect of the raid was the greatly exaggerated German 
losses and the down-played Allied losses.'^
Actually Allied losses were much heavier than those of the German 
and it appears as though it was an Allied defeat. In fact it was the Allies’ 
largest loss of aircraft in one day during the war. On the other hand, two 
former Canadian DHist historians note that not only were the Allies far more 
able to bear the losses, but that the situation is different when the ratio of 
losses to sorties flown is examined. While the Allies flew a total of 2,614 
sorties, the Germans flew approximately 600. This equates to the loss of one 
fighter for every 27.2 sorties flown whereas the Germans lost one per 7.6 
sorties. In summary, the Germans lost a third of their fighter strength in the 
west, while the Allies lost less then a tenth. But, as the DHist historians
^  The initial official conservative' estimate of German aircraft losses were 91 destroyed, 44 
probably destroyed and 151 damaged, while a 'reliable' agent report gave the figure of at least 
170. The mistake was quickly realized but not before it was in the media. In actual fact German 
records indicate the true losses were 25 bombers and 23 fighters, and 16 bombers and 8 
lighters damaged. German pilot losses are not certain but a reliable estimate Is not more than 
thirty. Actual Allied losses were 106 aircraft, of which 88 were fighters, 10 Army Cooperation 
tactical Reconnaissance Mustangs, and 8 bomber and smoke-laying aircraft. The number of air 
crew killed or missing was 81. Norman L.R. Franks, The greatest a ir battle: Dieppe, 19 August 
1942 (2nd edn., London: William Kimber, 1979,1992); Mathew Holden, Scramble Dieppe 
(London; Shere Books, 1980), is a largely fictionalized account of the air battle; Denis 
Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945: the fight avails [Official 
History] Royal Air force 1939-1945, ed. Denis Richards, 2 (3rd edn., 3vols„ London; HMSO, 
1993, c l 953), p.144 ['conservative' estimate); RUSI Editor, 'Diary of the war'. Royal Urtited 
Services Institute Journal B7/SA6 (November 1942), 123, claims 'At least 91 enemy aircraft 
destroyed and about 100 severely damaged or probably destroyed'; Air Historical Branch (I), 
'The day fighter offensive: July-December', in 'The air defence of Great Britain: the struggle for 
air supremacy, January 1942-May 1945', unpublished narrative, nd., 5, London: Air Ministry, 
p.124, DHist 86/49 [actual German/Allied losses and sorties); COHQ, 'Combined Report, 
p.33[81 air crew casualties).
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remark, the battle took place over German held territory so they would have 
recovered more of their air crew/^
From the point of view of the men the air forces were supporting, their 
personal accounts generally praise the air forces. However, due to a 
complicated system of command and control for close-support, instituted by 
Leigh-Mallory, and ignoring the Army Cooperation Command system 
already in place, requests for air support from the time of origin to 
implementation, were approximately an hour and a half. The standard of 
aircraft recognition also was very low, resulting in much 'friendly fire' being 
directed at Allied planes. Other points of interest were the slow GAF reaction 
-  over one hour for fighters and four hours for bombers. German records 
indicate that 945 planes, including black painted night-fighters, were sent 
into action from all over north-west Europe. One positive result of the raid 
was increase in German fighter strength in north-west Europe.^®
Brereton Greenhous, et al., 'The turn of the tide 1942-3', in The official history of the Royal 
Canadian Air Force: the crucible of war 1939-1945, 3 (4 vols., Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 1994), p.243 [30 German piiots iost); Terry Copp and Richard Nieisen, ‘Dieppe -  the 
battie', in No price too high: Canadians and the Second World liVar (Whitby, Ontario: McGraw- 
Hiii Ryerson Ltd., 1996), p.99 [iargest air iosses in one day of the war]; Wiiiiam A.B. Dougias 
and Brereton Greenhous, 'The army overseas 1940-1943', in Out of the shadows: Canada In 
the Second World War (2nd revised edn., Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977,1995), 
pp. 127-8 [ratio of sorlie/lossesj.
^  Brereton Greenhous, Dieppe, Dieppe (Montréai: Éditions Art Giobai inc. in cooperation with 
the Department of Nationai Defence. 1993), p. 130 [Army Coop Command ignored]; Charles 
E. Carrington, the former Army Liaison Officer at RAF Bomber Command, iaments that for 
Jubilee, 'no use was made of the organization they had been patientiy buiiding up for years... 
There were no ALOs [Air Liaison Officers] with Fighter squadrons who carried out iow-ievei 
attacks and therefore no adequate briefing, no ASSU [Air Support Signais Units] tentacies 
[radio nets] forward to the beaches and backward to the airfieids'. The Mustangs aiso had no 
direct iinks with the forward troops, 'The Dryshod Exercise and the Dieppe Raid', in Soldier at 
Bomber Command (London: Leo Cooper, 1987), p.104; Air Marshai T.L. Leigh-Maiiory, 
Dieppe report: covering ietter by Air Force Commander', 5 September 1942, p.1, NAC, RG 
24 G3/10870/23202 (DS) [bad aircraft recognition]; Stacey, Six years of war, p.383 [945 
pianes]; F.H. Hinsiey, etal., 'Air war in the West; May 1941 to end of 1942', in British 
Intelligence In the Second World War: Its Influence on strategy and operations 2 (6 vois.. New 
York: CUP, 1981), p.271 [increased fighter strength].
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SURRENDER AND CASUALTIES
The tank crews were ordered to evacuate at 1225 hours, whereupon 
they destroyed their tanks with the two 'sticky' bombs provided for this 
purpose. Some crews were unable to do so because the blast would have 
endangered the many men who were by now using the tanks as cover.*® 
Attempts at extraction of the men ashore resulted In more casualties to the 
landing craft crews. Stacey estimates that between 350 and 400 men were 
evacuated from the centre beaches and a total of approximately 1,222 from 
all beaches. At 1300 hours, about the time of general surrender on Red and 
White beaches. General Roberts sent out the code-word V ancouver, the 
signal for the entire naval force to turn around and head back to port.®®
*® Of the 17 officers and 154 ORs of 14 CATR landed; 2 officers and 10 ORs were killed, 3 
ORs were evacuated, 15 officers and 142 ORs were taken prisoner, some of them wounded, 
while 15 officers and 241 ORs of A Squadron, the three Fighting Troops of C Squadron and 
those remaining from B Squadron wore ordered to return to England. The three men who 
landed and were evacuated as wounded and were Tpr George Volk of 9 Tp B Squadron from 
BLUEBELL, Tpr Percy W. Aide of 8 Tp B Sqn from BULL, and L-CpI Frank Howe of 
Regimental Headquarters, the driver of scout car HOUND. See 'Part II Order 52 ,4  September 
1942, for 14 CATR', GHQ, Canadian Section', 2 Echelon, King's Own Calgary Regiment 
(KOCR) Archives; '14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment Personnel Returns from Dieppe', 
Memorandum, 10 September 1952, DHist 594.065(D7).
®® In summary, according to Stacey, of a force of about 5000 men, casualties totalled 3367 all 
ranks (approximately 67 per cent), of these 1646 were PoWs, 56 officers and 851 ORs were 
killed or died of wounds. Of the 7 COs of the major Canadian units engaged, only the FMR CO 
returned to the UK, and he was wounded. British Army casualties based on War Offfice 
statistics of 1950, estimate total casualties at 18 officers and 157 ORs, of whom 2 officers and 
12 ORs were killed, and 11 officers and 117 ORs were missing (many In fact KIA) or PoWs.
The Royal Marine Commando total casualties were 7 officers and 93 ORs, of which 4 officers 
and 27 OR were KIA, missing and presumed dead, or died in captivity. The Naval forces lost 1 
destroyer, 5 LCTs, and 28 landing craft. Including 17 LCAs. This was a total of 28 per cent of 
the Jubilee force. Total personnel casualties were 550, including 75 KIA or died of wounds 
and 269 missing or PoWs. German records indicate total casualties of 591 which Is confirmed 
by Stacey, Six years of war, p.385 [between 350 and 400 evacuated], pp.387-90 [casualty 
statistics); COHO, Battle Summary, p.38, fn.4 [1,222 evacuation total based on Stacey 
statistical table); HQ 4 CIB, 'Intelligence Log -  Intercepted Message, 19 August 1942', p.5, 
NAC, RG 24/10673/232C2(D53) [signals].
AFTERMATH, ALLIED AND GERMAN LESSONS
CHAINING OF DIEPPE AND GERMAN POWS
The PoWs taken at Dieppe suffered a further ordeal when, on 7 
October 1942, the Germans ordered that from the following day, all Dieppe 
PoWs were to have their hands bound behind their backs.’ This was in 
reprisal for an order contained in the Detailed Military Plan, two copies of 
which fell into German hands on the raid. The order, in direct contravention 
of the 1929 Geneva Convention concerning treatment of PoWs, specified all 
Germans captured were to be immediately bound to prevent them destroying 
their documents. General Roberts, GOC 2 CID, stated after the war that he 
had strongly opposed this order but was over ruled by Lord Mountbatten, 
CCO. At the time this practice was common in the Special Service Brigade. 
The Jubilee No.4 Commando operation order was more specific, stating 
'Prisoners will be securely tied by their thumbs with fish-line in the best 
Japanese tradition'. One wonders what the German reaction would have 
been if they had captured this operation order as well.^
’ The Germans originally issued the chaining order on 2 September 1942 but rescinded it 
after the British War Office categorically denied that any Germans were bound on the raid 
(which was incorrect) and declared that any such order. If Issued, would be cancelled. Vincent 
Massey, High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain, to the Secretary of State for External 
affairs, Ottawa, Cipher telegram No.2212, 3  September 1942, NAC, Ralston Papers, MO 27 III 
B11/43/'Dieppe Raid -  General -1942 '; the story was carried In press reports on 3 
September 1942, Captured Germans Not Bound', Daily Herald, 'Dieppe Lie Nailed', Dally Mall, 
Dieppe Britons In Chains... War Office denial of Nazi charge', MarKhester Guardian, all in 
NAC, RG 24/10708/21 S C I.58 (D360)/Operation Jubilee Papers/Oeneral File 59-1- 
0/lntelligence, fols.55-6. After further evidence came to light the Germans re-instituted the 
order.
2 Brigadier C. Churchill Mann, 'Intelligence Plan', 8 August 1942, Appendix L, p,1, in 
Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RO 24/10871/23202  
(D25); C.P. Stacey, Six years of war: the Canadian Army In Canada, Britain and the Pacific, 
Official history of the Canadian Army In the Second World War, ed. C.P, Stacey, 1 (4 vols., 
Ottawa; Queen's Printer, 1955), p.396; Lord Lovat, Operation Order No.1; Cauldron', 14
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Without consulting the Canadian government, the British War Office 
ordered an equal number of German PoWs in Britain and Canada to be 
similarly chained. This was opposed to by the Canadian authorities who 
acquiesced for the sake of preserving Allied unity. This Allied chaining lasted 
less than three months. A tit-for-tat diplomatic exchange continued and was 
not resolved until 22 November 1943, when the Dieppe PoWs were 
unchained. The Canadian government chose to let the matter drop at this 
point to avoid any repercussions on the Dieppe PoWs. The PoWs had been 
first bound from dawn until dusk with cord, then hand-cuffs, shackles, and 
finally with hand-cuffs, connected by eighteen inch chains. Evidence from 
repatriated PoWs indicate that after some months the situation was really a 
joke as the German guards did not enforce the practice and the PoWs were 
only required to parade twice a day wearing the chains. At other times the 
cuffs were easily picked and not worn at all.^
CANADIAN DOMESTIC AND CANADIAN 
ARMY OVERSEAS OPINION AND MORALE
The operation's repercussions on the morale of the Canadian Army 
Overseas and public opinion in Canada immediately after the raid, and for 
the remainder of the war, are instructive. The state of morale of the returning 
troops and of those who did not participate was judged at the time by 
censorship of mail and was summarized in various reports. One, based on
August 1942, p.6, NAC, RQ 24/13747/Serial 152/QS8.
3 The chaining of PoWs and the diplomatic exchanges are recounted In detail In C.P. Stacey, 
'Operation Jubilee', the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part III: Some special aspects', 17 
December 1943, amended 31 June [s/c] 1949, pp.21-26. Amendment No.1, pp.1-2, DHIst, 
CMHO Historical Officer Report No. 109; and summarized in Stacey, Six years of war, pp.396- 
7.
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examination of over eight thousand letters, noted that heavy casualties were 
freely admitted and many men were grief stricken, 'anxious and depressed' 
about the fate of many of their comrades. A later report concluded that the 
writers felt the losses for such an operation were justified and that morale 
among the participating troops 'is clearly at a high level. They were proud 
and pleased at being chosen, and on returning, the survivors of even the 
most badly hit regiments... say they are enthusiastically looking forward to 
another chance'. The effect on those who did not take part, the report stated, 
'raised morale to a new high level. Great pride was shown that the 
Canadians comprised the bulk of the invading forces... Tremendous 
confidence is shown in the fighting qualities of Canadian troops'. Raised 
morale throughout the Army, and other Services, was clearly reflected in 
press reports of volunteers 'rushing to fill up the ranks' of the depleted units 
of 2 CID. However, analysis of Canadian recruitment figures for the months 
following the operation reveal that only a slight increase was registered 
followed by a decrease lower than before the operation. Also noticeably 
absent were slogans similar to 'Avenge Hong Hong'.*
The poor publicity the operation received, discussed in the first 
chapter, which emphasized the American and British participation and 
down-played, or completely ignored, the major Canadian role, 
understandably upset many Canadian soldiers. One commented, 'To read 
these Limey papers the raid was pulled off by the English Commandos with
* Field Censors (Home), 'Notes on mail examined during the period 22-28 August 1942, In 
respect of comments on the Dieppe raid by Canadian troops, participants and non- 
participants', FCH/CR 36 ,1  September 1942, p.t [eight thousand], p.2 ['anxious']; Capt. D. 
Verney, 'Comments and reactions of Canadian forces on the Dieppe raid of August 19. 
Derived from the examination of letters from Canadian soldiers carried out at Liverpool', Ml 
12/839/33, 10 September 1942, p.2 [losses justified], p.1 ['high level'], NAC, RQ 
24/10708/2ISC  1.98 (D359).
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a few Canadians etc. to tag along for a spot of experience. They make you 
sick sometimes. Actually it was the other way around'.^
A German attempt to influence morale of the Canadian units in 
southern England occurred on the night of 4-5 September 1942 with the 
dropping of propaganda pamphlets on several of them, including the 
Calgary Tanks. The four-page pamphlet had German photographs of the 
aftermath of the raid. These showed the beaches strewn with Canadian 
dead and disabled Churchill tanks, piles of captured equipment, and 
numerous Canadian soldiers as PoWs. A censorship report of mail for the 
period of 4-19 September 1942 concluded that the leaflets did not scare the 
soldiers but made them even more determined to hit back. The following 
extract from one letter was quoted as typical. The Germans dropped 
propaganda leaflets to show what happened to our guys over there. I 
wonder if they think we imagine we are on a picnic? We know what is to 
happen when there is a war on, and they will never scare us with pictures'.^ 
In summary, the operation had a sobering influence on members of 
the Canadian Army Overseas, causing them to take a more serious view of 
their future employment in action. The demands for an immediate second 
front in Europe became less, while, Stacey concludes, 'the magnitude of 
such an enterprise was more clearly apparent than before, as was the need
 ^Field Censors (Horne), 'Notes on mail examined during the period 22-28 August 1942, In 
respect of comments on the Dieppe raid by Canadian troops, participants and non­
participants', FCH/CR 36,1 September 1942, p.4; 'Canadian public opinion on the 
employment of the Canadian Army, 1939-1945', 26 October 1949, p.35, DHIst, CMHO  
Historical Officer Report No.29 [recruitment, slogans],
B 'German propaganda leaflet: Dieppe', memorandum and original leaflet, 21 September 
1942, DHist 594.013 (D ll);  Field Censors (Home) report for period 4-19 September 1942, 
quoted In C.P, Stacey, 'Operation Jubilee: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Pari III; Some 
special aspects', 17 December 1943, amended 31 June [s/c^  1949, p.29, DHist, CMHQ  
Historical Officer Report No. 109.
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for the most detailed preparation, the most careful training, the most exacting 
discipline'/
The reaction in Canada was somewhat different. As this was the first 
major operation involving Canadian troops, preceded and followed by long 
periods of inactivity, Canadian public opinion and media hotly debated the 
operation for many months after and to a lesser extent during the remainder 
of the war. Initially the media positively praised the operation but the tone 
soon changed and criticism centred on the long casualty lists and the 
reasons for failure. The suggestion to publish Robert s' after-action report 
was immediately rejected for the security reason of giving valuable 
information to the Germans. Thus it was not possible to divulge any of the 
lessons learned which might have gone some way to calming the often ill- 
informed reports in the media.®
The Canadian authorities were very aware that some form of 
authoritative statement would have to be made to satisfy Canadian public 
demands for information. Several cables between Ottawa and London 
concerning this question were exchanged immediately after the operation. 
On 27 August Lt-Gen. McNaughton, the senior Canadian officer overseas, 
voluntarily held ^^international press conference to answer questions about 
the operation. In a secret cable in cipher sent the same day to Ottawa, he 
stated, 'I put myself at the disposal of visiting Canadian press 
representatives and others who have been asking information and for
 ^Stacey, Six years of war, pp.395-6.
® Initial media praise was replaced by the end of August with severe criticism of the planning, 
methods employed and leadership, undermining the initial confidence the raid had inspired 
and exacerbated by the continual Inaction of the Canadian Army Overseas. Examples of 
critical reports are In The Qlobe and Mall, Toronto, 23 and 28 August 1942, quoted In 
Canadian public opinion on the employment of the Canadian Army, 1939-1945', 26 October 
1949, pp.35-6, DHIst, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.29.
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upwards of two and a half hours stood cross examination in which I 
answered every question so far as security and our obligations to air and 
navy permitted. I hope this will result in some satisfaction at least to the 
people of Canada'.^
In the same cable McNaughton informed Ottawa that Major Charles 
Stacey, CMHQ Historical Officer, had been ordered to prepare a general 
account for public statement, the subsequent 'white paper' previously 
discussed, and also a more detailed summary for internal circulation in the 
Canadian Army Overseas. The former was used as the basis for a public 
statement on 18 September by the Canadian Minister of National Defence, 
the Honourable James Ralston. The latter was published 3 October in the 
Army Bureau of Current Affairs pamphlet IVar.’o
The continuing interest of Canadian public opinion and media in the 
controversy over the operation was raised to a higher plane in the Spring of 
1943 with its debate in the limelight of parliament. Members criticized the 
origin, planning and general conduct of the operation. The media went so far 
as to claim, wrongly in Stacey's opinion, that the Jubilee plan proved the 
'bankruptcy of Canadian generalship'. This criticism, Stacey states, 
undoubtedly undermined 'the hitherto unassailable prestige of General 
McNaughton with the public'. The Canadian Generals' responsibility, 
discussed previously, reveals Stacey is wrong to disagree. The constant
B 'Notes of an Interview of Lt-Gen. McNaughton by press correspondents at H Q  First Canadian 
Army on 27 August 1942', pp.1-6, NAC, MG 30 E 133/248/1-31 August 1942, fol.F; 
Canmilltary to Defensor, QS 3070, 27 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/12329/4/Dleppe/1 Press, 
fol.12.
War Office, Army Bureau of Current Affairs, 'Dieppe summary'. War 28 (3 October 1942), 1- 
12. Stacey discusses the preparation of this pamphlet In his diary, entries 9 throughi 1 
September 1942, pp.74-8, UTA, CSP/015/ 'Notebook No.17, 3 August -  13 September 
1942'.
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domestic interest in Dieppe was exemplified by a letter of 6 January 1943, 
from Brig. Sherwood Lett, former OC 4 Brigade during Jubilee, in Vancouver 
recovering from a wound to his arm, to Lt-Gen. Harry Crerar, GOC 1 
Canadian Corps. The letter explained that there still appeared to be a 'very 
keen interest' in the operation based on the number of invitations he had 
received to speak. He repeated questions put to him concerning the large 
number of casualties and possible German foreknowledge. Somewhat 
apologetically, he wondered if it would be possible, 'in the interests of the 
war effort here and of morale, [to] give the public a little more than we have of 
the lessons learned, the information gained and the practical benefits of that 
operation to the three services'. He noted that German media reports 
seemed to him to have been 'more widely read and better remembered' than 
Canadian press releases or even the Ralston's official statement. He also 
pointed out that some Dieppe PoW officers had sent home 'quite derogatory' 
letters concerning the operation', the effects of which were 'not good' in 
either eastern or western Canada, and reflected badly on 1 Canadian Corps 
in general.''
Crerar replied that he thought the Canadian domestic reaction to
Dieppe was normal under the circumstances, considering that the Canadian
public only have one battle, instead of many, to discuss. He concluded that;
This sense of frustration Is bound to lead to critical comments and unworthy 
inferences. A few good and successful engagements in which Canadian troops were 
offered a chance to distinguish themselves would clear all this muck in no time. Until 
this situation develops, however, those In positions of responsibility will continue to 
be subject to invidious attack.'^
"  Stacey, Six years of war, p.396 ['bankruptcy', McNaughton prestige]; Brig. Shenwood Lett 
to Lt-Qan. Harry Crerar, 6 January 1943, NAC, MQ 30 E 157/7,
'2 Crarar to Lett, 17 January 1943, NAC, MQ 30 E 157/7,
Crerar was correct for avid public interest in the operation began to lessen 
only with the involvement of Canadian forces in the invasion of Sicily, on 10 
July 1943.13
LESSONS LEARNED -  CLAIMS AND REALITIES
As In any operation of war, experience is gained and lessons are 
learned, that can be applied to future operations. This was so with Jubilee, 
although even with objective hindsight, a close examination of the 
documentary record reveals that many of these lessons were not new and, 
therefore, should have been obvious to the senior commanders concerned 
when planning the operation. In the aftermath of such an operation the usual 
procedure was the production, by all units involved, of after-action reports, by 
all senior commanders and COs, and as many individuals as possible, from 
which general summaries and analyses would be prepared. These, along 
with the units' war diaries, intelligence summaries, operational intelligence 
logs, operational question and answer summaries, operation orders, 
reconnaissance photographs, maps, and any other material relevant to the 
operation, were collected together by a single organization, such as COHQ, 
for analysis in the preparation of a comprehensive report on the operation, 
usually known as a Confidential Book (CB). Its most important part was the 
section on lessons learned.
Two days after Jubilee, Mountbatten held a large post-mortem 
meeting at COHQ, attended by the three Force Commanders, many of the 
officers who had taken part, the Minister of Information, Mr Brendan Bracken,
13 C.P. Stacey, 'Operation Jubllae. the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part III: Some special 
aspects', 17 December 1943, amended 31 June [s/c] 1949, p.29, DHIst, CMHQ Historical 
Officer Report No. 109.
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and, in the words of Hughes-Hallett, 'a galaxy of Press and Public Relations 
men'. The Force Commanders and many of the officers gave their own 
accounts of the operation. It appears that no record was taken of this 
meeting. Immediately after this meeting, Mountbatten ordered the formation 
of a Study Group within COHQ to formulate the lessons leamed.^^
Within two months it produced the two-hundred page 'Combined 
Report on the Dieppe Raid' (CB 04244). Part V, entitled 'The Lessons 
Learned', at fourteen foolscap pages, was an exhaustive examination of the 
lessons, first in summarized form and then in detail. It was also printed 
separately for wider circulation. The report observed that some of the 
lessons were known from previous experience. It is important to note that this 
CB was prepared with the planning of future raids in mind, not an invasion.
The reports that formed the basis of the lessons learned section of the 
Combined Report, were those of the three Force Commanders. Roberts, 
Leigh-Mallory and Hughes-Hallett, submitted after-action reports, on 27 
August, 30 August and 5 September, respectively, which all indicated certain 
lessons. In early September 1942 all three Force Commanders planned to
Hughes-Hallett, Transcript of interview, American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Dieppe, 
30 July 1967, p.43, Southampton University Library, Archives and Manuscripts (SUL), 
Mountbatten Papers (MBP), MB1/B67 [no record]; John Hughes-Hallett, The Dieppe Raid', in 
Before I Forget', Unpublished memoirs, 1971, pp.194, NAC, MG 30 E463/Memoirs 1971 
['galaxy'. Study Group],
Besides the wealth of Canadian unit after-action reports submitted by the CMHQ Historical 
Officer, Major Stacey, and other sources mentioned, one that has not come to light, is a 
memorandum submitted to Mountbatten, by Brig-Gen. Lucien K. Truscott, Jr, US Military 
Adviser to COHQ. This has never been acknowledged In any published work concerning this 
or any other aspect of the operation. Tniscott was aboard HMS Femie as an official 'Spectator' 
and his obsenrations concerning lessons learned are instructive. They will be elaborated on 
later. Brig.-Gen. L.K. Truscott to Mountbatten, Memorandum -  'Observations on Jublleef, 31 
August 1942, pp.1-3, GCML, LTP, 10/4; Hilary A. St. George Saunders, The Lessons 
Learned', Part V, pp.37-50. Combined Report on the Dieppe raid', BR 1887 (formerly CB 
04244), London: COHQ, 15 October 1942, DHist 594.013 (D1); Hilary A. St. George 
Saunders, 'The Raid on Dieppe — Lessons Learned', CB 04244(1), Extract from CB 04244 
(The Dieppe Raid Combined Report), London: COHO, September 1942, DHIst 594.013 
(D13).
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submit a Joint Force Commanders' letter to the CCO which would 
summarize the most important of these lessons. A draft outlined the need for 
adequate fire-support, greater flexibility in the plan, especially concerning 
the employment of reserves, that tanks should not be landed until the 
obstacles are cleared, better synchronization of close-support by air, and the 
need for better aircraft recognition.’®
The most important of these lessons are summarized below and later 
analysed in the light of the relevant documentary evidence. The lesson of 
paramount importance, and italicized for emphasis in the Report, was 'the 
need for overwhelming fire support, including close support, during the initial 
stages of the affack'. This was to be provided by heavy and medium naval 
bombardment, air action, special close-support vessels or 'mobile forts' (yet 
to be designed), and by the military forces themselves, in the landing craft 
during the run in. If the required overwhelming close fire support could not 
be provided, the Report stated that 'attacks should be planned to develop 
round the flanks of a strongly defended locality rather than frontally against 
it'.’7
The naval lesson of greatest importance was the need for 'the 
formation of permanent naval assault forces with a coherence comparable to 
that of any other first line fighting formation. Army formations intended for the
’® Roberts submitted a preliminary report to Crerar the day after the operation, Roberts to 
Crerar, Report on Operation Jubilee', 20 August, NAC, RQ 24/1058^21501 (D233); Ma).- 
Qen. J.H. Roberts, 'Report by Military Force Commander -  Operation Jublled, 27 August 
1942, pp.5-6, NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2 (D2); Air Marshal Sir Trafford L. Lelgh-Mallory, 
'Report by the Air Force Commander on the combined operation against Dieppe -  August 19, 
1942', 5 September 1942, cover letter, p.3, NAC, RQ 24/10870/23202 (D5); John Hughes- 
Hallett, 'Covering Letter, pp.1-2, 'Conclusions and Recommendations', Enclosure No.2, p.1, 
to 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RQ 
24/10872/232C2 (D48); Joint force Commanders' Letter to CCO, draft, 2 September 1942, 
NAC, RQ 24/10584/215C1 (D244), fols.12-13.
Saunders, 'Combined Report, pp.37, 42-4, 48.
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amphibious assaults must without question be trained in close cooperation 
with such naval assault forces'.’®
A further lesson was 'the necessity for flexibility in the military plan 
and its execution', in order to give the commander the option of reinforcing 
success. To this end it was emphasized that only a minimum of forces should 
be initially committed, retaining the maximum reserves for later exploitation 
of success. By the time of Jubilee the level of training the landing craft crews 
had received was insufficient to implement a flexible military plan. During the 
operation, the hold-up on the centre beaches had been reinforced after 
Roberts received a garbled, and thus erroneous, report that one of the 
Canadian battalions were finally in the town. Although they had been held 
up on the beach, and were therefore behind schedule, he reinforced them 
with one battalion anyway, and subsequently another, his last remaining 
reserve. He should have used these two battalions and the remaining 
twenty-eight tanks to reinforce the mile long inland penetration from Poun/ille 
-  following the known military axiom of only reinforcing success.’®
From this follows the lesson of 'The necessity for as accurate and 
comprehensive a system of control and communications as it is possible to 
establish'. To this end, the fitting out of a dedicated HQ ship, with no other 
role but this, and the duplication of channels and nets, was also noted.®®
Other minor or technical lessons included the necessity of having a 
combined staff living and working at a single HQ, better security before the 
operation, that tanks should not be landed until anti-tank obstacles are
’® Saunders, 'Combined Report', pp.37-8.
’® Saunders, 'Combined Report', pp.37, 39, 
®® Saunders, 'Combined Report', pp.37, 40.
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cleared, that operations should be planned so as to take place under tidal 
conditions that are as varied as possible, the need for better aircraft 
recognition both by the Navy and Army, the importance of using smoke, in 
larger quantities than during Jubilee, the need for some form of light or self- 
propeiled artillery, after the initial landing area has been secured, to support 
the assault inland.^^
Throughout the rest of the war and in the post-war period,
McNaughton, Crerar, Mountbatten, and Hughes-Hallett, and other senior 
Allied leaders, initially portrayed Jubilee as a great victory, and later, as an 
indispensable, preliminary and necessary sacrifice, and argued that the 
lessons learned were vital to the final, successful Allied invasion of the 
European Continent. They did this partly for propaganda reasons to maintain 
wartime morale, partly to protect their own organizations from criticism and 
cover their own responsibility, and partly because, initially at least, they 
believed it. The post-war historiographical manipulation of this theme has 
been outlined previously. The true Influence of these lessons, actual or not, 
on future amphibious operations, particularly the 1944 Normandy landings, 
and on German thinking generally, especially in countering an invasion, 
needs comprehensive examination within the context of the documentary 
evidence.
The first indication of Crerar's future reasoning concerning the Dieppe 
raid was in a personal letter, two days after the raid, to the Maj.-Gen. R.H. 
Dewing, HQ European Theatre of Operations (ETO), US Army, London. The 
letter thanked Dewing for his part in arranging the attachment of Rangers to 
Canadian units for Jubilee and concluded, 'Although the losses have been
Saunders, 'Combined Report', pp.37-9, 45-50.
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heavy indeed, I believe that from the widest point of view the results of the 
gallant raid on Dieppe will fully justify the cost'.^
Although the Combined Report, under preparation throughout August 
and September 1942, confined itself to the lessons learned for future raids, 
Crerar was already arguing that they applied to the future Continental 
invasion. On 28 August Crerar acknowledged receipt of Roberts after-action 
report, completed the previous day, and ordered him to meet with the other 
Force Commanders to discuss it and the lessons of Jubilee. The following 
day Crerar sent a letter to all Commanders and COs, 1 Canadian Corps, 
explaining that one of the reasons for carrying out Jubilee was that it was 
expected to furnish 'very important' and 'essential information* concerning 
the military aspect of an invasion across the Channel. He ended by saying 
that all three Force Commanders would later provide a detailed and 
comprehensive joint report, from which 'most important conclusions in 
respect to the requirements of full-scale invasion of the Continent should 
emerge'.23
A year later, in a summary of a 1 Canadian Corps combined 
operations training exercise, which envisaged an assault landing against 
Dieppe, he referred to Jubilee's lessons, stating that 'we owe it to those who 
fought it out on the beaches on that August day last year, to see to it that 
every ounce of value Is, indeed, obtained from everything they then did, or 
gallantly failed to do'. Almost a year after that, in a letter to the Canadian 
COS, Lt-Gen. Kenneth Stuart, emphasized that the technical and tactical
^  Crerar to Maj.-Qen. R.H. Dewing, HQ, European Theatre of Operations, US Army, 21 
August 1942, NAC, MG 30 E157/6/985C.009 (D146)/6-90.
23 Crerar to Roberts, 28 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10584/21 SCI (D233), fol.82; Crerar to all 
Commanders and COs, 1 Canadian Corps, 'Combined Service raid on Dieppe', MemorarKfum 
QOC 1-0-4, 29 August 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10584/21 SCI (D233), fol.88.
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problems of an invasion, were 'bought and paid for* at Dieppe, and that 'the
evolution of the requirements in the assault phase of Overlord [Normandy
invasion/D-Day 6 June 1944] had been a resultant Canadian contribution'.*^
Probably the day before the launch of Overlord, he spoke in the same
vein, in a general address to all ranks of the First Canadian Army, stating that
the plans, preparations, methods, and technique, which were to be used in
that operation, were based on 'knowledge and experience, bought and paid'
at Dieppe. He continued, 'The contribution of that hazardous operation
cannot be over-estimated. It will prove to have been the essential prelude to
our forthcoming and final success'.*^
The day after the beginning of Overlord, in briefing officers at his HQ
on the current operation, Crerar again brought in the connection to Jubilee,
speaking of the 'vital part' it had played in the 'conception, planning and
evolution' of Overlord. He concluded this introduction with his opinion that:
Although at the time the heavy cost to Canada, and the non-success of the Dieppe 
operation, seemed hard to bear, I believe that when this war Is examined in proper 
perspective, it will be seen that the sobering influence of that operation on existing 
Allied strategical conceptions, with the enforced realizations of the Allied 
governments of the lengthy and tremendous preparations necessary before invasion 
could be attempted, was a Canadian contribution of the greatest significance to final 
victory.*®
On 1 September 1944 the bloodless liberation of Dieppe by 2 CID 
took place. Two days later Crerar addressed 2 CID in a remembrance
*^ Lt-Qen. H.D.G. Crerar, 'Summing up by Commander 1 Canadian Corps, Combined 
Operations Study Period 26-31 July 1943', QOC 4-1-8, 31 July 1943, p.1; Crerar to Lt-Gen. K. 
Stewart, GOC-ln-C 1-0-2, 31 May 1944, both in NAC, RG 24/12749/24 Dleppe-1, fols.203, 
206.
*® Lt-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, 'A personal message from Lt-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, CB, DSO, GOC-ln- 
C, First Canadian Army', nd. (probably 5 June 1944], Appendix B(l), to Col. C.P. Stacey, The 
Operation at Dieppe, 19 August 1942: Some new information', 20 November 1944, DHIst, 
CMHO Historical Officer Report No.128.
*® Lt-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, 'Introduction to briefing of officers, HQ First Canadian Army, 7 June 
1944, Appendix B(ll), p.2, to Col. C.P. Stacey, 'The Operation at Dieppe, 19 August 1942: 
Some new information', 20  November 1944, DHIst, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.128.
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service at the cemetery for those who had died on Jubilee, again paying 
tribute to its sacrifice and contribution to Overlord. Crerar continued to make 
claims along these lines in speeches and interviews for the remainder of the 
war and into the post-war period.^^
During the spring of 1943 a month long conference on landing 
assaults, held at the US Assault Training Centre, HQ ETO, gave Hughes- 
Hallett the opportunity to emphasize his opinion on the role and lessons of 
Jubilee. In his address he stated that, 'It was definitely intended as a small- 
scale rehearsal for the major cross-Channel operation' intended for the 
future. He remarked that, the lessons learned caused a 'drastic re-casting of 
our ideas' about amphibious operations. Before summarizing the standard 
lessons, he emphatically claimed that 'In the absence of the experience 
gained at Dieppe there is not the slightest doubt that a major disaster would 
have occurred had we proceeded to attack North Western Europe on the 
lines hitherto visualized'.^
In 1946, in an interview with Stacey, he emphasized again the direct 
connection between Dieppe and D-Day. In 1947, the relevant extracts, 
concerning Jubilee's lessons, of his original 1942 after-action report were 
reprinted in the Supplement to The London Gazette. Whether he had any
^  Lt-Gen. H.F.G. Crerar, 'Remarks at Dieppe, 2 Canadian Division', 3 September 1944, pp.1- 
4, NAC, MG 30 E1S7/25/985C.009 (D426). See also 'Address by Gen. H.D.G. Crerar; A few 
reminiscences of 1939-1945', revised May 1953, p.2, NAC, MG 30 E157/25/985C.009 
(D426); 'Address by Gen. H.D.G. Crerar on the contribution of the Canadians at Dieppe', nd. 
(Circa 1945, revised 1962), pp.1-7, NAC, MG 30 E157/26/985C.009 (D378); George Ronald, 
CBC, to Crerar, 16 July 1962, and hand-written notes for CSC interview, NAC, MG 30 
E157/19/965C.009 (D304); Crerar, Transcript of Interview by George Ronald, CBC Close-Up: 
Dieppe, 9 September 1962, pp.2,6, NAC, MG 30 E507/'Gen. Crerar*.
^  John Hughes-Hallett, 'Summary of an address by Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett, RN; the 
Dieppe raid'. In 'Conference on landing assaults 24 May-23 June', 26 May 1943, Assault 
Training Centre, HQ European Theatre of Operations, US Army, p.1-6, USNA, RG 
332/338/ETO Hist. DIv. Admin. 109/491, 'Conference on Landing Assaults'.
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part or influence in this is unknown but publication served further to stress 
the direct connection between D-Day and Dieppe. In 1962, while in Toronto, 
he further pressed this point to Dieppe veterans during a reunion of the 
Royal Reginnent of Canada, and in an interview for the CBC television 
documentary Close-Up: Dieppe. This theme was expressed in two further 
television interviews, in 1967 for the American Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC) special Dieppe and in 1972 for the BBC production Dieppe 1942.^ 
Mountbatten felt even more deeply than any one else about the need 
to stress the role of Dieppe as an operational rehearsal for D-Day. This was 
because he felt he was responsible and guilty, although he never admitted 
this. Many historians agree. Villa writes, 'Dieppe haunted him forever; he 
never succeeded in exorcising it'. Richard Hough, in his unofficial biography, 
Mountbatten (1981), stated that Mountbatten felt badly about Dieppe and 
that 'it was a recurring sore for Mountbatten because it was seen by some as 
his failure... the name Dieppe hurt Mountbatten for the rest of his life'.^o
^  Capt. John Hughes-Hallett, Interview by C.P. Stacey, 29-30 September 1946, Diary,
France 1946', UTA, CSP/0012; John Hughes-Hallet, 'The Dieppe raid. Dispatch by Naval 
Force Commander, August 30,1942', Supplement to The London Gazette, Thursday, 14 
August 1947; 3823-4; John Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe raid: Address by Vice-Admiral J. 
Hughes-Hallett', 20 January 1962, Royal Regiment of Canada Association Dinner, Toronto, 
pp.10-11, PRO, CAB 106/6; see also McNaughton to Col. G.M.C. Sprung, 25 January 1962, 
and enclosure. Summary of Hughes-Hallett's speech 20 January 1962 and his notes, DHist 
594.011 (D12); Hughes-Hallett, Transcript of Inten/iew, CBC Close-Up: Dieppe, 9 September 
1962, p.9, NAC, MG 30 E507/8; Hughes-Hallett, Transcript of Interview, ABC Dieppe, 30 July 
1967, pp.48-50, SUL, MBP, MB1/B67; Hughes-Hallett, 'Transcription of filmed narration from 
Vice-Admiral John Hughes-Hallett', BBC Dieppe 1942, 25 February 1972, p.6, SUL, MBP, 
MB1/B63; Hughes-Hallett, Script for BBC production Dieppe 1942, 25 February 1972, p.8, 
NAC, MG 30 E/463/11 ; John Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe Raid', in 'Before I Forget', 
Unpublished memoirs, 1971, pp.195-200, NAC, MG 30  E463/Memoirs 1971.
^  Villa, Unauthorized action, p.210; Hough perceptively notes that:
On* of tha ■trongatt raaaona tia t Mountbattan uaad lor not parmHIIng an auVvxlzad blogiaphy to ba wrttlan In Na 
Matma waa tlia t na baMvad ha had navar mada a aingla (Tastaka In nia Ma. 'H la a cuttoua nna. but a fact, tra t I 
hava baan rlgfit In avarytoing 1 hava dona and aald In my IHa', Mountoattan aald many timaa. 140 ona would avar 
ballava a blographar who mada INa daim whila I waa aW aNva bacauaa raadara would conduda that I had 
cauaadittobaw iittan. thatiwaalaaningovarthaauthor'aahouldaf'. .. Olappa waa a thraat to thia daan raoord. 
Richard Hough, 'Combined operations'. In Mountbatten, New York; Random House, 1981, 
p.158.
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Mountbatten attempted right up until the end of his life to convince 
sceptics, especially Canadians, and particularly Dieppe veterans, of the true 
value of Dieppe. He did this in many television interviews, radio broadcasts, 
public addresses, and letters. He often finished by stating various versions of 
the following:
Those gallant men who gave their lives at Dieppe, by their supreme sacrifice gave to 
the Allies the priceless secret of victory in the subsequent assaults. The Duke of 
Wellington is credited with having said that the battle of Waterloo was won on the 
playing fields of Eton. I have no doubt that the battle of Normandy was won on the 
beaches of Dieppe. For every one man who died at Dieppe in 1942, at least ten or 
more must have been spared in Normandy in 1944.3t
In his last interview concerning Dieppe, the year before his assassination in
1979, he lamented to CBC producer, Terence Macartney-Filgate, that
Dieppe veterans seemed incapable of understanding that the losses had
been justified. He said;
So much stems from Dieppe, so much success and for some reason the Canadians 
don't wish to know K, they doni wish to be proud of it... they glory in their misery... I
Lord Louis Mountbatten, 'The Dieppe raid'. Transcript of filmed intenriew, 12 July 1962, p.5, 
CBC Close Up: Dieppe, 9 September 1962, IWM, Haydon Papers II, also In PRO, CAB 106/6 
[quote]; edited versions are in, 'Dieppe; Mountbatten's view'. The Legionary {Oc\ober 1962), 
33, and 'The Dieppe raid'. The Naval Review 5V^ (January 1963), 40; other relevant quotes 
are: 'It was a vital stepping stone to victory and you, the heroes of Dieppe, were the few who 
made possible the later Victory of the many', in 'Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of 
the Dieppe raid on 19 August 1942: speech by Admiral of the Fleet The Earl Mountbatten of 
Burma; at that time Chief of Combined Operations', Transcript of speech, 19 August 1967, 
p.11, this author's Dieppe Collection (this speech received wide press coverage, see Peter 
Strafford, 'Dieppe raid paved way for D-Day success', 21 August 1967, The Daily Express, 
Andrew Wilson, 'Dieppe raid ensured D-Day victory', 20 August 1967, The Observer)-, In a 
BBC Interview, 'The Dieppe raid was certainly Indispensable... without Dieppe the Russian 
frontier today might well have run along the Rhine', Transcript for BBC Dieppe:1942,1972, 
p.46, DHist 79/567/2; in a letter, 'If we had not done the Dieppe operation at all It Is possible 
there would never have been an Invasion of France or It would have been very greatly delayed 
and the results would have been very uncertain. So Dieppe was really a turning point In the 
war'. In Mountbatten to Mr Bender, 21 December 1973, TMFDC, Mountbatten File; In a 
speech to the Dieppe Veterans and Prisoners of War Association, 30 September 1973, 
'[Jubilee] was essential to our successful invasion of France. A vast number of allied lives... 
were saved In the Overlord landings... and in the previous landings in the Mediterranean as a 
result of the lessons learned at Dieppe', see 'Dieppe: the inside story'. Legion Magazine 48/6 
(November 1973), 10 and 'Operation Jubilee: the place of the Dieppe raid in history'. Journal 
o f the Royal United Services Institute 119/1 (March 1974), 25; and In a radio Interview, 'From 
the lessons we learned at Dieppe all subsequent landings In the Mediterranean and 
elsewhere benefited directly'. Transcript of Interview, Radlo-OuAbec, circa early 1974, p.84, 
TMFDC, Mountbatlen Fils.
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hope to God that you will succeed where most of your countrymen have failed, to try 
and explain to Canadians that they should be proud of Dieppe. Instead of revelling in 
the misery of all the casualties, the prisoners of war, and thinking It was a failure, it 
wasn't a failure. Without Dieppe we couldn't possibly have won the war... Try and 
make them proud, try and make them feel that If they died, they died gloriously and 
those who came back and suffered as prisoners of war, suffered not in vain. If you can 
do that, you'll have done a great thing... I don't know if it's too much to hope. It 
certainly hasn't worked up to now.^z
Unfortunately for Mountbatten, it has never worked, for veterans and 
historians are now even more critical of his role in Dieppe and of his 
justifying remarks.33
Stacey added credence to the lessons learned theme with publication 
of his authoritative official Canadian Army histories in 1948, 1955 and 1960. 
Although several other amphibious operations took place between Jubilee 
and Overlord, he stated, 'It is doubtful, however, whether any other operation 
had as much influence as Dieppe upon the Normandy planning. A full 
analysis would require a chapter to itself. Canadian historian, John 
Campbell, has written a convincing chapter disputing this claim. Based on 
analysis of the relevant documents, including German records, he effectively 
dismisses the idea of any link between the two operations, especially 
concerning the use of radar and deception. He concludes, 'if Jubilee 
provided the keys to unlock the secrets of success on D-Day, it is going too 
far to say that any of them turned the radar or deception lock', and notes that 
D-Day would have happened anyway in 1944 even if Jubilee had not 
occurred.^*
^  Lord Louis Mountbatten, Transcript of Intenriew, 197B, CBC Dieppe 1942,1979, DHIst 
79/567/79.
^  Brig-Gen. Forbes West, a Dieppe veteran, stated Tve heard Mountbatten speak before... I 
don't believe any of it'. In 'Some scepticism as Mountbatten gives history; Dieppe veterans' 
memories aren't all fond'. The Globe and Mall, Toronto, 1 October 1973, 5; Villa, Unauthorized 
action, pp.240-2; John P. Campbell, Dieppe revisited: a documentary Investigation, London: 
Frank Cass, 1993, pp. 196-227.
^  C.P. Stacey, 'The raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', in The Canadian Army 1939-1945: an  
official historical summary, 1 (4 vols., Ottawa; King's Printer, 1948), pp.84-6; Stacey, Six years
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The supposed role of deception and radar in Jubilee's planning and 
execution was examined previously and discounted. The 'Combined Report' 
'Lessons Learned' section does not mention radar at all, and only mentions 
deception in the sense of defensive security of the location, training and 
movement of the forces ear-marked for an operation. This has nothing to do 
with strategic deception of the type used in Operation Fortitude, the 
deception component of Overlord. Campbell thinks the 'Combined Report' 
did not refer to deception, and this could be said for radar also, because It 
was too sensitive to be put into such a widely circulated report. But this does 
not hold up since, as previously indicated, strategic deception had not 
developed to the operational employment stage by the time of Jubilee. 
Probably radar was not mentioned, since according to R.V. Jones, wartime 
British radar expert, nothing novel or new was learned on Jubilee worth 
reporting on. Thus post-war claims by conspiratorial historians like Cave 
Brown and others can be quickly dismissed.^!
One post-war claim by Maj.-Gen. C. Churchill Mann, although 
fantastic, rates a mention, if only for the reason that he was formerly GSO 1,
2 CID, during the planning of Rutter, and Deputy Military Force Commander 
on Jubilee. In correspondence to journal editors from 1975-1978, and the 
following year, in the senior, scholarly Canadian military affairs journal.
of war, pp.398-404, 403 [quote]; Stacey, 'The development of the plan for Invading north­
west Europe, 1940-1944', In The Victory Campaign: the operations In north-west Europe 
1944-1945, 3 (4 vols., Ottawa; Queen's Printer, 1960), p.7; see also Stacey's memoirs, 
'Aftermath of a dress rehearsal'. In A date with history: memoirs of a Canadian historian 
(Ottawa: Denau, 1983), pp.101-2; two years before his death, Stacey, with Barbara Wilson, 
wrote that Dieppe's 'justification must be sought In the contribution It made to the plans for the 
successful Invasion of Normandy In 1944', In 'The military task', in The half-million: the 
Canadian Army In Britain, 1939-1946 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p.18; 
Campbell, 'Dieppe and D-Day', In Dieppe revisited, pp.196-227, 205 (quote).
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.198.
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Canadian Defence Quarterly, he made the startling claim that the operation
order captured by the Germans on the raid had been deliberately taken
ashore for this purpose, as part of an elaborate strategic deception
campaign to make the Germans think that when the invasion took place, it
would be centred on capturing French Channel ports. The fact was that in
the summer of 1942 the invasion point and method, open beach
maintenance, had not been decided upon.^
The Director of the Directorate of History, Dr Douglas, wrote a
memorandum for the front of Mann's biographical file, containing copies of
the above correspondence concerning Mann's claims. This serves as an
insightful warning to historians of the dangers of dependence on the fading
memories of veterans, without substantiation by documents, that can lead to
myth-making and the distortion of history, and is therefore quoted at length:
These documents originated by Major General Churchill Mann are of Interest even 
though, thirty-six years after the event his memory is seriously at fault. Bearing in mind 
the absence of documentation to support his claims, he is expressing a common 
prejudice among veterans of the Dieppe raid that Canadians were sacrificed 
deliberately for the purposes of high policy. This prejudice normally comes out in the 
form of heated verbal exchanges, as on the occasion of Lord Mountbatten's speech 
In 197[3], In old age, after a belief of this kind has been fermenting for such a long 
time, it can become an obsession. Complete and well documented records of events 
should attempt to nip such beliefs in the bud, partly by getting complete accounts by 
key participants at the earliest possible moment after the event. Otherwise myth, as 
has so often been the case in Canadian military history, will come to pass for fact.^
The claimed lesson that amphibious operations should develop
around the flanks of a port, instead of frontally against it, now needs
examination. After Dieppe the idea of a frontal attack was not in fact
^  C.C. Mann to John Mellor, 26 August 1975 and 1 June 1976, TMFDC, Mann File; Mann to 
The Editor, Canadian Defence Quarterly {CDO), 7 October 1977 and rough drafts, DHist, C.C. 
Mann Blog. File; W.A.B. Douglas to C.P. Stacey, 17 October 1977, enclosed Mann to The 
Editor, CDQ, 28 November 1978, UTA, CSP/044; Mann to The Editor, The Legion Magazine, 
15 May 1978, UCSC, JMP; C. Churchill Mann. ‘On the real purpose of the Dieppe raid', CDQ 
9/1 (1979), 57.
^  W.A.B. Douglas, Memorandum -  'Dieppe raid; MQen Churchill Mann', DC 78/476, 24 
October 1978, DHist, C.C. Mann Blog. File.
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discounted, 'if very powerful support was available during the early stages, 
or if the defences had been subdued by action before the assault'. If this 
support was not available, then encircling attacks were recommended, 
although 'This by no means excludes a frontal feint staged in order to fix the 
enemy's defences and perhaps his reserves as well'.^s
This lesson was given more importance and different emphasis by 
Crerar, Hughes-Hallett, Mountbatten and post-war historians. Six days 
before the launch of D-Day, Crerar stated, in the postscript of a top secret 
letter to the Canadian COS;
I am also inclined to view that, when considered history is written, it will be found that 
had Dieppe, with great good luck, turned out to be a cheap success, there would 
have resulted a false and quite Inadequate appreciation of the problem of invasion. 
The 'sobering effects' of the Dieppe operation, in my opinion, have had an important
effect on Allied policies, strategy and, of course. Combined Service tactics,
This set the stage for the idea that, in the words of Stacey, 'Dieppe finally 
killed the always more than dubious idea of a frontal attack on a major 
fortified port, and at least produced grave doubts as to the possibility of the 
immediate acquisition of such a port by an assaulting force'. He continues 
that British amphibious planners were forced to thus think in terms of 
supporting an invasion through open beach maintenance. Stacey bases this 
claim, though, on the notoriously unreliable, verbal evidence given him by 
Hughes-Hallett in 1946.«
*  Saunders, 'Combined Report', p.48.
*  Lt-Gen. H. Crerar to Lt-Gen. K. Stuart, GOC-ln-C 1-0-2, 31 May 1944, NAC, RG 
24/12749/24 Dieppe-1, fol.206,
«  Stacey, 'Memorandum of Interviews with Capt. J, Hughes-Hallett, CB, DSO, RN, at 
Portsmouth, 29 and 30 September 1946', 1 October 1946, Appendix A, pp.S-6, to 
Operation Jubilee: the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942, Additional Information on planning', 5 
October 1946, DHIst, CM HQ Report No, 159; Stacey, Six years o f war, pp.401, 404 [quote].
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Concerning this lesson the unpublished Confidential history, The 
evolution and development of Combined Operations technique and material' 
(1956), states, 'probably the most important was that a frontal assault on a 
heavily defended port was not a practical proposition'. In the post-war period 
Crerar, Hughes-Hallett, Mountbatten, Mann never tired of repeating the 
lesson so that it has come to be regarded as fact. Interestingly, on 11 May 
1942, Mountbatten had stated in his cover letter for the Summary of Outline 
Plan for Rutter, submitted to the COS, that it would not 'throw light on the 
maintenance problem over beaches'.^’
It is true that the majority of the dozen or so raids and invasion plans 
on the table at the time of Rutter/Jubilee were based on the immediate 
acquisition of a port. These included three variants of Sledgehammer, 
known as East, Central and West, scheduled to attack, respectively, 
Boulogne, Alderney and St. Nazaire, in early September 1942. These would 
have been even more risky than Jubilee, since Boulogne was scheduled for 
a frontal attack and had stronger defences than Dieppe, Alderney's defences 
had been improved to the status of an impregnable fortress, while St.
Nazaire was not only beyond the range of fighter cover, but the defects in its 
defences revealed by the commando attack on it in March had been 
rectified. All these operations put great emphasis on tactical surprise. No 
heavy air support was envisaged, beyond the bombing of aerodromes to 
create diversions or delay reinforcements. No heavy preliminary naval 
bombardment or support was planned, beyond destroyers and possibly
Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, The evolution and development of Combined 
Operations technique and material'. Unpublished Confidential history, London: Ministry of 
Defence, 1956, p.19, PRO, DEFE 2/710; C. Churchill Mann, Dieppe was necessary and 
worth while'. The Legionary Magazine 33/9 (February 1959), 26; Mountbatten to COS, P,126, 
11 May 1942, NAC, RQ 24/10872/232C2 (D35), fol. HIST-10.
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modem cruisers. The former Chief of Staff at COHQ, General. G.E. Wildman- 
Lushington, wrote to Mountbatten in 1959, 'You will remember that the Prime 
Minister, as well as the COS, was insistent that there should be a 
reconnaissance in force across the Channel that autumn to test the feasibility 
of capturing a port for Operation Overlord.' Brigadier Antony H. Head, Military 
Adviser, Combined Operations, and a long-time member of the Joint 
Planning Staff, stated in a March 1949 lecture to the Royal United Service 
Institution, that 'it was considered that any re-entering of the Continent would 
have to be a quick capture of a port, and such an undertaking needed to be 
tried out'. Stacey's memorandum of a conversation with him days later 
confirm that the prevailing thinking during this period in higher command 
circles, was that a practical test of equipment and technique under battle 
conditions was considered essential as no large-scale amphibious 
operations had been carried out since Gallipoli. The immediate taking of a 
port was considered a prerequisite in all invasion plans, and thus there was 
a close connection between the Dieppe operation and this problem. Head 
further indicated that it was definitely with this problem in mind that the frontal 
assault was included in the Jubilee plan, since the capture of an intact port 
was the main pre-determinant. Thus, it is clear that senior American, British, 
and Canadian commanders were prepared to attempt a major assault on the 
Continent, centred on capturing a port, based solely on tactical surprise, 
without preliminary heavy naval and air bombardment or support. But 
Stacey's claim, that 'these optimistic tactical conceptions were dissipated 
with the gunsmoke of Operation Jubilee-, no more was heard of them after 
that day on the Dieppe beaches', is false.^
^  Qen. G.E. Wlldman-Lushington to First Sea Lord [Mountbatten]. draft letter, February 19S9,
305
That this amphibious doctrine and planning did not change after 
Dieppe, is clear from the Combined Report, which explained that planners 
still envisaged capturing a port, but using flank, as opposed to frontal, 
attacks, if the supporting fire was not available. In fact, the senior 
commanders mentioned are completely incorrect in ascribing the idea of 
beach maintenance and use of pre-fabricated harbours, code-named 
Mulberry, directly to the experience of Dieppe. Even after Dieppe, planners 
still envisaged capturing a port as a prerequisite for any invasion but they 
then studied how to do this by other means, such as flank attacks and the 
use of airborne troops. It was not until the experience of the North African, 
Sicilian, and Italian mainland landings, that the idea of beach maintenance 
over open beaches begun to take hold. Brig. Head agreed, explaining 
Dieppe invasion planners still remained 'port conscious' and that it was only 
after the invasion of Sicily, carried out over open beaches, without the 
preliminary capture of a port, that the idea of mounting a major assault on a 
beach maintenance basis really caught hold. He noted that this was done at 
the insistence of Gen. Sir Bernard Montgomery.^
One such port-orientated operation, planned for two months after 
Jubilee but never carried out, was Operation Coleman, an attack on Fecamp.
SUL, MBP, B 73, quoted In John P. Campbell, Dieppe revisited: a documentary Investigation 
(London; Frank Cass, 1993), p.213, see his discussion on pp.67, 212-3; Antony H. Head, 
'Amphibious operations' (Digest from a RUSI lecture 13 March 1946, printed in RUSI Journal, 
November 1946), Military Review 27/6 (November 1947), 107; Stacey, 'Memorandum of 
conversation with Brigadier A.H. Head, MC, MP, at Combined Operations Headquarters, 15 
March 1946', 24/Dieppe/1/2, Appendix B, pp.1-2, to 'Operation Jubilee-, the raid on Dieppe, 
19 August 1942. New light on early planning', 22 March 1946, DHIst, CMHQ Report No. 153; 
Stacey, Six years of war, pp.402-3 ['gunsmoke'].
^  Stacey, 'Memorandum of conversation with Brigadier A.H. Head, MC, MP, at Combined 
Operations Headquarters, 15 March 1946', 24/Dleppe/1/2, Appendix B, p.2, to 'Operation 
Jubilee, the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942. New light on early planning', 22 March 1946, 
DHIst, CMHQ Report No. 153.
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Its plan included a heavy preliminary bombardment of the port's central 
beaches, code-named Red and White, and the surrounding coastal defence 
installations.^
Campbell makes a compelling case for the lack of connection 
between Jubilee and Overlord, all the details of which there is not room for to 
examine here. But a few points he makes are revealing. First, he states, 'no 
mere raid could in any literal sense have been a rehearsal for an operation 
of the sheer magnitude and complexity' of Overlord. The basic prerequisite 
for this, he explains, was the complete reorganization of the Army and 
Metropolitan RAF from a defensive mode to one geared toward Continental 
offensive operations, including the huge build up of American armed forces 
and supplies in southern England. Campbell points out raids did not need 
detailed administrative planning on the scale of that required for Overlord.
He notes that a major difference was that 'the trickiest stage of a raid was the 
withdrawal and re-embarkation -  the "worst possible case” contingency for 
invasion planners'. He emphasizes the long period of almost two years 
separating the two operations and indicates that the many lessons learned 
from other operations were invaluable and widely circulated in COHQ. This 
is contrary to some 'sweeping generalizations', from people like Hughes- 
Hallett, who thought that the Mediterranean operations were of little 
significance in planning cross-Channel operations due to the completely 
different weather and navigational conditions. Campbell acknowledges, and 
all historians agree, that the real lessons learned that could be applied to
** Operation Coleman, Naval Operation Order, 25 October 1942. IWM, JHHP, JHH 7/1.
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any invasion were to do with the 'sharp end -  the assauit'. These will be 
examined later.^
Not only were lessons learned in the British operations but also in the 
American amphibious operations in the Pacific. These iessons were passed 
on to COHQ and the later invasion planners and vice versa. This was 
acknowledged by McNaughton in his post-Dieppe raid press conference. 
When questioned about American Marine landings in the Solomon Islands, 
he replied:
We are in very close touch with the American staffs in London and when they have 
got a fuller story, we shall be given it. There is much interchanging of lessons learned 
from all these operations and there is free exchangee between the Americans and the 
British and ourselves and cool-headed analysing with regard to failures, faults and 
lessons to be learned.^
The idea of prefabricated floating harbours -  Mulberry, was directly 
attributed to lessons of Jubilee. Mountbatten was a avid supporter of this, as 
well as others. On 2 October 1945, the Mulberry Exhibition, complete with a 
large-scale replica, was opened in Montréal, one of twelve Canadian cities 
on its tour. It previously had been exhibited in Paris at the request of General 
Charles de Gaulle. War Office Technical Staff, who had actually worked on
^  Campbell, Dieppe revisited, pp.209-210.
^  Notes of an interview of Lt-Gen. McNaughton by press correspondents at HQ First 
Canadian Army on 27 August 1942', p.6. NAC, MG 30 E l33/248/1-31 August 1942, fol.F. 
That information and lessons learned were exchanged between the US and British authorities 
concerned is reflected in the following intercepted Japanese communication (known as 
Magic' as opposed to Ultra) from its Spanish Ambassador to Tokyo, originating from a 
Washington intelligence agent:
Aocordng to ft*  itatomantt ol •  oatiton ofllcar ol to* Air D*t*n** Convnarxl. to* Untt*d Slat** I* **taM*hlng 
parachuMli' ichool*. Th* High Command hat raachad to* oorKkialon that to* ua* of parachul* troop* In 
attaching th* anamy from to* raar. couplad with landing oparatloni It axtramaly affactiv*
Th* High Commarvl to dlttaHtflad with to* actM«** of th* RAF. n advocatat txildiy ttrangtoanlng to* 
air attack* on Oarmany on a much largar teal* Spacial training In landing oparatlont muat b* maintalnad for tola 
purpota Th* cauaat of to* Plappa taioo ta t In to* fact that to* CorrvnarKlo* war* too faw and to* Canadton* 
who landad tiacama axdtad I tolt to Roma arto Bartin
Madrid (Suma) to Tokyo, No. 10859, *TO* Intelligence (From Washington October 7), October 
1942', Magic intercept 10 October 1942, translated by the Army 11 October 1942, 
declassified by the Deputy Director, NSA[National Security AgerKyl/Chief, CSS, December 
1978, USNA, received by this author January 1995 from Chris Hemandez-Roy who was 
researching there.
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the design and construction of the original, accompanied the exhibition to tell 
its story and answer questions. In Montréal the Canadian Minister of 
Defence, Ralston, was invited to speak, and emphatically declared that, 
‘Mulberry had its origins in Dieppe -  without Dieppe Mulberry might never 
have been thought of... Mulberry Xo Canada is a symbol of Canadian 
sacrifice at Dieppe, and a pathway to Canada's telling participation in the 
battles through to victory!'. Crerar gave the opening speech at the Toronto 
opening the following month, stating that the development of Mulberry, was 
'just one of the essential war inventions and developments which the Allies 
owe to the Canadians at Dieppe. The price paid was not in vain'. The 
accompanying information pack, 'News from the Mulberry Exhibition' that 
could be picked up at the exhibitions, contained a history of the origin, 
design, development, construction, and operational capacity, including 
statistics. In this, constant references were made to the significance of 
Mulberry and the fact that 'without Dieppe the harbour of peace might never 
have been bom'.^^
Hughes-Hallett, usually one to support the lessons learned theme, 
disagreed, writing to Mountbatten in 1962, that he did 'not think it could be 
sustained that the artificial harbours used for the invasion stemmed from the 
landings of Dieppe'. Close analysis of the records reveal Hughes-Hallett's 
suspicions were correct. Its roots can be traced back to long before Dieppe.^
Col. J.L. Ralston, 'Mulberry, Montréal address, 2 October 1945, pp.3-4, NAC, MQ 27 III 
B1 VX7SfMulberry, 2 October 1945; Lt-Qen. H. Crerar, 'Address -  Opening of the "Mulberry 
Exhibition, Toronto, 6 November 1945, MG 30 E158/27/985C.009 (0410); 'The Story of 
Mulberry, p.1 ['harbour of peace'], and Col. V.C. Steer-Webster, War Office. 'A technical 
note', pp.1-4. In 'News from Mu/berry Exhibition', NAC, MQ 30 E158/27/985C.009 (0410).
«  Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 27 June 1962, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/10
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On 16 October 1944, Mr G.A. Maunsell, a civil engineer, reacted to 
press reports that named Hughes-Hallett as the originator of Mulberry. 
Maunsell explains that he had sent a prefabricated port proposal, 'complete 
with plans and the whole idea of the Phoenix Scheme as eventually carried 
out', to his friend, Lt-Col. Wilson, Assistant director of Fortifications and 
Works, War Office, who forwarded it to the Director General of 
Transportation, War Office, in December 1940. Hughes-Hallett replied 
acknowledging Maunsell's full responsibility for the concept. Three years 
later Maunsell informed Hughes-Hallett of a Claim he was making to the 
Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors concerning the Mulberry harbour. 
In this he went into great detail, describing many of his previous inventions 
which had already been adopted by the Admiralty, some of which were 
being used operationally, these included Naval Forts, Anti-Aircraft Forts and 
Bombardment Towers. Further correspondence shows that Hughes-Hallett 
completely supported his case, even volunteering to give evidence to the 
Claim’s Commission on his behalf. In preparing to do this he examined the 
relevant sections of the July 1943 Rattle Conference, and Admiral Bertram 
Ramsay's covering memorandum in despatches for Operation Neptune 
(assault phase of Overlord). Both of these gave no indication of the origin of 
the master concept, although the latter confirmed that the 'original design for 
such harbours... were prepared, for some extraordinary reason, by the War 
Office'. In one of Hughes-Hallett's last letters to Maunsell, he explained that 
he had decided to adopt the concept on 13 June 1943, 'oddly enough during 
the singing of the Anthem at the Abbey'. At the end of June Hughes-Hallett 
explained it to a large meeting of British and American C-in-Cs and their 
staffs in London. Trials had been successful and it was agreed for it to be put
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in the Outline Plan for Neptune, which was later authorized by the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, in August 1943, at the Quebec Conference. Maunsell's 
origination of this concept has been ignored in all accounts of Jubilee and 
the lessons learned up to present.^
What was considered the most important naval lesson, was the need 
to form a permanent naval assault force that would train in close conjunction 
with specially selected Army units. This brigade group assault force was 
named Force J (Jubilee), put under command of Hughes-Hallett by 
Mountbatten, despite the opposition from Admiral Baillie-Grohman, who 
considered that it should not be separated from his sphere of command, as it 
would tend to become a 'Navy within a Navy within a Navy', beside being a 
waste of resources. Hughes-Hallett pushed for the assignment of a 
battleship to it, but this was repeatedly refused by the Admiralty. Due to the 
shortage of landing craft and trained crews, the majority of which were 
gradually siphoned off to participate in the Mediterranean operations. Force 
J undertook no operations and very few training exercises. Therefore, by the 
end of April 1943, Hughes-Hallett, bored with his assignment, recommended 
the disbandment of Force J, and requested transfer. However, it was 
maintained and ended up training and landing 3 CID on D-Day.^
Many of the so-called lessons learned were known before, and it was 
not necessary to attack a heavily defended port to re-leam them. One which
G.A. Maunsell to Hughes-Hallett, 16 October 1944 and reply, 19 October 1944, IWM, 
JHHP, JHH 7/1; Maunsell to Hughes-Hallett, 28 October 1947, enclosure, 'Prefabricated 
Harbour Claim', pp.1-14, Hughes-Hallett to Maunsell, 9 November 1947, ('Anthem'], plus 
other correspondence, and 'Extract from Record of Operation Rattle/, Minutes of 4 Meeting, 
Largs Conference, July 1943, and 'Extract from Admiral Ramsay's covering memo In 
despatches for Operation Neptune -  MULBERRY Pro\act.', nd., IWM, JHHP, JHH 7/2.
Rear-Admiral H.T. Baillle-Qrohman to Mountbatten, 14 September 1942 ['Navy within a 
Navy'], and reply, 17 September 1942, NMM, BQP, QRO/29; discussion of Force J In 
Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p 224; Stacey, Six years of war, pp.401, 404
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was considered one of the most important was the need for overwhelming 
fire support in the preliminary and close support stages. This supposedly 
new lesson implies that the necessary fire support doctrine for an 
amphibious operation such as Jubilee did not exist before it. This was clearly 
not the case. Historically the British army had always been interested in 
amphibious strategy and applied it when deemed in her national interest. 
After France's defeat in 1940, Britain found itself in a position of having 'no 
secure bases in Europe where its army could land and organize for 
operations; no prearranged supply system; no friendly army to fight 
alongside. Intervention on the continent now meant landing across open 
beaches in country occupied by the enemy. Thus, at this time, the British 
army was reduced to amphibious warfare'. Yet this was not an unfamiliar 
strategic situation that Britain found herself in 1942. Even though the 
previous quotation refers to Britain's strategic situation at the time of 
Napoleon Bonaparte, 1793 to 1815, the two periods were very similar.si 
Britain, historically a naval power, could only project its influence on the 
European and other continents by the integrated use of naval and military 
forces. Therefore the basis for British amphibious doctrine can be traced 
back to the 16th Century, and Sir Francis Drake's raiding of Spanish 
possessions in Panama and on the Florida coast. Thereafter, the British 
carried out various forms of combined arms landings, with varying degrees 
of success, up until the time of Dieppe. The development of this doctrine, 
especially during the 20th Century, would have been studied by anyone 
concerned with combined operations, and this perspective is important to 
remember in attempting to gain an understanding of the planners' and
S' Merrill L. Bartlett, Assault from the sea, essays on the history of amphibious warfare 
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1985), p.61.
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senior commanders' mindset during the planning and authorizing of 
Rutterf Jubilee.
The 1915 Allied campaign against the Turkish held Dardenelles, 
included the amphibious landings at Gallipoli, which was the only significant 
combined operation of the Great War, and as such, was studied at great 
lengths in the inter-war period. Bad planning and leadership led to poor 
coordination of naval fire support and the landing of the assault troops which 
resulted in ultimate disaster. Critics claimed that combined operations 
and its naval fire support component were incompatible with the new 
advances in technology and present and future warfare. This was view was 
supported by some historians and veterans, such as Bernard Fergusson, 
who believed that after this no significant amphibious doctrine development 
took place. He states that 'In the twenty years between the wars. Combined 
Ops [operations] took a back seat', and most informed people 'reckoned that 
daylight assaults against a defended shore were suicide and folly'.^
It is true that a lack of financing and lack of public and establishment 
support inhibited the development of amphibious doctrine and technique but 
this is not to say that it did not develop at all. Quite the contrary. Gallipoli 
yielded many lessons concerning indirect naval fire support, and the use of 
Forward Observation Officers and air observers, which were not ignored by 
the Staff Colleges, and various other military training and academic 
organizations and committees, concerned with the development of 
combined operations. From 1919-1939 these institutions produced and 
revised the Field Service Regulations and training manuals about combined
^  Bernard Fargusaon, The watery maze: the story ot Combined Operations (London; Collins, 
1961), p.35.
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operations. In 1921 a joint services, combined operations training manual 
was produced, and was revised in 1925, 1931 and 1938. The last version 
being the basis for staff courses up until Dieppe. During 1938 the Admiralty 
Also authorized the establishment of the Inter Service Training and 
Development Centre (ISTDC) which was an active amphibious operations 
training base. During the 1920s and 1930s, despite financial constraints, the 
Army and Navy were able to carry out sporadic combined operations training 
exercises, which although invariably of short duration and not very 
successful, were essential practical contributions to the development of the 
doctrine.53
The combined operations manuals contain specific references to 
amphibious doctrine and fire support which contradict the claimed new 
lessons learned at Dieppe. The 1921/25 Manual of Combined Operations 
states that close fire support was to be augmented by the army's use of their 
'land service guns', that is, howitzers and field guns, from the decks of ships 
during the assault landing phase. The 1931 Manual gives a detailed 
breakdown of the fire support capabilities at this time and suggested the 
maximization of this type of fire, particularly in unknown circumstances. It 
also indicates that destroyers could be employed close to shore for close fire 
support. The 1938 revised version uses similar language to explain the 
different types of ships and their capabilities and potential fire support 
situations that each ship could be used in. Relevant to Jubilee, is its point 
that in a dawn landing, if the defenders are expected to be alert, as they 
were at Dieppe's centre beaches, 'the value of covering fire will usually
*3 Kenneth J. Clifford, Amphibious warfare development in Britain and America from 1920- 
1940 (Laurens, N.Y,; Edgewood, 1983), pp.vli, lx, 30-65.
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outweigh the loss of surprise'. The characteristics of this covering fire -  
duration, intensity, and volume -  is dependent usually on inexact information 
on the enemy defences, which also could be sited in a way that would be 
difficult to neutralize by naval bombardment. Therefore, the Manual 
continues, 'it is important to employ the greatest volume of fire available'. In 
the absence of precise intelligence on the defender's dispositions, 'this fire 
should be directed on the beaches and sea-front wherever an enemy might 
find cover'. Concerning close support, it states that 'If ships are able to stand 
close in', they will be able to maintain effective cover fire while the landing 
craft reach the shore, and 'perhaps even while the troops are capturing the 
beaches'. It concludes that howitzers and mortars, specially mounted in 
small craft, landing craft or motor lighters, 'may be of great value in adding to 
the volume of high trajectory covering fire, and may also enable such fire to 
be provided closer inshore than would otherwise be possible'.^
The preceding analysis proves that, contrary to popular belief, Britain 
had a substantial modern amphibious doctrine, with a naval fire support 
component, based on eighteen years experience. By 1941 the British were 
also aware of the extensive American experience carried out in the 1930's of 
experimentation with fire support in amphibious assaults. Evidence for this is 
in correspondence indicating that they had copies of the current 1938 
American combined operations manual, 'Landing Operations Doctrine US 
Navy, FTP 167'. Concerning fire support, it states:
^  The 1921 Manual also suggested the need for special landing craft with ramps capable of 
landing transporting and landing tanks on beaches, Clifford, Amphibious warfare, p.40; 
Admiralty, 'Manual of Combined Operations, 1931', London: Naval Staff, Training and Staff 
Duties Division, 1931, pp.93-4, PRO, DEFE 2/708, pp.98-9. Chapter 7 (destroyers); 
Admiralty, 'Manual of Combined Operations, 1938', CB 3042, London: Naval Staff, Training 
and Staff Duties Division, 1938, pp.93-4, 144-5 (quotes), PRO, DEFE 2/709.
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The light cruiser is the ideal component of the close fire support group. The 6 inch 
light cruiser and the heavy cruiser are preferable as components of deep fire support 
groups of the regiment. The battleship is best reserved for deep support of the 
division and for use as a special fire support group. The use of destroyers as special 
fire support groups for participation in the preparation and for the purpose of firing on 
targets of opportunity on the flanks of the area to be attacked using ship spot is highly 
desirable. It may be desirable at times to use several destroyers instead of one cruiser 
as a close support fire group.^
The British clearly agreed with this employment of destroyers, however, they 
also assigned them the task of preliminary bombardment as well, which they 
were ill-suited for. This is evidenced at Dieppe where the large use of smoke 
contributed to the fog of war', clearly revealing the destroyers lack of certain 
technologies which was necessary for accurate indirect fire.
Several raids took place prior to Jubilee under the auspices of COHO. 
The success of these small scale operations led to COHQ to apply the same 
methods and conditions to the first large scale raid of the war. Unfortunately, 
the circumstances surrounding Jubilee were much different than the 
previous operations. For example, the raid against St Nazaire, 28 March 
1942, proved that it was possible for a small force of about six hundred men 
to frontally attack strongly defended port, under cover of darkness and 
dependent on the element of surprise. As the casualties were high -  sixty- 
three per cent -  the objective must be shown to be worth the sacrifice. 
However, this operation is very different from Jubilee since the attacking 
force was transported over the water, through the outer German defensive 
ring and deposited within, whereas for Jubilee the attackers had to 
overcome outer defences first before entering. Other operations were carried 
out against the Norwegian coast, however, these were supported by cruisers 
and destroyers but they did not meet any serious German opposition form
613-013 OPS Landing US Navy. Landing Operations doctrine USN 1938 (FTP 167), 
p.122. information from Brian Begbie.
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shore batteries, air attack or have to overcome formidable defensive 
positions. One worth examining was the raid on the island of Vaagsd, which 
was supported by one cruiser and four destroyers. The approximately six 
hundred commandos were put on shore, again maintaining the element of 
surprise. The two defending batteries were suppressed or knocked out and 
the troops accomplished their objectives, meeting no major opposition. The 
significance of the operation is that the initial, short, neutralizing 
bombardment was effective in allowing the assaulting commandos to gain 
the shore and move inland, while later cover fire with smoke and 
suppressing fire permitted the troops to carry out their mission with limited 
interference.®®
This and other successful raids, based on the elements of surprise, 
rapidity, preliminary and close support bombardment by air and naval forces, 
probably influenced the Dieppe planners into believing that these same 
factors could be applied to a raid on a larger scale. Dieppe was a more 
heavily fortified port, with a three tier defensive system, comprising coastal 
batteries, divisional artillery and fortifications. Correspondingly, the planners 
increased the number of assault troops ten times but did not do likewise for 
the naval fire support. Thus Jubilee was supplied with less naval support 
than was available for the unopposed raid on Spitsbergen.®^
®® Hilary A. St. George Saunders, 'Loften to Vaagsô', in The green beret: the story of the 
commandos 1940-1945 (London: Michael Joseph, 1949), pp.56 (six hundred], 57-63, 98 
[sixty-three percent). Part of the fire support at Vaagsd consisted the cruiser HMS Kenya's 
twelve guns firing on one of the batteries; in ten minutes, between four and five hundred six- 
inch shells fell upon a space not more than 250 yards square', Brereton Greenhous, Dieppe, 
Dieppe (Montréal: Éditions Art Global Inc. in cooperation with the Department of National 
Defence, 1993), p.20.
®^  The Spitsbergen raid of 19 August 1941 was supported by two cruisers and three 
destroyers, Stacey, Six years of war, p.304.
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The specific reasons why the heavy air and naval fire support was 
taken out of the earlier Rutter, and not included in the Jubilee plans, was 
discussed previously. The main reason being the prerequisite of assuring 
the tanks were able penetrate through the town and the fact that bombers 
could not accurately hit the town anyway. In hindsight it is hard to believe 
that the senior commanders authorized such an ill-conceived plan. Besides 
many of the British commanders involved in the planning of RutteriJubilee, 
including Mountbatten and Montgomery, all three senior Canadian 
commanders, McNaughton, Crerar, and Roberts, were trained gunners and 
had been through the Great War. Here they had experienced the need for 
overwhelming bombardment and rolling barrages to neutralize and 
suppress enemy batteries and to crush the enemy defensive belts, to clear a 
path for the infantry through no-mans land and the enemy positions. They 
were also aware of the lessons of the disastrous, amphibious Gallipoli 
landings. During the Second World War an amphibious operation over the 
Channel to take a defended port could be compared to a classic frontal 
attack on prepared positions of the previous war -  the Channel being 
substituted for no-mans land. Thus to have planned, mounted and launched 
a frontal attack on a heavily defended port, without the required, suppressing 
fire of the German batteries or preliminary bombardment of the beach, town 
and headland defences, is inconceivable. After Dieppe Head noted that 
COHO planners generally felt that 'although fixed coast defences were very 
troublesome, they were not as bad as had been expected'. The main 
difficulty, he explained, were the regular German artillery batteries.
i
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especially mobile ones, which had been well camouflaged in good positions 
and continued firing on the beaches and ships during the whole operation.^
Baillie-Grohman wrote to Mountbatten less then a month after the 
operation, commenting on the draft of 'Lessons learned from Dieppe' he had 
been sent to vet. Noting that the first ten paragraphs had been prepared by 
Hughes-Hallett, he stated that they only contained 'one really useful new 
lesson' -  the need for better aircraft recognition. 'Practically all the others', 
he continued, 'should have been known to Hughes-Hallett before he started, 
especially if he had ever read the CO [Combined Operations] Pamphlets.' 
Baillie-Grohman concluded that the paper would have been more accurate if 
it had been headed 'Lessons learned by Hughes-Hallett from Dieppe'. 
Wallace Reybum, who wrote the best-seller. Rehearsal for invasion: an 
eyewitness story of the Dieppe raid (1943), initially supported the lessons 
learned theme, but with more information, later changed his tune. On the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of Jubilee, he became involved in an acrimonious 
debate with Hughes-Hallett, acting as proxy for Mountbatten, which was 
reported on in the Sunday Telegraph, and reprinted in seventy Canadian 
newspapers.“
Concerning lessons learned at the sharp end and the use of tanks in 
the assault, Baillie-Grohman wrote to Roberts on 25 September 1942, 
wondering what his views were on this aspect. Baillie-Grohman noted that 
tanks could be useful in neutralizing MG positions on the beaches and that
Antony H. Head, 'Amphibious operations' (Digest from a lecture 13 March 1946, RUSI 
Journal, November 1946), Military Review 27/8 (November 1947), 107.
“  Baillie-Grohman to Mountbatten, 14 September 1942, NMM, BQP, QRO/29; Wallace 
Reybum, Rehearsal for invasion: an eyewitness story of the Dieppe raid (London: George G. 
Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1943), pp.12-13; Reybum/Hughes-Hallett Dieppe controversy In Sunday 
Telegraph from 27 August 1967, NAC, MG 30 E463/6; Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.197 
[proxy, seventy newspapers).
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possibly a 'special design of tank for landing in these assault [s/c.] and taking 
the bridge-head' was necessary. Roberts did not comment on this, only 
replying that he felt 'tanks should not be landed in the face of strong 
opposition'. He noted that the important aspect of their employment was their 
need to have a 'clear run and room to manoeuvre'. He explained that this did 
not happen at Dieppe due to the heavy fire on the beaches, which hampered 
the engineers' mission of building ramps for the tanks to cross the sea-wall 
and blowing the anti-tank road blocks into the town.“
Another lesson commonly thought to be a direct result of the tank 
experiences at Dieppe was the need for an armoured vehicle that could 
perform engineering tasks. Lt-Col. G.C. Reeves, Assistant Director of the 
Special Devices Branch of the Tank Department of the British Ministry of 
Supply, was on Jubilee. Back in London, he gave his staff the problem of 
'developing devices to enable obstacles to be surmounted by a tank or 
destroyed by a tank crew without them being exposed to enemy fire'. This 
view was endorsed by the senior Royal Canadian Engineer (RCE) officer, 
attached to 2 CID, Lt-Col L.F. Barnes, and by a Home Forces report on the 
principal lessons submitted to the DCIGS, Lt-Gen. Nye, in late October 1942. 
Only eight days after the raid, on 27 August 1942, a Canadian officer 
attached to the Department of Tank Design (DTD), Lt. J.J. Denovan, RCE, 
produced drawings of an engineer tank that was a significant contribution to 
the development of the AVRE, Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers.®’
®o Rear-Admiral H.T. Balllle-Grohman to Roberta. 25 September 1942, and reply, 1 October 
1942. NMM. BOP, QRO/29.
®’ Stacey, Six years ol war, p.404 [Reeves quote, tank drawing]; Lt-Col. L.F. Barnes, 'Report 
on Combined Operations', 5 September 1942, p.5, this author's Dieppe Collection; J.A. 
Sinclair, BOS (Plans), Home Forces, to DCQS, 'Operation Jubilee -  Principal Lessons', 
HF/00/934/G(Plans), 26 October 1942, p.4, PRO, WO 106/4195A.
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It is doubtful that Denovan based his drawing solely on the 
experience of Dieppe. Reeve's own after-action report, completed the day 
after, although concluding that it was 'essential that a method be devised of 
placing demolition charges by personnel protected by armour*, earlier states, 
that 'On conclusion of the exercise held on 2 to 8 July [1942] this 
development was put in hand by DTD'. Also significant were the many inter­
war and pre-Dieppe trials on various types of task-performing tanks, such as 
mine-rollers and tanks with floatation gear, or DD (Duplex-Drive) swimming 
tanks. Thus it can not be said that this was a new lesson but one that spurred 
on the development of the AVRE.®^
GERMAN LESSONS
AND INFLUENCE ON STRATEGIC THINKING
An advantageous result of Jubilee, constantly noted in the post-war 
period by Mountbatten and historians, including Stacey, was that Dieppe 
'unexpectedly, but most fortunately, became one of the great deception 
operations of the war*. What he meant here was that because of Dieppe the 
Germans learned the wrong lessons and based their whole anti-invasion 
defensive system on denying the Allies the use of ports. By concentrating 
their efforts in strengthening port defences, the argument goes, they 
remained vulnerable in other areas. What Mountbatten, Stacey and these 
proponents of this view fail to realize that the Germans would have done this 
anyway, even if Jubilee had not occurred. Hitler had ordered the 
construction of the Atlantic Wall, a defensive belt along the whole threatened
Lt-Col. Q.C. Reeves, 'Report by Lt-Col Q.C. Reeves on the raid carried out on Dieppe on 19 
August 1942', 28 August 1942, pp.6,7, NAC, RQ 24/10740/212C1.3009 (D18).
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coasts, based on turning ports into impregnable fortresses. Thus, although it
was possible to envisage capturing a port in 1942, this would not have been
possible after 1943, but this was not due to Dieppe. As Campbell, clearly
explains, it was a matter of strategic first principles. Any invasion would need
a deep water port to ensure supplies for any attempted invasion. As early as
25 April 1941, a German report noted that the ports of Dieppe and Le Tröport
will not be attacked directly by the enemy' but would be assaulted by means
of landing attempts at nearby points'.®3 A German post-raid report noted that:
whereas until now it was thought that the capture of a port was necessary to land such 
material [tanks]. It follows that an attacker can easily, in certain cases undertake an 
action on large scale without having captured an organized port, though the capture 
of such a port of course is necessary to carry out the operation.
Another German report deduced exactly what the COHQ planners had
decided, that any future operation would attempt to penetrate weak spots
between defended zones and 'try to take the harbours by an encircling
movement. They are not likely to repeat a massed frontal assault against a
strongly fortified area', as at Dieppe. For this reason, the report continued,
that mobile reserves, including a large component of armour and motorized
anti-tank weapons, be prepared for a counter-attack role, were considered
essential.®*
Examination of Cabinet Office Historical records closed until 1998, 
show a report of 1955 analysing the above problem, using all available 
primary and secondary Allied and German documents, especially the Führer 
Conferences of 2 and 13 August and 29 September 1942. The report
Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.199; Stacey, Six years of war, p.352 [Qerman report).
®* 'Note on the attempted British landing at Dieppe 19 August 1942 and Its lessons from the 
German point of view', circa August 1942, p.3, DHist 594.003 (D t) ['whereas until']; Theatre 
Intelligence Section Martian Report No.86, 'German Lessons from the Dieppe raid', 8 March 
1944, p.6, NAC, RG 24/10702/2125C1.981 (D298) (’try to take harbours'].
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concludes that Hitler was concerned at this time with strengthening the 
coastal fortifications in the West, 'inter alia round ports', which were known to 
be required in any major landing. The report also noted that he had 
'perceived the need to deny ports to the enemy' in fact before Jubilee, and 
'the raid seems merely to have confirmed him in this intention'.“
Although in 1944 a reversal of German strategy occurred, with the 
intention to defeat any invasion on the beaches instead of using armoured 
counter-attacks, this was not due to the German experience of Dieppe. 
Instead, it was because of their experiences of the Allied landings in the 
Mediterranean theatre.“
Contrary to some secondary accounts, it was widely believed at the 
time and into the post-war period, that the raid had also resulted in a 
significant transfer of German forces from the eastern to western fronts. In 
actual fact only one SS motorized division, Das Reich, and one SS 
motorized brigade, Adolf Hitler, were actually transferred.®^
In conclusion it is obvious that only lessons learned at the sharp end 
were of any real significance, although even the most obvious, such as the 
precursors of the AVRE, were already being developed and tested prior to 
the raid. The Mulberry has been shown also to have originated long before. 
Planners did not immediately change to thinking of open beach
®® R. Wheatley, Cabinet Office, to Dr. G.W.S. Friedrichsen, British Joint Services Mission, 
Washington, 'Dieppe raid and Aiiies' need for invasion ports', 21 December 1955; and 'Notes 
by R. Wheatiey on Dieppe raid in file ll/4/ili', 13 November 1963, Cabinet Office, Historical and 
Records Section (COHRS), CAB 146/349 [closed until 1998].
®® Campbell, Dieppe revisited, p.221.
®^  Basil H. Liddell Hart states Dieppe led Hitler to order the despatch of two of the best Panzer 
divisions -  at a crucial moment of his drive for Stalingrad. So even In failure, the Dieppe raid 
created a valuable distraction in aid of the Russians', The tanka, 2 (London; Cassell, 1959), 
p.320; J.R.M. Butler and J.M.A. Gwyer, 'Anglo-American strategy reconsidered: the decision 
for Torch', In Grand strategy, June 1941-Auguat 1942, 3(11) (London: HMSO, 1964), p.646.
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maintenance but instead continued thinking of other ways of capturing a port 
as a predeterminant to invasion. The idea only developed after the 
experience of the Mediterranean operations. The Germans initially drew the 
same conclusions concerning an Allied cross-Channel invasion and 
continued strengthening their defensive system based on tortified ports, but 
this was decided on before Jubilee. Their reversal of strategy was also 
based on their Mediterranean experiences.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this dissertation has been to reinterpret and resolve certain 
myths and misconceptions about the Dieppe raid. The sources examined, 
some not previously within the context of this operation, were instrumental in 
this accomplishment. These myths and misconceptions resulted in a 
confused historiography begun by official organizations and their 
representatives, mainly COHQ and Mountbatten. Although they were not 
entirely responsible for all of these misconceptions, Mountbatten's later 
repetition of them and his attempts at controlling the recording of the 
operation's history cannot be glossed over. One such myth, that the lessons 
of Dieppe were vital to the success of the Normandy invasion two years later, 
was the result of domestic propaganda, normal during wartime. The senior 
commanders of the Canadian Army Overseas, Generals McNaughton and 
Crerar, also advocated this and perpetuated it in the post-war period. Until 
recently their responsibility in this regard and other aspects of the operation 
has been ignored in past accounts.
This is clearly demonstrated in the controversial debate over the 
responsibility for and authorization of Jubilee. Analysis of the three extreme 
schools of thought has resulted in a consensus drawn from all three. 
Alterations in raiding procedure that resulted in the change in chain of 
command for Jubilee made the Canadian generals and C-in-C Portsmouth 
directly responsible for authorization. This conclusion invalidates Villa's 
circumstantial contention that Mountbatten pushed Jubilee through without 
formal COS approval. Mountbatten followed what he believed to be the
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guidelines set down for him by the COS concerning the procedure for 
planning, mounting and launching raiding operations, including Jubilee. 
Henshaw's extreme claim that Jubilee would have not occurred at all if it had 
not been for the Canadian pressure, underrates that from COHQ and the 
RAF, and does not property account for the background influence of 
Churchill and the COS. Only Mountbatten, the existence of COHQ, the 
momentum it developed for raiding, the support of RAF Fighter Command, 
and pressure from McNaughton and Crerar, revived the operation and saw it 
through.
The Whitakers' extreme criticisms of Churchill's, Montgomery's, and 
other senior commanders' responsibility for the operation, were shown to be 
incorrect. On the strategic level, the Whitakers hold Churchill and the COS 
responsible for pushing the operation forward to mollify the American, 
Russian and domestic demands for action. Yet in 1942 the Americans and 
Russians wanted not raids but a cross-Channel invasion of the Continent. 
The Russians correctly considered that raids such as Jubilee, had no 
influence on the movement of German strategic reserves from the eastern to 
western front. Also, the decision by Churchill and the COS, three weeks 
before Jubilee, to cancel any return to the continent in 1942 
{Sledgehammer), and proceed with the invasion of North Africa {Torch), 
defused American pressure and invalidated any remaining political-strategic 
justification for Jubilee. Montgomery recommended to Paget, C-in-C Home 
Forces, that the operation be cancelled forever for security reasons.
On the tactical level, the Whitakers blame Montgomery for the lack of 
heavy preliminary bombing on the raid. As Montgomery was delegated by 
Paget as the responsible military officer for Rutter, and chaired the Force
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Commanders meeting in which preliminary bomber support was decided 
against, he bears some responsibility for its deletion from that plan. Yet, after 
Rutter's cancellation, the operation was revived as Jubilee, with Montgomery 
excluded from the new chain of command and the subsequent planning 
process. During this planning the bombing issue was again discussed and 
opted against. Therefore, Montgomery cannot be held responsible for the 
lack of bomber support or any other part of the Jubilee plan.
Mountbatten's and Hughes-Hallett's post-raid claim that the 
Canadians, in agreement with GHQ Home Force's 'Army' planners, 
including Montgomery, were responsible for the implementation of the frontal 
assault in the outline and operational Rutter!Jubilee plans, was proven to be 
groundless. New evidence from the Major Henriques Papers supports the 
fact that COHQ planners, in conjunction with Home Force's planners, 
excluding Montgomery, made the decision during the Outline planning 
stage, before any Canadians came into the process. That a flawed final plan 
based on surprise, including a frontal assault, and lacking the necessary 
preliminary air and naval bombardment and close fire support, was 
subsequently confirmed by all Canadian commanders concerned, cannot be 
ignored.
Analysis of the operational intelligence available before Jubilee, 
although very comprehensive in most respects, was lacking in others, 
especially concerning German unit dispositions, defences and weapons. 
Jubilee battle maps indicate that HQs, from divisional level down, were 
wrongly identified or not indicated at all. The number, calibre and location of 
many of the beach defence guns were underestimated. The existence of two
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of the German divisional batteries was not established and the disposition of 
the strategic armoured reserves was incorrectly identified.
Ironically, both the Germans and British had timely and valuable 
intelligence available which they ignored or misinterpreted. Operational 
signals intelligence (Ultra) and RDF (radio direction finding) played a part in 
detecting German coastal convoys. German RDF actually did detect Jubilee, 
but ignored the plots, while the British also plotted the German coastal 
convoy on intercept course for Jubilee, but discounted it as a threat. Recent 
claims that Jubilee was primarily an electronic intelligence gathering mission 
were examined and discounted.
The long-standing myth that German foreknowledge of Jubilee 
resulted in the subsequent massacre on the beaches was analysed and 
rejected. Villa's recent claim that the way that Jubilee was remounted is 
explained by an internal deception plan to shield the operation from possible 
obstruction, is similarly rebutted.
The battle chapters examined the special operational units, such as 
the British and French Commandos, American Rangers, Special Operations 
Executive (SOE) and others, and shed new light on their role in training and 
in the operation. This is highlighted by the use of new evidence from 
Brigadier Peter Young's Papers, supported by previously unused 
correspondence and oral interviews with former British and French 
Commandos and Rangers who participated. The SOE Archivist also 
supplied information from closed SOE personnel files of Dieppe participants.
Analysis of the supposed lessons learned, and their relation to the 
1944 Normandy invasion, reveals that on the tactical level, these were well 
known before, especially concerning naval bombardment and fire support.
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Subsequent applications and ideas from these lessons were shown to be 
not new but old. An obvious example was the AVRE (Armoured Vehicle 
Royal Engineers), the development of which predated Jubilee. The 
Mountbatten claim that after Dieppe invasion planning centred not on taking 
a port for logistical support but on beach maintenance and the use of 
artificial harbours, known as Mulberrys, likewise was disproved. After 
Jubilee, planners still remained 'port conscious', and this is reflected in 
operation orders for future raids. The claim that the Mulberry was a direct 
development from the lessons of Dieppe was proven false, as new evidence 
showed that it was conceived two years prior to Dieppe.
Finally, examination of the influence of Jubilee on German strategic 
thinking shows that it did not have the impact claimed by Mountbatten 
and other senior leaders, and repeated by various authors, including Stacey. 
The claim was that because of Dieppe the Germans based their defensive 
system against invasion on denying the Allies the use of a deep water port. 
Actually the Germans perceived before Dieppe that a prerequisite for any 
invasion was the early capture of a port and this is revealed in German 
documents dated prior to Jubilee. That the Germans based their defensive 
system on this concept had nothing to do with Jubilee, except to reinforce 
this belief. The later decision to change from a defence in depth, to defeating 
the invasion on the beaches, was based on their experiences of Allied 
amphibious operations the Mediterranean.
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